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Foreword
I
HOSE who prior to World War II knew the chief
legal personalities of Europe recognized the outstanding position held by Ernst Rabel, the author of
the present treatise.
Born in 1874 in Austria, as a young man he studied law
in his own country, in Germany, and in France. His university career has been most distinguished; he taught Roman
and modern civil law in Switzerland and Germany, the many
invitations he received leading to celebrated professorates,
notably at Munich and ultimately at Berlin, where he occupied an influential position. His contributions to comparative legal history have been noteworthy; he first introduced
the comparative study of Egyptian papyri with the medieval
documents; he is a leader in the efforts, through the modern
search for interpolations, to reconstruct the original Roman
private law; his services as editor of various research publications in the field of legal history are well known. These
broad interests were complemented by extensive comparative
work on the modern Swiss, French, and German laws, later
including the Common Law as well; his contributions in the
preparation of international drafts of unified law, especially
that on sales of goods, are widely recognized.
In Rabel, outstanding legal scholarship has been enriched
by wide and unusual practical experience. He practiced law
in Vienna and served as judge in the appellate courts of
Basle and Munich. Shortly after the First World War, he
became a member of the German-Italian arbitral tribunal.
As a judge of the Court of International Justice (World
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Court) at the Hague, between I925 and I928, he took part
in German and Polish suits. He was president of the International Association of Comparative Law and a member of
the Council and Executive Committee of the Institute for
Unification of private Law in Rome. He received diverse
honors in Italy, Greece, Poland, Spain, and Norway.
The central interests and achievements of the author
have been in the development of comparative legal research.
In the course of the First World War, he recognized the
danger of a narrow legal nationalism and in I 9 I 6 founded
and became Director of the Institute of Comparative Law
in Munich, the world's first research institute for comparative law. In I926, being appointed Director of the Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute of Foreign and International Private
Law in Berlin, he was entrusted with the task of organizing
and conducting a much larger enterprise. This Institute,
parallel to the Institute of Foreign Public Law and the Law
of Nations, directed by the late Viktor Bruns, was devoted
to research as well as to the giving of practical information
and advice to the Foreign Office in Germany, legislative authorities, courts, lawyers, and business firms. Under Rabel's
guidance, the Institute trained a staff of experts in the various legal systems of the world, some of whom are now in
this country as law teachers, or members of the legal profession, and, in conjunction with the sister organization,
established the most comprehensive law library in Europe.
The opinions delivered by the Institute under Professor
Rabel's responsibility in matters of legislation, conflict of
laws, international trade and international law, numbered
about a thousand. The Institute exercised a profound influence in the legal thought and methods not only of Germany but also of those numerous other countries whose
scholars availed themselves of its facilities.
After the completion of the Restatement of the Law of
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Conflict of Laws in 1934, the American Law Institute had
under consideration a plan to supplement the Restatement
by a parallel work presenting to the American public the
rules, principles, and doctrines of the leading foreign countries. But, until in 1937 the Nazi insanity removed from the
directorship of the world's then principal organization devoted to the study of comparative law the director whose
foresight and leadership conceived and conducted it, it had
seemed all but impossible to find the right man for a task
requiring so wide and mature a background of learning and
experience. The opportunity thus offered to bring Doctor
Rabel to this country to do much to break down our isolationist legal attitudes was unique. Doctor Rabel knows the
private law system of German and Latin-American countries.
He knows much of the common law of the English-speaking
peoples. Furthermore, he has not only the law professor's
knowledge of legal theory, but the practical knowledge of the
similarities and differences in the application of the legal
principles of different systems to the solution of concrete
legal problems.
Accordingly, in the spring of 1939, the American Law
Institute took steps to bring Dr. Rabel to the United States
with the guarantee of two years' employment. He arrived in
this country in September, 1939, and at once began work
preparatory to the preparation of this treatise, of which the
first volume is now published. In the spring of 1942, his arrangement with the Institute having been fulfilled, the Law
School of the University of Michigan gave him a position,
which has now enabled him to complete the first of the volumes contemplated. His work in Michigan has been done
under the most fortunate surroundings, as he has had the
active advice and assistance from the point of view of a
leading American specialist in international law, Professor
Hessel E. Y ntema.
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The present treatise is the confirmation of Doctor Rabel's
life work. Its primary purpose is to make a comparison of
the significant legal systems of conflict of laws with reference to the specific problems arising in each topic. The first
volume, besides containing a most interesting and comprehensive introduction dealing with the literature, theories,
and sources of the subject, is devoted to a study of the problems of what may be described as family relations, such as
the personal law of individuals, marriage, divorce and annulment, and parental relations. It is a field presenting a
variety of interesting and difficult conflicts problems. The
second volume now well under way will deal principally with
Foreign Corporations, Torts, and the General Problems of
Contracts. It is hoped that there may be further volumes,
covering the other legal topics treated in the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws.
In the course of its preparation and completion, the plan
of the work has undergone substantial change.
The original plan was that of a work which, in arrangement, should exactly parallel the sections of the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws. This plan has turned out to be impracticable. The differences between the European and American
systems are too great to allow such minute comparison, section by section. The major subdivisions, however, present
sufficient analogy to those of the Restatement to draw attention to the significant distinctions and similarities. Comparison between the foreign and American law has been
emphasized throughout. The book does not simply constitute
a presentation of foreign law, but a painstaking and comprehensive comparison of the solutions accorded to the particular problems of family law, both here and abroad. It
is this feature that gives the work its special value and
attractiveness.
The author conceives that comparison of laws requires
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study in the legal systems compared of the solutions reached
on particular practical problems rather than the review of
general theories. In thus emphasizing the comparative solutions of concrete problems, he is in accord with our common
law habit of thought. Consistently carried out in the present
treatise, it greatly increases the value of the work in the
English-speaking countries. The method does not ignore the
necessary consideration of theories but obviously gives them
less significance than is usually found in most European
literature.
The work offers not only comprehensive assistance to the
practicing lawyer or the judge who is concerned to know the
answers in other countries to a conflict of laws problem, but
will also furnish the English-speaking reader with foreign
law concepts of the rules of conflicts of laws and their application in a form easily comprehended by those whose legal
training is largely confined to our common law and statutes.
In all the topics treated, the author enables us to appreciate
the "other fellow's" point of view and compare its practical
results with our own. This is not an insignificant service to
a people just awakening from a self-centered legal sleep to
an appreciation of the fact that we must hereafter go forward in a world which is increasingly one.
WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, Director
The American Law Institute

II
T is appropriate to add a few remarks from the viewpoint of the University of Michigan. The foregoing
statement by the director of the American Law Institute outlines the distinguished career of the author of the
present work and indicates the circumstances under which he
was invited by the Institute to undertake a comparative survey of the existing systems of conflicts law. As therefrom
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appears, while the inspiration to bring to this country an
internationally recognized jurist with unique qualifications
for the task-an extraordinary opportunity afforded only by
the malign policy that has betrayed Germany and crucified
millions in this generation-is to be credited to the Institute
and more particularly to the generous wisdom of the director, the studies reflected in the present volume have been
substantially accomplished at Ann Arbor, in large part with
the aid of funds and further assistance provided by the
University of Michigan.
This co-operation, illustrating an appropriate function, as
once suggested by the writer, for a nondenominational Institute in the world of academic rivalries, deserves a word of
commendation. On the part of the University, it has been
motivated not only by the liberal disposition of the Faculty
of Law to promote worth-while research and their longstanding interest in comparative legal studies, but more especially by the significance of the enterprise. This is no mere
tabula ex naufragio, thus rescued from the maelstrom in
which contemporary European culture is engulfed. The survey undertaken is essential at the present time for the proper
development of a branch of law of special interest for interstate and international trade, arising, as Story states, "from
the conflict of the laws of different nations, in their actual
application to modern commerce and intercourse." More
generally, it exemplifies a fundamental mode of legal investigation, which each day becomes more nearly indispensable in the modern world.
The latter consideration, the need in these times for comparative legal research, does not call for extensive comment.
The present conflict, multiplying contacts among the most
distant peoples and through untold suffering and sacrifice
uniting them to vindicate the common values of humanity,
like the Napoleonic wars and the War of 1914, again empha-
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sizes that no one is unconditionally immune from influences
operative within the effective orbit of international intercourse. In a universe progressively interrelated by the miracles of modern communication, therefore, it is neither prudent nor even longer possible for any nation to pursue a
policy of self-sufficient isolation. In such a universe, the
notion that the corresponding legal order is compartmentalized exclusively within political frontiers is inadequate.
For legal science, so pervasively indoctrinated these hundred years by the preconceptions of sovereignty and nationalism, this spells the necessity of comparative reorientation, of
ampler realization that justice both comprehends and transcends local interests. If the price of peace and liberty is constant vigilance in an integrated world, it is expedient to know
what transpires abroad as well as at home. While legal science in each country will and should continue to cultivate first
its peculiar institutions and traditions, these can no longer
be accepted as the horizon of legal knowledge. The practical,
specialized study of indigenous techniques, legislative, judicial, and administrative, must be complemented by scientific
comparison with other legal systems-to ascertain their
manifold bearings on domestic interests; to prepare the reforms that may be desired from time to time to bring the
municipal laws into harmony with advancing conceptions of
justice and the requirements of the international community;
to share in efforts to provide appropriate uniform legislation
for the commerce of the world; in fine, to establish a more
objective scientific basis for the consideration of legal problems. To attain these ends, indeed even to appreciate the
special genius of each legal system, the comparative method,
necessarily supposing intensive historical and functional investigation of particular institutions, is indicated. Without
this perspective, as Ihering pointed out long ago, there is no
legal science worthy of the name. Blind without history, juris-
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prudence without comparative understanding can scarcely
rise above the level of provincial casuistry and empirical
craft.
Obviously, such understanding of the existing legal systems is most immediately needed in those branches of law
that are concerned with international relations. Of these, the
law of conflict of laws, devoted to the principles governing
assumption of jurisdiction and resort to the proper law in the
solution of private disputes of an international complexion,
is in a parlous state, permitted presumably by the fact that
it is almost wholly administered in the ordinary courts in the
positivistic atmosphere of municipal law. For, in this subject
matter concerned with determining the application of the diverse legal provisions that may be involved in any such dispute, in consonance with, or at least without violating, common standards of justice, emphasis is rampant upon territorialism and nationality, upon the dominant pretensions of
lex fori or ordre public, in other words, upon ideas that obscure, limit, or frustrate the very purpose in view.
This, it is worth recalling, was not always the emphasis.
More than a hundred years ago, Story founded the modern
law of conflict of laws on a broad, comparative basis, that
looked despite uncertainty and diversity in the then existing
doctrines, "towards the establishment of a general system of
international jurisprudence, which shall elevate the policy,
subserve the interests, and promote the common convenience
of all nations." Fifteen years after Story penned these words,
in the preface to the eighth volume of the monumental System des heutigen Romischen Rechts, Savigny voiced two interesting prognostications in like vein. Adverting to the
variety of opinions among both writers and courts respecting
conflicts of laws, he nevertheless conceived that, from the
exceptional and active common concern in the problems of
this field of law, there would develop a universal, existent
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community of legal understanding and legal life. The further
suggestion that the principle of nationality, then coming into
prominence, would not make itself felt in a subject, the nature of which involves the resolution of conflicts of national
laws within a recognized community of the various nations,
equally reflects Savigny's international point of view.
How soon and how far these anticipations were to be disappointed is writ at large in the illuminating introduction
that forms Part One of the present volume.
A etas parentum, peior avis, tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiorem.
But two years after Savigny wrote, the doctrine of nationality, which in its exaggeration has so much contributed to
international disorder during the past century, was proclaimed by Mancini as the fundamental principle of the law
of nations and shortly became the distinctive basis of legislation in Continental Europe. Consequently, to borrow the
author's expression, the international community, as contemplated by Story and Savigny, disintegrated. Story's broad
understanding of the conflicts of law doctrines current in his
time eventually shrank in the United States to the dimensions
of the introverted treatment of the subject by Wharton and
later by Beale: in England, Westlake bridged the way to
Dicey's Anglican positivism; on the Continent, Savigny and
his international-minded successors were duly eclipsed by the
intransigent, if despairing, nationalism of Bartin and Kahn.
Thus, by 1900, the dominant supposition was a caricature
of the truism that international private law is not international but private law; absorbed in domestic legislation and
precedents, the doctrine reflected the prevailing provincial
dogmatisms of legal science generally. Apparently, justified
recognition of the circumstance that, under existing condi-
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tions, national courts typically administer conflicts rules as
a branch of municipal law, was thought to warrant indifference to their international raison d' hre. Consequently, legal
theory in this field in recent years, having lost sight of the
underlying purpose to be had in view, has devoted itself with
aprioristic methods to unreal issues and become something
of a logical mystery. Essentially, it face~ the problem of how
to square in terms of national interest or tradition a circle
of internationally superior needs.
In this country, the current isolationism of conflicts of law
doctrine has been accentuated by certain contributing factors: first, by a quite natural preoccupation on the part of
specialists in the subject with the relatively frequent internal
conflicts of jurisdiction and law arising within the federal
structure of the United States; and second, by the extensive
influence of the theories expounded by Beale, including the
belief that reference in this field to civil law authorities is
not one that tends "to preserve the correctness and purity
of the common law." It deserves repeating-even after almost twenty years-that this is a conceit, strange and for
the United States inexpedient. Strange, since it disavows the
considerable indebtedness of common law doctrines respecting conflicts of laws to the civil law; inexpedient, since a great
commercial nation cannot afford to remain in ignorance,
particularly in this subject matter, of the laws of foreign
countries with which it trades. In consequence of these influences, despite the pioneer work of Lorenzen and more
recent contributions by Kuhn, Nussbaum, and others, inadequate attention has been given in this country to the relations
between the doctrines of conflicts law as here evolved and
those of foreign countries other than England. It affords
little consolation that the condition is paralleled elsewhere.
But it does serve to explain why no systematic effort has been
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made hitherto to provide a comprehensive, critical comparison of the existing systems of private international law.
Had it not been for this background, the preparation of
the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, initiated in
1923 and promulgated in 1934, might well have been the
occasion for such a survey. This, however, was not to be-it
was precluded by the prepossessions of the reporter, by the
curious determination, deviating from the original plan, to
restate "the law as it is," and still more effectually by unfamiliarity with comparable foreign doctrines on the part of
those invited to participate as advisers (except for a time
Lorenzen) . Hence, the failure in this monumental codification of the Common Law to take account of other systems
was not merely an effect of, but has become a cause to perpetuate an inappropriate view of international private law,
which no longer befits the United States. On this count alone
and apart from other limitations duly noted by critics, we
repeat, the Restatement needs to be restated. But the preceding observations will suggest that it is still more important to provide the indispensable basis for such revision, including the comparative information without which inbred
doctrines remain unquestioned and their objective, scientific
consideration in terms of international needs is excluded

a limine.
To supply this need, as the author justly observes in the
preface, is a large task. The requisite survey of the existing
systems of conflicts law involves critical examination and
comparison of the significant rules on specific problems with
reference to their evolution and purposes, as exemplified in
these systems, and in the light of the pertinent literature and
jurisprudence for each country, preferably accompanied by
corresponding suggestions for improvement. Moreover, as
conflicts rules look to reciprocal recognition and understanding of the respective specific institutions of local law, it is
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necessary that any such survey should be made on the background, however succinctly adumbrated, of the historical development and contemporary nature, significance, and interrelations of these institutions, considered in the context of
the legislations of which they form part. The present volume
is a first and substantial contribution to this undertaking; in
addition to a magistral review of the literature, sources, doctrinal development, and general theories of the subject, it
provides a comparative conspectus of the rules applicable to
conflicts in the extensive field of family law. It is more than
an annotation to the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws, as was at first contemplated. It is the first comprehensive comparative legal study that has been published in English for many moons, certainly the first in any language to
take adequate account of the laws of the Americas as well as
of Europe. It is, in sum, a pioneer, intensive exploration of a
substantial part of the labyrinth of the laws of conflicts from
the indicated international point of view, a contribution not
only essential for progress in this field but also of general
interest as an exemplar of the comparative method in law.
In pursuance of its undertaking to support this enterprise,
the University has made substantial provision to maintain
and implement the author's individual researches, including,
among other things, accommodations in the Legal Research
Library, ministerial assistance as required from time to time,
and editorial collaboration, especially in adapting the author's incisive expressions to the idiosyncrasies of English
style, the independent verification of all citations, and the
preparation of the various tables (except for the index, which
was made up by the author). In arranging this assistance, the
responsibility for which was cast upon the editor as a condition of the adoption of the undertaking for a time by the
University, various obligations have been incurred, which
deserve to be acknowledged:

F'OREWORD

xxi

To the University authorities, to the Faculty of Law and
Dean Stason in particular, for their constant and generous
support in the effective prosecution of the work. To all those
who, as members of the research staff, were engaged in one
way or another in preparing, editing, and seeing the manuscript through the press, an exacting task in which the comparative use of legal materials from many countries has
presented an unusual variety of questions, for their indispensable, respective contributions, efficiently rendered. To
Eldon R. James, Law Librarian, Library of Congress, and
Arthur C. Pulling, Director of the Harvard Law Library,
for the appreciated assistance of their respective staffs, which
has made it possible to verify all save perhaps a dozen of
the limited number of references to works not available in
the Legal Research Library. To Hobart R. Coffey, to whom
the editor is indebted equally with the author for expert relief unstintingly given in the revision of the manuscript. And,
not least, to the author himself for unfailing co-operation
and courageous devotion to a complex task under disturbed
conditions.
Yet this is to be added. However indispensable the assistance provided by the University has been for the prosecution
of the work, the product is in substance exclusively the author's; he alone collected the materials, and the views expressed herein are his. It is fortunate that a jurist of the
author's attainments and scholarly sagacity has addressed
himself to the task, which, it is hoped, may be extended in
additional volumes to other significant branches of conflicts
law.
HESSEL E. Y NTEMA

Preface
ULL ap~lication .of compar~tive methods to the law
of conflicts reqmres a workmg plan of some magnitude. \Ve ought to take stock of the conflicts rules
existing in the different countries of the world, state their
similarities or dissimilarities, and investigate their purposes
and effects. The solutions thus ascertained should moreover
be subjected to an estimation of their usefulness, by the standards appropriate to their natural objective. Conflicts rules
have to place private life and business relations upon the legal background suitable to satisfactory intercourse among
states and nations. They are valuable to the extent that their
practical functioning, rather than their legal appearance,
serves this purpose.
To meet the challenge of this program with limited forces
is a risky undertaking. Nevertheless it has to be attempted.
The conditions of the law of conflicts are deplorable. It may
be said, to the reader's and my own consolation, that the
staggering provincialism apparent in the international family
law presented in this volume is not equaled in other parts. But
if conflicts problems have been cultivated by men of the highest erudition, idealism, and endeavor, they have also been the
object of prejudice and dogmatism. Suggestions of almost all
needed ideas may be found, but little agreement on a sound
choice. The courts of this country dealing with a wealth of
interstate cases have prevailingly shown sincere respect for
foreign legislation and applied an accomplished method of
comparative research. But this admirable attitude, which is
the most outstanding model for the practice of private international law, suffers exceptions, and in the field of international relations throughout the world, despite enormous ef-
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forts, the simple truth that harmony presupposes mutual
understanding and tolerance, has not prevailed in conflicts
law more than in foreign affairs.
All considered, the further we extend our comparative survey, the less doubt can subsist about the need for a total reconsideration of the international purpose and the undeveloped resources of this branch of law. The time has passed
when we may rest satisfied to state a rule and to regret it.
Not that the premature legislation or halfhearted treaty
making, familiar to the last decades, should be advocated.
What this book is intended to suggest is a patient and concerted world-wide discussion determined to relieve the present chaos. I am convinced that large results must not be deferred to a remote future. The legal profession has great
power and deserves great confidence. If it decided to consider conflicts law as a matter of general interest and gave it
its unbiased attention, much might be obtained that now
seems Utopian. I am particularly hopeful of the lawyers in
the United States.
According to the program, I have regarded my foremost
task to be the collection and grouping of the significant rules,
theories, critical views, and proposals, and the cases animated
by them. This task is comprehensive and worth-while enough
to dictate sacrifices. It has not been possible to spare the
reader and myself tedious enumerations and many a mosaic
of incoherent pieces, and I have had to renounce historical
and theoretical developments. Neither is there space to describe at length the institutions of private law that are the
subject matter of the conflicts rules. This compulsory limitation is the more regrettable, as common law lawyers have
not been introduced to the concepts of civil law as European
lawyers were informed of Anglo-American institutions during the period between the two wars.
I have also restricted my own critical appraisals, and I
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have doubted whether any recommendations for the future
should be added. Yet, in view of the personal encouragement
that I have received from such scholars as Elliott E. Cheatham, Max Rheinstein, and Hessel E. Yntema, and recently in
Ernest Lorenzen's great review of the last period of American conflicts law, it seems to be the writer's duty not entirely
to conceal his impressions regarding the desirable path that
the evolution may take. Theoretical conclusions of more general scope as well as specified proposals for elaborating the
rules may be expected, when comparative research in this
singular and disturbed field has become broader and bolder.
I hope the survey itself will almost automatically arouse the
wish for certain reforms.
Because of the war time, European rules and cases are
stated, in principle, as they were in 1939 at the beginning of
the war. This is a rather convenient date for a view back,
while a new epoch is starting. More recent materials coming
through have, of course, been registered.
The Legal Research Library of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor has afforded me a hospitable haven and
ample facilities for work. Its farsighted policy has enabled
me, for the first time in a work of this kind, to include a substantial amount of Latin-American doctrine. My satisfaction
in this regard is somewhat impaired by the fear that my efforts of analysis have not been entirely successful in regard to
certain Latin-American formulations. As these countries possess outstanding scholars in this field who are the natural intermediaries between common law and civil law, it is to be
hoped that they will participate in carrying on the work here
begun and supply the details not yet mentioned in the literature but with which the courts must deal.
To the American Law Institute, the Dean and Faculty of
the Law School, University of Michigan, and the Research
Department of the W. W. Cook Foundation directed by
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Professor Lewis M. Simes, I owe deepest gratitude. Dean
Emeritus William Draper Lewis, the eminent and beloved
director of the American Law Institute, has rescued me from
the cataclysm of Europe; he has been the original sponsor of
this enterprise and has not ceased to manifest his friendly
interest in it. Professor Hessel E. Y ntema, since I 940, has
fulfilled his task as editor with an unprecedented sacrifice of
time and labor. He has generously provided me with informations and suggestions, constantly supervised during all these
years the comprehensive ministerial aid furnished by the research staff of the Faculty, and devoted his command of English style to an extremely delicate and exacting revision of
the language of my manuscript. Professor Hobart R. Coffey
has liberally shared in this burden, and to him, as Law Librarian, as well as to his entire staff, who have been most
kind, I am grateful. I feel cordially obligated also for the
devoted services of Mrs. Lilly Melchior Roberts, who, with
the assistance of Miss Dorothy Karl, has been especially
helpful in checking the documentation, to Dr. Vladimir
Gsovski, Chief of the Foreign Laws Section, Law Library
of the Library of Congress, and to those whose contributions
Mr. Yntema has deservedly acknowledged.
Finally, it is my privilege to thank publicly Professor Max
Rheinstein of the University of Chicago, the most faithful of
friends, for the help he has freely given to this book as well
as to me and my family. I am happy to see him represent in
this country our common scientific ideals.
ERNST RABEL

Ann Arbor, Michigan
March 5, 1945
NOTE : Chapter I I was published in preliminary, condensed form
in volume 28 of the Iowa Law Review, January I943, as "Divorce
of Foreigners-A Study in Comparative Law."

Preface to the Second Edition
This volume, the first in Ernst Rabel's monumental comparative treatise on the conflict of laws, was initially published in 1 94 5. Since then three additional volumes have
been added, completing the survey of the systems of conflicts law as originally contemplated. Meanwhile, the first
edition of the first two volumes has been exhausted for some
time, and the literature of conflicts law has substantially
increased, reflecting the new developments that have taken
place since I 94 5. Accordingly, plans for a new edition of
the first two volumes were discussed with the author before
his death on September 7, I 9 55, and were approved by him;
these plans contemplated that the manuscript should be
prepared by an assistant of the Institute of Foreign and
International Private Law, formerly directed by the author,
who should be entrusted with the formidable task of integrating with the original text the relevant conflicts materials
which have appeared during the international turmoil of
the past decade.
This new edition has thus been made possible through
the continued support of this research by the University of
Michigan Law School and the generous co-operation of the
Institute, now the Max-Planck-Institut in Hamburg, in
making available the competent services of a member of
the staff of the Institute, Dr. Ulrich Drobnig, who utilized
the special facilities at the Legal Research Building in Ann
Arbor from July, 1955, to June, I956. In accordance with
the advice of the author, whom Dr. Drobnig fortunately
was able to consult before undertaking the revision of the
two volumes, the collection and inclusion of new material
in the author's text has been strictly limited to the addition
of new citations and illustrations. Consequently, alterations
xxvii

xxvm
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of the text proper, as distinguished from the footnotes, have
been avoided as far as possible. The additional materia]
covers publications up to July r, 1956, but it has been possible to take account of a few later developments. The revised edition of the second volume is to follow in the near
future.
HESSEL E. Y NTEMA
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Literature and Sources of Conflicts Law
I.

ScoPE OF CoNFLicTs

LAw

N the American literature, the law of conflicts includes
both choice of law, which contemplates the determination of the particular state law applicable to specific
cases typically within the sphere of private law, and jurisdiction of courts, regarded by some writers as an aspect of legislative jurisdiction. In following this pattern, we shall observe
the limitations of private law more strictly than is usual and
only to the extent necessary explore the implications of constitutional, administrative, procedural, criminal, and public
law generally. Thus, the rules of judicial jurisdiction will be
considered in connection with those matters which are governed in this country by the domestic or internal law of the
jurisdiction (the lex fori) and consequently depend upon
choice of court rather than on choice of law.
According to the French doctrine, "private international
law" combines choice of law, the law of nationality, and the
legal status of foreigners. This last subject, concerned with
the rules granting or refusing foreigners equal treatment
with nationals, in theory is thoroughly different from conflicts law conceived primarily as choice of law. It presupposes
that the law applicable to aliens has been selected and found
to be the internal law of the state. For this reason, it is not
regarded in Germany as part of private international law. 1
In this country, likewise, rules relative to "foreign" individuals-aliens and non-residents-typically do not appear

I

1

See

I ZITELMANN

256;

KAHN, I

Abhandl. 263 ff.
3

4

INTRODUCTION

in the treatises on conflicts law. The explanation given is
that citizens and non-citizens are not differentiated 2 in respect to private law; this seems to contemplate exclusively
relations between the American sister states. Nevertheless,
the rules concerning foreign corporations, pertaining for the
most part to internal law and in fact presenting many special
features in the United States and to some degree in Germany, are included in the usual orbit of conflicts discussion.
This practical method will be followed, although the regulation of foreign corporations is different from choice of
law and in general forms part of administrative law.
Similar considerations make it desirable to give some attention to substantive provisions concerned with property
situated or contracts performed or acts done in another state,
or that otherwise involve foreign elements. Such provisions
often appear as purely internal rules, but they may include
genuine conflict rules. For instance, a rule stating that a
money debt expressed in foreign currency may be paid, at
the option of the debtor, in domestic currency at the exchange of a certain date, is substantive merely. But the principle, enunciated in certain American statutes and judicial
decisions, 3 that statutory formalities prescribed for insurance
contracts apply only to contracts executed within the state, is
not merely a rule of municipal law territorially limited; it
contains two rules, the one substantive, imposing formalities,
the other, a conflicts rule, however delicate the borderline
may be.~ There are also scattered throughout the national
2 I BEALE 8. On the rules, see MOORE, 4 Digest of International Law (I906)
ch. XIII.
8
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (I900) I79 U. S. 262; Johnson v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. ( I90I-I902) ISO Mass. 407, 62 N. E. 733 (on Mass. Stat. I894,
c. 522, § 73, now Mass. General Laws (I932) c. I75 § I3I); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Long (I9I7) I77 Ky. 445, I97 S. W. 948 on Ky. Stat. § 679,
Ky. Rev. Stats. (I953) § 299.I30 statutorily embodied since I950 (now Ky.
Rev. Stats. (I953) § 304.648).
4 In fact, the provision cited in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Long (supra
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legislations numerous provisions that are not intended or are
unsuitable for application by foreign courts, as for instance,
the peculiar English provisions imposing upon certain persons the burden of support of indigents. 5 All such internal
regulations, with potential international significance, deserve
systematic examination in connection with the laws of the
particular countries. In the present survey, it will be possible
only to make occasional reference to such problems. On the
other hand, in view of their preponderant influence, internal
rules embodying so-called stringent public policies, and hence
superseding the operation of general conflicts rules, must be
taken into account.
The observations in the present introduction are not intended to serve as a general analysis of conflicts law. Modern
writers in this field have begun to develop a body of generalized theories, 6 but most of the topics they deal with are beyond present purposes. Certain problems, such as the attitude
of the courts in the different countries with regard to public
policy or the methods of considering foreign law in lawsuits,
involve positive formulations of law, which ought to be reported in a comparative survey and will be referred to in
their appropriate connections. Other long-standing problems
of deep scientific interest, such as the exact classification of
conflicts law in the legal system, do not need more international discussion. Others, including the dubious role of the
n. 3) has been characterized as a "spatially limited" internal rule by NussBAUM, Principles 70.
5 See infra pp. 349, 655, n. 8, 667, n. 63.
6 A penetrating analysis has been made by MAURY in his Hague lecture,
"Regles generales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 325. Other lectures
under the same title by AGO, 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247; DAVIES, an English
author, 62 Recueil 1937 IV 427; and H. LEWALD, published separately,
Basel, 1941 (an elegant theoretical study). See, moreover, I. HENRI HIJMANS,
Algemeene Problemen van Internationaal Privaatrecht (1937) and W.
NIEDERER, Einfiihrung in die allgemeinen Lehren des internationalen
Privatrechts (ed. 2, 1956).
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"preliminary question," 7 have not matured sufficiently to
warrant general observations.
Finally, there are problems regarding the structure and
application of conflicts rules that are of interest from the
viewpoint of method and have attracted wide and vivid attention during recent years. The purpose of this introduction
is to summarize the writer's view on these questions. This
view premises that each case should be considered on its
merits; therefore it does not presuppose the determination
of individual problems by general dogmas.

II.
1.

LITERATURE

8

The International Historical Background 9

In its generally accepted sense, the law of conflicts or private international law dates from the medieval school of the
7 See CoRMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary
Question in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221, 243·
8 The titles of many of the works cited by authors' names in the following
brief survey are to be found in the bibliographical list on page 661. The accompanying dates indicate the years in which the first considerable publications of the respective authors occurred.
9 On the history of conflicts law: Outlines in English: 3 BEALE 188o-1975;
CHESHIRE 68; RHEIN STEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1935) 232-269; and YNTEMA, "The Historic
Bases of Private International Law," 2 Am. J. Camp. Law (1953) 297-317,
German translation in I Festschrift Rabel ( 1954) 513-537.
Standard works: CATELLANI, II diritto internazionale privata e i suoi recenti
progressi, 2 vols. ( 1895, 1902) ; LAINE, Introduction au droit international
prive, 2 vols. (x888, 1892); NEUMEYER, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwickelung
des internationalen Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus, 2 vols. (1901, 1916);
idem, "Zur Geschichte des internationalen Privatrechts in Frankreich und den
Niederlanden," in 2 Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht (1920) 190; MEIJERS, Bijdrage
tot de geschiedenis van het internationaal privaat- en strafrecht in Frankrijk
en de Nederlanden ( 1914) ; idem, "Nieuwe bijdrage tot het onstaan van het
beginsel der realiteit," 3 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis ( 1922) 61;
idem, "L'histoire des principes fondamentaux du droit international prive a
partir du Moyen-Age, specialement dans !'Europe occidentale," 49 Recueil
1934 III 543; GuTZWILLER, "Le developpement historique du droit international prive," 29 Recueil 1929 IV 287 (with full list of literature 395-397).
Historical summaries are given in almost every handbook; particularly
recommendable are those by WEISS, 3 Traite 8-129, 13o-149; GuTZWILLER,
Internationalprivatrecht 1521-1534; EsPINOLA, 7 Tratado II5-313.
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postglossators (also named legists or commentators), who in
the late thirteenth century succeeded the glossators in the
universities of northern Italy and southern France. 10 Like the
Roman law into which it was artificially incorporated, this
branch of law was regarded as universally binding. The territorial realm of the doctrines of the postglossators exceeded
even the boundaries within which the canon and Roman laws
were received as "written reason," representing the law of
all Christendom. These doctrines, as accepted and transformed by eminent scholars in France 11 and Holland 12 during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gained recognition in England and in the United States.
The law of conflicts thus became one field, in which the
common and civil laws had a common doctrinal basis and
which could be thought of as a truly international law. This
conception of a world community was still prevalent when in
18 34 the great American, Joseph Story, merged the Dutch
doctrine with the Anglo-American cases. His treatise acquired authority in both hemispheres and contributed to the
continuation, in renewed form, of an internationally-minded
school on the European Continent. In particular, Germany's
10 The last and most authoritative member of the school of glossators, AcCURsrus, instigated the query by his brief annotation (A. D. I228) to the first
Imperial decree of the Justinian Codex (C. J. I, I, I), the Constitutio "Cunctos populos." The postglossators developed the treatment of the conflict of
statutes (i.e., those of the upper Italian cities) as glosses to this Constitution.
The most outstanding postglossators were also the main authorities for conflicts law: BARTOLUS DB SAXOFERRATO (I3I4-I357) and BALDUS DE UBALDIS
( I327-I400).
11 The most famous scholars were MoLINAEUS
(CHARLES DuMOULIN)
(15oo-I566), and ARGENTRAEus (BERTRAND D'ARGBNTRE) (I5I9-I590). On
these see also MElLI, "Argentraeus und Molinaeus und ihre Bedeutung im
internationalen Privat- und Strafrecht," 5 Z.int.R. (I895) 363, 452, 554; and
GAMILLSCHEG, Der Einfluss Dumoulins auf die Entwicklung des Kollisionsrechts (1955). For what is now Belgium, NICOLAUS BuRGUNDUS (I586-1649),
and for Holland, CHRISTIAAN RoDBNBURGH (I6I8-I668), may be mentioned.
12 "Dutch school," main representatives: PAULUS VoET (I6I<}-1677); ULRIcus HuBER (I636-I694); JoHANNES VOET (I6I7-I7I3)· See LORENZEN,
"Huber's De Conflictu Legum" in Celebration Legal Essays (in honor of
John H. Wigmore, 1919) 199.
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greatest jurist, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (I 849) using
Story's materials and rational method, 13 established the
fundaments of modern conflicts law. It was significant that
his treatment of this subject formed the last part of the celebrated System of Modern Roman Law; for him, there was
no doubt about the suprastate nature of the subject matter.
This work of the leader of the historical school became the
principal authority in all Europe and Latin America during
most of the nineteenth century and is still highly regarded in
certain countries. The international conception of "international private law" was adopted by Foelix (I 843) in
France, a professed follower of Story, by the Belgian Laurent (I88o), the Italian Fiore (I869), 14 the Swiss Brocher
{I87I),15 and by almost all outstanding authors until approximately I 890. 16 These authors wrote on conflicts law in
a common atmosphere, among brethren of the same creed,
envisaging its application in all countries. So did also the
scholars who with the eminent German, Ludwig von Bar
( I 8 6 2), 17 protested against being classified among the internationalists 18 but who neverthelesss thought that special
studies, restricted to the positive laws of particular legal systems, unaided by general theory, narrow in perspective,
are prone to choose improper premises or to misconceive the
13

See SAVIGNY, iv (tr. Guthrie 44); GUTZWILLER, 29 Recueil I929 IV at

34I14 PASQUALE FIORE, Elementi di diritto internazionale privata (Firenze,
1869).
15 CHARLES BROCHER, "Theorie du droit international prive," Revue 187I,
4I2, 540, Revue 1872, I89, Revue 1873, 137, 390.
16 NussBAUM, D. IPR. II, and in an extensive paper, "The Rise and Decline
of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev.
(1942) 189, I94, accounts for the prevalence of universalism or aprioristic
thought from I87o to 1930, on divers assumptions which the present writer
does not share. See also GuTZWILLER, review of NussBAUM'S D. IPR., 8
ausl.PR. (1934) 652, and see the list of "nationalists" by KAHN, I Abhandl.
3 n. 2 and 270 n. 29.
17 BAR, Das internationale Privat- und Strafrecht (Hannover, I862).
18 BAR, "Neue Prinzipien und Methoden des internationalen Privatrechts,"
I5 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (1900) I at II, 45·

z.

LITERATURE AND SOURCES OF CONFLICTS LAW

9

sphere of individual principles in the "organism" of international private law. 19
In time, the international community disintegrated. The
common law lawyers, segregated from the civil law background, instinctively receded from naive cosmopolitan attitudes. Absorbed in the judicial decisions of their countries,
they gave slight attention to developments elsewhere. In the
civil law countries on the other hand, from the end of the
eighteenth century, there appeared an increasing number of
national codifications of private law, which divided the European Continent into separate units, secluding them behind
progressively higher barriers of national legislation. Relatively late, the impact of this process reached the conflicts
law. The specialists in this branch of law, which seems predestined always to lag behind the currents of general jurisprudence, were tardily and rudely awakened by the discovery
that the supposed international source of law did not exist. 20
Former universalist conceptions gave way to the knowledge
that conflicts rules no less than other rules of law must have
their roots in the soil of some state and that international
rules in the proper sense flow only from international custom
or treaties, and at that in a very thin stream. Thus, the longestablished international community of conflicts studies was
dissolved, and the national conflicts rules succumbed to the
same spirit of isolationism that permeated other fields of
law. Against this background, the meager achievements of
the Hague Conventions of 1902 and 1905 appeared like a
little island of blossoming internationalism.
Although the doctrine of "national" or "positive" origin
of conflicts rules has been definitely established long since, a
few ingenious thinkers have resented its dismal consequences.
19 Preface to the second edition of BAR, I Theorie und Praxis des internationalen Privatrechts vii ( tr. Gillespie viii).
2o The scientific formulation of the "positivistic" approach was given by
NIEMEYER, Zur Methodik des internationalen Privatrechts (1894) 26.
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They have tried to revive universal rules by new ideas. With
this in view, Pillet ( I894) ,21 distinguished two classes of municipal law, viz., necessarily territorial general rules and
"permanent" rules of extraterritorial application, the distinctive criterion being the "social purpose" of the rules. 22 The
German professor Zitelmann (I 897), in a work full of suggestive ideas, conceived the possibility of creating a vast system of conflicts law upon the basis of the law of nations. 23
Belatedly, Frankenstein ( I926) has spun a whole web of
conflicts rules from the premise that the only "scientific"
choice of law is primarily predicated upon the dominance of
each state over its citizens and over things in its territory. 24
Such deductive systems have been commonly rejected.
A third movement was initiated by the Italian patriot,
Mancini (I 85 I). 25 His vigorous emphasis on the function of
the nation produced a wave of emotional nationalism in the
field of international law. When Mancini advised the drafting of the preliminary provisions of the Italian Civil Code of
I 86 5, his postulates were transferred from international
public law to conflicts law, as expressed in the principle that
all persons should be governed by the law of the state whose
citizens they are, which by an eventful transition of ideas be21 PILLET, "Le droit international prive. Essai d'un systeme general de
solution des conflits de lois," Clunet 1894, 417, 7II, Clunet 1895, 241, soo, 929,
Clunet 1896, 5·
2 2 Cf. GAUDEMET, "La theorie des conflits de lois dans )'oeuvre d'Antoine
Piilet et Ia doctrine de Savigny," I MELANGES PILLET (1929) 89.
23 See GuTZWILLER, "Zitelmann's viilkerrechtliche Theorie des International privatrechts," in Festgabe, x6 Archiv fiir Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie (1923) 468. A pious apology for Zitelmann's doctrine was written
by BETri, "Ernst Zitelmann e il problema del diritto internazionale privato,"
17 Rivista (1925) 33, continued at x88.
24 See the criticism by YNTEMA, Book Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. (1927)
794; YNTEMA, Book Review, 42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) 1092; LoRENZEN,
Book Review, 36 Yale L. J. (1927) 1030j LORENZEN, Book Review, 39 Yale
L. J. ( 1930) 921; NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1929) 260; Li!WALD, 2 Blatter f.
IPR. (1927) 65; GUTZWILLER I534i PACCHIONI 65; complete bibliography
by GHIRON, Z7 Rivista (1935) 125.
2 5 "Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti," inaugural
address at the University of Turin.
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came identified as the national law. This principle was
adopted in all Central and Southern Europe, as well as in
Brazil, Japan, and China. It was advocated by internationalists such as Laurent, Andre Weiss, and Bartin and appears
in the German, Swedish, Polish, and many other legislations,
clearly embodying the doctrine of positivism. No other doctrine has found more fervent adherents ; none has more estranged the civil and common laws from each other.
These three schools, the aprioristic internationalists, the
faithful expositors of fragmentary statutes and cases, the
propagandists of nationality as the standard of personal
rights and duties, have had their time, and their time is over.
A new epoch began about 1925. Previously, a few far-seeing
scholars, Bar, 26 Kahn, Anzilotti, Niemeyer/7 perceived that
conflicts rules, though derived from a national source like
other ordinary legal rules, have special functions and purposes requiring a method of international scope. Kahn, one
of the most acute advocates of positivism, went so far as to
postulate that both the international and the positivistic
methods should be integrated through the comparative
method and so superseded. 28
2.

Modern Treatises

The following are the most significant works on conflict of
laws of the nineteenth century and of the first quarter of the
twentieth.
England. 29 The English courts were slow and reluctant to
2 6 IS Archiv des offentlichen Rechts ( 1900) I, supra n. IS.
27 KAHN, I Abhandl. 3u, 3I5, 322, 326; ANZILOTTI, II diritto internazionale
nei giudizi interni (I 90S) ISI (see his earlier Studi critici di diritto internazionale privato (1898) I30 V), declared the conflicts rules national in form

(source) and suprastatal in substance: this formula served as a basis of a
peculiar theory which was followed by numerous Italian and French writers.
Cf. Aoo, Teo ria 83 n. 2; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III at 366; NIEMEYER,
Das IPR. des BGB. so.
2s I Abhandl. 502 (written in 1900).
29 Treatises by WESTLAKE, FOOTE, DICEY, HIBBERT, BURGE.
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adjust themselves to the application of foreign law. Until recently, the literature was sparse. 30 In the nineteenth century
Westlake alone wrote a treatise (I 8 58) purporting to establish a system of conflicts. With this exception, the English
writers refrained from criticism of the courts and left the law
in the incoherent state represented in the cases. The often reedited treatise of Dicey ( 1896) illustrates this descriptive
method with its finest and its less desirable characteristics.
The intercourse within the parts of the British commonwealth occasioned a certain interest in their different legislations. The early work of Burge on colonial law, including
private international law, is being published in a revised,
monumental, though unsystematic, edition.
United States. 31 Succeeding Chancellor Kent's influential
Commentaries ( 1826-1830) ,32 Joseph Story's work ( 1834)
was of immense importance. 33 Admittedly, Story, who employed an eclectic method to choose among the various doctrines of his predecessors, the statutists, in substantial measure preserved their conceptions and solutions, but his touch
modernized the wealth of casuistic practice that lay immersed in the literature of half a millennium. These materials he enriched with the English and American case law,
and he was the first to master the huge subject with the
wisdom of a great judge.
80 See HARRISON, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws ( 1878, 1879,
reprinted and annotated by LEFROY, 1919) 121. The first writers were }ABEZ
HENRY (1823) and BURGE (1838) according to HARRISON, Clunet 1880, 429i
see also GuTZWILLER, 29 Recueil 1929 IV at 338.
81 KUHN, "La conception du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et
Ia pratique aux Etats-Unis," 21 Recueil 1928 I 193.
Treatises: KENT, STORY, WHARTON, MINOR, GOODRICH.
Case books: BEALE, LORENZEN, HARPER and TAINTOR, and by CHEATHAM,
DoWLING, GooDRICH and GRISWOLD.
For lists of Anglo-American articles in the field of conflict of laws see
CHEATHAM, DOWLING, GOODRICH and GRISWOLD, Cases and Other Materials
on Conflict of Laws (1941) p. xlix, and LoRENZEN, Cases and Materials on
the Conflict of Laws (1937) p. xxi.
82 J. KENT, Commentaries on American Law (4 vols., ed. I, New York,
1826-1830).
33 See the praise by HARRISON, supra n. 30, at 119 j 3 BEALE 1912.
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Thereafter, only two notable treatises appeared during
many decades: Wharton's valuable and richly documented
two volumes (I 872), which recognized legislative action, instead of "moral duty" or "comity" as assumed by the Dutch
writers and Story, as the source of conflicts rules; and the instructive compendium of Minor ( I90I), providing a doctrinal analysis of the cases as of the turn of the century.
A radical change came with the extraordinary achievements of Beale. In an admirable effort, he collected and
sifted the case materials, which had piled up to a gigantic
height, and, after many special studies, undertook to reconstruct the American conflicts law into a unified system. His
life work culminated in the Restatement of the Law of Cottflicts of Laws, 84 inspired and primarily prepared by Beale,
which has been promulgated ( I934) by the American Law
Institute, and in his Treatise (I 935) which presents an authoritative commentary on the Restatement. One might compare the historic role of Beale's work in American conflicts
law with that of the Glossa Magistralis of Accursius in the
Middle Ages. More than a century of Anglo-American case
law was condensed under the leadership of a strong methodical mind. Values buried in the vast mass of decisions were
brought to light and preserved for the future. In various subjects, court practice gained increased certainty, and theoretical thinking received decisive impulses; indeed, a new literature grew up. Goodrich, footing on Beale's theories but adding his own experience and sense for social policy, has written
an excellent leading textbook.
Most American writers, however, though grateful for
Beale's work, have turned against his doctrines. Beale was
84 Abroad the Restatement was much noticed. See particularly HARPER,
"Das 'Restatement of Conflict of Laws' des Amerikanischen 'Law Institute,'"
9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 8:u; MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, "The American Restatement," 21 Grotius Soc. 1935, 161; BARBEY, "L'oeuvre du Professeur Beale, de
Harvard," Revue Crit. 1936, 86; NoLDE, "La codification du droit international prive aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique," Nouv. Revue 1936, 7·
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the last eminent advocate of the theory of territorialism that
dominated the Dutch statutists. In its proper sense, the territorial nature of law predicates exclusive control by domestic
law in each jurisdiction. This theory, however enfeebled by
gradual concessions, is the exact antipode of private international law. This foundation of Beale's system was entirely
destroyed by Lorenzen and Cook. The revived theory of
vested rights by which Beale tried to maintain the doomed
principle of territorialism was successfully attacked by
Y ntema, Cook, Lorenzen, Heilmann, and, on the Continent,
by Arminjon, Wigny, and others who simultaneously were
particularly interested in combatting Pillet's kindred philosophy.85 In addition, many particular points peculiar to the Restatement were the object of special critical studies. Thus, a
new school has arisen, paralleling German efforts and promising further improvements.
France and Belgium. 86 The French masters of statutist
doctrine in the sixteenth century, d'Argentre and Dumoulin,
and their many disciples in the two succeeding centuries 37 established a tradition that has continued until recently, just as
the method of the postglossators in private law survived
after the Napoleonic codes for a considerable period into the
nineteenth century. This heritage, it would seem, included
various traits-a certain conservatism in method, an inclination toward a priori assumptions, an alert interest in the
problems presented in the courts, and comprehensive elaboration of the arguments involved in particular issues. Concurrently, the influence of Story and Savigny added new
elements. A large number of talented authors assured the
85 See infra pp. 23ff.
86 Treatises of FOELIX, BoUCHER, V AREILLES-SOMMIERES, BARTIN, PILLET,
WEISS, AUDINET, DESPAGNET, VALERY, SURVILLE, NIBOYET, LEREBOURB-PIGEONNIERE, ARMINJON {the last three now leading).
Belgium: LAURENT, ROLIN, POULLET {the last now leading).
87 Most famous: FROLAND (published 1729, died 1746) j BOULLENOIS {168o1762) j BOUHIER {1673-1746).
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French literature a leading role, more completely justified
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth than in the sixteenth or the eighteenth. Richly documented treatises by Laurent, Boucher, and
Rolin were followed by the original systems of V areillesSommieres (I897), Bartin (Etudes 1897, I899), and Pillet
(Principes I903, Traite I923-1924). Andre Weiss (Traite
I 892-I 90 5) consolidated theory and practice in a comprehensive work, in which the nationality principle was brought
to its climax. Numerous periodicals, headed by the Journal
de droit international of Clunet (I874-) and the Revue de
droit international prive published by Darras (I 90 5-)' in
addition to the Dictionnaire de droit international prive published by Vincent and Penaud in I888, 38 collected so many
French and foreign decisions that, as early as 1905, H. Donnedieu de Vabres was able to describe the "evolution" 39 of
the French practice in a monograph.
Bartin, Niboyet, Pillet's outstanding disciple, and Arminjon, a critically-minded former judge at the Egyptian Mixed
Tribunals, continued this brilliant literature. These and
other modern writers have constantly studied the judicial decisions and meditated on general problems such as public
policy, formalities of legal acts, capacity, matrimonial property law, etc., while the courts have been interested in the
theoretical as well as the practical aspects of the cases. The
Revue has been continued in two rival periodicals edited, respectively, by Niboyet and La Pradelle, who formerly had
jointly published the useful Repertoire de droit international
prive in ten volumes.
The French manner of conceiving conflicts problems conss R.
(Paris,
39 H.
matiere

VINCENT et E. PENAUD, Dictionnaire de droit international prive
x888-x889).
DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, L'evolution de Ia jurisprudence fram;aise en
de conllits des lois (Paris, 1905).
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tains a two-fold weakness. The tradition deriving from d'Argentre, the French predecessor of Ulricus Huber, has laid an
extraordinary emphasis upon the national interest. The following chapters dealing with the law of persons will show
the devastating effect of innumerable open or concealed considerations of French ((ordre public." For decades, writers
sharply criticized the tendency of the courts to apply French
law despite the ordinary principles of conflicts law, but, more
recently the Traite of Niboyet ( 1938) and the Precis of
Lerebours-Pigeonniere ( 1928), undoubtedly the two leading French works, testify to a violent struggle between the
nationality principle, expounded by Andre Weiss and his followers, and the fears and wishes of an apprehensive, ambitious territorialism, represented by a movement, reflecting
the interests of an immigration c'fntry, that accentuates the
peculiarities of French legislation. On the other hand, the
individualism and independent judgment characterizing
French judges and jurists, which produce an abundance of
ideas within the limits of their methods, have resulted in a
curious instability. In many topics of conflicts law, every conceivable opinion has its advocate. Neither writers nor courts
feel bound by precedent. Consequently, French conflicts law
as a whole presents a great wealth of inspiring conceptions,
attended by a degree of uncertainty, if not chaos, that is
scarcely compatible with the very purpose of this branch of
law.
ltaly.40 Dionisio Anzilotti, eminent scholar of international public law, has devoted a part of his work to conflicts
law and is to be regarded in both fields as the founder of an
important school, which also includes Cavaglieri, Salvioli, 41
and Udina. At a relatively early date, Diena published mono40 Treatises: FIORE, DIENA, GABBA, ANZILOTTI, CAVAGLIERI, UDINA, PACCHIONI, FEDOZZI, Aco, GEMMA, Bosco, SCERNI.
41 G. SALVIOLI, Storia del diritto italiano (Torino, 1930).
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graphs on international commercial law (I900-1905) and
the principles of private international law (1908-19I0). In
the 1930's, a succinct manual by Pacchioni (I930) and a
perspicacious treatise by Fedozzi ( 1935), accompanied under his leadership by works of other writers on ecclesiastical,
commercial and procedural conflicts, continued the Italian
tradition. This tradition has been characterized by refined
abstract theory, nourished by intimate knowledge of the
French and German developments. While Anzilotti possessed a high sense of practicality, his successors have more
and more yielded to the scholastic passion for formulae and
dialectic argument. Italian writers have been the last in Europe to consider court decisions. Fortunately, the light has
recently been seen by the younger authors noted below.
The distinguished periodical founded by Anzilotti in
1906, the Rivista di diritto internazionale, includes important contributions to conflicts law, but only few selected decisions. Fedozzi founded a promising Rivista italiana di diritto internazionale privata e processuale ( 193 I-I 932),
which was ended by his lamented death.
Other Latin countries. Numerous meritorious compendiums related to the French, Belgian and Italian literature on
conflicts law have been published in Argentina (Zeballos,
Calandrelli, Alcorta, Romero del Prado and, now leading,
Vico), Brazil (Clovis Bevilaqua, Rodrigo Octavio, Pontes
de Miranda, Eduardo Espinola and his son) , Colombia
( Restrepo-Hernandez), Cuba (De Bustamante), Guatemala (Matos), Rumania (Antonescu), and Spain (Lasala
Llanas, Trias de Bes) .
The Netherlands. During this period, three outstanding
works appeared, namely those of Asser (I 8 So), Jitta
( I 9 I 6) , and Kosters ( I 9 17).
Germany. In Germany there was a less known statutist
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school from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, 42 when
Waechter destroyed the entire doctrine (I 842) .48 The modern development was brilliantly inaugurated by Savigny in
44
I 849. His theories were accepted both by Roman law scholars such as Seuffert, Keller, Holzschuher, Unger, Windscheid, and Regelsberger and by students of German legal
history like Walter, Gerber, Baseler, Roth, and Gierke. 45
Although an admirer of Savigny, Bar (I 862), in his works,
especially in the second edition of his treatise, entitled
Theory and Practice (I 889), took a distinct position, joining
theoretical conception with profound study of civil and common law cases and presenting, for the first time since Story,
a comprehensive comparative law of conflicts. Zitelmann's
highly refined system and the penetrating analytical studies
of Franz Kahn, as well as the historical works of Neumeyer,
characterized the high level of scientific treatment in Germany at the turn of the century. Leading decisions were reproduced in the Zeitschrift fur I nternationales Recht of
Bohm, later Niemeyer. Gebhard's drafts of the law of
46
I 896
and the commentaries thereon by Niemeyer, Habicht
and Niedner are noteworthy.
Nevertheless, this literature was sporadic and heterogeneous, without definite working plan and method. The courts
struggled for principles; their decisions, although by no
means negligible, were not conveniently digested and, conse42 Thorough survey and criticism by WAECHTER, 24 Arch. Civ. Prax.
( 1841) 230 ff., and BAR § 19 ff.; see for the names also GUTZWILLER, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 329-331.
43 WAECHTER's series of articles entitled "Ueber die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten," appeared in 24 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1841)
230 ff., 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1842) Iff., 161 ff., 361 ff.
44 On SAVIGNY's work and effect: GuTZWILLER, Der Einlluss Savignys auf
die Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts ( 1923), and same, in 29 Recueil
1929 IV at 353·
4 5 For details see GUTZWILLER, Der Einlluss Savignys auf die Entwicklung
des Internationalprivatrechts so, 56.
46 Einfiihrungsgesetz of August 18, 1896.
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quently, were for the most part unknown. The German
courts, otherwise meticulous, often ignored the conflicts
problems hidden in cases.
In striking contrast to the richness of the French literature, for many years there was no textbook on conflicts law
in Germany, and a good Austrian handbook by Walker was
used in repeated editions by the few interested students.
Switzerland. 41 In the nineteenth century, only the legislation of Zurich aroused more than local interest from the
viewpoint of conflicts law. At the beginning of the present
century, the work of Meili, succeeding Brocher, was well
known. It has been followed more recently by the booklet of
Stauffer, by Beck's extensive commentary on the Swiss enactments, and finally by treatises on private and commercial
laws by Schnitzer.
Greece. 48 Greek legal science has exhibited much devotion
to private international law. There are excellent contributions of recent date by G. Streit and Maridakis.
3· New Orientation
Roughly speaking, it may be contended that, until about
I

92 5, in the Anglo-American orbit, the theoretical approach

and, in the Continental literature, the practical understanding, left very much to be desired. Had minds such as those of
Story and Bar continued to illuminate the way, grave mistakes and defects would have been avoided. The deplorable
state of this branch of law was worse than the experts would
acknowledge. A few overrated controversies were endlessly
discussed. Other problems, often involving the simplest questions of daily occurrence, were neglected. Few things were
certain, and there were more incongruities than in any other
field of law. It needed the unspoilt mind of a newcomer to
4 7 Treatises
48 Treatises

of
of

BROCHER, MEILI, STAUFFER, BECK, SCHNITZER.
KALLIGAS, CEKONOMIDES, KRASSAS, STREIT, MARIDAKIS.
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conflicts law to be appalled at the maze of confusion and injustice. Mancini's outburst at the absurd, deplorable anarchy
in the conflicts rules is famous. In 1879 Frederick Harrison
stated:
"There is a department of Law, the first principles of
which have been furiously disputed by lawyers; the canons of
which are hesitating and contradictory; the sources of which
are themselves a matter of argument; having an authority
which is most differently interpreted by doctors and judges;
and a sphere which is understood in various ways ;-and yet
this branch of Law is attaining in our day continual development and fresh importance from a variety of causes, and in
a manner often unobserved." ' 9
Each word of this indictment, despite all efforts, remained
true for half a century thereafter. Recently, Cook has described the American cases as "hopelessly contradictory and
chaotic," even on the simplest questions. 5° This situation, bad
enough in each particular country, is worse in a world in
which conflicts laws are inconsistent. A marriage may be
valid in one jurisdiction, invalid in another, previously valid
but dissolved in a third. Such is the state of the contractual
relation, regarded as the most solemn and sacred, whose existence or failure involves the most vital interests of the
spouses, their issue, and their relatives. The reaction of the
business world to the desperate plight of national conflicts
laws-in the words of a terrified corporation lawyer, a veritable labyrinth, 5 1-superimposed upon the divergent national
commercial laws, has resulted in a striking phenomenon; international commerce has devised an elaborate network of
arbitration and standard forms to eradicate these conflicts
laws so far as feasible.
Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws 98.
CooK, Legal Bases 136.
n R. FRANKEL, "Der Irrgarten des international en Privatrechts," 4 Z.ausl.
PR. (1930) 239, 241.
49 HARRISON,

50
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It is reassuring that a thorough revision now appears in
the offing. On the one hand, the technical revolution of the
means of communication reducing distances and destroying
isolation and, on the other, the political and economic upheaval caused by the first World War, have made it clear
that international life needs a better order. The peace and
postwar treaties and the numerous international tribunals
created after the war brought little improvement, but they
did exhibit appreciation of this need and at the same time
added a great many new problems.
In Germany/ 2 depressed and struggling for life, the situation was most acute, and the interest in foreign and international law became painfully alive. While, before the war, the
otherwise richest juridical literature of the world had left
comparative law and conflicts rules to very few scholars and
no funds seemed available in the prosperous prewar times for
research in these subjects, the distress of the war and postwar years reversed this attitude. The change of views was
distinctively reflected in the creation of two comprehensively
planned and broadly conceived institutes in Berlin, devoted
respectively to foreign and international private law and to
foreign public and internationallaw (I 924-1925) .53 In these
institutes, facts and legal phenomena were to be collected,
current problems defined, and the functions and purposes of
legal institutions clarified by comparative research. With respect to conflicts of laws, the German cases had first of all to
be collected. This undertaking was greatly facilitated by the
works of Lewald and Melchior, who each for his own handbook assembled the materials, both the older and more re52 Treatises: see text. Monographs and papers: DUDEN, EcKSTEIN, H. LEWALD, NEUNER, RAAPE, RABEL, RAISER, WAHL, WENGLER.
53 "Institut fiir ausliindisches und internationales Privatrecht" and "Institut
fiir ausliindisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht." For history and organization see RHEINSTEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1935) 232, 240.
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cent. In I 926, the Institute of Foreign and International Private Law initiated a yearbook of German decisions 54 and
commenced in its Review 55 to provide surveys of the foreign
cases. To signalize this modified outlook, the Review celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Reichsgericht ( I929)
in a series of articles constructing special doctrines on the
basis of judgments of this, the supreme court of Germany,
comparable to the American style of treatment and entirely
dissimilar to the usual European literature. It was one of the
tasks of the Institute to answer inquiries of German courts,
attorneys, and administrative authorities; in many hundreds
of opinions, information on conflicts matters was given, extending knowledge and intelligent use of the applicable rules
so that the gulf between theory and practice, which had existed since the end of the statutist period, was almost closed.
German lawyers were amazed at the number and quality
of the newly discovered precedents, which were soon given
attention by several handbooks. Lewald ( I930-I93 I) was
the first to renovate the German conflicts law (excepting
commercial matters) on the basis of decided cases, with wellconsidered conclusions. Melchior ( I 9 3 2), following the
form of Dicey's treatise, regarded the decisions as a true
source of law, supplementary to the Code; in this belief, he
inquired primarily into the ideas underlying the cases and
formulated rules of impressive originality. All other German
writers deny the binding force of case law. Nevertheless,
Nussbaum ( I932) in his treatise devoted primary attention
to cases and procedure and preferred a practical treatment
to theoretical analysis. Raape (I 9 3 I ) provided a profuse
exegesis of the provisions in the Introductory Law of I 896;
because of its explicitness, this book will be most frequently
54 Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des internationalen Privatrechts in den Jahren 1926 und 1927 (Berlin, 1928-).
55 Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht (Berlin,

1926-).
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cited in our survey as representing the German doctrines.
Finally, Martin Wolff (I 933) masterfully condensed the
subject matter in a textbook, small in size but rich in content.
More recently, Raape, the only one of these writers still in
Germany, published a commendable introduction to the present German conflicts law ( 1938-I939).
Thus, the long-standing scarcity of production was replaced during a few years by a vigorous stream of literature.
As deductive considerations gave way to practical studies,
many values were modified. However, it is not in the nature
of German students to sacrifice entirely systematic thinking
to empirical considerations. 56 In addition to the treatises
mentioned, the learned outlines by Gutzwiller ( 19 3 I) and
a number of monographs (Neuner, Raiser, Wengler, etc.)
contain good science. But for the time being too much had
and still has to be corrected to allow much generalization.
This new German school quickly influenced other European countries. In conservative England, the pitiful state of
conflicts law was suddenly subjected to refreshing criticism
by Foster 57 and Beckett; 58 a new handbook by Cheshire
challenged Dicey's leading treatise, the second edition appearing shortly after and extending the reforms suggested
in the first. An admirable collaborative undertaking was initiated in Italy. Through the endeavors of Salvatore Galgano,
commencing in 1927, several comprehensive periodicals were
inaugurated, covering and annotating foreign decisions; of
these, the Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale
privato continued after the outbreak of World War II.
56 This seems to be disapproved by NussBAUM, Book Review, 40 Col. L.
Rev. ( 1940) 1461, 1470, who condemns what he calls the new "logistic
school."
5 7 J. G. FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws,"
16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84.
5 8 BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46.
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Authors such as Babinski and Przybylowski in Poland, 59 and
younger scholars, including Vittorio Tedeschi and BalladorePallieri in Italy, Fragistas, Vallindas and Zepos in Greece,
von Steiger and Niederer in Switzerland, participate in this
practical international co-operation.
A little later than in Europe, a corollary reform began in
the United States and Canada. 60 Here, the enormous case
material had been assembled by Beale as the basis of the
Restatement. Immediately, new studies, criticizing antiquated
doctrines and correcting inaccurate terminology, appeared
by such eminent scholars as Lorenzen, Cook, Yntema,
Cheatham, Falconbridge in Canada, Harper, Griswold and
Stumberg, who also published a realistic handbook. Another
modern treatise was devoted to the conflicts law of one particular state, Arkansas, by Leflar. The methodological
postulates of this reform have recently been stated in Cook's
magistral Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
( I 942) . Numerous law review articles and a monograph or
two, such as Hancock's book on torts, 61 are promising for the
future development of this branch of law.
The American literature has attracted much attention in
France and Belgium, where its importance has been stressed
by Barbey, Leprt~tre, Wigny, and Batiffol, the last being the
best informed French expert on foreign conflicts law and
international needs.
A common feature of all these new attempts is the decided
turning from deductive methods to considerations of policy.
There are many other points of agreement, but also many
controversies as respects method. Private international law
59 LEON BABINSKI, Zarys Wykladu prawa miedzynarodowego prywatnego
(Outlines of Private International Law) Vol. I, I935; KAZIMIERZ PRZYBYLOWSKI, Prawo Prywatne Miedzynarodowe (Private International Law)
Vol. I, I935·
so See Cheatham, Cases, ix, x.
61 MOFFA1T HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflict of Laws, Michigan Legal
Studies (Ann Arbor, Chicago, I942).
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has again become a young science, and children do have
diseases.
It remains to summarize what has recently been done for
research in foreign conflicts law. In the first place, foreign
cases, enactments, and literature have been reproduced or
reviewed on a large scale in the publications of the abovementioned institutes in Berlin and Rome, 62 as well as in other
periodicals 63 and books of reference. 64 For an excellent collection of the enacted conflicts rules in force throughout the
world, as of 1953-an indispensable work-we have to
thank A. N. Makarov. 65 Under the auspices of the Hague
Academy of International Law, many competent lecturers
have treated the laws of particular countries as well as special problems of comparative interest. 66
In addition, Niboyet and La Pradelle, generously aided
62 Institute of Berlin: Zeitschrift fiir ausliindisches und internationales Privatrecht (since 1926/27), containing continuous reviews of conflicts law in
Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
selected decisions involving conflicts law in the United States, Scandinavian
cases, and reports from many other countries; Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf
dem Gebiete des internationalen Privatrechts ( 1928-) ; Beitriige zum ausliindischen und internationalen Privatrecht (1928-). Rome Institute for Legislative Studies (Instituto italiano di studi legislativi), editor GALGANO: Annu·
ario di·diritto comparato (1927-); Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale privato ( 1932-) (among seven periodicals).
68 Especially for Eastern Europe until World War II the periodicals of the
Institute in Breslau ( Osteqropa Institut) : Zeitschrift fiir osteuropiiisches
Recht ( 1925-1927), later merged with Ostrecht into Zeitschrift fiir Ostrecht
( 1927-1934) and finally again, Zeitschrift fiir osteuropiiisches Recht (Neue
Folge, 1934-1944). This tradition is continued since 1955 by OsteuropaRecht ( 1955-).
Internationales J ahrbuch fiir Schiedsgerichtswesen, edited by ARTHUR
NussBAUM (Berlin, 1926-1934). American edition: International Year Book
on Civil and Commercial Arbitration (New York, 1928-).
Journal du droit international. Fonde par Clunet, continue par Andn!Prudhomme et Goldmann (1874-).
International Law Quarterly (1947-1951), continued as International and
Comparative Law Quarterly (1952-).
64 BERGMANN, Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht ( ed. 3, 1952).
65 MAKAROV, Die Quell en des internationalen Privatrechts. vol. I: Gesetzestexte ( ed. 2, 1953).
6 6 Published in Recueil des cours de l'Academie de droit international de Ia
Haye (1925-).
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by foreign contributors, have published the Repertoire de
droit international, which includes reports on the conflicts
laws of many countries, some not previously examined, as
well as articles on related topics in French law accompanied
by comparative observations. Much information is given in
the Rechtsvergleichendes H andworterbuch of Schlegelberger, in which the conflicts laws of the world were, for the
first time, described in an excellent, though sketchy, synthetic
review ( 1933) .67 The treatise on Greek Priva'te lnternanational Law ( 1937) of the distinguished Greek diplomat
and scholar, G. Streit, and his valiant disciple, Vallindas,
admirably indicates the literary doctrines of all countries. In
the United States, Lorenzen 68 deserves commendation for
attracting the attention of the scholarly world to foreign
conflicts laws. Finally, Arthur K. Kuhn has coordinated on
broad lines American and European institutions of private
international law ( 1937) and Nussbaum has published a
volume of comparative observations on the general doctrines
of common law and civil law (1943). 69
4· Developments after World War II
The upheavals of the war and the post-war period, resulting in displacement of many millions of people, have
presented a variety of new conflicts of laws problems. In
Germany, absorbed by urgent practical issues, only the prewar books of Raape and Martin Wolff 69a have reappeared,
1nternationales Privatrecht, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. (1933) 32o-542.
See in particular LoRENZEN, "The French Rules of the Conflict of Laws,"
36 Yale L. ]. (1927) 731; 37 ibid. (1928) 849; 38 ibid. (1928) 165./d., "The
Conflict of Laws of Germany," 39 Yale L. J. (1930) 8o4; 40 ibid. (1931) 401.
69 Unfortunately I do not know more than the title of LEVY ULLMANN,
Cours generale de droit international prive selon Ia methode historique, jurisprudentielle et comparative ( annee universitaire 1931-1932) stenographie
publiee par "Les cours de droit" (licence, 3• annee).
69a RAAPE, Internationales Privatrecht (ed. 3, 1950; ed. 4, 1955); MARTIN
WoLFF, Das internationale Privatrecht Deutschlands ( ed. 2, 1949; ed. 3,
1954).
67

68
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each in two revised editions, reflecting in their supplements
the special problems of German interzonal law. Italy's new
codification of 1942 has given rise to the treatises of Ballaclore Pallieri, Monaco, and Morelli. 69b In France, still
strongly influenced by Niboyet's territorialism, as last embodied in his extensive Traite, 69c Lerebours-Pigeonniere's
Precis has been revived in three post-war editions and the
valuable Traite of Batiffol has been added. 69d Especially
gratifying is the active interest of English lawyers. Besides
the thoroughly revised post-par edition of Dicey's treatise
and new editions of Cheshire's and Martin Wolff's treatises,69e the English literature has been enriched by the books
of Graveson and Schmitthoff. 69 t In Spain, Goldschmidt's
comprehensive Sistema and the treatises of Arjona, Miaja,
Orue and Verplaetse are noteworthy, 69g and in Sweden those
of Gihl, Michaeli, and Karlgren. 69h In their respective
69b BALLADORE PALLIERI, Diritto internazionale privato (1946 j ed. 21 1950) j
MoNACO, Diritto internazionale privato (1943); Manuale di diritto internazionale pubblico e privato ( 1949) ; L'efficacia della Iegge nello spazio (VAsSALLI, Trattato di diritto civile italiano vol. I, 4) (1952); MORELLI, Elementi
di diritto internazionale privato italiano (ed. 2, 1949; ed. 41 I955).
69c NIBOYET, Traite de droit international prive fran<;ais ( vol. I and z,
I938; vol. I, ed. 2, I947i vol. 2, ed. 2, I95Ii vol. 3, I944i vol. 4 1 1947; vol. 5,
I 948 ; vol. 6, I 949-50).
69d LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, Precis de droit international prive ( ed. 41 I946 j
ed. 51 I947 i ed. 6, I954) ; BATIFFOL1 Traite elementaire de droit international
prive (ed. I, I949i ed. 2, I955).
69e DICEY, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict
of Laws (ed. 6, under the general editorship of MORRIS, I949); CHESHIRE,
Private International Law (ed. 4, I952i ed. 5, I957); MARTIN WOLFF, Private International Law (1945), (ed. 2, I950).
69f GRAVESON, The Conflict of Laws (1948) (ed. 2, I952, ed. 3, I955);
ScHMITTHOFF, The English Conflict of Laws (I945), (ed. 2, 1948; ed. 3, I954).
6Dg WERNER GoLDSCHMIDT, Sistema y Filosofia del Derecho Internacional
Privado (vol. I, I948, ed. 2, I952; vol. 2, I949, ed. 2, I954); ARJONA, Derecho Internacional Privado ( I949, I954); MIAJA DE LA MUELA, Derecho
Internacional Privado (vol. I, I954i vol. 2, I955); ORUE, Manual de Derecho Internacional Privado (ed. 3, 1952); VERPLAETSE, Derecho internacional
privado ( I954) ·
6Dh GIHL, Den Internationella Privatrattens Historia och Allmanna Principer (I95I); MICHAELI, Internationales Privatrecht gemass schwedischem
Recht und schwedischer Rechtsprechung (1948); KARLGREN, Kortfattad Larobok i Internationell Privat-och Processriit ( I950).
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countries, the treatises of Borum (Denmark), Brake! (the
Netherlands), Poullet and de Vos (Belgium), Schnitzer and
Niederer (Switzerland), Maridakis (Greece), Blagojevic
and Eisner (Yugoslavia), and Lunz (Soviet Russia), are
representative. 69 J
In the Americas, the fertility of the Latin-American production and the scarcity of the Anglo-American literature
are in strange contrast with the practical importance of conflict of laws in their respective areas. In the United States,
the two standard works of Goodrich and Stumberg have
been re-edited. 69 k In Canada, the new enlarged edition of
Falconbridge's Essays 691 comes close to being a treatise.
Among the recent Latin-American publications, the treatises
of Romero del Prado, Ennis and Sapena (Argentina),
Alb6nico and Duncker (Chile), Tenorio and Valladao
(Brazil), Quintin Alfonsin (Uruguay), Salinas (Bolivia),
Caicedo and Cock (Colombia) , and Ortiz (Costa Rica) are
valuable. 69m
69j BoRUM, Lovkonflikter ( ed. 3, I948); VAN BRAKEL, Grondslagen en
Beginselen van Nederlandsch Internationaal Privaatrecht (ed. z, I95o; ed.
3, I953); POULLI!T, Manuel de Droit International Prive Beige (ed. 3, I947);
DE Vos, Le Probleme des Conflits de Lois (vol. I and z, I946); ScHNITZER,
Handbuch des Internationalen Privatrechts (vol. I and z, ed. 3, I950);
NIEDERER, Einfiihrung in die allgemeinen Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts (I954; ed. z, I956); MARIDAKIS, IAinTIKON AIE9NE~ AIKAION
(Private International Law) (vol. I, I95o; vol. 11/I, I954; 11/z, I956);
BLAGOJEVIC, Medunarodno privatno pravo (I950); EISNER, Medunarodno
privatno pravo ( I953) ; LuNZ, Me.lK.I{yHapo.I{HOe lJacTHoe TipaBO (Private
International Law) (I949)·
69k GOODRICH, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws (ed. 3, 1949); STUMBERG,
Principles of Conflict of Laws (ed. z, I95I).
G9l FALCONBRIDGE, Essays on the Conflict of Laws (ed. 2, I954).
69m ROMERO DEL PRADO, Manual de Derecho Internacional Privado (vol. I
and 2, I944); ENNIS, Derecho Internacional Privado ( I953); SAPENA, Derecho Internacional Privado (vol. I, I944); ALB6NICO, Manual de Derecho
Internacional Privado (vol. I and 2, I950) ; DuNCKER, Derecho Internacional
Privado (I950); TEN6RIO, Direito Internacional Privado (ed. z, I949; ed. 3,
I953) ; VALLADAO, Estudios de direito internacional privado ( I947) ; QUINTIN
ALFONSIN, Curso de derecho privado internacional ( I955) ; SALINAS, Manual
de Derecho Internacional Privado (ed. 2, I948); CAICEDO, Derecho lnternacional Privado (vol. I and 2, I949); CocK, Tratado de Derecho Internacional Privado (ed. 4, I952); ORTIZ, Curso de Derecho Internacional
Privado (I947)·
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In the field of comparative conflict of laws, studies restricted to two countries form a new development, designed
primarily for practical purposes. This type of comparative
study, inaugurated in booklet form by the "Bilateral Studies" edited by Nussbaum, 69n has achieved a high degree of
perfection in a binational co-operative work on the FrancoGerman conflict of laws in the field of domestic relations. 690

III.
I.

SouRCES

Codifications

The first considerable codification of conflicts rules was
provided in articles 7 to 3 I, inclusive, of the Introductory
Law that accompanied the German Civil Code of I896.
This body of rules had been elaborated carefully by Gebhard but, for somewhat obscure reasons, allegedly political,
was reduced by Bismarck and the upper House so as to cover
in its final form only a part of the subject matter. Contracts
are left out entirely, and most rules are limited to cases in
which the application of German law is required (so-called
unilateral rules). What is more, these provisions lack the
elaborate detail work for which the Code is famous. Nevertheless, the task was novel, and the skill and precision employed were high enough to impress contemporaries. Subsequently, this part of the German law served as a model for a
slightly more extensive Japanese Law of June IS, I898, and
for a similar Chinese Law of August 5, I9I8. The Hague
san Bilateral Studies in Private International Law ( ed. by NUSSBAUM,
vol. I) ; NussBAUM, American-Swiss Private International Law, 1951; vol. 2,
DELAUME, American-French Private International Law, 1953; vol. 3, KoLLEWIJN, American-Dutch Private International Law, 1955; vol. 4, DOMKE,
American-German Private Law Relations. Cases 1945-1955, 1956) ; vol. 5,
EDER, American-Colombian Private International Law, 1956; vol. 6, EHRENZWEIG, FRAGISTAS, and YIANNOPOULOS, American-Greek Private International
Law, 1957; vol. 7, PHILIP, American-Danish Private International Law, 1957.
690
Le droit international prive de Ia famille en France et en Allemagne
( 1954) ; German ed.: Das internationale Familienrecht Deutschlands und
Frankreichs ( 1954).
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Conventions of I902 and I905 on divers matters of conflicts law were based on the same principles, and they were
in turn closely followed by the Swedish statutes of July 8,
I904, amended by later laws, and of June I, I9I2. Also,
the excellent Austrian draft of I 9 I 3 of an international
private law was conceived on the same lines; it served as the
basis of the important Polish Law of August 2, I926 (whose
principal author Zoll had been a member of the Vienna draft
committee), as well as for the Czechoslovakian Law of
March I I, I948. Indirectly, the German law has influenced
all more recent legislative projects in Europe.
The Code Napoteon of I804 devoted to the problem of
its territorial application only one article of the preliminary
title and a few other dispersed provisions, and in European
France there was no subsequent codification. Likewise, the
Austrian Civil Code (I 8 I I), which is still in force in some
regions, was satisfied with a few superficial rules ( §§ 4, 3437, 300), in contrast to the Prussian Landrecht (1794),
which incorporated more comprehensive provisions, partly
based on statutist doctrine (see, e.g., Introduction, §§ 2 7-49)
and partly representing original ideas. The European and
Latin American civil codes of the French type have retained
the custom of touching on conflicts in a preliminary title, or
law, but with gradual additions, for instance, Italy (I 86 5,
and enlarged in I 9 3 8 and I 942), the Netherlands ( I 8 29),
Quebec ( I866), Brazil ( I942).
Recently, such preliminary provisions have taken the shape
of short codifications in the civil codes of Greece (I 940),
Peru (I936),Egypt (I948),andSyria (I949). 70
7° Also the modified Civil Code of Rumania of 1940, published in the
Monitorul Oficial no. 2o6 of September 6, 1940, contained in its preliminary
provisions a codification of conflict rules. The code, however, never entered
into force after its effective date had been deferred to an undetermined
future time (Decree-law 4 225 of December 30, 1940, Monitorul oficial no.
306 of December 31, 1940); German translation 54 Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft ( 1941) 221-229.
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Moreover, the statutory regulations of French Morocco
(I 9 I 3) and Spanish Morocco (I 9 I 4), concerning relations
between subjects and foreigners, include a number of modern
conflicts rules based on the French doctrines. In the absence
of codifications in the motherlands, these provisions are
often cited. Suggestions for legislation have been made by
learned societies. In particular, a draft of the Society for
Legislative Studies, concerning the status of foreigners in
France and of Frenchmen in foreign countries, 71 deserves
attention. Bartin considers this project as the legislation of
tomorrow/ 2 but it is a singular document of overstressed
nationalism.
A separate position has been taken by Switzerland. The
statute of June 25, I89I, was mainly a regulation of the
interstate conflicts between the Swiss cantons having at that
time full legislative power over private law. A few additional provisions incidentally considered Swiss citizens
abroad (arts. 28-3 I) and foreigners in Switzerland (arts.
32-34). In I9I2, when the Federal Civil Code of I907 became effective, the significance of the statute of I 89 I was
limited to cases of the latter type; thus, international private
law was left largely dependent upon these not too welldrafted sections and certain additions (C. C., final title,
art. 59). What the Federal Tribunal has been able to do
with this precarious legislation is noteworthy.
The most extensive national codification of conflicts law
has been undertaken in the tiny principality of Liechtenstein;
provisions dealing with conflicts have been inserted in the
various chapters of a recent civil code, which has been partially promulgated. This codification is a curious mixture of
71 Deliberations and Project have been published in Bulletin de Ia Societe
d'etudes legislatives; see the tentative draft in 24 ibid. ( 1928} 399; discussion
26 ibid. (1930) 76; and definitive text in 26 ibid. (1930) 175. BARTIN was
president and NIBOYET reporter of the draft committee.
12 BARTIN, ~ Principes 201.
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clauses inviting big finance and reflecting inordinate nationalism.78
2.

Special Legislation

Conflicts rules on special matters exist, of course, in many
countries. In numerous states of the United States, various
uniform laws and other statutes deal with the conflicts aspects of marriage and wills; also provisions on immovable
property, contracts and capacity are frequent. 74 There is but
one exceptional Federal enactment, 75 although Congress apparently has legislative power on the subject. 76
3· Multilateral Treaties
(a) Montevideo Treaties. The treaties on international
law of Montevideo of February I 2, I 8 89, are a worthy object of pride for the five countries that have ratified them,
viz., Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. 77
The first international agreements of their kind, they
achieved an extensive unification, remarkable despite the
73 See the review by WAHLE, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) I34·
74 An attempt to collect these and certain other statutory provisions has
been made by MAKAROV, Quellen.
75 U.S. C. tit. 22 § 72, see infra p. 257, n. I6I.
76 CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflicts of Laws," 89 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. ( I94I) 430, 441, 442; cf. also CHEATHAM, "Federal Control of Conflict
of Laws," 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. (I952-53) 581-606.
7 7Texts: Official (Spanish) text in ERNESTO RESTELLI, Aetas y tratados
del Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado, Montevideo
I888-I889 (I928).
French: MARTENS, IS Recueil general de traites, 2° serie, 424-453; German:
HECK in I Z.int.R. ( I89I) 339-340, 477-482; MElLI, Die Kodifikation des
internationalen Civil- und Handelsrechts ( I89I) I03-I 38.
History: Aetas de las sesiones del Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado, Buenos Aires, I889.
Literature: PRADIER-FODERE, "Le congres de droit international sudamericain et les traites de Montevideo," in 2I Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I889)
2I7-237, 561-577; SEGOVIA, El derecho internacional privado y el Congreso
sudamericano de Montevideo (Buenos Aires, I889); HECK, "Der Kongress
von Montevideo und das internationale Vertragsrecht der siidamerikanischen
Staaten," I Z.int.R. (I89I) 339-346, 477-483, 592-6oo; BEWES, "The Treaties
of Montevideo, Text of I889,'' 6 Grotius Soc. I92o, 59·
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close relationship of the legislations involved, facilitating
cooperation. Of this unification, the treaties concerned with
"international civil law" and "international commercial
law," in particular, will be considered in the appropriate
connections in the present book. To celebrate the fifty years'
anniversary of the treaties, a conference was held in Montevideo in 1939 and 1940, which adopted considerable modernizations of the old rules. 78 However, the new texts have
been ratified only by Uruguay and Argentina. For the most
part, conflicts rules are contained in the treaties respectively
concerning international "civil" law, the law of land commerce, and the law of maritime commerce. In the present
volume, the first of these treaties is of special interest and
will be referred to as the treaty of Montevideo.
(b) Hague Conventions. Widely praised but much less
comprehensive, the Hague Conventions of 1902 and 1905
were concluded only after arduous efforts. 79 Their provisions
78 Segundo Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado de
Montevideo, 1939-1940, published by Facultad de derecho y ciencias sociales,
Institute argentino de derecho internacional. For a first view of the contents,
see RABEL, "The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Conflicts," in 39 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1941) 517. English translation by J. IRRIZARRY
y PUENTE and G. L. WILLIAMS in 37 Am. ]. Int. Law, number 3, July, 1943·
79 Conventions of The Hague of 1902 and 1905. Official (French) text in
MARTENS, 3 I Recueil general de traites, 2° serie, 706-715; 6 ibid., 3" serie,
48o-489·
English translation by ARTHUR H. KUHN, in F. MEILI, International Civil
and Commercial Law (1905) 532; German translation in German Reichsgesetzblatt 1904, 221 If.; RGBI. 1909, 409 If., RGBI. 1912, 453 ff.; reproduced
in MAKAROV, Die Quellen des internationalen Privatrechts (1929) 336 If., 342
If.; Italian translation in AMEDEO GIANNINI, Le convenzoni dell'Aja di diritto
internazionale privato {Roma, 1925).
On the history of the Hague Conventions see Actes de Ia Conference de Ia
Haye, chargee de reglementer diverses matieres de droit international prive
(13-27 septembre 1893) (2 vols. in r, LaHaye, 1893); Actes de Ia Deuxieme
Conference de Ia Haye chargee etc. (25 juin-13 juillet 1894) (La Haye,
1894); Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia Haye pour le droit international prive (29 mai-r& juin 1900) {LaHaye, 1900); Actes et documents de
Ia Quatrieme Conference de Ia Haye pour le droit international prive ( r6
mai-17 juin 1904) (LaHaye, 1904). Provisions of national law and cases relating to the Conventions: J. KosTERS and F. BELLE MANs, Les conventions de
Ia Haye de 1902 et 1905 sur le droit international prive (La Haye, 1921),
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cover but a few selected questions, and these they answer
with many reservations on the part of the reluctant member
states. With the exception of the relatively popular procedural treaty, they were ratified by only a few, though important, states and later partially deserted even by some of
these.
In 1954, 79a the conventions were binding upon the following states:
(i) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws in regard
to Marriage, of June 12, 1902.
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory),
Sweden, Switzerland.
(ii) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws and jurisdictions in regard to Divorce and Separation, of June
12, 1902.

Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Rumania (old territory).
(iii) Convention to regulate the Guardianship of Minors,
of June 12, 1902.
Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
continued by surveys in 6 Bulletin de l'lnstitut intermediaire international
( 1922 ff.), since 1933 under title of Bulletin de l'Institut juridique international. Literature: F. KAHN, Die Dritte Haager Staatenkonferenz fiir internationales Privatrecht, in Griinhut's Z. vols. 12, 13, and IS (1903, 1905), also
in KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 37-178, 303-444. BUZZATI, Trattato di diritto interna2ionale privato secondo le convenzioni dell'Aja (Milano, 1907); also French
by F. REY (Paris, I9II). MEILI and MAMELOK, Das internationale Privatund Civilprozessrecht auf Grund der Haager Konventionen (Ziirich, 191I);
LEWALD, "Haager Konventionen zum internationalen Privatrecht," in STRUPP,
I Wi:irterbuch des Vi:ilkerrechts und der Diplomatie 454-481; HEINSHEIMER,
"Haager Zivilprozessabkommen," ibid. 487. M. TRAVERS, La Convention de
Ia Haye relative au mariage (2 vols., Paris, 1912); TRAVERS, La Convention
de Ia Haye relative au divorce et a Ia separation de corps (Paris, 1909);
TRAVERS, "La Convention de Ia Haye relative a Ia tutelle des mineurs et les
accords anterieurs passes par Ia France," Revue 1912, 641.
79a See 43 Revue Crit. (1954) 893.
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( iv) Convention concerning the conflict of laws relating
to the Effects of Marriage on the rights and duties of
the spouses in their personal relations and on the property of the spouses, of July I 7, I 90 5.
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Rumania (old territory), Sweden.
( v) Convention concerning Interdiction and similar
Measures of Protection, of July I7, I905. (Interdiction means the deprivation of an adult's competency to
act legaiiy.)
Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Sweden.
(vi) Convention concerning Civil Procedure, of July 17,
I 90 5 (treats only the participation of foreigners in
lawsuits).
Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
France (as to the signatories of the protocol of ratification of July 4, I924), Germany, Hungary, Israel,
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Yugoslavia.
During both World Wars, it was disputed whether conventions were suspended as between the belligerent groups.
Italian and Dutch courts negatived the question. 5° The peace
treaties after World War I enumerated only the conventions
mentioned under (iii) and (vi) among the multilateral conventions to be revived.soa The peace treaties after World
80 Leading in Italy App. Venezia (Oct. 9, 1917) Giur. Ita!. 1917, I 2, 440,
in the Netherlands H. R. (Apr. 2, 1948} N. J. 1948 no. 442; compare also
Allen v. Clark (1947), 331 U.S. 503, for a bilateral treaty. For termination
of a bilateral treaty, the French Cour de Cassation in an important decision
(Cass. p!en. civ., June 22, 1949) 77 Clunet (1950) 122. For other cases and
opinions, see AuBIN, 5· Beiheft zur Deutschen Rechts-Zeitschrift (1948) 1o;
VERPLAETSE, 2 Revista Espaii. Der. Int. (1948) 501 j PLISCHKE, 48 Am. J.
Int. Law (1954) 245.
soa But several conventions were reinstated later by bilateral agreements;
see MAKARov, Quellen (1929) 335, 342, 346, 352, 356.
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War II were deliberately tacit on this point, the prevailing
opinion being that multilateral treaties are only suspended
during the war. Bob
A very important step has been taken by the Protocol
signed at The Hague, March 27, 193 I, recognizing the
competence of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
now the International Court of Justice,B 1 to interpret the
Hague conventions on private international law, now binding on Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden.
(c) C6digo Bustamante. This is a complete codification
in 437 sections, including the entire international private law
in 29 5 sections and in the remainder criminal and procedural
conflicts law. Drafted by the Cuban jurist, Antonio Sanchez
de Bustamante y Sirven, this Code of International Private
Law was adopted at the Sixth Pan-American Conference in
Havana on February 20, 1928, 82 and has been ratified by
fifteen Latin American states, viz., 83
BOb Note, 46 Am. J. Int. Law (1952) 532. Doubtful cases are settled in
bilateral agreements. Thus, the applicability of The Hague conventions to
the Federal Republic of Germany was expressly stipulated as respects its
former enemies of World War II situated west of the Iron Curtain, except
Belgium as to the Convention on Guardianship and Portugal as to the Convention on Civil Procedure.
81 Between member states of the Statute of the new court the attribution of
competence to the former court is substituted (art. 37 of the Statute) ; see 43
Revue Crit. (1954) 896.
B2 Spanish text with Portuguese, French and English translations in 86
League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 711; English and French in HuosoN,
4 Int. Legislation 2279 No. 186, 2283 No. 186a; French by PAUL GouLE in
NIBOYET et GouLi, 2 Recueil de textes usuels de droit international (1929)
508. Also in BUSTAMANTE y SrRVEN, Le Code de droit international prive et
Ia Sixieme Conference panamericaine (1929) 150. In German, books I and II
by MAKAROV and REUPKE, in MAKAROV, Que lien ( 1929) 397-418.
On the history of the Code, see ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BusTAMANTE y
SrRVEN, La Comisi6n de jurisconsultos de Rio de Janeiro y el derecho internacional (Habana, 1927), translated by GOULE: La Commission des jurisconsultes de Rio de Janeiro et le droit international (Paris, 1928); El C6digo de
Derecho Internacional Privado y Ia VI. Conferencia panamericana (Habana,
1929), translated by GouLE: Le Code de droit international prive et Ia VI"
Conference panamericaine (Paris, 1929).
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Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
Bolivia and Peru, having adhered to both the Montevideo
Treaties and the Havana Treaty, have authoritatively declared the former to prevail in their relations with each
other. 84
(d) Scandinavian Treaty. Extensive legislative cooperation among the Scandinavian countries, 85 fostered by their
historic affinity, has found significant expression with respect
to conflicts law in a convention concluded in Stockholm on
February 6, 1931, by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden, containing "provisions of private international
Literature: See primarily the works of the author of the Code, ANTONIO
SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE y SIRVEN (cited in the Jist of abbreviations), including his discussion of the application of the Code to Cuba in his Manual de
derecho internacional privado (Habana, 1939). AUDINET, "Un pro jet de Code
de droit international prive," Revue 1927, I; FRAGA, "Die Kodifikation des
internationalen Privatrechts in Amerika," I Z.ausl.PR. ( 1927) 563; KUHN,
Book Review, 20 Am.]. Int. Law (1926) 631; 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 480.
8 3 For ratification and accessions to this and the subsequently mentioned
treaties, see League of Nations, Official No. A.6.1939. Annex I. V.
8 4 In signing the C6digo Bustamante, Bolivia reserved its obligations under
the Montevideo Treaties. This has been held decisive for the relations between Bolivia and Peru by the Supreme Court of the latter country. Decision
of Gonzalez, Dec. 7, 1935, 2 Tratados, convenciones y acuerdos vigentes entre
el Peru y otros Estados (1936) 516; Lurs G. ALVARADO, Apuntes de derecho
internacional (1940) 6o.
85 Relatively uniform legislation on marriage, adoption and guardianship
was introduced in Sweden, Denmark and Norway from 1917 to 1927, and
Finland approximated its laws to this convention in 1925 and 1929. Conventions, including Iceland, followed on: Collection of Maintenance Allowances,
of February 10, 1931 (English and French translations in 126 League of Nations Treaty Series (1932) 51; HUDsON, 5 Int. Legislation 885 No. z8z); on
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, of March 16, 1932 (139 League
of Nations Treaty Series (1934) 181; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 6 No. 305);
on Bankruptcy, of November 7, 1933 (155 League of Nations Treaty Series
(I935) I33; HuDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 496 No. 35I); and on Inheritance and
Succession, of November I9, I934 (164 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1935) 279; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 947 No. 397, 953 No. 397a). Cf.
UDDGREN, 9 Z.ausl.PR. (I935) 5I3; MARKS VON WURTEMBERG, IO Z.ausl.PR.
( I936) 711.
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law in the field of marriage, adoption, and guardianship," in
force from January I, I932. 86
(e) Conventions on Negotiable Instruments. Substantial
success was attained in the two Geneva conventions of I930
and I93I 1 providing a Uniform Law of Bills of Exchange
and a Uniform Law of Checks: 87
(i) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of
laws in connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, of June 7, I930, in force from January I,
I934·
Austria, Belgium, Danzig, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal (without colonies),
Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland.
( ii) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of
laws in connection with Checks, of March I9 1 I93 I, in
force from January I, I934·
B 6 English and French translations in u6 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1931) 141; HunsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 877 No. 281,884 No. 28n; German
translation and comment by BLOCH in 8 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1934) 627; VIGGO BENTZEN-HAMMERICH, "La recente Union scandinave de droit international prive,"
Revue 1934, 855.
8 7 Official French and English texts in 143 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1934) 317, 332, 409, 424; HUDsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 550 No. 259, 558 No.
259a, and 915 No. 284, 924 No. 284a.
Comments: HUDSON and FELLER, "The International Unification of Laws
Concerning Bills of Exchange," 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) 333 at 370; FELLER,
"The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks," 45 Harv. L. Rev.
(1932) 668 at 692i ARMINJON et CARRY, La Iettre de change et le billet a
ordre (Paris, 1938); LESCOT, La nouvelle legislation de Ia lettre de change
(Paris, 1937) ; PERCEROU et BouTERON, La nouvelle legislation fram;aise et
internationale de Ia lettre de change, du billet a ordre et du cheque (Paris,
1937); XAVIER }ANNE, "L'unification internationale des lois sur les effets de
commerce," 56 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1929) 52, I SYMMIKTA STREIT
( 1939) 477-483; LENHOFF, Einfiihrung in das einheitliche Wechselrecht,
(Wien, Berlin, 1933); QuAssowsKI, "Die Genfer Abkommen iiber die Vereinheitlichung des Wechselrechts," 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 770; DE SEMO,
"L'unificazione intemazionale del diritto cambiario," 7 Annuario Dir. Comp.
(1932) 220.
Decisions: v. Bargen, Internationale Rechtsprechung zum Genfer einheitIichen Wechsel- und Scheckrecht (1954).
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Danzig, Denmark (except Greenland), Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal
(without colonies), Sweden, Switzerland.
On the fringe of the war, the three Baltic countries
adopted a slightly modified version of all six Geneva conventions; 87a after the war, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
enacted the Geneva conflict rules in their internal legislation.87b

(f) Other multilateral efforts. On the fringe of our subject matter, recent important conventions have been concluded on the following topics : 88
(i) Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened for signature at Geneva, September 24, 1923. 89
Alabama, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (and
many parts of the British commonwealth), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Danzig, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monaco,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand.
(ii) Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, opened for signature at Geneva, September 26, 1927. 90
87a Convention providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes between Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia from April 8, 1938
(official French text and English translation in 191 League of Nations Treaty
Series II9)· See v. Nottbeck, 5 Z.osteurop.R. (1939) 604.
87b Yugoslavian Law on Bills of Exchange (Dec. u, 1946) art. 94-100, to
which also the Law on Promissory Notes (Dec. 26, 1946) refers (art. 23) ;
Czechoslovakian Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Dec. 22,
1950), title I §§ 91-98, title II §§ 69-75 (German and French translations of
all texts: MAKAROV, Quellen).
88 See list of ratifications and accessions League of Nations, Official No.
A.6.1939· Annex I.V.
89 27 League of Nations Treaty Series (1924) 157; MARTENS, 19 Nouveau
recueil general de traites 3• serie, 156; HunsoN, 2 Int. Legislation 1062 No. 98.
90 92 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 301; HuosoN, 3 Int. Legislation 2153 No. 183.
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Austria, Belgium, Great Britain (and parts of the
British commonwealth), Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Danzig, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand.
(iii) Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, opened for signature at The Hague, April 12, I930, in force from
July I, I937· 91
Ratifications or accessions until August 28, I939, by
Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (all territories), Canada, Australia, India, China, Monaco, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Sweden.
(iv) Simultaneously with the Convention under (iii), a
"Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness"
and a "Special Protocol concerning Statelessness" have
been concluded, 92 the first of which is in force from
July I, I937 in Brazil, Great Britain (with all territories), Australia, South Africa, India, Chile, China,
the Netherlands, Poland, El Salvador.
( v) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
opened for signature at Geneva, July 28, I95 I, with
the important conflicts rule of art. I 2 on the personal
status of refugees. 92a Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany (Federal Republic)
Great Britain, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia.
91 Text from League of Nations Document, C.224.M.x n.1930.V; HuDSON,
5 Int. Legislation 359 No. 249·
92
League of Nations Document, C.zz6.M.n3.I930.V; League of Nations
Document, C.227.M.II4.1930.V., HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 381 No. 251 and
387 No. 252.
92
a 189 United Nations Treaty Series (1954) 137; French text also 43 Revue
Crit. (1954) 245·
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More conflicts rules have been established in multipartite
conventions providing uniform treatment of such matters as
communication and transportation, with respect to problems
that proved inaccessible to unification. 93
(g) Drafts. The tireless efforts of the Dutch Government in promoting the Hague Conferences on conflicts law
were continued in I925, I928, 94 I95I 195 and 1956, 95 a andresulted in elaborate treaty drafts regarding the law of succession on death ( 1925 and I928), bankruptcy ( 1902 and
I928), on the recognition of foreign corporations, renvoi,
and civil procedure ( I95 I), on transfer of title and jurisdiction in international sales, support of minors, and execution
of support titles (I 9 56), which were not ratified. The
draft on uniform conflicts rules for the sale of goods
(I 9 5 I), which also was not ratified, is outstanding. 95 b Moreover, certain provisions supplementary to the earlier conventions, referring in particular to persons without nationality or having more than one nationality, were adopted
9s For example, see the rules concerning aviation, enumerated by HuDSON,
4 Int. Legislation 2354·
9 4 Conference de Ia Haye de droit international prive. Actes de Ia Cinquieme Session tenue du I2 octobre au 7 novembre I925 (La Haye, 1926).
Documents relatifs a Ia Cinquieme Session (La Haye, I926). Actes de Ia
Sixieme Session tenue du 5 au 28 janvier I928 (La Haye, 1928). Documents
relatifs a Ia Sixieme Session tenue du 5 au 28 janvier I928 (LaHaye, I928).
See accounts by KosTERS in Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I 926) I 56, 245 ;
(I928) 8I3i (I929) 308, 79Ii TRAVERS, Revue I926, 220j VOLKMAR, JW,
I926, 307 i I928, 857 i }ULL!OT DE LA MORANDIERE, CJunet I928, 28I.
95 Conference de Ia Haye de droit international prive. Actes de Ia Septieme
Session tenue du 9 au 3I octobre I951 (La Haye I952). Documents relatifs a
Ia Septieme Session (La Haye I952). English translation of the draft conventions in I Am. J. Comp. Law (I952) 275-288, German translation in 17
Z.ausl.PR. (I952) 269. Comments by DE WINTER [I951] Nederlands Juristenblad 877; DE LA MoRANDIERE, 4I Revue Crit. ( I952) 5; DoLLE, I7
Z.ausl.PR. (I952) I6I; KUHN, 46 Am. ]. Int. Law (1952) 5I5; and on the
desirability of future American cooperation NADELMANN, I Am. ]. Comp.
Law (I952) 268; REESE, 5 ibid. (I956) 611.
95
a Text in 45 Revue Crit. (1956) 746 ff., English translation in 5 Am. J.
Comp. Law (I956) 65o-66I. DE LA MORANDIERE, 46 Revue Crit. (1957) I.
95
b Comments by DE CASTRO, 5 Revista Espafi. Der. Int. ( I952) 765; NIAL
and DENNEMARK, 40 Svensk Juristtidning ( I955) 8I; and supra n. 95· Former
drafts are reprinted in GuTZWILLER and NIEDERER, Beitriige zum Haager
International-privatrecht I95I (Freiburg/Schweiz, I95I) 64 ff.
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and, although not ratified, apparently have had some influence. Both political contrasts and doctrinal controversies
contributed to all these failures.
Also, the Convention on uniform rules of Private International Law, concluded on May I I, I 9 5 I, by Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxemburg 95c is as yet not ratified.
4· Bilateral Treaties
In addition to the multilateral treaties, both the postwar
periods produced numerous bilateral treaties, containing
clauses promoting international intercourse. The subjects
treated include status of foreign persons, both individuals
and business organizations, judicial assistance, enforcement
of foreign judgments, and the like, with occasional true conflicts rules interspersed. In this way, more progress was
achieved than in any other, and for the first time Great
Britain participated.

5· Case Law
It has already been noted that even in civil law countries
conflicts rules to a large extent are judge-made. French and
Belgian courts have to operate almost without any written
rules. The manner in which German courts, from early times,
have treated the problems in this field and have done so since
I900 in the absence of provision by the Introductory Law,
has some similarity to Anglo-American practice. 96 The same
is true of Switzerland, whose statute is insufficient, and in
many other countries.
Consequently, the rules are flexible and incomplete, and
very far from being frozen or petrified as certain theorists
95 c The French text with motives is reprinted in 40 Revue Crit. (1951) 710
(4I ibid. (I95I) I65 and 377), an English translation appears in I Int.
Comp. Law Q. (1952) 426. See MEIJERS, 2 Am. J. Comp. Law (I953) I.
D6 See GUTZWILLER, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 75•

LITERATURE AND SOURCES OF CONFLICTS LAW 43

imagine. Precedents are reversed, when shown to be unreasonable.
In the United States, it is problematical whether conflict
of laws is subject to general federal law, in addition to
common law as coined in the different jurisdictions. It seems
now settled that no such source of law is available to the
federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases. 97 Except in
such cases, the question is open 98 but has so far remained
without practical importance. Federal courts may perhaps
still subject conflicts rules regarded as procedural to an approach different than in state courts. 99
However, as may be noted by foreign readers, this question has nothing to do with the influence of the Federal
Constitution, as developed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, on the application of the conflicts rules. As
the cases, in their overwhelming majority, involve the relations between two sister states of the Union rather than
international intercourse with a foreign country, constitutional requirements respecting due process of law, interstate
commerce, privileges and immunities of citizens, full faith
and credit of acts, documents and judicial proceedings, or
impairment of obligations, exercise a more or less intensive
effect by unifying and controlling the solution of conflicts in
the separate jurisdictions.100
97 Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. (1941) 313 U. S.
487; Griffin, Administrator v. McCoach, Trustee (1941) 313 U.S. 498.
98 CooK, Legal Bases 108, 143.
99 Note: "After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins: Some Problems in 'Substance'
and 'Procedure,"' 38 Col. L. Rev. (1938) 1472; Note: "Congress, the Tompkins Case and the Conflict of Laws," 52 Harv. L. Rev. (1939) 1002; NussBAUM, Principles 62 ff.
1oo See the explanations to foreign readers by YNTEMA, "lnternational-privatrechtliche Entscheidungen in den Vereinigten Staaten im Jahre 1926," in
z Z.ausi.PR. (1928) 856; and LoRENZEN, "The Federal Constitution of the
United States of America as a Source of Private International Law," 3 Recueil d'Etudes sur les sources du droit, en l'honneur de Franc;ois Geny (1934)
437-465; RHEINSTEIN, "Das Kollisionsrecht im System des Verfassungsrechts
der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," in I Festschrift Rabel (1954) 539-589.
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6. International Custom
Apart from treaties, is there any international conflicts
law established by custom within the international community of states? According to an opinion universally obtaining, each member of this community is bound to have
some sort of conflicts law, in order to leave to other states
the power of adjudicating situations, persons or things, exclusively belonging to their respective domains. 101 What does
this maxim practically mean, however, after Zitelmann's
failure to derive the conflicts law from the requirements imposed by the law of nations upon states? Probably no tangible derivation can be found. 102 Of course, outside of the
domain of conflicts law, public international law has important aspects for the treatment of foreigners 103 and assumption of jurisdiction.104
There are, finally, certain rules of almost universal force,
such as the rules that the law of the situs governs immovable property, that a tort is governed by the law of the place
where the allegedly tortious act transpires, or that the
formalities of legal acts are determinable by the law of the
place where they occur. These rules were established by
statutist doctrines at a time when state borders did not exist
as today. But now these uniform rules are national. The law
of nations never was their source. They are ·simply customary law of a great majority of states, though as such
important. International courts have been glad to avail
1o1 Since SAVIGNY § 348, a constant principle. See for literature AGo, Teoria
70 n. I, 82 n. I, 126 n. I, and for analysis BARTIN, I Principes 112.
1° 2 MELCHIOR (skeptical), 36; RUNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit international prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue I936, 3I4, SI2 at
536; FEDOZZI u6. Contra: CAVAGLIERI 49, 50; }ITTA, La methode du droit
international prive (La Haye, I89o) 69; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 325,
355· CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws," 89 Univ. of Pa. L.
Rev. ( 194I) 430 at 434 ff., mentions three cases of diplomatic intervention
without result.
1oa See M. WOLFF, IPR. IO.
104 See CHEATHAM, 89 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. ( I94I) 430 ff., supra n. I02.
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themselves of such rudiments of trans-national rules. The
common law countries possess in common numerous additional rules of customary origin, which because of their significance are known as principles of conflict. 105 No conflicts
rule, however, has attained, on the basis of international
usage, a universal standing without exception, equivalent to
that of the general principles of the jus gentium.
7· Conclusion
It is notable that of the enacted or restated conflicts rules
existing today in the world, only the two Latin American
multipartite treaties and the Restatement, the latter not a
law but purporting to reproduce the law, are comparable in
comprehensiveness and elaborateness to codifications of
private law as known to lawyers in most countries. The remaining efforts, rudimentary if not poor, contrast strikingly
with the usual fondness of civil law countries for statutes
and codes 106 and even with the recent increase of legislation
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Niboyet once tried to justify the complete absence of French legislation on conflicts
law by the elusive nature of the subject. 107 But the chaotic
brilliance of the French literature and practice suggests
rather that the preparation for crystallizing the law has been
insufficient. The German enactment as a whole is so unsatisfactory that, as early as 1927, a movement for a new codification appeared. 108
However, the two copious formulations of conflicts law
achieved in the Western hemisphere have remarkably analo105 BuRGE, 2 Colonial and Foreign Law 29-36 (Statement of Principles); I
WHARTON I ("preliminary principles") ; DICEY (Table of Principles and
Rules) XLV-CXXIX.
106 For the predilection of civil law countries for statutes, attention may be
recalled to SPERL, "Case Law and the European Codified Law," I9 Ill. L.
Rev. (I92S) sos.
107 NrBOYET, 26 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. ( I930) 77·
10s Mitt. Deutsche Ges. f. Volkerrecht, Dresden Meeting I927·
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gous defects, despite their very different history, function,
and character. The American Restatement has been accepted
in the courts and, it seems, in the literature, to the extent
that it reflects the actual cases or clarifies controversial issues. Its doctrinal background has been repudiated almost
unanimously. Hence, many rules asserted in the Restatement
as flowing from principles are devoid of authority. The
Havana Code introduced a great wealth of refined provisions in the laws of the participant states 109 and is admired
throughout Latin America. But, as the Code largely rests
on a selection among literary opinions, mostly of French
writers, its practical us.efulness has yet to be tried in the fire
of litigation. Of such confirmation, nothing is known so far.
As all doctrinal studies of the Code evidently suggest, there
are certain difficulties in analyzing its rules.
Once more, the immaturity of this branch of law appears
and its need of intensive, prolonged cultivation.
109 Occasionally, the thesis has been adopted that the code represents the
general law of the country. Thus, the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal,
senten~,;a estrangeira no. 993 (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 has applied its
jurisdictional rules in relation to Portugal. Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Peru (July 2, 1929) 25 Anales Jud. (1929) 78 has termed the Montevideo
Treaty "the law of the land" in relation to Japan.

CHAPTER

2

Structure of Conflicts Rules
I.

THE PARTS OF THE RULE

NTELLIGENT application or development of conflicts rules requires full awareness of the two parts of
which these rules are necessarily composed. Thus, although it need not exactly conform to the example, a typical
conflicts rule runs as, for instance, section 29 5 of the Restatement:

I

( 1) The validity of a trust of movables created by a will
( 2) is determined by the law of the testator's domicil at the
time of his death. (Numbers added.)
The first part of the rule defines its object, that is, certain
operative facts/ the legal consequences of which are determined in the second part. From another point of view the
first part raises, and the second part answers, a legal question. In comparison with ordinary legal rules, there is one,
a fundamental, difference. The legal effects of an ordinary
rule of law are fully indicated; the question raised is immediately solved by commanding or prohibiting or authorizing
certain conduct. ("Material," "substantive," "internal"
rules, in German, Sachnormen.) In contrast, conflicts rules
decide only which state shall give such immediate solution.
The specific quality of these rules resides therefore in the
second part that declares the municipal law to which the
question should be referred or "connected" (in German,
angekniipft) or, in other words, prescribes the legislative
1

German: "Tatbestand," translated by LEA MERIGGI, Revue 1933, 201 at
n. 1, into Latin: "substratum" (subject matter); Italian: "presupposto"
(premise).

205,
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domain in which the question should be "localized." (There
is no point in arguing which mode of thinking represented by
these expressions is preferable.) An essential element of conflicts rules, therefore, is the indication of a "connecting factor" or "point of contact" (A nkniipfungspunkt, point de
rattachement) 2-the testator's domicil as of the time of
death in the case above, or in other cases the situs of property, the place where a contract was concluded or where it is
to be performed, etc. In this line of thought, the facts localized by the connecting factor appear separately as the "thing
connected." In the example above, these facts form thefirst
part of the rule, while the connecting factor appears in the
second part. For the sake of simplicity, we shall continue to
conceive of the rule in the manner stated, although, in some
conflicts rules, the localizing elements or some of them, are
inserted in the first part.
Strangely enough, the misfortunes of the doctrine taken
over from the nineteenth century have been caused largely
by insufficient attention to this nature of the conflicts rules.
As will be seen hereafter, the parallelism of the first part
with substantive rules was overlooked, and the basic peculiarity in the second part was not consistently appreciated.
Part of the confusion lay in the traditional notion of "the
law of the forum." Lex fori once meant the entire set of legal
rules in force at the place of suit. In a system of pure territorialism, every tribunal either applies its own law as a
whole or dismisses a case found to belong to a foreign jurisdiction. There is no choice of law, no application of foreign
law in such a system-a system which was observed in Eng2 Term introduced by KAHN, cf. NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 261,
translated as point of contact by LORENZEN, and as connecting factor by FAL·
CONBRIDGE. For recent discussion, see FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the
Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. ( 1937) 235, 537 at 549; reprinted in his
Essays, chap. 5, p. 124. CORMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization
and Preliminary Question in Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at
241, "localization."
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land with more consistency than anywhere else and is still
represented in many conceptions of Anglo-American law. If
the entire "law of the forum" be considered a unit, conflicts
rules are in effect integrated with the internal law. But when
assumption of jurisdiction no longer implies application of
the domestic rules and there exist choice of law rules, the
latter must live apart from the internal set of rules. At this
stage of development, appropriate language can designate
as law of the forum only the pure internal law, strictly excluding conflicts rules.
Likewise, the extensive recent discussion, under the French
catchword of "qualification," 3 of the nature and function of
the law of conflicts has been a source of difficulty. Bartin, the
author of this expression, assumed that conflicts rules are an
inseparable part of the law of the forum 4 and that, accordingly, the legal terms used in a conflicts rule must by
logical necessity be explained ("qualified") in terms of the
peculiar concepts of the lex fori. Had it not been for this
theory, characterization would never have attained the role
it occupies in the present literature. In fact, as that theory
has suffered increasing exceptions and modifications, the term
qualification has become uncertain. The writers argue which
characterization problems are genuine and which false and
even whether characterization is of immense or minimal significance. Such terminological disputes should be ended.
The real subject of the basic debate about conflicts law is
the interpretation of the rules of conflicts. This is essentially
broader than commenting on expressions. Moreover, it
s While KAHN spoke of "latent conflicts of law," HARTIN's term "qualification" became usual in Europe. BECKET!' and CHESHIRE translate it by "classification," FALCONBRIDGE proposed "characterization" and is generally followed. See FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 235 at 239, supra n. 2. For
other surveys, see VAN PRAAG, "Bijdrage tot de leer der kwalifikaties in het
internationaal privaatrecht," Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 1939, 525, and
recently FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 50.
4 See infra n. 9·
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furnishes a clearer objective than does reference to some substantive law, for evidently conflicts rules have to be interpreted by exploring their own meaning rather than the meaning of something else, e.g., an internal rule. Emphasis should
be shifted from "characterization" to "interpretation."
If nevertheless characterization is to retain a technical
meaning, it may be used to denote the problem whether or
not a certain expression in a conflicts rule has the same connotation as a similar word employed by domestic law or in a
foreign system. 5 Characterization of facts as such is not significant of conflicts law.
The most important objective in interpreting a conflicts
rule is to determine its scope. The borderline, for instance,
delimiting the cases for which the conflicts rule on contracts
prescribes the applicable law from those subject to the conflicts rule concerning torts, must be marked in every conflicts
system. This process may be termed classification in the
proper sense.

II.

THE FIRST PART: THE OBJECT oF THE RuLE

The statutist doctrine classified each substantive rule of
positive law in one of three categories, territorial law
( statuta realia), extraterritorial law ( statuta personalia),
and "mixed statutes" (statuta mixta), the last-named category being assimilated to the first by the late French and the
Dutch school. Thus, in the statutist conception, the object of
conflicts law is the substantive rule of law. The substitution
for this of the legal relations between persons or of persons
to things by Savigny constitutes the chief advance from this
to the modern conception. Savigny and his followers, who
apparently are still numerous, therefore deemed it to be the
characteristic task of conflicts law to connect each single
"legal relation" with a certain country.
5 RABEL,

5 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1931) 253, Qualifikation 23.
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This conception, despite its advantages, still was not quite
correct. Its consequences, as later deduced by Franz Kahn,
demonstrate that the mistake was not harmless. The starting point of analysis, as should be obvious, ought not to be
the legal relation, e.g., an obligation, a property right, the
relation between spouses. Any such relation must be based
on a determinate legal system. Which system, when the applicable law is not even yet contemplated? At this stage,
there is nothing but a factual or "social" situation. 6 If two
persons of Greek Orthodox faith go through a marriage
ceremony before a Greek Orthodox priest in Paris, is this a
marriage? The answer depends on what law we apply: the
law of the forum, the French law, the Greek law, or perchance some other law. No court except in Greece, however,
would actually apply its own internal law to the question.
Nevertheless, Kahn and the many who share his view assume that the legal relationship of marriage as constituted
under the domestic law of the forum is exclusively the object
of the conflicts rule. This makes no sense; it is simply a way
out of embarrassment in order to find some legislation containing the allegedly necessary definition of such object. Evidently, conflicts rules must operate as do all other rules,
directly on the facts of life, not on a legally predicated, ab6 RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) at 243; reproduced in Revue 1933, I at 5 ff.,
Qualifikation at 8, followed by NEUNER, Der Sinn ( I932) ; M. WOLFF, IPR. 2;
Priv. Int. Law 5 ; DE CASTRO, "La cuesti6n de las calificaciones en el derecho
internacional privado," 20 Revista Der. Priv. (I933) 2I7 at 240, 265 at 280,
282; VALLINDAS, Book Review, I Archeion ldiotikou Dikaiou ( 1934) I76;
MEZGER, Decision Note, Revue Crit. 1935, 447; I STREIT-VALLINDAS (I937)
243; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (193'7) 235 at 242, supra n. 2, but now
Essays 39; RoBERTSON, Characterization 63; HusSERL, "Foreign Fact Element
in Conflict of Laws," part II, 26 Va. L. Rev. (1940) 453 at 471; MoRELLI, Elementi 9 ff.; MoNACO, L'efficacia 35; GIHL 321; BoRUM 1. More precisely, the
object has been described as a factual situation taken in abstracto; see
MERIGGI, Revue 1933, 205, or as the facts underlying the relation which is
mentioned by the conflicts rule and taken in abstracto, see NEUNER, "Die
Ankniipfung im internationalen Privatrecht," 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 8I, 85.
(Erroneous criticism by DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv. ( I933) 239, 241,
supra this note.)
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stract subject matter. They refer to merely factual events,
such as the marriage ceremony before the Greek priest, a
document concerning the sale of a movable, a declaration by
a married woman, purporting to transfer property, the death
of an individual leaving no will, etcetera.
This statement is of cardinal significance; it ends all speculation about the necessary dependence of conflicts rules on
some legal system, whether the law of the forum or the lex
causae. This supposition was engendered by the short manner
in which conflicts rules have been generally framed, as for
example:
Immovables, even those possessed by foreigners, are governed by French law. The laws concerning the status and
capacity of persons govern a Frenchman, even resident
abroad. (French C.C. art. 3.)
Or, when the rules became more detailed:
The capacity of a person is to be determined according to
the laws to which the person belongs. Personal relations between German spouses, even though domiciled abroad, are
governed by the German laws. (German EG. art. 7 par. 1,
art. 14par. 1.)
Broad stretches of subject matter have thus customarily been
indicated by abbreviated terms, seemingly corresponding to
the captions of large chapters of private law, such as capacity, relation between spouses, inheritance, et cetera. But
this is merely the technique of shorthand expression.
III. INTERPRETATION AND CHARACTERIZATION

No doubt such legal terms ordinarily have been taken
from the headings used in the civil code or accepted legal
classification of the forum. But was that always so, must it so
remain; is the interpretation of such a term bound to its
specific significance in the internal law?

STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS RULES
I.

53

Lex Fori

Franz Kahn, 7 in his elaborate earlier opinion, which to a
vaguely defined extent he later revoked, 8 and Bartin, 9 who
first sponsored the theory, considered it a matter of course
that when a conflicts rule speaks of domicil or marriage settlement or tort, it meant exactly what such expression signifies in the corresponding domestic law. This theory has had
an immense following 10 and has been adopted in the Restatement 11 and the C6digo Bustamante. 12 Logical as well as
so-called practical arguments have been adduced in quantity
to prove this assertion; 13 they may now also be found reproduced in English 14 and need no repetition.
7 KAHN, Gesetzeskollisionen: ein Beitrage zur Lehre des internationalen
Privatrechts ( I89I), I Abhandl. I, especially "Latente Gesetzeskollisionen" at
92·
8 KAHN, itber Inhalt, Natur und Methode des international en Privatrechts
(I899), I Abhandl. 255 at 3I2.
9 BARTIN, "De ]'impossibilite d'arriver a Ia suppression definitive des conflits de lois," Clunet I897, 225, 446, 720, reprinted in BARTIN, Etudes (I899)
I; BARTIN, I Principes ( I93o) 22I; BARTIN, "La doctrine des qualifications
et ses rapports avec le caractere national des regles du conflit des lois," 3 I
Recueil I 930 I s6 5·
10 For lists see MELCHIOR I IO § 78; MAURY, "Regles generales des con flits
de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 467. To mention the most significant
names, in France: ARMINJON, BATIFFOL, H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE, NIBOYET, SURVILLE, WEISS; in Belgium: POULLET, DE Vos; in
Germany: GuTZWILLER, LEWALD, MELCHIOR, NEUMEYER, NussBAUM, RAAPE,
ZITELMANN; in Italy: ANZILOTTI, AGO, BUZATTI, CAVAGUERI, FEDOZZI, PERASSI,
SALVIOLI, UDINA; in the N ether]ands: VAN BRAKEL, KOSTERS, MULDER.
More recently in Britain and the United States: CHESHIRE; LORENZEN, "The
Theory of Qualification," 20 Col. L. Rev. (I92o) 247; LORENZEN, "The
Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of
Laws," so Yale L. J. (I94I) 743; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (I937)
245, supra n. 2; ROBERTSON, Characterization 24; CoRMACK, Renvoi, republished in his Essays (I947) 46; cf. 30 Can. Bar Rev. (I952) us, reprinted
in his Essays ( I954) 58; I4 So. Cal. L. Rev. ( I94I) 22I at 223, supra n. 2.
11 Restatement § 7·
12 C6digo Bustamante art. 6. Also the Civil Codes of Egypt of I948 (art.
IO) and of Syria of I949 (art. n) as well as the never applied Rumanian
Civil Code of I940 (art. 48); cf. 54 Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende Rechtwissenschaft ( I94I) 22I and supra p. 30 n. 70.
1s See especially NIBOYET no. 4I6.
1 4 See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private
International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46, esp. 53 ff.;
ROBERTSON, Characterization 59·
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2.

Lex Causae

Another opinion went in the opposite direction; the terms
or concepts of the conflicts rule should be understood according to the foreign internal law referred to by the conflicts
rule itself. Originated by the French Despagnet, and recently
revived by Pacchioni, M. Wolff, and Balladore Pallieri/ 5
this theory has been generally rejected. 16 In the present
writer's opinion, which is not here elaborated, the solutions
sought by Wolff are acceptable in special circumstances, but
not in principle.17
3· Comparative Method
A third opinion, which, in opposition to both these dogmas, advocates a method rather than a doctrine/ 8 was expounded by the present writer in I 929 and r 931. 19 In this
15 DESPAGNET, "Des conflits de lois re!atifs a Ia qualification des rapports
juridiques," Clunet 1898, 253; DESPAGNET et DE BoECK, Cours de droit international public {ed. 4, 1910) no. 106 bis; M. WoLFF, IPR. 54; Priv. Int.
Law 154 ff.; PACCHIONI, EJementi I67; BALLADORE PALLIERI 63 ff.; partly also
NEUNER, Der Sinn, and FRANKENSTEIN, "Tendances nouvelles du droit international prive," 33 Recueil 1930 III 245 at 3I3.
16 For a resume of the almost general rejection, see MAURY, "Regles generales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 484.
17 See infra p. 66.
1 8 Rightly MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 477·
19 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 752 at 755; RABEL, "Das Problem der Qualifikation," 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I931) 24I, separate (I9S6), (in Italian) 2 Rivista
Italiana (I932) 97, (in French) Revue I933, I.
In the same sense: in Belgium: WIGNY, Revue Crit. I936, 392; England:
BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46; France: J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 765 j Germany; NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932) j SILBERSCHMIDT,
48 Z.int.R. (1933-34) 313 at 334 and 54 Zentralblatt (1936) at I7j ZWEIGERT,
Festschrift Raape (I948) 35; Italy: MERIGGI, "Saggio critico sulle qualificazioni," 2 Rivista Italiana (1932) 189, (in French) Revue I933, 20I, (in
English) I4 B.U.L. Rev. (I934) 319; ZANCLA, Sede di fatto del rapporto,
Atti deli'Accad. Pelorit. (1936) 18; Spain: DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv.
{1933) 240 at 245, supra n. 6 (in part divergent); YANGUAS, Derecho Internacional Privado (Madrid, 1944) 238; Switzerland: WERNER NIEDERER, Die
Frage der Qualifikation als Grundproblem des internationalen Privatrechts,
in Zurcher Studien z. internat. Recht, no. I (Ziirich, 1940); Einfiihrung in die
allgemeinen Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts {ed. 2, 1956) 246; VON
STEIGER, Die Bestimmung der Rechtsfrage im internationalen Privatrecht,

STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS RULES

55

view, the factual situation, which is the true premise of any
conflicts rule, must be referable indifferently to foreign as
well as to domestic substantive law. Hence, if legal terms are
used to describe this factual situation, they must be susceptible of interpretation with reference to foreign institutions,
even those unknown to the lex fori. This operation includes
comparative research. Thoughtful courts have always employed this method, but systematic efforts are needed gradually to free national conflicts rules from undue dependence
on internal conceptions.
For example, the first theory above was resorted to in the
English case, Leroux v. Brown, 20 in which the parties in
France made a contract satisfying every condition of validity
under French law. However, the action failed on the ground
that the statute of frauds imposes a rule of procedure, which
as such must be observed by all litigants in England. Consequently, the conflicts rule on "formalities" was deemed inapplicable. This decision has been severely criticized. 21
Although the case conforms to the lex fori doctrine domiAbhandlungen zum Schweizerischen Recht, I29 Heft, (Bern, I937). (The
Federal Tribunal has left the decision open; see BG. (Feb. 24> I939) 65
BGE. II 66, 7I; BG. (Oct. 30, I940) 30 Praxis 63 no. I, at 64). NEUNER and
MERIGGI, however, add essential propositions of their own. Practical application of this method to particular problems has been made by WERNER VON
SIMSON, Die materiellen Wirkungen des rechtskraftigen Urteils im internationalen Privatrecht (Thesis, Freiburg i.Br., I935); H. P. ZsCHOKKE, Die
Rechtsstellung internationaler Kartelle, Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Internationales Recht, Druckschrift no. 35 (I936); HANS H. RIEMANN, Die
Schuldvertrage im internationalen Privatrecht (Dresden, I939) v and 9·
United States: CHEATHAM, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of
Laws," 2I Cornell L. Q. (I935) 570, warns against "two closely related practices" (p. 589), viz., (I) "the uncritical transfer to Conflict of Laws of the
meaning given to a term in internal law," and (z) "the use of. a distinction
worked out in internal law as decision of an issue in Conftict of Laws without
adequate consideration of whether the internal law distinction is appropriate
to the other issue."
20 (I852) 12 C. B. 8oi.
21 See BECKET!', "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private
International Law," I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) at 69 § I8; CHESHIRE
55 and 655; FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization," I5 Can. Bar Rev. (I937) 220, 224, now Essays 98, is doubtful, however.
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nant in the United States, it has been generally disapproved
by American courts and writers. 22 Moreover, it appears that
in this country foreign statutes of frauds are deemed to prescribe formalities as defined by the conflicts rule relating to
formalities, though such statutes may be otherwise interpreted in the various jurisdictions for other purposes. This
construction agrees with the third theory above.
The reason for this solution is obvious. It offends justice 23
to deny enforcement of an oral contract complying with local
requirements of form, for the mere reason that the domestic
law requires a memorandum in writing. Conversely, a contract unenforceable where executed, may be deemed to depend on such other contacts as the conflicts rule of the forum
admits; thus, by the applicable conflicts rule, a contract may
be considered valid under the law of the place of performance. But, if under the conflicts rule the transaction has no
connection with the forum, it cannot be validated by the
municipal law of the forum. The object of the conflicts rule
on formality thus may include foreign statutes of frauds
and exclude the domestic statute, irrespective of domestic
classifications.
The prescriptions of the domestic statute of frauds indeed
may be considered to relate to procedure in a court for the
purpose of their application ex officio, irrespective of formal
demand by a party, or to determine whether failure to observe the statute constitutes reviewable error, as well as to
decide whether amendments thereof have retroactive effect.
The purposes of conflicts law are different. In fact, the English writers seem to regret Leroux v. Brown only because of
22 Straesser Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. (1925) 8 F. (2d)
6o1; Ohlendiek v. Schuler ( 1929) 30 F. (2d) 5; WILLISTON, 2 Contracts
§ 6oo.
23 See Lams et ux. v. F. H. Smith Co. (1935) 36 Del. 477, 178 At!. 651,
Clunet 1937, 873, LoRENZEN, Cases 269; CHEATHAM, Cases 372; LoRENZEN,
"The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale L. J. (1923) 311,
320; GOODRICH 247; 3 BEALE § 602.1.
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24

its implications for conflicts law. French and German 25
courts classify provisions concerning oral agreements as
formalities in all respects, and certainly not as procedure, the
only doubt being whether they do not affect the substantive
requisites of consent to a contract.
In consequence, an American, French, etc., court has to
apply the English statute of frauds, or, until 1954, the special provision of section 4 of the British Sales of Goods
Act, 25 a respectively, to an English transaction, in particular
to an agreement to sell concluded in England. (That this is
true, although the English courts reach the same result on
procedural lines, in the case of English transactions, needs
some comment in our later discussion.) 26
There is very little doubt, in fact, that conflicts law has its
own denotation of formality, independent of either the lex
fori or the lex causae. 21
Without resuming all arguments of the vivid controversy
that went on during the last decade, it may be stated that
the lex fori theory has visibly shrunk under the weight of
the attacks to which it has been subjected. In the first place,
there seems today little support for the once-pretended logical necessity of resorting to domestic notions, Niboyet's
argument de necessite. There still are die-hards, 28 it is true.
24 Cass. (req.) (April 18, 1865) S.I865.1.317; Cass. (civ.) (June 29, 1922)
D.I9Z2-I.I27, S.I923.I·249·
25 Unanimous. For a foreign provision prescribing written contracts, see
KG. (Oct. 25, 1927) JW.1929, 448, IPRspr. 1929, no. 7· See also the definition
of formalities in art. 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1930 for the settlement
of certain conflicts of law in connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.
25a S.4 of the Sales of Goods Act. 1893, as well as important cases of s.3
of the Statute of Frauds, 1677, have been repealed by the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954. 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34·
26 Infra pp. 71 ff.
27 This problem will be treated in connection with the requirements for
contracts.
2 8 A climax was reached by RuNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit international
prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles)
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While even Bartin conceded two "exceptions" to the principle of characterization according to the domestic ideas, some
of his followers have insisted on its pure application. In particular, Bartin saw that the question whether foreign-situated
property is movable or immovable, is almost universally decided according to the law of the situs and not to the lex
fori. 29 This is clearly a sound rule and, thanks to its adoption
throughout the world, an oasis of uniformity; but important
writers have protested. 8 ° Franz Kahn diluted his own axiom
even more; he states that a rule referring "parental power"
or "tort" to some foreign law does not mean exclusively
what the civil code of the forum means by such terms, but
also includes "the corresponding and similar foreign notions." Only the "nucleus of the foreign institution" must be
similar, not the "technical envelope." 81 For this acute
thinker, a half-century since, the lex fori was not an infallible
guide, but rather a signpost showing vaguely a direction.
At present, the advocates of the lex fori theory, conscious
that the theory must be justified by convenience rather than
logical necessity, 82 are entangled in difficult efforts to avoid
absurd results. They feel, for instance, free to concede that
a concept such as contract or tort may have a much broader
scope in conflicts law than in private law. 33 Again, the Ger(I936) 3I4. 5I2, who declares any separate development of conflicts law
"logically" impossible. Contra: BALOGH, I Symmikta Streit ( I93,11) 88.
29 This is now for BARTIN the "only true exception," I Prin~ipes 236.
so NIBOYET, 3 Traite no. 957 and 2 Repert. 411 no. 27; KAHN, I Abhandl.
76; and others.
81 KAHN, I Abhandl. 112 {1891), generally followed up to 193I, although
KAHN himself sensed the futility of this escape in 1899, see I Abhandl. 3II;
cf. RABEL, Revue I933, 20, 24·
82 RoBERTSON, Characterization 74; LEWALD, Regles generales des conll.its
de lois 77·
88 Aao "Regles generales des conll.its de lois," 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247 at
33 7; M~uRY, "Regles generales des con flits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 I!~ ?25
at 494; BATIFFOL, Traite no. 295 and 297; FEDOZZI 186. See also the cntiCIS~
by PACCHIONI, Elementi 181. GuTZ'":ILLER, ~lso a follower of. the lex fort
theory has seen that the Mixed Arbttral Tnbunals have apphed numerous
gener;l legal concepts of the civilized world, or of the civil law countries
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man conflicts rule ( EG. art. 2 I ) concerning the right of an
unwed mother to claim support from the illegitimate father
of her child, is strictly predicated upon a rule of the German
Civil Code specifically granting such right; Raape recognizes
this connection but nevertheless suggests the application of
the rule to an essentially different claim under Norwegian
law and to certain even more remote types of actions for
damages under other laws. 34 For such analysis of the compass of conflicts rules, he employs comparative methods as a
matter of course. Nussbaum, who on the contrary is a decided foe of comparative methods in the subject, yet applies
the conflicts rules regarding wrongs to liabilities without
fault, irrespective of the treatment in internal law, construes
terms such as "company" or "corporation" "in the freest
manner," and particularly recommends "flexible methods"
and "broad" interpretation. 35 Maury 36 ends his apology for
the lex fori with the following recipe:
One starts from the lex fori, from its concepts. But these
concepts are adapted first to their international function and
then enlarged by a comparison with those of the foreign
laws. We approach the viewpoint of Mr. Rabel, but we do
it rather modestly.
This dictum has been adopted by Robertson 37 with a
qualification. He avows that
"some categories (of conflicts law) will be quite different
from any category of the internal law, because designed to
make provision for institutions of the foreign law not known
to the internal law of the forum."
(see "Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die Friedensvertrage eingesetzten Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshi:ife," 3 Int. J ahrbuch f. Schiedsgerichtswesen (1931) 123 at 149 ff.).
84 RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 401 at 452, 524.
35 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 48, 194, 288; NussBAUM, Principles 73·
86
MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 325 at 504.
3 7 ROBERTSON, Characterization 91.
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Such independent categories, he confesses,
"are already known to have been developed for most types
of cases that are likely to arise, such as contract, tort, succession, administration, matrimonial property, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, adoption, and so on."
These writers clearly and consciously draw on comparative
law, although Robertson 38 disapproves of "international
principles of comparative law determining disputed characterizations."
It will be interesting to see what remains of the BartinKahn theory after dealing with particular problems in the
course of this book.
However, the "logical" argument has been overturned in
a striking manner, thanks to the special refutations by
Neuner 39 and, more recently, by Cook, 40 both pointing out
the mistake of seeking in internal law the concepts needed
in conflicts law. The naive argument they criticize attributes
an absolute character to juridical concepts, irrespective of
their purposes; it presupposes that the concepts of domicil,
contract, capacity are identical in the laws of property,
family, jurisdiction, taxation-and conflicts I Only the ancient "realism of concepts," which had some force in GrecoRoman philosophy and a disputed role in Roman jurisprudence,41 and the Begriffsjurisprudenz of the nineteenth century, ridiculed in Jhering's "Heaven of Concepts," present
equal errors. The relativity of legal concepts is a mere commonplace in all other departments of law.
The chief reason why the present writer started the attack
against that theory and here stresses its utter unsoundness,
ROBERTSON, Characterization 31, 189.
NEUNER, Der Sinn, esp. 132; also "Policy Considerations in the Conflict
of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479 at 484.
40 CooK, Legal Bases, esp. 214.
41 SoKOLOWSKI, Die Philosophie im Privatrecht (2 vols., Halle, 1902-1907),
and for criticism, RABEL, Viertelj ahrsschrift fiir Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 1904, 108.
38

89
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is illuminated by the very title of Hartin's paper, "On the
impossibility of arriving at a definitive suppression of the
conflicts of law." Naturally, if each conflicts law is nothing
but an annex to the corresponding internal law and receives
its sense and meaning only from this national and local
source, uniformity cannot be achieved, even though all conflicts laws should be unified, without simultaneous unification
of all municipal laws. The temporarily complete victory of
this idea has weighed heavily on hopes and endeavors to
reform and unify the national bodies of private international
law. Black pessimism resulted, and it is no wonder that the
excesses of nationalism in our field were particularly serious
in the writings of the many students who followed Kahn and
Bartin. This gloomy outlook, unfortunately, is still shared
by certain present writers.
As things now stand, few points respecting the writer's
opinion still seem to call for explanation. The most significant is the objection on a priori grounds that this comparative-analytical method, though representative of the future,
is useless for existing law. 42
It has never been denied that the actual conflicts rules of
the European codifications or those usually applied by AngloAmerican courts originally had linguistic connections.42a The
question is merely that of "freeing," "emancipating," these
rules from their domestic background. Is this illicit? A few
Italian writers say so; in their opinion, rules must be interpreted within the perspective of the legislator. But, even if
42 PACCHIONI, Elementi 182; FEDOZZI 190; DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der.
Priv. (1933) 240 at 247; FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict
of Laws," 55 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 235 at 245, reprinted in his Essays (1947)
46, but omitted in ed. 2, 1954. followed by DAviEs, "Regles generales des
conflits de lois," 62 Recueil 1937 IV 497; GRAVESON 53; MAURY, 57 Recueil
1936 III 325 (definitely milder), followed by BATIFFOL, Traite no. 297·
42a WERNER GOLDSCHMIDT, I Sistema 268 enumerates several concepts in
conflicts rules not derived from the internal law. As an example he mentions
the English distinction between movables and immovables not corresponding
to the Common Law concepts of real and personal property.
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this were true, do we have to assume that draftsmen of conflicts rules have been ignorant that foreign laws may differ
in many respects from their own conceptions? In laying down
the rule that wrongs are governed by the law of the place of
wrong, do legislators not consider the possibility that an
injury done abroad may constitute a wrong where committed, though not in the forum? Or are conflicts rules not
supposed to be applied indifferently as respects all laws of
civilized peoples? In fact, their compass is generally worldwide, and, in the absence of a universal language, they
necessarily employ the "word-symbols" of the domestic
vocabulary.
Again, whether rigid limitations on the interpretation of
legal rules be inferred from the alleged intention of the legislator, as the Italian school seems to postulate, or from the
principle of strict construction of statutory texts, often followed at common law, such restrictions are inconsistent with
the methods of creative interpretation recognized in modern
legal practice. Formalism is particularly misplaced in construing conflicts rules, the overwhelming majority of which
are in an unsettled and formative stage throughout the
world. Most are unwritten, and many of the written rules
are vaguely drafted and defectively constructed. As a matter
of fact, the art of interpretation, a versatile and fecundating
implement of modern private law, is not used with entire
efficiency in our field. Clumsy constructions and half-hearted
attempts at adjusting antiquated maxims or correcting inexact texts abound. Should progressive development from
case to case and through systematic effort be barred, this
stepchild of jurisprudence would be an orphan indeed.
Yet, in the case of many writers, one hand does not seem
to know what the other is doing. While Ago is the most intransigent adversary of analytical comparison, he has selected from a hundred cases discussed in the literature, one,
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the simplest, to demonstrate with what perfect safety the
lex fori theory operates. 48 This is the case. Under German
and other laws, spouses may by settlement institute heirs to
either of them. The Italian legislation does not expressly
allow such appointment by contract of a successor upon
death. How should an Italian judge consider such a settlement by German spouses? Ago agrees that the question is
covered by the Italian conflicts rule concerning intestate succession and wills, although these two grounds of succession
do not include settlements. German law therefore governs.
But Ago declines to accept any extensive interpretation based
on comparison of the three grounds of inheritance involved.
He takes the application of the conflicts rule respecting inheritance for granted, because the Italian inheritance law,
tacitly excluding settlements respecting succession at death,
implicitly classifies them as grounds of succession. By chance,
the question came up in the French Court of Cassation. 44 A
prenuptial settlement concluded in France by Italian nationals contained a stipulation by the wife, leaving at death
the unrestricted portion of her estate, including a French
immovable, to the husband. It was pleaded that the settlement was void under Italian law, since it contemplated a
donation of future acquisitions. The court held the gift valid
under the lex situs, viz., the French provision allowing devise
by prenuptial settlement, thus emphasizing the contractual
aspects of the transaction. Niboyet apparently conceives that,
while the French court proceeded on the basis of the law of
succession, an Italian court would have held the gift invalid
specifically on the ground of the conflicts rule concerning
matrimonial property. 45 However all this may be, since the
48

AGO, 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247 at 333·
Cass. (req.) (May 7, 1924) Revue 1924, 406, Clunet 1925, 126. The
French law of the situs was likewise applied to a settlement of Spanish
spouses, Cass. (civ.) (April 2, 1884) Clunet 1885, 76.
45 See NIBOYET 503 no. 417.
44
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Italian Code does not recognize such agreements either in
the chapter on matrimonial property or in defining grounds
of succession, the characterization cannot be inferred from
these chapters. Unconsciously, Ago did assimilate the foreign institution within the titles mortis causa on the basis of
a comparison of legislations.
The process required for such interpretations, in fact, is
necessarily of a comparative nature and has always been so
recognized by thoughtful scholars. 46 Assuredly, the comparison has not always been comprehensive, systematic, and
fully documented. But today, at least in civil law countries, it
is no excuse to neglect comparative studies on the ground of
unavailability of information. So much has been done in making the sources and literature accessible even in distant
countries that the existence of gaps should be an incentive
rather than a deterrent for scholars able to collaborate. So
far as interstate conflicts go, the studies in this country are
the most prominent example of continuous consideration of
some fifty internal laws. Never has comparative law been
more thoroughly utilized than in this country, and never so
much uniformity achieved.
It has been objected, nevertheless, that a scientific approach to conflicts law by comparative critique is precluded
by the defective conditions of comparative research and that
conclusions will be arbitrarily subjective. Such an assertion
indicates lack of personal experience in such work. The common law is a living refutation. In civil law countries, no serious student of conflicts law has failed to consider neighboring legislations. Moreover, comparisons between the common law and the civil law were undertaken by Story in
America in I 834 and by Bar in Europe in I 86 2 with patent
success. To bridge the gulf between these two halves of the
46

See for instance KAHN,

I

Abhandl. 315, 491;

2

Abhandl. 18.
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legal world is the task of the present generation of lawyers.
Hidden behind apparent dissimilarity, there are fundamental
likenesses, suggesting international cooperation, though of
course not necessarily unification.
No doubt, existing comparisons of the kind required in the
field of conflicts of laws are of recent date and far from exhaustive.47 General concepts, which may be used universally,
are being built up but slowly. However, a great deal of
knowledge has been attained, and to gain more is within the
capacity of modern science. Researchers to a variable extent
are of course engrossed in the legal culture in which they
have been educated. 48 A lawyer is apt to state more accurately and to give preference to the conceptions of his
system over foreign ideas. However, with increasing international collaboration in comparative work, the qualities of
the different scholars will compensate for each other, and
the multiplicity of views in the world will provide a rich
variety of outlooks. In any case, an imperfect attempt to do
justice to foreign institutions is superior to any technique
which ignores them. Judges are fully entitled to limit their
inquiries to the two or three laws primarily influencing a case
in which legal science has done nothing to help. 49 Instinctively this is what the courts do.
With respect to the narrower subject of characterization,
expediency alone is decisive. It may be that categories as defined by internal law have a role to play in such subjects as
jurisdiction, procedure, taxation, etc., but ordinarily not in
the case of conflicts rules. For conflicts law, characterization
according to the law declared applicable in the conflicts rule
47 The following are not new admissions by the writer. See RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.
PR. (19z9) 756; 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) z87, Qualifikation 7z, Revue 1933, 1 at
61.
48 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. ( 19Z9) 756; BECKETI, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int.
Law (1934) 46 at 59·
49 RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) z67, Revue 1933, 1 at 37·

66

INTRODUCTION

also is by no means excluded, but only for special situations.
Martin Wolff was perhaps inspired by the problems of marital property with which he first happened to deal, to suggest
this method of characterization. In principle, a private law
term used in a conflicts rule means what is common to the
various institutions of the national laws serving the same
legislative purpose.
It is not even true that the so-called connecting factors
should always be understood as defined by domestic law.
Domicil cannot be so simply treated. Nationality is exclusively defined by the state whose national an individual is
claimed to be. The place of contracting in negotiations between absent parties is not to be determined by the law of
the forum alone, at least if under this law the place is found
to be situated abroad, etcetera.

IV.
1.

THE SECOND PART: REFERENCE TO A LEGAL SYSTEM

The Nature of the Reference

While American students of conflicts law but recently have
begun to discuss other general problems, as a rule they have
been interested in the controversy regarding the locus standi
of foreign law in court.
The doctrine of territorialism indicated by d'Argentre and
perfected by Huber is predicated upon Huber's first axiom
that the laws of a state have force only within the territorial
limits of its sovereignty. This tenet, adopted in the American
cases, was solemnly formulated by Story, Dicey, and Beale. 5°
The first section of the Restatement reproduces it literally:
"no state can make a law which by its own force is operative
in another state; the only law in force in the sovereign state
is its own law . . . "
"Law" in this connection means internal law, and the contention therefore is that foreign internal law has no "force,"
50 STORY

§§

I8

ff.,

DICEY 9 j I BEALE

52.
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even though invoked by a conflicts rule. The flagrant inconsistency of this thesis with actual needs and practices was initially relieved by Huber's theory of ((comitas gentium" and,
after this shallow idea had finally exploded, 51 by Dicey's and
Beale's attempt to reanimate the theory of vested rights. 52
Hence the Restatement, section 1, continues:
" . . . but by the law of each state rights or other interests in
that state may, in certain cases, depend upon the law in force
in some other state or states."
This theory has also been employed in modern France by
Pillet and Niboyet, 58 on the background of conceptions eminently hostile to the application of foreign law. However,
both the Anglo-American and the French theories of acquired rights have been critically destroyed, 54 together with
that of neoterritorialism. 55
The Italian writers think, nevertheless, that the phenome51 DICEY (ed. I) 10; I BEALE 53; GOODRICH II; LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 282
nos. 29, 30.
52DJCEY u; BEALE, 3 Cases on the Conflict of Laws (I902) §§I-5; 3
Treatise I968; CHESHIRE ( ed. I) 3, revoked in ed. 2, 86; SCHMIITHOFF 35·
53 VAREILLEs--SoMMIERES V ff., XXXIV ff.; PILLET, Principes 495-57I; NmoYET, 5 Repert. 708 to 725, 3 Traite 284-299.
54 United States: CooK, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws," 33 Yale L. J. ( I924) 457, Legal Bases I; LORENZEN, "Territoriality,
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 Yale L. J. (I924) 736; YNTEMA,
"The Hornbook Methods and the Conflict of Laws," 37 Yale L. J. ( I928) 468;
HEILMANN, "Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws,"
43 Yale L. J. (I934) 1082; STUMBERG, "Conflict of Laws. Foreign Created
Rights," 8 Texas L. Rev. (I930) I73 and STUMBERG 9·
England: CHESHIRE 32; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 2.
France and Belgium: ARMINJON, I Precis 27I and ARMINJON, "La notion
des droits acquis en droit international prive," 44 Recueil I933 II 5 esp. at 59;
J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 754; WIGNY, "La theorie des droits acquis d'apres
Antoine Pillet," 58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I93I) 34I and WIGNY, Essai
I 59·
Germany: HORST MuLLER, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im
internationalen Privatrecht, Hamburger Rechtstudien Heft 26 (I935), authoritatively reviewed by GUTZWILLER, IO Z.ausl.PR. ( I936) 1056.
55 All European writers have protested against the principle of territorialism. See for instance NIBOYET, 6o4, stating that the French courts, for some
time immediately after the Code came into force, were perhaps impressed by
the memory of the former strict territorialism of the statutists, but actually
rejected this nefarious principle.
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non of the application of a law created by a foreign state still
presents a problem, and on independent grounds eminent
critics of Beale's theory in this country think the same. In the
opinion once proposed and then revoked by Anzilotti, which
has been perpetuated by others, a foreign rule cannot be applied unless it has been appropriated by the state of the
forum and transformed into a domestic rule. 56
This theory of "material reception" of foreign law supposes an untenable fiction. Nobody really believes that Norwegian marriage law is made the law of Oklahoma, just for
the purpose of deciding in Oklahoma whether the parties
years ago celebrated a valid marriage in Oslo. Where one
party sues for annulment, a Norwegian enactment intervening in the meantime and modifying the conditions of annullability of previous marriages, is applicable, 57 clearly because
the Norwegian law and not that of the forum governs.
Another opinion is that the foreign rule is adopted by
"formal reception" only; the conflicts rule is construed as
implying that the foreign rule is inserted into the body of the
domestic law of the forum but with the significance and value
it has under the foreign system. 5 8
The "local law theory" as developed in this country is
kindred to these conceptions, presumably more closely to the
idea of "formal" reception. It differs in the thesis peculiar to
this country that the judge creates the law according either to
his own or to foreign legal rules as the case may require. But,
56 ANZILOTTI, Studi critici di diritto internazionale privata, parte II ( I898) ;
PACCHIONI, Elementi 137; Contra: FEDOZZI 162: "artificial," "a phantom of
studio"; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 Ill 325 at 382.
57 HARTIN, I Principes 298.
58 ANZILOTTI, Corso di diritto internazionale (Roma, I923) 85; GHIRARDINI,
"Sull'interpretazione del diritto internazionale privata," 13 Rivista ( I919)
290; PERASSI, "Su l'estensione del diritto internazionale privata italiano aile
nuove Provincie," Rivista I926, SIS; BALDONI, La successione nel tempo delle
norme di diritto internazionale privata (Rom a, I932) 9; Aao, 58 Recueil 1936
IV 247; Bosco 95; also MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 386.
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for conflicts law more than any other branch of national law,
law must exist before and outside of lawsuits.
After all, why can the foreign rule not simply come into
court without crutches? Is it not sufficient that the court's
own conflicts rule orders application? Once more, the full
power of conflicts rules seems to be greatly underestimated.
On the other hand, no kind of domestication invests a foreign rule with exactly the same power that domestic rules
have. For example, the maxim jura novit curia is usually not
extended to .foreign law. 5 9 The dominant opinion in Europe 60
as well as in this country 61 has entirely discounted the remnants of the doctrine inherited from Ulric Huber; there is no
longer any problem.
2.

The Extent of the Reference

The theory of Bartin, Kahn, and their followers purports
not only to determine the content of the first part of the conflicts rule but also that of the second part; not only should
the matters referred to a foreign law be selected according to
domestic conceptions, but also the foreign rules to which
these matters are referred must accord with the domestic
system. Consequently, within the limits of a conflicts rule respecting "torts," foreign substantive rules concerning what
in the eyes of the forum would be "quasi-contract" are inapplicable.
An example of this kind of argumentation is furnished by
the well-known English decisions relating to the statute of
limitations. In the leading case of Huber v. Steiner, 62 Tindall,
BARTIN, I Principes 295·
PILLET, I Traite no. 5I; BARTIN, I Principes 20 § 10; LEREBOUR8-P!GEONN!ERE no. 2I6; RAAPE I2; CAVAGL!ER!, Revue I930, 397, 405.
61 CAVERS, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev.
( I933) I73, I77, thinks that the majority of voices is contrary to the local law
theory.
62 2 Bing. N. C. 202 (C. P. I835).
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C. J., refused to apply the French rule of prescription to a
French promissory note. He declared the French rule procedural, on the ground of Story's test that a limitation imposed on enforcement only rather than upon the right is procedural in character. German law has been treated in the
same way in the English courts. 63 Actually, the undisputed
German conception and the dominant French opinion is that
a limitation bars the action only and the right survives. This
does not mean that a limitation is procedural; it is substantive in the precise sense here relevant, namely, that it provides the debtor an exception to his obligation, a material
right of defense. 64 Consequently, the French and German
courts characterize statutes of limitations as substantive for
the purposes of conflicts law. Modern English writers agree
that the English cases are wrong; they deprive the debtor of
a defense because of the accidental forum. 65 The American
decisions in cases where the courts do not feel bound by the
early doctrine, give effect to foreign statutes of limitations. 5 6
While Kahn corrected his doctrine by suggesting some
latitude in recognizing foreign rules as applicable but protested against the application of foreign law in its totality, 67
recently Bartin has radically restricted the scope of his
theory. 68 He has done so, following an argumentation usual
63 Societe Anonyme Metallurgique de Prayson v. Koppel, The Times, November z, I933, 77 Solicitor's Journal (I933) 8oo cited by BECKETI', I5 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (I934) 75, supra n. 48.
64This alone is relevant. Neither BECKETI', I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law
( I934) 46 at 75, supra n. 48, nor ROBERTSON, Characterization 248, 25I, have
reported correctly on the Continental law.
6 5BECKETI', I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 75 ff., supra n. 48; CHESHIRE 653 j MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, "Delimitation of Right and Remedy,"
I6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I935) zo at 4I; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law
232; ROBERTSON, Characterization 64; CORMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization,
Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," I4 So. Cal.
L. Rev. (I94I) zzi at 234·
ua See Maki v. George R. Cooke Co. (C.C.A. 6th, I942) I24 F. (zd) 663,
and Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I942) 723.
67 KAHN, I Abhandl. I90.
68 BARTIN, I Principes 23I; 3I Recueil I930 I 56I, 603.
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in Italy, namely, that, in the first instance, the lex fori, being
the legal order in which the conflicts rule originates, prescribes the characterization to be adopted, but that, the applicable law having been selected, it must be applied with its
attendant interpretation. 69 In other words, characterization
by the lex fori for choice of law-characterization by the
foreign law once chosen. This reasoning has found favor
with several Anglo-American writers under the name of "secondary characterization," 70 but seemingly they do not agree
with each other on numerous details.
This generous concession to common sense is welcome, but,
due to its faulty origin in the lex fori theory, it is not broad
enough and lacks a clear concept. For instance, it has been
recently suggested 71 that, if the object of a conflicts rule is
"primarily" characterized as property, those foreign rules
that are considered property law in the foreign country
should be applied. Yet, in a court in state X, why should a
claim recognized by the domestic law of the forum (state
X), on the theory that property is recoverable, not be sustained under the "applicable" law of Y, which regards the
property as lost but provides recovery on some quasi-contractual or other theory? Or, to return to the statutes of
limitations, the German Reichsgericht in a notorious early
6 9 ANZILOITI, Corso di lezione ( 1918) 359 and Corso di diritto internazionale privata (1925) 79; CAVAGLIERI 104; PERASSI, Lezione di diritto internazionale, parte prima (1922) 78; UniNA, Elementi 51; AGo, Teoria 145; FEDOZZI 183 j BOSCO 107 j BALLADORE PALLIERI 65. These authors, however, speak
in a very fragmentary manner.
1° CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 72; in ed. 4 (1954) while the names of primary and
secondary classification have been dropped, the author insists on his distinction in substance; UNGER, "The Place of Classification in Private International Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3 at 17; ROBERTSON, Characterization
chs. v, I I 8 ff., and IX, 23 5 ff.; CORMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. ( 1941) zZI at
234, supra n. 65; SCHMITTHOFF 38. Contra: RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 8
Brooklyn L. Rev. ( 1938) 253 at 256; FALCONBR!DGE, "Renvoi, Characterization
and Acquired Rights," 17 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1939) 369 at 373; NussBAUM, Book
Review, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1461, 1467.
11 CORMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at 235 and n. 86, supra n. 65.
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decision refused to apply the limitation statutes of Tennessee, whose law was considered controlling, because in
America the defense was regarded as merely proceduraU 2
This refusal to apply a foreign provision because it is considered procedural in the foreign law, illustrates the theory
of secondary characterization; it is evidently absurd.
Recently, the Reichsgericht discovered the correct solution
long anticipated by many writers, namely, to apply the American statute. 73 The reasoning is, however, uncertain and
partly based on the precarious ground that in German eyes
the American remedy "also" possesses a "substantive" element justifying its application.
All such doubtful and complicated manipulations are unnecessary. The needs are simply and efficiently fulfilled by
the application of the foreign law as it stands and, despite the
admonition of Kahn, "in its totality." 74 If the first part of
the conflicts rule, the description of the matter referred to
the applicable law, is correctly formulated, i.e., not burdened
by internationally impractical concepts, it contains in itself all
that is necessary for its purpose. All else belongs to the selected system. In other words, the question which state's law
governs the case, is answered by the choice of law; there is
no reason why reference should not be made to this law as
a whole instead of to parts prematurely chosen. (Whether
some public policy of the forum is involved is entirely separate and independent.) More precisely, the court has to decide the question exactly as a court sitting in the foreign state
would do, if such court had jurisdiction and had to apply its
own domestic law.
72

RG. (Jan. 4, 1882) 7 RGZ. 21.
RG. (July 6, 1934) 145 RGZ. 121, IPRspr. 1934, no. 29, Revue Crit.
1935. 447·
74 See the writer's detailed argument, 5 Z.ausi.PR. {1931) 273, Revue 1933,
I at 44, Qualifikation 52. No comparative law is needed for this purpose as
certain critics have suspected. For a discussion of renvoi see infra p. 75·
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The Development of Conflicts Law
I.
I.

RETARDING FACTORS

Preconceptions

T is gratifying that the majority of writers now advocate emancipation from deductive methods. 1 Past
theories have left remainders too persistent, however,
not to cause mischief. As a matter of course, and without
reference to the desirability of doing so, the doctrine of territorialism has allocated broad fields to the law of the forum,
including that of divorce and support, which is to be discussed
in the present volume. There is still reluctance to attribute
full legal effect to foreign acts and judgments in cases where
the original power or jurisdiction of the foreign state is
freely admitted, as is shown in the treatment of foreign
adoption and foreign corporations.
Moreover, foreign law, though "applicable" under the appropriate conflicts rule, may nevertheless be rejected on the
ground of "public policy" of the forum. Due formerly to the
jealousy of small communities and princes, recently to
chauvinism and worship of the state, this ground has abnormal significance. 2 Though for a long time French courts were

I

1 See in particular ARMINJON, "L'objet et Ia methode du droit international
prive," 21 Recueil 1928 I 433, against deductive and for analytical method;
LORENZEN, "Developments in the Conflict of Laws," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (1942)
781 at 8os, "There is some indication that our courts are prepared to adopt
a somewhat more realistic approach in conflicts situations. The immediate
hopes fgr the further development of the conflict of laws in this country would
seem to be in this direction."
2 JusTus WILHELM HEDEMANN, former democrat, wrote in Dt. Justiz 1939,
1523: "Slowly the so-called private international law will take another aspect.
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generally attacked because of their exaggeration of ordre
public, European writers now tend to outdo them.
The increase of national feeling in Europe in the midst of
the nineteenth century engendered Mancini's famous doctrine of nationality. The "principle of nationality," administered on a world-wide scale as Mancini insisted, would have
been able to establish a balance in matters of personal status.
But, excluded from the Anglo-American realm and from
other countries, it created confusion on account of the claim
of European states to govern the status and capacity of subjects who had emigrated to such countries. Moreover, as we
shall see, the principle was repeatedly interpreted without
sense of responsibility and reciprocity.
The doctrinal arguments generally adduced against such
practical necessities as "renvoi" and the right of the parties
to a contract to determine the applicable law are so significant that these two institutions deserve preliminary discussion immediately hereafter. Both have been rejected as incompatible with state sovereignty l The power of parties to
choose their law by agreement was even declared "impossible," because there had to be first a substantive law allowing
them such choice l
In a similar misuse of logic, 8 it has been declared that the
law governing the effects of a contract cannot "logically"
control the extent to which error, fraud, or duress affects the
consent of the parties-there must be a law to determine the
validity of the transaction, before the law governing its effects can be selected. The law of the state of incorporation,
It might be that the general clauses concerning public policy and reprisals
(articles 30 and 31 of the Introductory Law) will overshadow everything
else of the private international law." In the first World War, the Reichsgericht upheld firmly the conflicts rules, and the government in no serious
respect interfered.
s See on the following examples, RABEL, "Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung in
einzelnen Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts, Vorbemerkung," 3 Z.ausl.
PR. (1929) 752; WAHL, ibid. 791; KESSLER, ibid. 768.
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or other law regulating the life of a corporation, has been
said to be unable "logically" to determine the conditions of
valid constitution of the corporation. The settled rule that
the law governing torts decides whether or not an act is a
tort has been characterized as a "legal impossibility." 4 Remembering the deduction of the clever Romanist, Miihlenbruch, that assignment of a chose in action is logically inadmissible, and similar errors of eminent jurists, 5 we may
derive consolation from the thought that time will provide a
remedy.
In the United States, courts and writers are cognizant of
such handicaps and are endeavoring to overcome them. Tradition and modernism are engaged in an interesting combat
with varying results. Circumstances differ in the parts of this
vast country. In respect to certain problems, it is difficult to
state what American law actually is, as the Restaters have
come to suspect. But the writers, practically without exception, and the great majority of the courts are seriously conscious of their duty to reach adequate solutions. When handbooks and notes in law reviews report on a subject, they
usually present the forward trend of advanced courts in
preference to formalistic decisions and precedents exaggerating local policy.
Renvoi
The controversy on "renvoi" is the most famous dispute
in conflicts law, 6 a classic example of violently prejudiced
2.

4 This was the expression of 2 FRANKENSTEIN 363.

See RABEL, Aufgabe and Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, Miinchener J uristische Vortriige, edited by the J uristische Studiengesellschaft in
Miinchen, Heft r, reprinted from 13 Rhein, Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht
5

(1925).
6 Bibliography is to be found in PoTu, La question du renvoi en droit international prive (1913); up to 1929 in LEWALD, "La theorie du renvoi," 29
Recueil 1929 IV 519; and in the footnotes by MAURY, "Regles generales des
conflits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 519 ff. On the history of the problem since
a French case of 1652 see E. M. MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 38 Bull.
Inst. Int. ( 1938) 191, 197.
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literature confronting naively consistent practice. Only where
courts finally succumbed to the persuasion of world-wide
learned criticism, did they falter, as in Greece, Italy, and in
Anglo-American literature in addition to the treatises: LORENZEN, "The
Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law," 10 Col. L. Rev. (1910)
190, 327; same author, "The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of 'The Law of a Country,"' 27 Yale L. J. (1918) 509; idem, Cases 299303, 318-323; SCHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American
Law," 3 I Harv. L. Rev. ( 1918) 523; POLLACK, "The 'Renvoi' in New Y ark,"
36 Law. Q. Rev. (1920) 91; ALLEMES, "The Problem of Renvoi in Private
International Law," 12 Grotius Soc. ( 1927) 63; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and
Succession to Movables," 46 Law Q. Rev. (1930) 465, 47 Law Q. Rev. (1931)
at 271; also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi et succession mobiliere," in Revue 1932,
254, 451; idem, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev.
( 1937) 559-567; idem, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," 17
Can. Bar Rev. ( 1939) 369 at 378; idem, "Renvoi and the Law of Domicile,"
19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 3II to 317, 329 to 334; idem, "Renvoi in New York
and Elsewhere," 6 Vand. Law Rev. (1953) 708 et seq.; all these papers rearranged in FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 137-263. L. T. BATES, "Remission and
Transmission in American Conflicts of Laws," 16 Cornell L. Q. ( 193 I) 3 II;
DICEY (-MORRIS) 47-61 as against ed. 5, Appendix, Note I, 863 to 878; BENTWICH, "Recent Application of the Renvoi in Matters of Personal Status," 14
Can. Bar Rev. ( 1936) 379; MoRRIS, "The Law of the Domicil," 18 Brit. Year
Book Int. Law ( 1937) at 32; CowAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical
Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1938) 34-39; GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited,"
51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 193 7) II65; CoRMAcK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev.
( 1941) at 249 to 275; RAEBURN, "The 'Open Offer' Formula and the Renvoi
in Private International Law," 25 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 1948) 2II-235;
E. W. BRIGGS, "'Renvoi' in the Succession of Tangibles: A False Issue Based
on Faulty Analysis," 64 Yale L. ]. (1954/55) 195-220. See also LORENZEN, 6
Repert. 284 nos. 4o-44, 353 no. 366; Decision Note, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 253;
BENTWICH, "The Development of the Doctrine of Renvoi in England in
Cases of Succession," 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 433; BELLOT, "La theorie anglosaxonne de conflits de lois," 3 Recueil 1924 II 99, 164 to 168; KUHN, "La conception du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et Ia pratique aux
:Etats-Unis," · 22 Recueil 1928 I 186 at 27o-272. On the English cases, see
furthermore MELCHIOR 194 n. 2; ELKIN, "La doctrine du renvoi en droit
anglais," Clunet 1934, 577; MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Modern
English Law (Oxford, 1937); GRASSETTI, "La dottrina del rinvio in diritto internazionale privata e Ia 'common law' anglo-americana," 26 Rivista ( 1934)
3-41, 233-261, 350; DE NovA, Book Review of GRASSETTI, 12 Annuario Dir.
Comp., parte prima ( 1937) 258; and DE NovA, "Considerazioni sui rinvio
in diritto inglese," 30 Rivista (1938) 388; idem, "II rinvio nella recente
giurisprudenza inglese," II Giur. Comp. DIP. ( 1954) 120; RHEIN STEIN, Book
Review, 12 Annuario Dir. Comp., parte prima (1937) 314 at 316.
In continental Europe besides the notes mentioned infra n. 7, P'AGENSTECHER,
Der Grundsatz des Entscheidungseinklangs im internationalen Privatrecht
(Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen
der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1951, no. 5) is noteworthy.
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the isolated and now superseded Tallmadge case in New
York. 7 On the other hand, the constancy of the French, German, and Swiss courts has been sufficient to impress their
foremost I tali an opponent, Anzilotti, 8 and recently their
main French adversary, Niboyet. 9
In the course of the debate, many wrong arguments,
"logical" and "practical," were advanced on either side. 10
Most of these have cancelled each other long since. According to the view shared by the writer and gaining favor in this
country, 11 the entire problem is not to be taken in the lump
and decided on a priori reasoning. The various categories of
cases merit individual consideration in the light of expediency. Hence, in the subsequent treatment of each particular
subject, the prevailing opinions, and the chief countries con1 In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's Court, New York
County, October, 1919) 109 N. Y. Misc. 696, x8x N. Y. Supp. 336. DEAK,
Book Review, I La. L. Rev. (1939) 642, at 644 n. 14, notes that the court misunderstood the French rule. In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N. Y. Supp. (zd)
652, 77 Clunet (1950) 976, 16 Z.ausl.PR. (1950/51) 620 with note ZWEIGERT;
notes 64 Harv. L. Rev. (x9so/sx) x66; so Col. L. Rev. (1950) 862; 35 Minn.
L. Rev. (195o/sx) 87; 26 N.Y. U. L. Rev. (x9so/51) zox; 4 Int. Law Q.
(1951) 268; LEWALD, Renvoi Revisited ? in: Fragen des Verfahrens- und
Kollisionrechts, Festschrift fiir Fritzsche (Zurich, 1952) x6s-x8o; NussBAUM,
American-Swiss Private International Law (Bilateral Studies in Private International Law, no. x, 1951) 21. On a dictum of Steinbrink J. in Lann v.
United Steel Works Corporation (1938) x66 N. Y. Misc. 465, I N. Y. Supp.
(2d) 951, "cavalierly" dismissing the problem of renvoi, see FREUTEL, "Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws," 56 Harv. L.
Rev. ( 1942) 30, at 42 ff.
8 ANZILOTTI, formerly against renvoi, Studi critici di diritto internazionale
privato, parte 3, 193, 300, elaborated a system approaching the ideas of
the English judges, Corso di diritto internazionale privato ( 1925) 66, 77;
Decision Notes, 12 Revista (1918) 81, 288.
9 NIBOYET, Decision Note, Revue Crit. 1939, 474-476 and 3 Traite no. IOI3IOI6, now accepts renvoi as definitively adopted by the courts, moreover as
convenient, but in addition also as a tribute to territorialism.
10 Surveys on these arguments in English: LORENZEN, "The Renvoi Doctrine
in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of 'The Law of a Country,'" 27 Yale L. J.
(1918) 509; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 252 to z6o, supra
n. 6. Cf. in favor of renvoi: LEPAULLE, "Nature et methode du droit international prive," Clunet 1936, 284, 296; Conclusions of M. REY in a French case
of 1935, Nouv. Revue 1936, II4.
11 GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1937), n65 at n84, supra n. 6. See also
RAAPE, IPR. 65; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 3) no. 260.
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cerned, will be stated. Here we have to deal only with the
basic issue. 12
Renvoi, translated as "remitting," "reference back,"
properly means that, when a conflicts rule of a state refers to
the "law" of another state and the conflicts rule of the latter
state directs the application of the former's own internal law,
such law is applied. Thus, in a French court, succession upon
death to the movables of an American citizen domiciled in
France is governed by the "American law" but, the law of
the domicil, i.e., French inheritance law, being applicable under American principles of conflicts, this law is applied by the
French courts.
When the principle of renvoi was first adopted in the
Forgo case by the French Court of Cassation/ 3 the avowed
motive was favor of the law of the forum, the law familiar
to the judge and appearing to him the most suitable. In that
case, moreover, the French state had a material interest. The
judgment gave the property of a deceased Bavarian citizen
in the absence of heirs to the French exchequer rather than to
that of Bavaria. This narrow-mindedness is responsible for
much of the ensuing heated attacks on the doctrine. Nevertheless, many courts applying renvoi exhibit a similar attitude, and some writers, as well as a few projects, recognize
only the reference back to the law of the forum, in contrast
to other forms of reference. 14 However, renvoi ought not to
1Z The policy considerations involved in the following exposition were indicated by the present writer in "El fomento internacional del derecho privado," I8 Revista Der. Priv. (1931) 367; RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 28I;
RABEL, 7 ibid. (1933) I99 n. I; RABEL, Die Fachgebiete n8; they are in
essential agreement with the opinions of MELCHIOR and GRISWOLD, fundamental for German and American laws, respectively.
13 Cass. (req.) (Feb. 22, I88z) Clunet 1883, 64; moreover, confirming the
doctrine, Cass. (req.) (March I, 19Io) Clunet 19Io, 888, the vote of the
Counsellor Denis, published in Clunet 1912, 1013, declared: "]'aime mieux Ia
loi fran~,;aise que Ia loi etrangere."
14 STAUB, Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Anhang zu § 372 no. 5 (a);
HOLDER, 19 Z.int.R. ( I909) I98; NUSSBAUM, Principles 99·
The drafts of the new Italian preliminary provisions allowed only reference
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be understood as a concession to judicial deficiencies or prejudices. It represents the idea that a rule of conflicts of country
X, referring to the law of country Y, should not be pursued
to the point where the court in X applies to an inheritance
the law of Y, and a court in Y the law of X. Except under the
influence of the learned literature, no normal judge would
approve such a result. The theoretical accoutrements for this
feeling have finally been furnished by a few modern writers.
Reasonable interpretation of conflicts rules, often, if not normally, restricts the application of foreign substantive rules of
law to the territorial limits defined by the respective foreign
legal systems. in their conflicts laws. 15 Hence, the reference to
the "law" of a foreign state may mean selection of the specific internal law that such state itself applies, and even an
express reference to the internal law of a state may be conditional on its applicability by the state in question to the particular case. 16
The opposite opinion, generally prevailing until recently,
takes it for granted that a sound conflicts rule must necessarily refer to the material rules of some country and not
leave the ultimate issue to foreign conflicts law. Why? One
argument asserts that it is unworthy of a sovereign state to
follow the commands of a foreign state. 17 It appears that
Italy, influenced by the intended universal significance of the
Italian conflicts rules, has been won over by this argument. 18
back and have been justly criticized as inconsistent by Aao, "Le norme di
diritto internazionale privato nel progetto di co dice civile," 23 Rivista (I 93 I)
297 at 349, 3so.
In Soviet Russia, reference back is considered to agree with the spirit of the
law; see MAKAROV, Precis I23; but LUNZ 129 also recognizes reference over.
lS MELCHIOR 242-244.
16 RAAPE 74I and RAAPE, IPR. {ed. I) 42.
17 The argument was invented in France: LABBE, Clunet I 88 5, 5 at 9;
VALERY 486 nos. 372, 374; PILLET, I Traite 532; BARTIN, I Principes 205,
and many others.
18 See MELCHIOR 200; cf. 2.p. An entire book against the doctrine of the
Italian courts has been published by PHILONENKO, La theorie du renvoi en
droit compare {Paris, I935).
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It seems most curious that Italy's dignity should be offended
when Italian courts apply the Italian Civil Code instead of
English case law. Another, the most popular argument,
states that renvoi leads to a vicious circle. If the "acceptance" of renvoi from the (American) country of nationality
to the (French) law of domicil is right, dominant opinion
reasons, the same method must continue with renvoi from
the French law of domicil to the American law of nationality. "Logical mirror," "international lawn tennis," "pingpong," are celebrated names of the supposed circulus inextricabilis/9 time and again designated as the "most powerful
argument" for rejecting renvoi. 20 By parity of reasoning, it
has been supposed that an English or American court resorting to renvoi ought to accept renvoi from the French law
of domicil to the American law of nationality, and so forth.
A striking, though tacit, answer has been provided by the
English practice, more than a hundred years in development,
in the very field where renvoi originated, viz., where nationality and domicil principles conflict.The practice enables the
English courts to obtain results in harmony with the Continental decisions in specific situations and to avoid the circulus.
Basically, confronted with the French and German renvoi
practice, the English courts simply have given free play to
their own principle of domicil. The estate of an English decedent domiciled in France is distributed under French law,
both in French courts by renvoi and in English courts as the
19 KAHN, I Abhandl. zo; LAINE, Clunet 1896, Z4I at z57, 481; BARTIN, 30
Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1898) 155; STREIT, zo Recueil 19Z7 V IOI;
LEWALD 17 no. 2z; In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's
Court, New York County, October, 1919) 109 N. Y. Misc. 696, 181 N. Y.
Supp. 336.
20 The "decisive argument" for innumerable writers and still so, for instance, for LEWALD, "La Theorie du renvoi," 29 Recueil 1929 IV 519 at 545,
595; MEIJERS, "La question de renvoi," 38 Bull. In st. Int. ( 1938) 191, Z19.
For this "powerful" reason, the Italian drafts limited renvoi to reference
back, and the final text, C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. zo, eliminated it
entirely.
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law of domicil. Put to the test when Italian courts repudiated
renvoi, disdained to apply Italian inheritance law, and insisted on British law for British successions in Italy, the English judges exhibited real wisdom in avoiding the absurd
result not of renvoi but of the rejection of renvoi. They
realized that the traditional form of their domiciliary principle refers to the same law which is applied by the court of the
domicil. 21 Under the principle as now defined, the reference
to the law of domicil points primarily to the conflicts law of
the domicil. The cases use different language to express this
policy of forbearance. Undue attention has been given to inconsistencies and to sayings such as that the English court
should decide as if sitting at the place of the domicil. 22
In fact, several modes of stating renvoi are thinkable and
have been employed by writers, courts on the Continent, and
British judges. Falconbridge lucidly distinguishes three formulations of renvoi, 23 and some authors, who have contrived
an intricate system of distinctions, call the English method
"double renvoi." But these details do not touch the essential
point, namely, the policy behind the cases. The writers who
seem not to have understood this policy-unfortunately
there are many-may be excused, since even Luxmoore, J.,
21

In re Ross, I Ch. D. [1930] 377, 388.
Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt. Ecc. Ct. (1841) 855, 863, per Jenner, J., often
quoted, and adopted by DICEY in his early thesis that "the object of our courts
is to deal with such a will exactly as the courts of the domicil would deal
with it." DICEY, The Law of Domicile, as a Branch of the Law of England
(London, 1879) 295·
The differences of language and certain errors in the decisions were sub·
jected to a meticulous criticism by MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Modern English Law, followed widely by CHESHIRE 62-87, in an unforunate
contrast to his former view, "Private International Law," 51 Law Q. Rev.
(1935) 76 at 77, (CHESHIRE, ed. x, 135-139). Both authors, in the spell of the
formalistic international theories, failed to appreciate sufficiently the policy
questions. The same is true of the subtle criticism by MORRIS, x8 Brit. Year
Book Int. Law (1937) at 32, supra n. 6, now also DICEY(-MORRis) 47-61. See
GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1938) at II72, supra n. 6, and his Book Review,
51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 573·
23 FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," 17 Can.
Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 378, now Essays x86.
22
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in In re Ross and Lord Maugham, in In re Askew/5 while
confirming and fortifying the rule, evidently regretted that
the precedents had abandoned the pure domiciliary test. The
English rule is a praiseworthy contribution to international
harmony, not difficult to derive from the principle- of domicil. It was prepared by the historic doctrine that jurisdiction
implies application of the law of the court. 26 Finally, these
principles have been illuminated by the Privy Council in a
recent case 27 "with all the weight of a considered judgment
devoted to the issue" of renvoi in general. 28 The reference
from the lex situs to the national law in the Palestinian Succession Ordinance, 1923, of a deceased owner is construed as
pointing to the law which the courts of the national country
would apply to the property in question, as distinguished
from property in their own country, the contrary construction being regarded as "deliberately cutting across the principle" 29 recognized by the English courts.
What, then, of the mirror cabinet? If the world is split
into two contradictory systems, there must be some modus
vivendi. Renvoi is one of the best means to this end. It stands
to reason that it cannot be applied in the same manner by the
two antagonistic groups and at the same time reach conform24

In re Ross, Ch. D. [1930] 377·
In re Askew, 2 Ch. D. [1930] 259·
26 See the interesting discussion by MoRRIS, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law
(1937) at 32, supra n. 6; RHEINSTEIN, u Annuario Dir. Comp. (1937) 315 ff.;
KUHN, Comp. Com. 52; DE NovA, "Considerazioni sui rinvio in diritto
inglese," 30 Rivista 1938, 388 at 412-41 5·
27 Jaber Elias Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Nahas [1941] 3 All E.R. zo, per
Clauson, L. J., the Judicial Committee (including Lords Atkin, Russel of
Killowen, Romer and Sir George Rankin).
28 KEITH, "The Privy Council on Renvoi," Journ. Comp. Leg. (1942) 69.
29 [1941] 3 All E.R. at 25. The decision is heavily relied on by WYNNPARRY, J., In re Duke of Wellington [1947] Ch. 506 at 513 (affirmed on
other grounds, [1948] Ch. uS); notes by MoRRIS and JENNINGS, 64 Law Q.
Rev. (1948) 264; MANN, u Mod. Law Rev. (1948) 232; FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 229; RAEBURN, 25 Br. Year Book Int. Law (1948) zu, supra n. 6;
BRIGGS, 64 Yale L. J. (1954/55) 195, suPra n. 6; also 15 Z.ausl.PR. (1949/50)
149 with notes of NEUHAUS, ibid. 161, and W. GOLDSCHMIDT, ibid. 342; I I
Giur. comp. DIP. (1954) II9 with notes of LIPSTEIN and DE NOVA.
24
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ity. 30 The English method, in turn, is not to be observed by
courts following the nationality principle! Theorists should
not demand schematic symmetry just to obtain an argumentum ad absurdum. This understood, it need no longer be
feared that the English attitude will create new cases of
circulus inextricabilis. 81 The difference between nationality
and domicil as tests of personal law requires a different technique in each group of countries. Indeed, the nationality
principle does not mean that a foreign national is subject
necessarily to the substantive law of his country; it means
that the state to which the individual belongs should determine his personal relations. The law of domicil does not
mean that everybody must be subject to the substantive law
of his domicil. The reasonable construction is that the law
of the place of domicil determines what law should govern.
so The view of the English courts has a striking parallel in an equally wise
old decision of the Appeal Court of Liibeck, of March 21, 1861, Krebs v.
Rosalino, 14 Seuff. Arch. 644 no. 107. The case was entirely analogous to the
Annesley case [1926] Ch. 692. The testatrix, a subject of Frankfurt on the
Main, according to the normal concept of domicil, had her last domicil in
Mainz, but, as she did not have the governmental authorization for domicil
according to the French Civil Code in force in Mainz, she lacked domicil
there in the meaning of the law of Mainz, quite as Mrs. Annesley did under
French law. The conflicts rule of Mainz was uncertain; possibly it subjected
succession to movables to the law of nationality of the deceased, i.e., the
statute of Frankfurt. The Court of Liibeck, under its own conflicts rule, referring the succession to the domicil of the de cuius, declared that correct
application of the principle required that the entire law of the testator's
domicil in its totality be applied and succession upon death be adjudicated
as in the courts of the domicil.
In his recent work, LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois ( 1941) 49,
56, again insists that thus the Court of Liibeck refers from domicil to nationality, while the Forgo case and all its followers refer from nationality to
domicil. But why should this contrast which involves no contradiction, be cited
as a reproach to the renvoi principle, rather than to the diversity of conflicts
principles and of concepts of domicil?
s1 This is feared by MORRIS, "The Law of Domicil," 18 Brit. Year Book
Int. Law ( 1937) 32, 37 and now DICEY (-MORRIS) 56; CHESHIRE 68; MAURY,
57 Recueil 1936 III 329, 538; DE NovA 441; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev.
( 1941) 221 at 272, supra n. 6; NussBAUM, ''Rise and Decline of the Law-ofNations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev. (1942) 189, 202,
and Principles 98.
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Instead of following writers 32 who with a certain pride declare that they intend to "explain away" the English conception of renvoi, the English model should be extended to
other types of cases and to other countries in accordance
with the spirit of the principles guiding the forum.
As to such types of cases, the German 38 courts have consistently assumed that reference back must be accompanied
by the acceptance of reference to a third law (Weiterverweisung, transmission). 34 In the case of an English testator
domiciled in Germany who leaves immovables in Georgia
(U.S.A.), the German rule refers to English conflicts law
which refers to the lex situs. The statute of distribution of
Georgia, therefore, is applicable in a German court as well
as in England, although German conflicts law itself does not
distinguish immovables for the purpose of succession. The
persistent objections to this extension of the renvoi principle
chiefly tend to demonstrate that the chain of references may
lead nowhere, a fear not justified by any noteworthy case material 85 and not significant in view of the standard set by the
English precedents. There must always be some hierarchy in
the applicable laws. Renvoi is not just an aimless game.
Illustrations: 36 (a) A Danish national dies domiciled in
Rome, Italy, leaving movables in Germany. A German court
will consult the national "law," i.e., the Danish conflicts law,
82

MORRIS, MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, CHESHIRE and others.
More doubt exists with respect to French courts, but transmissive reference is recognized by Cass. (req.) (Nov. 7, 1933), Guez c. Ben Attar, Clunet
1935, 88, Revue Crit. 1934, 440 and Tribunal civil de Ia Seine (June 28,
1950), 40 Revue Crit. (1951) 648 with note MoTULSKY, 79 Clunet (1952) 174
with note PHILONENKO; also BATIFFOL, Traite no. 309.
34 For this translation see ScHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in
Anglo-American Law," 31 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1918) 523.
35 See NussBAUM, 42 Col. L. Rev. (1942) 202, supra n. 31.
36 The first example is solved by MELCHIOR 225 § 151, as in the text, while
WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 1) 50 (2), uses the first and third examples in order to
show that renvoi to a third Jaw should not be followed, if the two foreign
laws involved disagree in the choice of Jaw. The case on which they agree
is often excepted from the doctrinal refusal of renvoi.
33
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which refers to the domicil and allegedly does not recognize
renvoi. Therefore, the Italian statute of distribution is applied. It does not matter that Italian conflicts law equally refuses renvoi so that an Italian court under its nationality
principle would apply the Danish inheritance law. Hence a
German judge can without difficulty apply W eiterverweisung
in this case, although the two foreign conflicts laws involved,
the Danish and the Italian, do not agree with each other.
(b) A United States citizen domiciled in Rome leaves at
death movables in Poland. The inheritance law of Italy is
not applicable in any one of the three countries. An Italian
court would apply "American" 37 inheritance law. An American court, were it to adopt the English renvoi practice,
would give effect to the inheritance law of an American state.
A Polish court, on the basis of the nationality principle and
renvoi, should reach the same result.
(c) An Argentinian domiciled in Rio de Janeiro dies lea ving movables in France. The French court is referred by its
conflicts rule to the Argentine principle of domicil, and
thereby to the conflicts rule of Brazil. Until recently, Brazilian conflicts law "accepted" the Argentine "renvoi," and
Brazilian inheritance law was applicable in Buenos Aires as
well as in Rio de Janeiro.
The present Brazilian Introductory Law of 1942, adopting the domicil principle, leads to the same result. The circumstance that the two internal laws are not in disaccord is
not material in a French court, which simply follows the decision that the national (Argentine) court would render.
In the only decision on renvoi since the five former highest
tribunals of Italy were replaced by the present Supreme
Court, the advantages of "transmission" or reference over,
as distinguished from reference back, are recognized. 38 This
case, decided in 1937, is regarded as spectacular, since it is
contrary to the settled practice of other courts, to the great
majority of writers, as well as to the formal prohibition of
37
88

Which state's law? See infra pp. 138 ff.
Cass. Ita!. (Dec. 29, 1937) 9 Rivista Dir. Priv. ( 1939) II 228.
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renvoi expressed in the new Italian Code, then soon to enter
into force. 39
While some authors accept only reference back 40 and
others solely reference over, 41 an increasing number advocate
renvoi in either form for situations in which the same law is
indicated by the conflicts rules of two or more foreign countries principally involved. 42 For instance, in case two Swiss
nationals, uncle and niece, whose intermarriage is prohibited
by Swiss law, were to marry in Soviet Russia while there
domiciled, the marriage would be valid according to both
Russian law and Swiss conflicts law. 43 Presumably, it is admitted, the validity of the marriage would be recognized by
any court. 44 Again, by the admission, the existence of a preconception is at least partially avowed.
In addition to references from the national law to the
domiciliary law, others from the law of situs to the national
or domiciliary law and vice versa, and in the field of obligations, have been admitted with good justification. The particular situations need separate consideration.
Ordinary renvoi is not able to settle a "positive" conflict
of conflicts rules. Where a Spaniard dies domiciled in the
United States, his movables are distributed here under the
statute of the domicil and in Spain under Spanish inheritance
law. This thorny problem is best covered by bilateral treaties. Or it may be obviated by extraordinary concessions, as
in the Swiss statute on conflicts. In an admirable effort to
avoid collisions regarding Swiss nationals abroad, the statute
See GRASSETII, Note to the decision supra n. 38.
See supra n. 14.
41 The sovereignty of the forum is said not to be involved; BATE, Notes on
the Doctrine of Renvoi (1904) 112 ff.; also, Austrian OGH. (May 2, 1929)
JW. 1931, x66 (for obscure reasons).
42 LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 519 at 574; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III
329 at 549; M. WoLFF, IPR. 76.
43 Example adduced by RAAPE, 24, 745, as support for renvoi in general.
44LEWALD, Regles genchales des conflits de lois (1941) 58.
39
40
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provides that Swiss citizens should be subject to Swiss municipal law only if the local domestic law of the domicil does
not claim to govern. 45 Hence, the national law extends to
Swiss nationals abroad only under a negative condition.
At present, renvoi is prescribed by statutory provisions in
Germany, Austria, Poland, Sweden, Finland, China, Japan,
Siam, Liechtenstein, and Israel, 46 moreover by the Hague
Convention on Marriage, 47 and the Geneva conventions concerning negotiable instruments. 48 In practice, it occurs beyond the limits of these provisions 49 and in other countries. 5°
45 NAG. arts. 28, 3I. Compare also the German EG. art. 28, the Polish law
on international private law of I926, arts. I6, I9 par. 31 and the Czechoslovakian law on private international law of I948, ss. I7, 23. But the Federal
Tribunal has restricted the scope of this concession by excluding the cases
where the conflicts rule of the foreign domicil either remits the case to a
third state's law (BG. April 3, I952 1 78 BGE. II zoo, 203) or declares itself
applicable but by virtue of a conflicts rule differing from the Swiss rule (e.g.,
by subjecting an illegitimate child's support claim to the personal law of the
unwed mother where Switzerland applies the Swiss father's personal law,
BG. Feb. z, 1955, 8I BGE. II I7, zo).
46 Germany: EG. art. 27, in five cases of status questions.
Austria: Decree of Oct. IS, I94I 1 § IS.
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. 36.
Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of I904 with subsequent amendments, c. I § z, c. 2 § I.
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, § 53, Law of Dec. 28, I929, § 9·
China: Law of I9I8, art 4·
Japan: Law of I898, art 29.
Siam: Law of I939 on Private International Law, art 4·
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 45 and SCHLUSSABTEILUNG, § 70; S.R. art. I3 par.
z; see also for another provision WAHLE, 2 Z.ausi.PR. (1928) 137.
Israel: Palestine Order in Council, Sept. I, I922, art. 64 (2) ; Succession
Ordinance, March 8, 1923, s. 4 (iii) (c).
Cf. cases commented by WENGLER, "Internationales und interreligioses Privatrecht in Paliistina," 12 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1939) 772, 790.
Also the Rumanian C.C. (1940), supra p. 30, n. 70, art. 46.
Yugoslavia: Law on Succession of April 25, 1955, arts. I 56, 159.
47 Art. I. Member states, supra p. 34·
48 Resolutions of the Hague ( I912) concerning checks, art. 32, similar provision in Soviet Russia: Law on checks, of Nov. 6, I929 1 art. 36. Cf. MAKAROV,
Precis I91. Geneva conflicts rules on bills of exchange ( I930) art. z par. I
and on checks (I93I), art. z par. I. These rules are not only binding between
the contracting parties (supra p. 38), but have been enacted by several countries as internal law, see MAKAROV, Quellen (Index).
49 The German Supreme Court especially applies the principle of renvoi to
all matters of conflicts laws. See MELCHIOR § I39·
50 MELCHIOR I98, mentions Argentina (contra: Vrco no. 304 and art. zo
of the Draft Civil Code, 82 Clunet (I955) 232), Brazil (but see note 52
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Under the influence of the theoretical literature, the recent
codes of Italy, Greece, Egypt, and Syria 51 have rejected
renvoi, as does the Brazilian law of 1942, 52 while at the same
time reducing conflicts by its acceptance of the domiciliary
principle. But in the Continental literature, the traditional
hostility of the writers is being abandoned. 5 8 In 1932, the Institute of International Law, which had censured renvoi in
1895, 1898, and 1900, recognized the conventional, legislative, and judicial trend, manifesting itself in various countries in certain applications of the renvoi doctrine, particularly with respect to personal status. 54
A like change of mind is to be hoped for the United States.
The usual case for resort to renvoi is here almost without
infra), Belgium (decisions in DE Vos, 2 Probleme no. 821), Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal (also the Draft Civil Code, arts. 30, 31) Spain
(cf. W. GoLDSCHMIDT, 15 Z.ausl.PR. (1949/so) 342, supra n. 29), Rumania
(supra n. 46), and Venezuela. To be added are certainly Switzerland
(SCHNITZER 205), Lebanon (Cass. Dec. 26, 1951, 43 Revue Crit. (1954) 364

with note GANNAGE) and probably many other countries. See also AngloGerman Mixed Tribunals (May 31, 1926) 6 Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes 540.
51 Ita!. C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 30.
Greek C. C. ( 1940) art. 32.
Egyptian C. C. ( 1948) art. 27.
Syrian C. C. (1949) art. 29.
The Dutch decisions prevailingly reject renvoi (VAN BRAKEL, 75 n. r).
The Benelux-Draft on uniform conflict of laws, supra p. 39, though in
principle not accepting renvoi (art. r, par. I) admits both reference back
and reference over from the national law of a person to the law of his
domicil (art. 15, no. 2 and 3).
5 2 Brazil, Lei de IntrodU(;ao, of Sept. 4, 1942, art. r6.
58 France: in addition to older writers
(WEISS, VAREILLE&-SOMMIERE,
COLIN), LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, "Observations sur )a question du renvoi,"
51 Clunet 1924, 877 and now Precis no. 259; ARMIN JON, "Le renvoi," Revue
1922-1923, 565 at 583 ff. and now r Precis no. 194; NIBOYET, 3 Traite no.
IOI3-IOI6,

Belgium: ROLIN, POULLET no. 256.
Germany: NUSSBAUM (D. IPR. sr) M. WOLFF (IPR. 76), RAAPE (IPR. 64),
in addition to the older writers recorded by MELCHIOR 201 § 137.
Switzerland: ScHNITZER 198; NIEDERER 274.
Italy: ANZILOTTI.
Spain: TRfAs DEBEs, "Regles generales des conflits de lois," 62 Recueil 1937
IV 62; GoLDSCHMIDT, r Sistema 377·
5
~ Annuaire 1932, 471.
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significance, as, in common with almost the entire British
Empire, none of the States accept the principle of nationality.
This evidently is the reason why the basic need has not been
felt as in Europe. Other conflicts, however, have occurred,
striking enough to compel the Restaters to admit some exceptions to their rejection of renvoi. 55 Cowan proves that renvoi
is "logically" possible, 56 and Griswold vigorously pleads for
renvoi wherever no special reasons militate against it. 57 Even
from an opposed point of view, Cormack, in effect, accepts
the practical result of renvoi in all cases respecting status and
property, since he would determine these matters according
to the law considered applicable at the domicil or situs respectively.58 It would accordingly seem that the critic who declared his appreciation for Griswold's advocacy of a cause
lost before the formidable array of the enemies of renvoi, 59
may soon have to look for another ground of sympathy.
The new, more realistic approach to renvoi looks for international agreement rather than doctrinal solutions. The
Draft Convention of the Hague Conference (I 9 5 I) "to determine conflicts between the national law and the law of
domicil," 59 a though limited in range seeks to eliminate the
most important group of conflicts. According to the Project,
the reference of the national law of a person to the law of his
domicil is binding both for the domiciliary state and for third
countries (art. I). In order to avoid divergent qualifications,
the Draft defines "domicil." This is a considerable progress.
Restatement § 8.
COWAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. (1938) 34-49·
57
GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1937) n6s.
58 CORMACK,
14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 229 supra n. 6 · contra
' 19 Can. Bar
' Rev.
F ALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi. and the Law of the Domicile,"
(1941) 3II at 335, 337, now Essays 141, 164.
9
5 Annual Survey of English Law 1938 388.
59
a Texts and general comment, supra ~. 41, n. 95· For other proposals, see
RABEL, 4 Int. Law Q. ( 1951) 402-411; German counterproposal, 17 Z.ausl.PR.
(1952) 27355
56
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But elaborate construction in this field will still be needed,
after the blank negation is suppressed.
3· Choice of Law by the Parties

60

The doctrine of "autonomy of the parties" is also to be
noted in this connection as an example of obstinate theory
opposed to universal practice. The details will be considered
later in connection with contracts.
The practice allowing parties to a contract to determine
the law applicable to their contractual relation, recognized in
Dumoulin's theory, for centuries has been applied by courts
throughout the world with slight dissent. 61 In commercial
arbitration, this right of the parties is taken for granted. If
this time-honored view has recently suffered vacillation, it is
due to the fanatical campaign of the handbooks in the last
decades. After World War I, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals,
which were free to choose their method, had no doubt about
the rule. 62
Despite this practice, prevailing theory 63 attacks the freedom of the parties to a contract to determine the law that
shall govern its validity, because this enables them to evade
60 An excellent comparative study on the subject is the book by H. BATIFFOL,
Les conflits de lois en matiere de contrats (1938).
61 The Swiss Federal Court had held that the questions connected with the
formation of a contract, such as those concerning consent, fraud, error, formalities, power of attorney, are inaccessible to the parties' choice of law; it
seems that these questions were determined, preferably at least, under the
law of the place of contracting. See BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. II 397, 399;
BG. (July 12, 1938) 64 BGE. II 346, 349· Recently, concededly under the
influence of the Swiss writers, the court has admitted that the formation of
a contract also is generally governed by the parties' choice of law, with the
exception of formalities and the capacity to contract; BG. (Feb. u, 1952)
78 BGE. II 74, 83 with note GUTZWILLER, IO Schwz. Jahrb. (1953) 304;
(Aug. 27, 1953) 79 BGE. II 295, 299·
62RABEL, I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 42.
aa See the endless lists of majority opinions by CALEB, Essai sur Ie principe
de l'autonomie et de Ia volonte en droit international prive (1927) 81;
MELCHIOR 500 § 353 n. I j GUTZWILLER I6o6 n. I; BATIFFOL II, Exceptional
positions were taken by KOSTERS (1917) 733; SURVILLE ( 1925) 351,
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compulsory rules of a law otherwise controlling. It has been
said that to allow parties to select their law would elevate
them to the rank of a legislature and delegate to them a
sovereign power. Hence, it is supposed, each contract must be
localized in one state whose law shall prescribe whether the
contract is valid and whether, or to what extent, the parties
are allowed to submit controversies to the law of another
state. To recognize an agreement respecting applicable law
before determining which law governs the validity of the
agreement, is accordingly regarded as putting the cart before
the horse.
On the other hand, courts operate on the unassailable
basis of a customary, extremely well-settled conflicts rule. Autonomy is needed in the first place by international and, in
this country, also by interstate commerce. For such matters,
at least in peace time, few compulsory, imperative rules of
law are provided in the national legislations; existing prohibitions will more often than not be considered by the court
in which the contract is in issue either from the viewpoint of
local public policy or as a defense based on illegality of performance. Thus, the danger that prohibitions established by
one law may be evaded by a party exercising the right to select another law is practically negligible, so that a state ordinarily has no substantial interest, as the theory postulates,
warranting intrusion into the international freedom of contracting. On the contrary, the merchants have an enormous
interest that a certain and preknown body of rules should
govern future litigation. They are surrounded by a chaos of
national conflicts laws and national legislations, private and
commercial. Contracts between merchants of different nations are likely to touch several territories. No attorney is
able to predict the law under which the various rights and
duties of the parties will be adjudicated in all courts in which
litigation may occur. This primordial need for relative cer-
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tainty is documented by the multitudinous usages and standard forms of the several branches of international trade and
impels courts familiar with business requirements, British,
French, German, and Swedish, to grant the parties wide latitude. They usually assert without qualification that the applicable law is determined by the parties. 64
N onmercantile situations must be independently evaluated. The case in which Dumoulin advocated autonomy of
the parties involved marriage settlements; the French courts
still insist on free choice of law by the parties in this case.
The prevailing view, however, is that the law governing in
the absence of a settlement, controls the permissibility of the
settlement, 65 including any agreement respecting the applicable law. In fact, as contrasted with business contracts, marriage settlements are frequently subjected to restrictions imposed by law.
The attitude of the courts has finally received the support
of a succession of German 66 and an increasing number of
French 67 writers. The dominant theory has also been criticized of late in the United States; 68 that the cases do not
64

See, e.g., for English dicta, CHESHIRE 206.
See infra, Effects of Marriage on Property, Chapter IO.
6 6 The first opposition to the dominant reasoning was expressed in my observations, I Z.ausi.PR. (I927) 42 n. I, and Book Review, 4 Z.ausi.PR. (I930)
4I7i also in IS Revista Der. Priv. (1931) pi, 363, for the reasons explained
above; more study was given with arguments of varying kind by HAUDEK,
Die Bedeutung des Parteiwillens im internationalen Privatrecht, Rechtsvergl.
Abhandl. no. 7 (I93I); MELCHIOR 498 § 351 ff. (1932); NUSSBAUM, D. IPR.
2I4 (I932); M. WoLFF, IPR. I39i Priv. Int. Law 4I6; RAAPE, IPR. 424;
DOLLE, I7 Z.ausi.PR. (I952) I70i also the Swiss author NIEDERER 193-196.
67 LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE, Note, DALLOZ I931.2.33 and Precis no. 25I j
WIGNY, "La regie de conflit applicable aux contrats," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1933) 676; PLANIOL, RIPERT et ESMEIN, 6 Traite pratique 64I no.
467 j PERROUD, CJunet 1933, 289 j BATIFFOL 8 j }. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 253 j
MAURY no. 54I; also }EANPRETRE, Les conflits de lois en matiere d'obligations
contratuelles, selon Ia jurisprudence et Ia doctrine aux Etats-Unis (I936) I37·
Cf. RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 37 Col. L. Rev. (I937) 327.
68 CooK, "'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Ill. L. Rev. (I936) 143
at I45i CooK, Legal Bases (I942) at 349; and ibid. 389; and see LORENZEN
and HEILMANN, "The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws," 83 U. of Pa. L.
65
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confirm the hostility of the Restatement to election of law by
the parties, is well known. 69
Hence, the recent literature interests itself more in the
limits to be imposed upon the autonomy of the parties' intention than in challenging its existence/° Consideration was
given to a particularly important phase of this problem in
connection with the uniform conflicts rules in relation to sales
of goods prepared by the International Law Association and
the Sixth and Seventh Hague Conferences. 71 The British
lawyers were in significant opposition to the insistence of
Continental scholars that the validity of an agreement making a certain law applicable, should be subject to the same
law that, under the intended Convention, should be applied
in the absence of such agreement. The proponents of this restriction claimed that this would ensure greater certainty for
the parties than if the law of the forum were to determine
the validity of the agreement. In the Draft Convention of
the Seventh Hague Conference ( I 9 5 I ) , the former view
was adopted recognizing for international sales the parties'
free choice of law unrestricted by some "primary law" or a
"legitimate interest" of the parties. However, the entire discussion and others that followed in the literature make it desirable to sound a warning that business security will be further menaced by ensnaring commercial autonomy in a netRev. ( 1935) 555; WILLis, "Two Approaches to the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study of the English Law and the Restatement of The American Law
Institute," 14 Can. Bar Rev. (1936} I; YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (1936) 183; idem, "'Autonomy' in Choice
of Law," I Am. J. Comp. Law (1952) 341.
69 See the writers cited in the precedent note and in a detailed criticism by
NussBAUM, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement," 51
Yale L. J. (1942) 893.
7°See M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 2) 118; Priv. Int. Law 416 no. 398; and M.
WoLFF, "The Choice of Law by the Parties in International Contracts," 49
Juridical Review (1937) 110, 118.
71
A clear resume is to be found in Int. Law Association, 35th Report (1928)
136 ff.
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work of limitations through a combination of substantive and
conflicts rules.
Of course, when the world enjoys a reliable uniform conflicts law, neither renvoi nor self-choice of law will be so
largely needed as today.

II. THE

PuRPOsE OF CoNFLICTS

LAw

r. Uniformity
Since Savigny, it has been customary to regard the attainment of uniform solutions as the chief purpose of private international law. Cases should be decided under the same substantive rules, irrespective of the court where they are
pleaded. 72 We may gratefully note that this postulate has
continued in favor, if only as an ideal remote from reality,
at a time when separate conflicts laws have grown up in the
various countries and their diversities have been prized. The
real value of this postulate under present conditions is that it
forms a test for the relative convenience of conflict rules. 73
The time has come to approach the goal with more energy.
One of the considerations leading to a universally useful
rule is the legitimate expectation of the parties. Not to disappoint fair assumptions by persons disposing of property or
entering into engagements, was the justified motive of the
twisted doctrines protecting vested rights. 74 For example,
formalities are subject to the law of the place where a transaction has been concluded; the acquisition of property is governed by the law of the situs as of the time of the acquisition;
72 SAVIGNY § 348; recently, for instance, TAINTOR, "'Universality' in the
Conflict Laws of Contract," I La. L. Rev. (I939) 695, 699; HANCOCK, Torts
in the Conflict of Laws (I942) 54·
73 SeeM. WoLFF, IPR. 9, Priv. Int. Law IS; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934)
I96; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 423; NEUNER, "Policy Considerations
in the Conflicts of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (I942) 479, 483.
74 GoODRICH, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. Va. L. Q.
(1930) 156, 167 ff. and GOODRICH 7 j CHESHIRE 31 37 j NEUNER, 20 Can, Bar
Rev. (I942) at 482, suPra n. 73·
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capacity to contract a business obligation partly is, or should
be, determined by the law governing the validity of the contract, etcetera. "When a matter has been settled, in conformity with the law then and there controlling the actions of the
parties, the settlement should not be disturbed because the
point arises for litigation somewhere else." 75 This "fundamental premise" suggests that courts should search, in the
absence of express intentions with respect to the applicable
law, for the "tacit" and eventually the "presumed" intentions
of the parties.
Moreover, as a European writer has recently postulated,
when a fact or an act is governed by a certain law according
to all the conflicts laws practically involved, this law should
be applied by any court before which the case may come as a
result of subsequent circumstances. 76
In a more general way, Savigny regarded it a guarantee of
uniform treatment of legal relations that the law of that
place where the relation has its legal "seat" should be applied everywhere-a conception that through Wharton has
been admitted in the Supreme Court of the United States. 77
Gierke substituted for "seat" "center of gravity"; Bar
sought localization "according to the nature of things"; and
Westlake recommended the law of the state with which the
relation has closest connection. All these formulas tend
toward the same goal, the importance of which still is in no
wise impaired. But the obstacles barring the way to the goal
have increased since the world order envisaged by Savigny
has been dissolved into more than a hundred national legal
systems.
In view of the difficulties of reaching uniformity, a more
modest aspiration has been correctly proposed by Cook,
75 GooDRICH, 36 W. Va. L. Q. (1930) 156, 164, supra n. 74·
76 MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 3& Bull. lnst. Int. (193&)
77 Pritchard v. Norton (1&&2) 106 U. S. 124 at 130.

at :225.
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namely, to attain "as much certainty as may be reasonably
hoped for in a changing world" and is compatible with
"needed flexibility." 78
2.

Policy Considerations

A just result or the realization of prescribed policies is
now often viewed as the main purpose of conflicts law. 79 This
is right without doubt, if certain fundamental distinctions be
borne in mind. 80
(a) The usual confusion of private and conflicts laws has
engendered the conception that both have to follow the same
pattern of values and purposes. If this were true, all the
differences that permeate the national laws with respect to
the organization of the family, the categories of property
rights, freedom of contract, privileges and duties, public interests, and so on, would be reflected, nay reproduced, in the
conflicts rules of the divers countries. The writers have formulated their axioms according to their particular views.
Kahn, 81 for instance, who considered relationships created by
internal law to be the subject matter of conflicts rules, required conformity with the fundamental idea of the internal
institution. If, in the doctrine of the internal law, parental
power is regarded as a mere right, the father's personal law
should govern; if the father's duty is accentuated, the law of
the child. Under Pillet's leadership, French writers transformed their doctrine of sovereignty 82 so as to require the
determination of what law ought to govern capacity to contract, succession on death, etc., in conformity with the "social
78 CooK, Legal Bases 432.
79 See in particular NEUNER, Der Sinn (I932); CAVERS, "A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. (I933) at I73; NEUNER, "Policy
Considerations in the Conflicts of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. ( I942) at 486;
HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases (I937) 55, recognize "a desirable result" in
their third and fourth classification of "social policies."
80RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 284.
81 KAHN, I Abhandl. 112.
82 See DE Vos, IS Revue Inst. Beige ( I929) I, 97; I6 ibid. ( I930) I33·
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purpose" of the state regulations pertaining to personality,
family, security of commerce, etc.; the applicable law is that
which most efficiently protects the purpose fostered by the
forum's own domestic legislation. 83
This identification of motives, sometimes extremely consequential, aggravates the difficult task of the conflicts law beyond all limits. To care for social prosperity is the responsibility of the municipal private laws, which have to resolve the
merits of each particular problem. The principle, jus suum
cuique tribuere, instructs legislators and judges to ponder
carefully private and public interests. But this is what each
private law does for itself; the function of private international rules is to choose the applicable law with all its evaluations whatever they may be. Existing conflicts law presumes
that all laws of civilized countries are of equal rank, not to
speak of sister states in a federation. Assuredly, the origin of
this idea was political, and its modern theoretical foundation
came from its connection with the law of nations. But, as
things are, to inject national policies directly into conflicts
law, will destroy it. In such event, "international public order" would embrace all internal laws.
(b) When preconceptions are eliminated, policy in the
field of conflicts law is of course the main object of concern.
Conflicts rules have never been entirely uninfluenced by the
underlying social situation. This is pioneer ground. How the
interest of the state, of other states, of the parties, of third
persons in good faith, of commerce or trade in general, are
to be valued against each other in various situations and best
reconciled with the postulate of certainty, needs renewed and
detailed deliberation. For the time being, it would be entirely
premature to try to enumerate or to analyze such considerations in a general way. 83a
83

See the illustrations of NrBOYET 500 no. 416.
saa For recent discussions, especially by American and German writers, see
NEUNER, "Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev.
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(c) The postulate that conflicts rules should have just results may be understood-or perhaps misunderstood-as
signifying that the outcome of lawsuits in every case should
conform, not to the lex fori, but to the judge's sense of
justice.
We well know that courts will try many direct or devious
ways to satisfy this sense of justice. They will use the faculty
to reject a foreign rule on the ground of a public policy of
the forum. They will classify an unwelcome foreign rule as
inapplicable foreign procedure. They will, with a desired end
in view, affirm or deny a person's domicil. And we may trust
the courts always to select, of two accessible ways, that which
leads to the result to them appearing preferable. 84 These
expedients of judicial wisdom cannot be closed entirely, and
should not be, while conflicts rules remain crude and vague.
It is good to know that inscrutable judgments occasionally alleviate the conflicts chaos.
Yet, subservience to subjective and local values would be
dangerous and unsound as a general policy. Cavers seems to
envisage disintegration of conflicts rules as the consequence
of his postulate of just results and, by way of palliation, recommends re-enforcement of the doctrine of stare decisis and
recourse to standards. 85 Such programs, not sufficiently detailed, are disturbing.
Several points discussed in this chapter are illustrated in
(1942) 479-501; HARPER, "Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 56 Yale
L. J. (1947) II55-II77; WENGLER, "Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsiitze des
IPR. und ihre Kollisionen," 23 Zeitschrift fiir Offentliches Recht ( 1943/44)
473-509, 41 Revue Crit. (1952) 595-622, ibid. 42 (1953) 37-60; ZWEIGERT,
Festschrift Raape (1948) 49-52; KEGEL, "Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz
im Internationalen Privatrecht," Festschrift Lewald (1953) 259-288.
8 4 American courts prefer to satisfy a desirable solution in usury cases than
to have all decisions harmonized. See STUMBERG 237, and WENGLER, Book
Review, I I Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 967.
85 CAVERS, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) 173 at 196, supra n. 79· Recently
CAVERS himself has confessed troublesome doubts concerning his reference to
social and economic considerations, Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1943)
1170 at II73·
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the case of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v.
Cox. 86 The plaintiff, having been injured on a passenger train
in Missouri, for consideration released her rights to the local
agency of the railroad by a document executed in Missouri.
Under a statute of Missouri, she could not bring an action to
cancel the release without refunding the sum received. Without doing so, she sued in Arkansas, and the Supreme Court
held ( I ) that the failure of tender was characterized in Missouri as going to the basis of the right, but ( 2) that in Arkansas such a suit could be prosecuted without returning the
sum, and (3) that, therefore, the question being merely procedural in the forum, the suit should be allowed. From the
viewpoint of a sound system (or of analytical jurisprudence), there are three fundamental objections to be made.
( I ) The Missouri provision is questionable, though possibly
directed against ambulance chasing. ( 2) Yet, even if wrong,
the provision is of course substantive, affecting the material
rights of the plaintiff, any procedural consequence being
merely accessory. The law of Arkansas not requiring tender
is equally substantive; it denies what the other law affirms.
(3) The Court evidently applied the law of the place where
the contract was made and performed. On this ground, it
should not have evaded its own conflicts rule, as it did by a
characterization according to the alleged lex fori. What
really was intended is obvious, however. The court wanted
desperately to satisfy its own sense of equity as against an
objectionable foreign law.

Ill.
I.

RATIONALIZATION

Special Rules

Inductive methods include the creation of special rules for
typical situations. Case law in this country has produced a
sa St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Cox (1926) 171 Ark. 103,
283 S. W. 31; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 272.
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wealth of such specific rules, whereas the European codifications have been satisfied to formulate conflicts rules in very
broad and generalized terms. Specialization of the rules has
recently become a recognized tendency, particularly in the
field of obligations, in which, even in this country, general
axioms have done much harm. The Institute of International
Law has been active in this direction since I908. The Polish
Law of I 926 (art. 8) and the Czechoslovakian Law of I 948
( § 44-46) state different points of contact appropriate to
the various types of contract-contracts executed at an exchange or market, retail bargains, construction and employment contracts with the state and other public corporations,
insurance contracts, contracts with attorneys and similar persons, employment by business enterprises, etcetera. The Permanent Court of International Justice has held that a governmental loan by issue of bonds having several places of
payment is subject to the law of the issuing government. 87
Maritime shipping contracts have been made the subject of
special international conventions. 88 The scope of a power of
attorney is determined under the law of the state in which
the agent acts. 89 Courts in all countries have elaborated a
wide-flung net of specialized solutions by localizing contracts
according to the "tacit," "presumed," or simply the fictitiously assumed intent of the parties. 90
This growing emphasis on the law corresponding to the
particular type of contract has two additional wholesome effects, namely, promotion of uniformity, since types of contracts are the same everywhere under modern circumstances,
and concentration-so far as feasible-on one convenient
Judgments nos. I4 and IS of July 12, I929.
Cf. for instance, the provisions of the Montevideo Treaty of I889 on
commercial law, arts. I4 and IS, changed in the Draft of I940 on commercial maritime law to art. 2S·
89 Restatement § 34S; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. ( I929) 812 ff.
90 For a synthesis, see BATIFFOL.
87

88
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law. In the latter regard-the problem of depet;age -it is
noteworthy that both American and Continental conflicts
laws suffer from cumulated application of several conflicts
rules, referring to different legislations, to one and the same
contract. The Restatement, for instance, divides the problems arising on a contract into two parts, subjecting one part
to the law of the place where the contract is concluded and
the other to the law of the place where the contract is to be
performed. 92 The division is precarious and very objectionable in several respects, but chiefly because a contract should
not be split on a priori grounds. A similar distinction between
the creation and the effect of contracts was admitted by the
Swiss Federal Tribunal. 93 Still worse, the German courts allocate the duties of the seller and the buyer to the laws of
their respective places of performance, these, if not otherwise provided, being presumed to be at the corresponding
domicils. A bilateral contract cannot be broken up into such
fragments without distorting a number of problems. 94 All
such rules will vanish when the different types of contracts
in general form the center of interest.
Another point will hold our attention in the next chapters.
Capacity to contract is generally determined in this country
by the law of the place where the contract is made, a law not
necessarily the same as the law governing the contract in
other respects, for instance, that intended by the parties. In
Continental Europe, an individual's capacity is determined as
a rule by his personal law, a law potentially different from
that or those governing other aspects of the contract. In both
hemispheres, the respective rules concerning capacity appear
overextended, and the distinction between capacity and other
91 For theoretical discussion of the method of connecting isolated parts of
the facts with different countries, see WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1934) 230.
9 2 Restatement§§ 332 and 358; cf. in particular CooK, Legal Bases, 345, 346.
93 Supra n. 61.
94 See NEUNER, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928} 108.

INTRODUCTION

102

aspects of contracts, at least in certain cases, should be
abolished. 95
2.

Independent Conflicts Rules

The crucial point to be reformed is the blind subjection of
conflicts rules to the private law of each country. The extremely broad and at the same time fragmentary rules usual
in the enacted conflicts laws of the nineteenth century, including the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, incorporate language taken from provincial legal thinking. As
these rules are progressively refined, the more urgent is their
independence of notions defined by the law of the forum in
order to enable other legal systems in the pertinent cases to
be invoked.
This need is by no means limited to "characterization."
Cook has pointed out how often in this country confusion is
caused by applying the "law" of a state, without exact inquiry whether such law is not limited to domestic cases and
raises no question of conflicts law. 96 Thus, a statute of Texas
prescribing that a married woman cannot charge her separate estate to secure her husband's obligation, does not necessarily impose such restriction upon a wife domiciled in another state, even when the transaction occurs in Texas. 97
Resort to statutory construction is the usual method of
avoiding faulty conclusions. This method, however, should
be limited to its natural domain. A statutory provision must
be analyzed in respect to the question whether it incorporates
a fundamental policy of the state (as in the case of the Texas
statute mentioned). It may occasionally occur also, as we
have remarked before, that a private law rule is not intended
or is not fit to be applied in another jurisdiction, a situation
95
96
97

Infra pp.

210 ff.
CooK, Legal Bases.
CooK, Legal Bases 438, 439·
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that much more frequently occurs in the case of administrative (police) regulations. But answers to the regular questions of conflicts law are rarely contained in municipal statutes. Private law rules ordinarily qo not direct which persons
or movables they include. It is as mistaken to apply such rules
blindly to events all over the world as to presume them limited to merely domestic situations. They are simply neutral;
the answer is not in them. Generally, therefore, what is
needed, or even feasible, is not an interpretation of the statute but a rule of private international law to accompany and
delimit the rule of private law. A striking example is the confusion exhibited in determining the relation between adoption and inheritance statutes in different states, a confusion
chiefly attributable to futile attempts to interpret one or
the other of these statutes, neither dealing with conflicts
questions. 98
A full program for the needed reform cannot be outlined
in this place. There is no reason why this branch of law
should not enjoy the abundance of legal devices, characterizing modern private or penal law.
3. Internationalization
Against the expectation of a priori theorists, it is remarkable to what extent conflicts rules are able to serve in many
countries, once relieved from the burden of local legal techniques and related to situations in actual life. The modern
means of communication, the organization of international
trade, the progress of science, and some general trends in the
evolution of social policy, provide a common basis. An unbiased examination of the actual facts represented by an international sale, an employment contract, a claim for workmen's compensation, or a negotiable instrument payable to
the holder, should and will result in similar solutions everyDs

Infra pp.

21o-2I2

and 698.
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where. As a matter of fact, there exists a truly international
consideration of all these and many other matters, which encounters few obstacles in national legal peculiarities but
many in doctrinal traditions.
Here it is that comparative research again comes in to indicate whether and, if so, to what extent unification or mutual reconciliation is feasible and desirable. In one respect,
this statement requires qualification. With little justification,
the comparative method is often suspected to favor imitation
of alien ways and to sacrifice national characteristics. The
facts are to the contrary. 99 Not infrequently, foreign institutions, naively adopted without adequate comparison, have
been transplanted from their natural soil to degenerate in
uncongenial surroundings. Often also, "reception" of foreign legal institutions has occurred without appreciation of
the grave defects inherent in an admired law. Scientific
comparison discerns the essential from the accidental causes
and effects of legal rules.; its purpose is to enrich, rather than
to standardize the juridical world.
Conflicts law, however, has it own measures. It urgently
requires sanctuaries from chaos. The more private rights are
protected by international justice, the more will unification
be desired. Federations such as the United States or Switzerland 100 know from copious experience how indispensable is
a common background of legal concepts and principles to
cope with the peculiar terms and ideas of particular states or
99 See, for example, FusTEL DE CouLANGES, La cite antique 2: "Pour a voir
mal observe Ies institutions de Ia cite ancienne, on a imagine de les faire
revivre chez nous." HEYMANN, Das ungarische Privatrecht und der Rechtsausgleich mit Ungarn (1917) 96; EuGEN HuBER, Erlauterungen zum Vorentwurf des Schweizerischen Zivil-Gesetzbuchs 7; RABEL, Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, published as Miinchener Juristische
Vortrlige Heft I (1925) 9, 23.
1oo BG. (June 30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 287: for the purpose of intercantonal
conflicts law, the scope of matrimonial property law, as contrasted with inheritance law, is to be defined according to the general Swiss concePts and
the nature of things rather than to the cantonal laws involved in the case.
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cantons. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals of the 1920's plainly
exemplified the situation of courts that lack a "law of the
forum" in the ordinary sense of the term and have no conflicts rules other than those that happen to coincide in the
participating states. 101 The great expectations for a development of this branch of law by these courts, first dealing on a
large scale with international private causes, were disappointed.102 After the present catastrophes, fervent hopes may
well attach to supranational courts adjudging private actions
of international significance. 103 But any substantial development of such judicial relief will have to be accompanied by a
radical turn of choice of law rules from provincial to worldwide thinking.
The new trend can be summarized in the three-fold effort
toward realism, comparative method, and international
understanding.
101 See RABEL, I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 33-47.
102 On the conflicts cases of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals

see GuTZWILLER,
"Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die Friedensvertriige eingesetzten
Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshiife," 3 Int. J ahrbuch f. Schiedsgerichtswesen
(1931) 123·
1° 3 The Institute for International Law proposed in 1929 to extend the
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice to disputes concerning the interpretation of the conventions on private international law;
see Annuaire 1929 III 305. This suggestion has been taken up by the Protocol of March 27, 1931 (supra p. 36), recognizing the competence of the
Permanent Court of International Justice to interpret these Conventions. In
my opinion regional international courts and a second division of the World
Court should be created to deal with various kinds of private claims having
international significance.

PART TWO
PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS
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The Personal Law
I.
1.

NATURE AND ScoPE

OF PERSONAL

LAw

Personal Law Defined

T

HE term "personal law" had its origin in the doctrine of the Italian school of postglossators ( thirteenth-fifteenth centuries) and their French successors (sixteenth-eighteenth centuries). This school divided all
rules of law into three categories, viz., statuta realia, statuta
personalia, and statuta mixta. Statuta personalia, "personal
statutes," comprised those rules of law that followed a person from one jurisdiction to another, thus having "extraterritorial effect," while the rules of the "statute real" applied exclusively within the territory of a single sovereign. Ever since
the times of the postglossators, the terms have been in use
but with considerable variations in meaning. 1 Even today
writers disagree in defining personal law, and particular rules
of law are variously characterized as pertaining to the realm
of the statute real or to the statute personal. 2
Despite these differences, however, it is commonly assumed that in certain respects the legal position of an individual should normally be determined by the law of that
state with which he is deemed to be connected in a permanent
way, rather than by the divergent laws of those states in
which he may happen to be physically present, to act, or to
engage in transactions. This proposition includes two parts:
lz ARMINJON (ed. 2) 70 ff. nos. J8-I8 ter.
Cf., for instance, WALKER 24.

2
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First, that a person is attributed certain legal characteristics of a comparatively permanent character; and,
Second, that these permanent characteristics ought to be
determined by one law for all purposes rather than from case
to case by different laws.
Scope of the personal law. The sphere of application of
the personal law has fluctuated in the course of time and is
not everywhere the same today. Under the broadest definition, problems pertaining to the following subjects would be
regarded as problems of personal law:
Personality or capacity to have rights in general (German
Rechtsfahigheit, French capacite de jouissance) ;
Beginning and end of personality;
Capacity to engage in legal transactions (German Geschaftsfahigheit) ;
Protection of personal interests, such as honor, name and
business firm, privacy, and the like;
Family relations, especially the relations between the husband and wife, parent and child, and guardian and
ward, also transactions of family law, especially marriage, divorce, adoption, legitimation, emancipation,
and appointment of a committee for an incompetent
person;
Succession, both testate and intestate, to movables and in
more recent times also succession to immovables.
While in the various civil law countries this list is subject
to varying restrictions, it is sharply reduced in American law.
It is true, the general principle, repeatedly stated by British
courts and textwriters, that the "status" of a person is determined by the law of his domicil, 3 is plainly accepted in the
United States, 4 where it has even been called "the most
469; CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 256.
4Pfeifer v. Wright (1929 D. C. N.D. Okla.) 34 F. (2d) 69o; Strader v.
Graham {x8so) IO How. (51 U.S.) 82; Woodward v. Woodward (x889)
87 Tenn. 644, I I s. w. 892 (emancipation in Louisiana); and others.
8 DICEY
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widely advocated rule of conflict laws." 5 Nevertheless, current opinion in the United States is inclined to ascribe to the
personal law a domain narrower than it receives in England 6
and much more limited than it enjoys on the Continent. In
particular, capacity to contract is now preponderantly regarded as being determined by the law of the place of contracting rather than by the law of the domicil, although in a
few American decisions 7 the domiciliary law has been recognized as governing an individual's capacity to contract and in
numerous cases it coincides with that of the place of contracting.8
Beale goes still further in reducing the significance of "status," perhaps since he encountered difficulties in reconciling
an ubiquitous personal law with the system of territoriality
that he advocates. 9 In his treatise and in the Restatement, he
proposes to delete what may be described as a remnant of a
former status law, except for a strictly limited number of
family relationships, such as marriage, the relation between
parent and child, adoption, and guardianship. Although status is defined in the Restatement in general terms 10 and although the topics dealt with in Chapter 5 of the Restatement
are designated merely as "those of chief importance," they
seem nevertheless to be all-inclusive. 11
5 HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 27I n. I7. See STORY §§57 ff. and §§ 94-96
and I WHARTON §§ IOI-I04 2/3, both recognizing only restrictions of public
policy on the ubiquity of personal law.
6 But also in England modern writers tend to limit the application of the
personal law to questions of status. See the results reached by DICEY 6I9624, 758--786, and more recently CHESHIRE 159 ("a rule which regulates the
capacity or incapacity of a person is part of the law of his status"). For the
entire problem, see below, p. 206.
7 Especially Brown v. Dalton ( 1889) 105 Ky. 669, 49 S. W. 443; also Huy's
Appeal (1854) I Grant (Pa.) 51; Ritch v. Hyatt (1879) 3 MacArthur 536
(Io D. C.); Matthews v. Murchison (I883 C. C., E. D. N.C.) 17 Fed. 760;
Freeman's Appeal (1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420; cf. 2 BEALE u8o n. 4·
8 Cf. RUDOLF MUELLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (I934) 888-890; BATIFFOL 328.
9 See WIGNY, Essai 75·
1o Restatement § II9 and comment.
11 In the Restatement, "status" is not treated as containing permanent con-
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This position will attract the attention of any civil law
writer as a striking contrast to established doctrines. In all
countries outside of the United States, the concept of personal law has preserved a dominant position and has retained more vigor than its ancient opponent, the territorial
law, which has found such eminent defenders in this country.
On the other hand, the traditional theory has been challenged in several respects by recent European critics, and reference has repeatedly been made to the American rules for
this purpose.
The broader conception of the personal law is to be found
authoritatively defined in recent treaties concluded between
Western and Oriental powers, whereby foreigners are exempted from the territorial jurisdiction in "matters of personal law." It is interesting to note that the United States
has participated in such treaties. The following definition is
given, for instance, in the Agreement between the United
States and Persia, concluded on July I I, I 9 2 8 : 12
"Whereas Persian nationals in the United States of America
enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the matter of personal status, . . . non-Moslem nationals of the United
States in Persia shall be subject to their national laws in the
said matter of personal status, that is, with regard to all
questions concerning marriage and conjugal community
rights, divorce, judicial separation, dowry, paternity, affiliation, adoption, capacity of persons, majority, guardianship,
trusteeship, and interdiction; in regard to movable property,
the right of succession by will or ab intestato, distribution
and settlement; and, in general, family law."
ditions or qualities, but it is limited to such "relationships" between persons
as have been described by BEALE as relative in contrast to absolute ones, 2
BEALE 649· This narrow definition has been criticized by KuHN as being made
"wholly from the viewpoint of one (i.e., the American common law) system," whereas, in solving problems of conflict of laws, the attribution of
capacity and incapacity to persons has also to be considered. KUHN, Comp.
Com. us.
12 Published in U. S. Executive Agreement Series No. 20.
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By the Convention of Montreux of May 8, 1937, which
abolished the system of capitulations in Egypt, the Mixed
Tribunals were retained for a further period, running until
1949, and status and capacity were declared to be subject to
the jurisdiction of these tribunals in the absence of consular
jurisdiction where the religious courts are not competent.
This Convention provided the following definition of personal status:
"Personal status comprises: suits and matters relating to
the status and capacity of persons, legal relations between
members of a family, more particularly, betrothal, marriage,
the reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife, dowry
and their rights of property during marriage, divorce, repudiation, separation, legitimacy, recognition and repudiation of paternity, the relation between ascendants and descendants, the duty to support as between relatives by blood
or marriage, legitimisation, adoption, guardianship, curatorship, interdiction, emancipation and also gifts, inheritance,
wills and other dispositions mortis causa, absence and the
presumption of death." 18
2.

Legal Problems

Status. Usually,"status," taken from the Roman doctrine
of status libertatis (freedom), status civitatis (citizenship),
and status familiae (position as head of the house or as free
person subjected to the paterfamilias) 14 refers to situations
18
Rules concerning Judicial Organisation in Egypt, art. 28, referred to in
art. 10 pars. I and 2 of the Convention Concerning the Abolition of the
Capitulations in Egypt, Montreux, May 8, 1937. Text in U. S. Treaty Series,
No. 939, in 34 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. (1940) 201, 182 League of Nations
Treaty Series ( 1937-1938) 37, and in HUDSON, 7 Int. Legislation 684 No.
48o-48oc. The Convention has been ratified by the United States, Egypt,
. Belgium, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, Union of
South Africa, New Zealand, India, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy,
Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. See comment in 1 STREITVALLINDAS 385-400. Cf. comment in 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1938) x6x;
MoRELLI in 29 Rivista (1937) 324, 329· Other provisions in the Regulations
contain elaborate rules on conflict of laws, prepared on the basis of the
Hague Conventions.
14
In the Roman sense status means a degree in legal capacity; cf. SIBER,
2 Romisches Recht (1928) 25.
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subjected to the personal law. The word, "status," is commonly used but should not be taken as a precise legal term.
Its exact meaning in English law has been discussed in many
places but in a manner described by competent English writers as confused. 15 "Of all the perplexing questions which the
science of jurisprudence presents, the notion of status or condition is incomparably the most difficult," declared Austin. 16
Some American decisions also have considered the concept
nebulous, while unwarranted conclusions have been deduced
from it by others. 17 In fact, modern law recognizes no absolute legal characteristics inherent in a person as in the Roman
or medieval laws. Qualification of an individual as husband
or legitimate father indicates no more than the existence of
legal relations with another person, although it is true that
third persons may thereby to a certain degree be excluded
from challenging the relationship.
Prohibitive policy. It is universally agreed that foreign
laws affecting a person's status are to be disregarded where
they have a political or penal character.18 Hence, such impairments of a convict's capacity to enjoy civil rights or to engage
in transactions as are provided by the English Forfeiture Act
of July 4, 1870, the French Law of May 31, 1854 (arts. 2
and 3), or American civil death statutes, are not enforced by
the courts of other states. 19
15 See CHESHIRE ( ed. z) zo& and for a survey ALLEN, "Status and Capacity," 46 Law Q. Rev. ( I930) 277.
16
AusTIN, 1 Jurisprudence (ed. s, I88s) 351; ibid. 943: "To fix the
notion of status with perfect exactness, seems to be impossible."
17 See the penetrating observations of TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy
and Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," IS Can. Bar Rev. ( I940) 589, 591,
691-697·
18 See STORY § I04; 1 WHARTON 18 § 4b; STIMSON, Conflict of Criminal Law
( I936) I; I BAR § I46. It is no exception to this rule, that a person may be
considered incapable of being entrusted with a function, such as guardianship, because of a foreign conviction; see, e.g., Spanish C. C. art. 237 par. 2
and TRIAs DE BEs 72 no. 99·
19 The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I940, art.
1, 2nd sentence, provides that no incapacity of a penal character nor for rea-
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Likewise, a law or decree disenabling a person from disposing of his property, in a manner discriminating against
him rather than for the purpose of his protection, is generally denied effect outside of the state of enactment. 20 Thus
the Soviet Russian monopoly of trade prohibiting all private
persons residing in Russia from concluding contracts with
foreign countries except through the Commissariat of Commerce, like other monopolies of public law, is inapplicable
outside of Russia. 21
Connection of a person with a given territory. What connection must exist between an individual and a particular
state in order to subject such person to the personal laws of
that state? There are two different systems. In certain countries, the necessary connection is deemed to exist between an
individual and a particular state, if the individual is one of its
nationals; in other countries, the necessary connection is
found in the fact that the individual is domiciled in the state
in question.
3· Rationale
While, a generation ago, the existence of a personal law
was explained by such theoretical arguments as the nature of
law, the needs of sovereignty, the character of the power of
a sovereign over persons, and the like, in recent times the
advocates of the theory of personal law customarily resort
to more practical considerations of convenience and expediency.
A first line of argument is based upon the interests of the
sons of religion, race, nationality or opinion will be recognized. On the nonapplication of foreign civil death statutes, see Note in 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
(1939) z88.
20 See the recent decision of Trib. comm. Bruxelles (June 9, 1938) Jur.
Comm. Brux. 1938, 4IZ, and App. Ziirich (March I, 1939) 4Z Bull. Inst. Int.
(1940) 87.
21 MAKAROV, Precis 194 reaches the same result by another (mistaken)
reasoning.
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individuals concerned. The legal position of a person, 1t IS
said, must be the same everywhere; it would be unjust and
impracticable to have it determined in different ways in different countries or in different situations, perhaps in some
instances even in the same court. In other words, the unity
and identity of a person should be respected and guaranteed
by the consistent application of one and the same law in all
countries and in all situations.
A second line of reasoning has become singularly effective
today. Each state is said to have a profound governmental
interest in the regulation of the personal status and the
family relations of its subjects, 22 an interest which every
other state ought properly to respect. In order to protect
this interest more effectively, exclusive jurisdiction over questions of status is often claimed by the state of the personal
law, or the rules of the personal law are declared to belong to
the domain of public policy. Thus, a state which adheres to
the principle of nationality attempts to extend its own system
of social regulation to its nationals living abroad, whereas a
country adhering to the principle of domicil imposes its own
laws upon the foreigners living within its borders. These
tendencies, and particularly that of extending one's own laws
to nationals living abroad, are so firmly rooted in the political traditions of Europe that recent counter-currents have
not only failed to leave any deep impression on the legislatures but have even suggested to an eminent French author
that the scope of application of the personal law should be
expanded far beyond its present extent. 23
22 With respect to those matters that are recognized in the Restatement as
covered by status, this governmental interest is explained in § 119 comment c.
23 BARTIN, z Principes zo, 90. Throughout the four volumes of FRANKENSTEIN'S work, the national law is considered as "the primary basic principle
of private international law." See vol. 4, 650.
Recently the Danish writer BoRUM recommended that his country go over
from the domiciliary principle to that of nationality. See his Personalstatutet
552, 565.
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It seems, indeed, that uniform regulation of matters of
status is justified, at least with respect to the basic facts of
personal life. Whether a person shall be deemed to be married, divorced, adopted, subject to guardianship, or civilly
dead, should be decided at any place in the same way, if uncertainty and confusion is not to beset the individual, his
family, and other persons with whom he engages in transactions. The weight of this consideration may vary as regards
different problems, and careful investigation of the interests
at stake ought to be undertaken with regard to each situation. But, essentially, the principle seems undeniable.
The most formidable objection against a single personal
law arises from the present state of international law; the
doctrine cannot be carried out consistently. Apart from the
intricacies caused by conflicting rules of jurisdiction, serious
conflicts are due to the difference between the principles of
domicil and nationality, resulting in the subjection in different
states of one and the same individual to different laws. Moreover, no agreement exists with respect to where a person is
domiciled, nor is nationality an unfailing criterion. It should
not be overlooked, however, that many such conflicts can be
remedied by special techniques, especially by application of
the "renvoi," an institution that, on account of its usefulness,
should be viewed without theoretical prejudices.

II.
1.

CONTACTS DETERMINING THE PERSONAL LAW

Domicil

(a) Domicil of origin. In all the centuries since the postglossators, the traditional contact for the determination of a
person's status has been his domicil. In earlier, ancient and
medieval, organizations, the legal condition of an individual
in its totality was created by his "origin" as a member of a
political unit, in Roman law his origo, signifying his citizen-
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ship in an autonomous city. Following the older fundamental
role of descent, some of the pandectists in various cases resorted to what was shortly and paradoxically described 24 as
the domicilium originis, generally the domicil of the father
of the individual at the time of the latter's birth. 25 Although,
naturally and legally, a child takes its father's domicil at
birth and upon attaining majority may acquire a new domicil,
the domicil of origin substituted for the actual domicil, when
doubtful or incorrectly obtained or where no domicil was to
be found. This subsidiary concept was employed in the eighteenth century by French writers and in the Prussian legislation 26 as the prime test for determining majority or interdiction for prodigality. 27 Even today in Argentina, it is applied
to persons without an actual domicil. 28 In British countries,
this criterion has been retained and singularly developed; not
only is the domicil of origin resorted to whenever the domicil
of choice cannot be ascertained or has been abandoned without establishing a new domicil, but the courts also require
such strong evidence of abandonment of the domicil of origin
that it has been said to be "difficult to conceive of a case in
which the domicil of origin can be shaken off." 29 It corresponds to Continental nationality rather than to Continental
domicil.5°
24
25

See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. ( q) ·
See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. (n). The same definition of domicil of origin is
still proper in English law. See WESTLAKE § 245; 6 HALSBURY 200.
2 6 Prussian A1lg. Landrecht of I794, Einleitung § 29.
It may be suggested that the same idea is implied in the much discussed
words of § 34 of the Austrian AUg. BGB. which may be translated as "laws
of the place to which the foreigner is subject ( als Untertan unterliegt) by
virtue of his domicil or if he has no actual domicil by virtue of his birth."
2 7 0rigina1ly by FROLAND and BOULLENOIS; see PILLET, Principes 304 no. I43
n. I; 2 ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) So ff. no. 18 ter.
2 8 Argentina, C. C. arts. 96 and 89 zd part; cf. I VICO no. 392.
29 CHESHIRE I8o; cf. Lord Macnaghten in Winans v. Att. Gen. [I904] A. C.
287 at 29I; Lord Hanworth in Boldrini v. Boldrini [1932] P. 9·
80 BENTWICH in: The Law of Domicile in its Relation to Succession and the
Doctrine of Renvoi ( I9II) 12; 5 Z.ausl.PR. ( I93 I) 57; 6 Z.ausl.PR. ( I932)
7I5; 52 Jurid. Rev. (I940) 284, 285 ff. Cf. the British diplomatic note of
Nov. I, I946 to the Syrian government, II U. N. Treaty Series I53·
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(b) Domicil of choice. The normal concept of domicil is
presented by that domicil which is voluntarily chosen by an
independent person. The law of this domicil primarily controls personal relations in the following countries:
All English common law countries and, in addition, Scotland, South Africa, and Quebec (where the principle
has been laid down in the C. C. art. 6) .31
Denmark, 32 Norway, 83 Iceland. 34
Argentina: C.C. arts. 6 and 7. 35
Brazil: Introductory Law (I 942) art. 7.
Guatemala: Constitutive Law on Judicial Power ( I936)
art. xvii ; Law on Foreigners ( I 93 6) arts. I7 and I 8.
Nicaragua: C. C. tit. prel. VI, 1.
Paraguay: C. C. arts. 6 and 7.
Peru: C. C. ( I 9 3 6) tft. prel. art. V (for non-Peruvians).
The Treaty of Montevideo of I 889, article I (Argentina,
Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay) still in force among the
contracting countries, is to the same effect .. Article I of the
text of I940, ratified by Argentina and Uruguay, provides
that the existence, the status, and the capacity of physical
persons are governed by the law of domicil.
(c) Domicil by operation of law. In most of the just mentioned countries, altqough not in all, as for instance not in
Norway and Denmark, 36 certain groups of persons (wife,
minor children, etc.) are considered by law to share the
domicil of other individuals. The latter accordingly determines the status of the dependent person.
(d) Residence. If, according to the concepts of the forum,
it is found that an individual has no domicil of choice or as a
It seems to be recognized in Canada generally; cf. 1 JOHNSON 182, 454·
BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 19; BORUM 91.
88 CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 569 no. 66.
34 4 LESKE-LOEWENFELD I 76I.
85 Domicil is decisive not only for capacity to contract but also for personality. See I VICO no. 438, rejecting other theories.
86 BORUM 93·
31

32

120

PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS

dependent, either within or without the country, different solutions obtain. English courts apply the law of the domicil
of origin. In this country, it is generally assumed that a domicil once established continues until it is superseded by a new
domicil. 37 This proposition is a direct corollary of the axiom
that every person must have a domicil and is therefore categoric. In addition, it is presumed that an intended change or
abandonment of the last established domicil is not completed
until a new home has been acquired. 38
All these views are represented in Latin-American legislations. In addition, the subsidiary test of residence, well
known in such fields as jurisdiction and taxation, 39 at times
appears in conflicts law. This method has been followed by
the Montevideo Treaty 40 and the C6digo Bustamante/1 as
well as by the recent Brazilian law. 42 In default of residence,
the latter two enactments contain a supplementary reference
to the place where the individual is temporarily dwelling.
These expedients would seem to serve well also in this
country in cases where the continuance of a former domicil
cannot be affirmed without undue fiction.
2.

Nationality

The principle that an individual's personal law ought to be
determined by his nationality was first established at the be37
Restatement § 23 and its various Annotations. See also 28 C.J.S., Domicile § 13.
38 28 C.J.S., Domicile § 16.
39 This rule has been adopted in following the doctrine of SAVIGNY 107
§ 354 in an influential provision of the Chilean Civil Code art. 68: mere residence replaces civil domicil with respect to persons not domiciled elsewhere.
40 Text of 1889, art. 9, which is not really contrary to art. 5, as has been
claimed; text of 1940, art. 5, 2°-4°.
The Argentine C. C. arts. 89, 96, resorts to the domicil of origin, and art.
98 declares that the last known domicil prevails when no new domicil is
known; but art. 90, 5°, provides for a legal domicil as the place of actual
residence for transients as well as for persons having no known domicil.
41 Art. 26.
42 Decreta-Lei n. 4.657 of 1942, Lei de Introduc;ao, art. 7 § 8.
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ginning of the nineteenth century in the Code N apoteon,
which provided that the French laws concerning personal status and capacity govern Frenchmen even when residing in
foreign countries (Art. 3 par. 3). In the converse case of a
foreigner residing in France, the French courts, after some
initial doubts, now generally apply by way of analogy the law
of the country of which he is a national.
While this French provision exerted a steady influence as a
model, an additional powerful impulse was started in the
same direction by the Italian patriot, Mancini. In a famous
lecture, delivered in Turin in I 8 5 I, he proclaimed that a person should be subject in all respects affecting his personality
to the law of his nation. The Italian Civil Code adopted this
doctrine, referring the concept of nationality to political allegiance to a given state and extending the sphere of the personal law from problems of "status and capacity," to which
it was applied in France, to the whole law of family relations.
In this way, the notion that an individual's private rights
should be determined not by his physical location but by his
political allegiance, owes its origin to the awareness of national identity that was born in the French Revolution and
strengthened in the Italian struggle for national unity. With
the expansion of political nationalism, the idea that each
country should determine the legal status of its subjects, admitting the analogous claims of other states, expanded likewise and has been adopted in the following countries:
France and French colonies: C. C. art. 3 par. 3·
Italy and Italian colonies: C. C. (I 86 5) Disp. Prel. art. 6;
C.C. (I938) Disp. Prel. art. 7 par. I; C.C. (I942)
Disp. Prel. art. I7 par. I.
Belgium: C. C. art. 3 par. 3·
Luxemburg: C. C. art. 3 par. 3·
Monaco: C. C. art. 3 par. 3·
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The Netherlands: Law of May IS, I829, arts. 6, 9; H. R.
(Jan. 5, I9I7) W.I0073, N.J. ( I9I7) I43; Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I9I9) W.I0444, N.J. (I9I9) I032.
Surinam: Law of Sept. 4, I 868, art. 7.
Rumania: C. C. art. 2; for foreigners, App. Bucarest
(May 9, I 90 I) Sirey I 904, 4.2 I (with note by the procurator of the government at the court of cassation) ;
Plastara, 7 Repert. 62 nos. I4I, I43·
Bulgaria: Law on Persons and the Family of Aug. 5,
I949, arts. 24, 57, 58.
Czechoslovakia: Law of March I I, I 948, I.
Finland: Law no. 379 of Dec. 5, I929.
Germany: EG. BGB. arts. 7, 9, I3-I5, 17-25.
Greece: c. c. ( I940) arts. s-8, IJ-24, 28.
Hungary: Law no. IV/I952 and Decree-Law no. 23/
I952.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 23.
Poland: Law of Aug. 2, I926, art. I par. I.
Portugal: C. C. arts. 24, 27.
Spain: C. C. art. 9; for foreigners cf. Trias de Bes 66;
Lasala Llana 20-22, and decisions cited.
Turkey: Law of March I, I9I5 for foreigners: for Turks
abroad see Salem, 7 Repert. 26 I no. I 99·
Yugoslavia: Law of April3, I946, arts. 82, 85, 86; Law
of April 25, I955, arts. IS6-I59·
Syria: C. C. art. I 2.
Israel: Palestine Order in Council of I922, as amended,
§ 64.
Egypt: C.C. art. I I.
Iran: C. C. art. 962.
Siam: Law of March Io, I939, § 10.
China: Law of Aug. 5, I9I8, art. S·
Japan: Law of June I 5, I 898, art. 3·
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Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3·
Cuba: C. C. art. 9·
Dominican Rep.: C. C. art. 3 par. 3. 43
Ecuador: C. C. art. I4.
Haiti: C. C. art. 7·
Honduras: C. C. art. I3.
Mexico: former C.C. ( I884) art. I2. See pages 126-I29,
infra.
Panama: C. C. art. sa.
Venezuela: C.C. art. 9·
Treaty: Colombia-Ecuador of June I 8, I903, art. 2.
The nationality principle was also adopted in the Hague
Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5, 44 and formed the base of the
Treaty of Lima, I878. In the Treaty of Montevideo, on the
other hand, the domiciliary law was preferred. During the
preparation of the C6digo Bustamante, vigorous efforts were
made to overcome the cleavage dividing the American nations with respect to the test of personal law, but unfortunately without success. 45 Article 7 of the C6digo declares that
"Each contracting state shall apply as personal law the law
of the domicil or the law of the nationality or that which its
domestic legislation may have prescribed, or may hereafter
prescribe.''
Hence, no unified rule whatever has come into existence.
3· Mixed Systems

Sweden. The Hague Conventions on Marriage ( I902),
on Divorce and Separation and on Guardianship, based on
the principles of nationality, have been adopted as internal
43 See the reservation no. I of the Dominican delegation to their signature
to the C6digo Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (19z9) No.
1950, Z40, Z4I, 376.
44 It also was adopted for the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals in their Regulations of Judicial Organisation, art. z9, and is preserved in the Egyptian C. C.,
art. II.
45 See BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes de Rio ZI3 ff.
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law of Sweden. Succession and inheritance also are governed
by the national law of the deceased. 45 a However, as between
the Scandinavian countries all these matters are, in general,
regulated by the law of a person's domicil in one of the Scandinavian countries. 45 b The domicil test is now also employed
in certain cases as respects capacity to marry, nullity of marriage, and divorce. 45 c
This dual system has not been regarded as irrational, but
the present legislative trend seems to favor reference to the
domiciliary law. 45 d
Switzerland. Switzerland 46 applies Swiss private law to
foreigners domiciled in Switzerland and prescribes that a
Swiss national abroad shall be governed by the law of his
domicil. If, however, the state of the foreign domicil does
not subject the Swiss national to its municipal legislation,
then the Swiss courts have to resort to the law of the canton
of which he is a citizen. This proviso applies, for instance, to
Swiss nationals domiciled in France, Germany, or Italy, all
of which follow the system of national law.
In this way, conflicts with the law of the domicil are
avoided, the Swiss law being resorted to only where it is also
applied by the courts of the domicil. Followi.ng this approach
of the Swiss law, the German courts are now in agreement
that a Swiss citizen domiciled in Germany is to be judged according to Swiss law and that Swiss law ought not to be in45 a Act governing certain international relations concerning marriage,
adoption, guardianship and similar matters of July 8, 1904, as amended;
Act governing international relations concerning Succession of March 5, 1937.
45 b Decree of Dec. 31, 1931 and Act of March 1, 1935.
45 cAct of 1904 (supra note 45a), c. 7 sec. 2 {2), 4a.
45 d FoLKE SCHMIDT, "Nationality and Domicile in Swedish Private International Law," 4 Int. Law Q. ( 1951) 39 ff.
46 NAG. arts. 2 and 28. Capacity to contract, however, is excepted from the
rule stated in the text and is subjected to the principle of nationality; see
below, p. 200.
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terpreted as containing a renvoi to the law of the domiciJ.4 7
Austria. The draftsmen of the Austrian Civil Code of
I 8 I I probably intended that the law of the domicil, either
of choice or of origin, should be applied to foreigners
whether living in Austria or abroad. 48 The relevant section
of the Code 49 was so badly drafted, however, that its meaning was never quite certain. While the older annotators regarded the provisions as establishing the domiciliary test,S 0
authors and courts of the nineteenth century came to look
upon it as a full-fledged adoption of the principle of nationality.51 This development was motivated not only by the general trend of the period but also by the provision which the
Code had established for Austrians living abroad. Under this
provision, not all private affairs of such citizens were subject
to Austrian law, but only acts and contracts of Austrians occurring abroad, to the extent that the Austrian law limits personal capacity to undertake such acts and contracts and these
acts and contracts are intended to produce legal effects in
Austrian territories. 52
Most annotators were inclined to regard this provision as
a general adoption of the principle of nationality so far as
Austrians were concerned and to neglect the limitations expressed in the text. 53 The Supreme Court, however, follow4 7 See the following Swiss authors: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 28 no. 3; BECK,
NAG., I4I no. 36.
In Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, I9I2) Warn. Rspr. I9I3 no. 37; RG. (Nov. 8,
I922) I05 RGZ. 340; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 12, I9I7) 35 ROLG. 380, cf.
MELCHIOR 224 § I50j RAAPE 750.
48 In the case of a person having no domicil at the relevant moment, presumably the law of his domicil of origin was intended to be applied.
49 Allg. BGB. § 34·
5o SAVIGNY § 363 II j UNGER, I System I64 j for further citations see WALKER
92 n. I9·
5 1 RANDA in 6 Griinhut's Z. (I879) 785; KRASNOPOLSKI in 25 Geller's
Zentralblatt ( I907) I08; STEINLECHNER in 2 Festschrift zur J ahrhundertfeier
des Allg. BGB. (I9II) 65; WALKER 93 and n. 24.
52 Allg. BGB. § 4·
58 See WALKER 9I n. I6j I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (I925) 94 calls the re·
striction superfluous.
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ing a theory which had been established by an ingenious author, 54 imbued the limitations with new life by holding that
the numerous peculiar restrictions of Austrian marriage law
would not be applied to an Austrian marrying abroad and
not intending at the time of such marriage to live in Austria.M This decision has been criticized as opening the door
to law evasion. 56 The German decree of October 25, 1941,
still in force in Austria, has confirmed the trend to the
nationality principle.
Latin America. However, the ideas underlying the provision of the Austrian Code appeared so reasonable to Andres Bello, the draftsman of the Chilean Civil Code of 1 855,
that he adopted it, in a modified form, for his own country. 57
His example has been followed in several other Latin American countries, where the Austrian rule has been adopted in
combination with varying systems.
Under the Chilean Code, every inhabitant of the country,
even though he may not be a citizen or a domiciliary, technically speaking, is declared subject to the law of Chile. 58
Similar provisions, with or without textual modification, have
been included in the laws of Colombia, 59 Ecuador, 60
Mexico, 61 and El Salvador. 62 The provision in itself has been
vigorously criticized 63 and seems to have been made the ob54 MAX BURCKHARD, 2 System des Oesterreichischen Privatrechtes ( 1884)
223.
55 OGH. (May 24, 1907) 10 GIU. NF. no. 3787, 8 Amti.S. NF. no. 1007,
Spruchrepertorium (Collection of binding precedents) no. 198; cf. WALKER
91, 622; see below, p. 305.
56 PERROUD, Clunet 1922, 5; WALKER 625.
5 7 BELLO's notes, which indicate that he was influenced by the Austrian law
as well as by the French Code, are referred to by I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93
no. 148.
58 Chile: C. C. art. 14.
59 Colombia: C. C. art. 18.
60Ecuador: C. C. art. 13.
61 Mexico: Federal C; C. art. 12.
62 El Salvador: C. C. art. 1463 Cf. CHAMPEAU (respecting Colombia)
Clunet 1894, 932; BORJA, 1
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ject of a diplomatic exchange of notes between Chile and
France. 64 On the other hand, each of these legislations declares the national law applicable to a national living abroad:
first, as concerns his capacity to engage in "certain transactions" producing effects in his own country; and, second, with
respect to his family relations. 65 This combination of domiciliary and national law 66 has already been noticed as anomalous.67 The interpretation of these provisions necessarily
must cause difficulties; in fact, in Colombia 68 efforts looking
to a reasonable interpretation have been made, and recently,
after thorough consideration, the commission for reform of
the Civil Code has proposed that the entire system be replaced by the simple law of domicil. 69
In addition, Costa Rica has adopted the principle of nationality, but prescribes that foreigners are governed by the
law of Costa Rica when they act in that country or if their
contracts are made and are to be performed therein. 70 This
Estudios sobre el c6digo civil chileno (1899) 211-213; URIBE (regarding Colombia) Revue 1911, 322.
64 WEISS, 3 Traite 255 mentions a diplomatic note of August 20, 1882, in
which the Chilean minister, Verga, refers to a restrictive interpretation of art.
14. Apparently, the French Government had protested against the application
of Chilean law to French citizens living in Chile. It has not been possible to
ascertain whether any practical results ever came from this correspondence.
65 Chile: C. C. art. 15, No provision in Mexico, but see former C. C. (1884)
art. 12.
Colombia: C. C. art. 19.
Ecuador: C. C. art. 14.
El Salvador: C. C. art. 15.
66 MATOS 277 no. 175; SALAZAR FLOR 483.
6 7 BORJA, op. cit. supra n. 63 at 213 ; I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93 no. 149;
Soro's observations in: Colombia, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil
1939-1940, 92, 98 inter alia. The present system on that occasion was defended by ZULETA ANGEL (ibid.) and }ULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE of Paris
(ibid. 116).
68 See 1 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93 ff. nos. 149-159·
6 9 Art. 36 of the Draft on formation, promulgation, effects, interpretations
and derogation of the laws, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil op. cit.
supra n. 67. Uruguay, which formerly had adhered to the same combination
(C. C. arts. 3, 4), has by Law of Dec. 3, 1941 already introduced the pure
domiciliary test (C. C. art. 2393).
10 Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3·
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provtswn has been superadded to the others in the Civil
Code of El Salvador. 71
Contrary to their Austrian prototype, which, at least in
the last period of the Austrian law, was used to mitigate the
effects of the principle of nationality, these various Latin
American countries expand their own national law beyond
the limits of the basic principle which they have adopted.
These sophisticated modern endeavors are quite in line with
recent European, especially French, 72 tendencies, claiming application of the domestic law to nationals living abroad as
well as to foreigners domiciled within the forum. The principles of nationality and of domicil are thus inconsistently
combined.
A final stage of this unfortunate development has been
reached at present in the Civil Code of Peru of 1936.78 This
Code generally adopts the law of domicil 74 to govern all
foreigners whether domiciled abroad or in Peru. Nevertheless, the Peruvian law on status and capacity extends without
any limitations to all Peruvians living abroad. 75 The VeneEl Salvador: C. C. I912, art. I6 par. 3·
See infra p. I 64.
73 A complete history of the matter is given by LUis ALVARADO, Apuntes de
derecho internacional (Lima, I940) 43-7'3·
'
74 A. GusTAVO CoRNEJO, I C6digo Civil ( I937) so no. 49 points out that
the reference to the law of domicil is intended to include the conflicts norm
of the domicil (as in Switzerland).
75 C. C. (I936} Tit. Prel. art. V par. I. For this reason, the Peruvian
delegation appointed to revise the Montevideo Treaties declared, in a reservation to the text of I940 on international civil law, that the provisions
therein respecting status and capacity should be understood not to affect the
provisions of the Peruvian national law applicable to Peruvians. Cf. RABEL,
"The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Conflicts," 39
Mich. L. Rev. (I94I) 5I7, 52I. At the same time, under the original treaty
provisions actually in force, the new code is inapplicable to Peruvians domiciled in Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay; cf. ALVARADO, op. cit.
supra n. 73 at 7I. Previously the Peruvian Code of Civil Procedure, art.
usS, has reserved the exclusive jurisdiction of the Peruvian courts over all
questions of status, capacity and family relations as regards Peruvians domiciled at any place and foreigners domiciled in Peru; cf. ROGER, 7 Repert.
30 no. 49·
71

72
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zuelan Civil Code of 1942 follows this model. The same excessive claim has been made with respect to marriage in the
recent Civil Code of Latvia. 77
A similar conception is said to control the problems of
capacity for contracting in the Soviet Union; everybody in
Soviet Russia and every Russian abroad is subject to Soviet
Russian law. 77 a However, this is not deemed to concern the
general capacity of having rights, which seems "not to be
considered by the Soviet law as a faculty inherent to man as
such." 78

III.

SUPPLEMENTARY RULES

The principle of nationality cannot be applied to persons
who are not nationals of any country, and it causes difficulties
in its applications to persons who are nationals of more than
one country. For both types of cases, the principle of nationality must be supplemented by special rules.
I.

Multiple Nationality

In matters of status, a person who is simultaneously a national of the state of the forum and of some other state is
usually considered by the forum as exclusively its own national, his additional foreign nationality being disregarded.
This approach has been traditionally followed in France,
Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg 79 and
has been adopted more recently by statutes in Czechoslovakia, Liechtenstein, Egypt, Syria, China, Japan, and Siam,
and by the courts of Germany and of other countries. 80 The
76

Venezuela: C. C. (1942) arts. 8 and 9·
C. § 11; cf. ScHILLING, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 226, 229.

77 Latvian C.
7 7 a LUNZ 163.
78

See MAKAROV, Precis 175 and 192.
Surveys by KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 59, also in 30 }he rings
MAURY in 9 Repert. 297 no. 113.
so Czechoslovakia: Law of March 11, 1948, s. so.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. 1.
79

J ahrb. ( 1891) 68;
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Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws (art. 3) has
recognized the right of a state to apply its law in such cases.
Where, on the other hand, a person is a national of two or
more countries but the litigation arises in a third country, the
law most consistently applied is that of the country of which
the person is not only a national but where he also has his
domicil or habitual residence or, in the absence thereof, his
residence. 81 This view was approved by the Sixth Conference
on International Private Law held at the Hague in 1928,
which formulated corresponding provisions to complement
the older Hague treaties on international family law; 82
eliminating reference to domicil, the test is "habitual residence" and, in its absence, simply the "residence" at the time
decisive for the particular purpose, for instance, when the
personal capacity to marry is in question, the moment of the
marnage ceremony.
Another solution has been essayed by Japan, 83 and still
Egypt: C. C. art. 25 par. 2.
Syria: C. C. art. 27 par. 2.
China: Decree of August 5, I9I8, art. 2 par. I.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. I.
Siam: Law of March Io, I939 1 art. 6 par. 3·
To the same effect Brazil: Former introd. art. 9 par. 2.
Germany: RG. (J~n. 24, I9o8) I8 Z.int.R. 533, 539i RG. (March I3, I924)
Leipz.Z. I924, 74I; RG. (Nov. 5, I928) 43 Z.int.R. (I93Q-I93I) 86, IPRspr.
I929, no. I.
81 Institut de Droit International, Resolution of Oslo I932, art. 2, Annuaire
I932, 47I (residence habituelle et principale).
Brazil: C. C. Former introd. art. 9 (domicil, residence).
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. 2 (domicil, residence, last acquired citizenship).
Cf. for Spain: TRiAs DE BEs in 6 Repert. 247 no. 78; for Hungary: SzA.szY
in I I Z.ausi.PR. (I937) I70 (domicil). On other theories, see 2 ARMINJON
(ed. 2) 34 ff. no. IO bis.
82 See the list of the various supplementary clauses in MAKAROV, Allgemeine Lehren des Staatsangehiirigkeitsrechts (I947) 288. The Hague Convention of I930 on Conflicts of Nationality Laws, art. 5 (HUDSON, 5 Int. Leg.
359, also in 24 Am. J. Int. Supp. (I930) I92) declares not to prejudice the
matters of personal status.
83 Law of I898, art. 27 (law of the last acquired nationality).
Similarly, Siam: Law on Conflict of Laws of March Io, I939 s. 6 par. I,
see LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois, no. 42 n. 8 at Ioz; also
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others have been suggested. 84 For the purposes of public international law, it has long been a well-recognized tendency
to prefer among several nationalities of a person that which
in a given case appears the most "effective" one. 85 This principle has been formulated by the Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930, as follows:
"Within a third State, a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any conventions in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country
in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected." 86
2.

Stateless Persons

A person not being a national of any country is called an
apatride or apolide or heimatlos. 87 Such a situation could
arise under ordinary international circumstances, where a
child of parents whose home country adheres to the pure
principle of jus soli, was born in a country in which the jus
sanguinis was in force. The recent unrest of legislation respecting married women has engendered other cases. Thus,
where a Swiss woman marrying a Frenchman before 1945
failed to sign a declaration of intention to acquire French
citizenship, under article 19 of a French law of November
12, 1938, she did not acquire French nationality, though not
Czechoslovakia, Law of March u, 1948, s. 51. Cf. I BAR § 88 at z6I, tr. by
GILLESPIE at 194·
84 See Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 29, I934) Clunet I937, 570 and comment.
Egypt (C. C. art. 25 par. I) and Syria (C. C. art. 27 par. I) authorize their
judges to determine the applicable law.
85 Greece: C. C. art. 3I par. 2; see FLOURNOY, "Dual Nationality and Election," 30 Yale L. ]. (I92I) 693; MAURY, 9 Repert. 298 no. u4.
86 Art. 5·
8 7 This German expression is used by French and other writers, while the
official German term is "staatenlos."
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retaining her former citizenship. 88 Untold numbers of individuals have also been rendered stateless by the political
events of this century. Many thousands of emigrants have
lost their nationality by Soviet decree and many more by the
ruthless legislations of Italy and Germany, introducing the
system of "expatriation" as a political measure against real
or alleged political enemies. Furthermore, the peace treaties
following World War I and later events have made it frequently impossible in fact to ascertain the nationality of a
person, who in such a case must practically be treated as an
apatride, as is done in the case of gypsies. 89
At present, individuals lacking a definite nationality are
generally subject to the law of their domicil or habitual residence, and, in default thereof, to the law of their temporary
residence. This has been the view of the Institute of International Law since 1880.90 Most countries accede to this position.91 It was also adopted by the Sixth Conference on Inter132

8 8 Swiss Department of Justice, BBl. I939 II, 284 no. I4. This case would
not arise under art. 8 of the 1930 Convention on Conflicts of Nationality
Laws which Switzerland did not ratify. Under the French Code of Nationality of Oct. I9, I945 (art. 37), the Swiss wife would acquire French nationality by her marriage. On the other hand, if she repudiates this nationality
(Code, art. 38), she would upon declaration retain today her Swiss nationality of origin (Swiss Nationality Law of Sept. 29, I952, art. 9).
89 Poland: Law of I926, art. I par. 1.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 3I par. I.
Yugoslavia: Law of April 25, I955, art. I57·
90 Institut de Droit International: Resolution of Oxford, art. 6 pars. 2 and
5, Annuaire I88I-I88z, 57; Resolution of Oslo, art. 3, Annuaire 1932, 47I, 472.
Unfortunately the Institute has changed its attitude in a Resolution on
"Statut juridique des apatrides et des refugies" voted in Brussels in I936,
Annuaire I936, II 292. Art. 4 provides that the law applicable in the case of
a stateless person will be that of the country either of a nationality possessed
previously or of his domicil or, in the absence of either, of his habitual residence at the date regarded as relevant by the court.
91 Belgium: POULLET 307 no. 255; Congo: Decree of Feb. zo, I89I, art. 8
(for foreigners domiciled in Congo).
Czechoslovakia: Law of March u, I948, s. 52.
France: Trib. civ. Nantes (Nov. 28, 1901) Clunet I902, 590; Trib. civ.
Seine (Feb. I4, I908) Revue I9IO, uz; Cour Paris (Nov. 25, I9I3) Revue
I9I4, I3o; App. Nancy (June 10, I9I4) Clunet I9I5, 620, Revue I9I4, 579;
French Morocco: Law of I913, art. 5 (for foreigners domiciled in Morocco).
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national Private Law at the Hague in 1928 in the complementary drafts just mentioned, in which, as in all recent
treaties, the term "domicil" is abandoned in favor of "habitual residence" or, in its absence, "residence." The new
Italian Code has intentionally chosen the test of residence. 98
Another solution was formerly adopted by the German
Civil Code (EG. art. 29), providing that a person who had
once held but subsequently lost the nationality of a country
without acquiring another, was declared to remain subject to
his former national law. This provision compelled the German courts to decide the private status and the incidents of
family relations of Russian emigres in accordance with the
legislation of the Soviet Union, i.e., the country which was
their very enemy and which had refused to accept the role of
successor to the former Russian Empire. 94 With respect to
succession upon death, the situation between Germany and
Greece: C. C. art. 30.
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 44 (2).
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. 29 (residence}. Previously the law of
June 13, I9I2 on nationality, art. 14, subjected the apolidi residing in Italy to
Italian civil law, but for other apatrides there was controversy, although residence was the test most frequently adopted. See UmNA, Elementi I22. The
new code substitutes domicil as the test.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 3I par. 2.
The Netherlands: KoSTERS 289 (domicil).
Poland: Law of I926, art. I par. I.
Rumania: 7 Repert. 63 no. I5I.
Sweden: Supreme Court (Feb. 25, I949) 23 Nordisk Tidsskrift (I953) 20,
I6 Z.ausi.PR. (I950/5I) I45·
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7a.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. 2.
China: Law of I9I8, art. 2 par. 2.
Siam: Law of March IO, I939, art. 6 par. 4·
Brazil: C. C. Former introd. art. 9·
Cf. TRACHTENBERG, "Heimatlose-Heimatlosat," 8 Repert. 565 no. 72 et
seq.,· MELCHIOR 449 n. I.
92 Cf. MAKAROV ( ed. I) 42I VIII I b.
93 Italian C. C. ( I938} Disp. Prel. art. I9; cf. Relazione I938, no. I5; C. C.
( I942) Disp. PreI. art. 29.
94 RG. (Oct. 6, I927) Warn. Rspr. I928, no. I3, IPRspr. I928, no. 22.
An analogous provision is contained in the Yugoslavian Law on Succession
of April 25, I955, art. I 57·
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Russia was at first remedied by a treaty. 95 Recently, however,
Germany has adhered, by a new law, to the rule proposed by
the Sixth Conference at the Hague. 96
In addition, two multipartite treaties of 1933 and 1936 on
the status of refugees (the one treaty, in case they have no
nationality, the other irrespective of nationality), determine
the personal law of refugees by the law of the country of
domicil or, in default thereof, by that of the country of residence.97 The same principle is maintained, regardless of nationality, by a Convention of 195 r superseding the former
treaties. 97a
The test of domicil or residence has thus proved to be indispensable in important cases.

3· Nationals of Countries with a Composite System of Private Law
Composite law on personal basis. In Algeria, Tunisia,
Syria, Egypt, Iran, India, China, and other Eastern coun9 5 German Law of Jan. 6, 1926, on the German-Russian Treaties of Oct.
12, 1925 {based on the "Rapallo" Treaties of 1922) RGBI. 1926 II I, art. 4·
9 6 German Law of April 12, 1938 (RGBI. 1938 I 380) art. 7, altering the
text of EG. art. 29, states that insofar as the laws of the state to which a
person belongs are declared decisive, the legal relations of a person without
nationality are to be decided according to the laws of the state in which he
has, or if the decisive moment lies in the past, had at the moment, his habitual residence, or, in the case of lack of habitual residence, his residence.
Literally the same provision in the Austrian international family law in
§ 17 of the (still valid German) Decree of Oct. 25, 1941.
Cf. a comment by VON STACKELBERG, 12 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1938) 66. The "motives"
of this legislation explain that Germany accepts the generally adopted principle in the form proposed by the Sixth Hague Conference, which now governs the personal law so far as it goes, while other matters remain subject
to their own special rules, as e.g., C. Civ. Proc. § II4 par. 2.
97 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, Geneva, Oct.
28, 1933, arts. 4, 5 in 159 League of Nations Treaty Series (1935-1936) 199,
6 HunsoN, Int. Legislation 483 If. No. 350; Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, Geneva, July 4, 1936,
arts. 5, 6, in 171 League of Nations Treaty Series 75, 7 HunsoN, Int. Legislation 375 No. 448.
97a Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951,
art. 12, in 189 U. N. Treaty Series {1954) 137· Ratification, see supra p. 40.
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tries, personal status is determined by religion, class or
race. 98 In India, for instance, the law is different for Buddhists, Hindus, Mohammedans, and whites, although it is in
every case a "law of the forum." 99 Some elements of this
system also survive in Eastern European countries.
Such diversity of personal law is a part of the substantive
law of the country concerned. When a conflicts rule refers to
the "law" of such a country, either because it is the law of the
domicil of an individual or because it is his national law, no
uniform law being in force in any part of the country, the
reference can only be to the particular set of rules that governs the group of persons to which the individual belongs. 100
Under this approach, it is obvious that the conflicts rule is
quite sufficient in itself and that it does not need any additional rules, complementary to those which invoke the law
of domicil or nationality.
Difficulties may arise, it is true, from the fact that the
regulation of interreligious or interracial relations in the
oriental countries concerned is often so obscure and incom98 Cf. on Egypt and other Islamic countries: ARMIN JON, in Clunet 1912,
698, 1025; C!unet 1913, 34, 435, 812; and I Precis I 54· On Palestine, TransJordan, Cyprus, Syria and Iraq: GoADBY 79, 107, 142; WENGLER, Internationales und interreligioses Privatrecht in Palastina," 12 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1939)
772-808; VITTA, Conflict of Laws in Matters of Personal Status in Palestine
(1947). On India: BARTHOLOMEW, "Private Interpersonal Law," I Int. Comp.
Q. (1952) 325-344. On Hindus in Zanzibar before the British courts: HUGH
E. KINGDON, The Conflict of Laws in Zanzibar (1940) 15. On the Belgian
Congo: MAURICE VERSTRAETE, "Intergentiel Recht," 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1940,
col. n69. On the Netherlands Indies: KoLLEWIJN, "Interracial Private Laws,"
in The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay
Archipelago, edited by SCHRIEKE (Batavia, 1929) 204.
99 On the contrary, in an Indian court a Chinese Buddhist custom is foreign
Jaw. See the careful judgment by Sir George Rankin in Tan Ma Shwe Zin v.
Khoo Soo Chong [1939] A. C. 527 (Privy Council). Cf. Casdagli v. Casdagli
[191&] P. (C.A.) 89 at no, per Scrutton, L. J.; and, in general, ARMIN JON,
Clunet 1913, 39·
too GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II xo.
Siam, Law of March xo, 1939, art. 6 par. 5; Portugal, Draft C. C. (1951)
art. 33·
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plete that it may not be easy for a foreign judge to cope with
their ascertainment and application. 101
Composite law on territorial basis/ 02 As contrasted with
the grouping of population according to personal qualifications, the law of conflicts is directly affected when the law of
a country to which a conflicts rule refers is split into territorially different systems. A composite system of law on a territorial basis makes nationality an incomplete criterion. The
United States, the British Empire, and Mexico (until recently also Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia) are examples of
political units lacking a unified law on personal status; their
territories are divided into parts where different bodies of
rules are in force. A court which has to apply the "Mexican
law" relative to a Mexican subject's capacity to marry,
would be unable to find an appropriate set of rules, except by
locating such person in one of the several states of Mexico.
A secondary rule of conflicts is necessary.
First case: Where interregional rules exist.
If the country to whose law reference is made possesses a
unified internal regulation declaring which one of the several
1o1 See for Palestine: GoADBY 119; For Latvia {where classes are distinguished): BERENT in 4 Leske·Loewenfeld I 577; For Bulgaria: DANEFF, 38
Bull. Inst. Int. (1938).
102 Cf. I ZITELMANN 403 ; RAAPE 29 and IPR. 142; WALKER 104; MELCHIOR
451 § 3ro; DE NovA, in 30 Rivista (1938) 388; 44 Revue Crit. (1955) 1; and
II richiamo di ordinamenti plurilegislativi: Studio di diritto interlocale ed
internazionale privato (1940) {not available); GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv.
( 1935) II 3; VITTA, Conflitti interni ed internazionali, Saggio comparato
( 1954); 1 STREIT-VALLINDAS §§ 16, 17 {the best survey of facts and literature) ; CHESHIRE 192; FALCON BRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile,"
19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 311, Essays 199. The aggrandizement as well as
the post-war split of Germany caused problems in view of which the doctrine
of interregional law has been discussed again; see quotations by DE NovA,
15 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1941) 338, 339 and for the recent questions of
"interzonal law" FICKER, Grundfragen des deutschen interlokalen Rechts
(1952); DROBNIG, Sammlung der Entscheidungen zum interzonalen Recht
1945-1953. 2 vols. (1956). See furthermore the Swiss NAG. in its original
main application to intercantonal conflicts and the French law of July 24,
1921 concerning the conflicts between the French and the local law of AlsaceLorraine.
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private laws applies to the individual concerned, this regulation is universally accepted for the purpose of secondary reference. For instance, the Polish law of "internal relations"
( interlocal private law), enacted simultaneously with the
Polish law on international private law, August 2, 1926/03
provided that the status and the capacity of an individual of
Polish nationality, domiciled abroad, is to be determined by
Polish courts in the first instance under the law of the last
domicil he had in Poland and, in the second, under the law
of the Polish capital. Accordingly, German, French, Italian,
etc., courts apply the same expedients. This method was recommended by the Institute of International Law 104 and has
been adopted in several statutory enactments.105
It is easily understandable that a foreign court looking for
the "national law" of an individual, should adopt the localizations effected by the sovereign of the foreign nation. But
the theoretical background of this operation has been a subject of discussion. An essential resemblance between interregional and international private laws cannot be denied; both
are types of conflicts rules. Yet the reference leading from
the conflicts rules of the forum through the interprovincial
rule to a particular family law of a territory must not be
treated as identical with a regular renvoi; the foreign inter103 Arts. I and 3· Another example is art. I4 of the Spanish Civil Code,
providing that the conflicts rules established with respect to the persons, the
transactions and the property of Spaniards abroad and of foreigners in Spain
are applicable to the persons, transactions and property of Spaniards in territories or provinces of different civil legislations; see BEATO SALA, I Revista
Der. Priv. (I9I3-I9I4) 2oi; TRIAs DE BEs, 6 Repert. 266 no. I6S.
10 4 Resolutions passed at Oxford, 188o, art. 3 par. 3, Annuaire I88I-I882,
57·
10 5 Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with amendments, c. 7 §I.
Finland: Int. Fam. Law of 1929, § 52.
Egypt: C. C. art. 26.
Syria: C. C. art. 28.
Siam: Law of March IO, I939, art. 6 par. s.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. 3·
China: Law of I918, art. 2 par. 3·
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regional rule is not in competition with the forum's own conflicts rules. 106 As a matter of fact, the strongest adversaries
of renvoi agree with this use of foreign interregional
statutes.107
It must be presumed that the interlocal rules are to be
adopted with all their characteristics, e.g., what they understand as "domicil," the domicil concept of the forum being
immaterial. Also, such particular notions must be applied as
the Swiss cantonal citizenship 108 or the "town settlement"
(H eimatzustandigkeit) 109 which was a basic concept in the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and remained in force in the
successor states. 110 In Hungary and Czechoslovakia it was
abolished but recently. 111
Second case: Where no interregional rules exist and the individual is domiciled within his national country.
Most countries that have no uniform private law also lack
106 Cf. RAAPE 34 against I ZITELMANN 398 and NIBOYET 493 no. 411 j
GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. ( 1935) II 4, against other Italian writers;
and see the survey by I STREIT-VALLINDAS 354·
1° 7 NIBOYET, op. cit. supra n. 106; LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 590; see
RAAPE 34108 "Heimat" is still important for the matters of cantonal legislation that
have not been unified.
109 The French text of the Treaty of St. Germain of Sept. ro, 1919, art. 3
uses the term "indigenat" with the Italian equivalent "pertinenza" in 'parentheses. The German translation in the Austrian Staatsgesetzlatt 1920, at 1048
is "Heimatrecht." The English version "citizenship" as published in British
and Foreign State Papers ( 1919) sos, is wrong.
no See, e.g;, for parts of Yugoslavia, PERITCH in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 879
n. 15 and LOVRic, ibid. 1038 n. 172 (Croatia-Slovania). See also PERITCH, 32
Bull. Inst. Int. (1935) 3·
For Czechoslovakia, HoCHBERGER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( 1938) 621, 629 reported
that Czechoslovakian nationals domiciled in Czechoslovakia were considered
having the capacity of their domiciliary law, but if domiciled abroad, that of
the law of their township. Before enactment of the uniform C. C. of 1950,
the Act on Private International Law of March II, 1948 had declared relevant for the interlocal relations a person's domicil or last domicil in the
country or, in absence of either, his ethnical origin or other connections with
one of the local laws ( s. 54).
1 11 In Hungary it had been replaced by domicil for interlocal purposes by
Law XIII of 1939; cf. 13 Z.ausi.PR. (1940) 258, 259· For Czechoslovakia
see preceding note.
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a unified set of interlocal rules. Such a situation existed in
Germany before th·e Civil Code took effect on January I,
I 900, and after World War I the same was true in all countries that had annexed new provinces and in which legal unification was not yet achieved. Yugoslavia and Rumania were
until recently in this situation. But the foremost examples
are presented by the British Empire and the United States.
With respect to the former, it is hardly doubtful that "there
is in fact no system of conflict of law common to all parts of
the British Empire," 112 that would enable a foreign court to
discover all-British rules connecting British subjects with
their several jurisdictions. Neither is it permissible to apply
the English rules on conflicts or on the law of status to all
British subjects, for the English law cannot be construed as
"the true nationall~w" of all British subjects. 113 Perhaps in
the future, some point of localization might be found in local
conceptions of nationality, Canadian, South African, etc.,
which seem to be in a state of development, in addition to the
notion of British subject; 114 but the new conception of dominion nationality apparently has not yet been taken into consideration for such purpose 115 and in any event would not
112

FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, Essays 205, supra n. 102.
This was contended by DICEY (ed. 5) &73; see contra CHESHIRE 193;
DICEY (-MORRIS) 57i FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 328, Essays
209, supra n. 102.
114 See KEITH, The Dominions as Sovereign States ( 1938) 184-199. Cf.
EMMEIT, "Nationality in the Union of South Africa," 17 Brit. Year Book Int.
Law (1936) 187; 18 ibid. (1937) 181; see also GEY VAN PITTIUS, Nationality
Within the British Commonwealth of Nations ( 1930) 223.
11 5 The problem has scarcely been discussed; in 2 Encyclopaedia of the
Laws of England (ed. 3, 1938) 467 ff. it is observed that at present colonial
nationality is not distinguished from the British, although in the future the
principles embodied in the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (c. 4) might affect
nationality within the Empire.
The latent significance of the new local nationality for the purpose of
jurisdiction, in particular divorce jurisdiction, has been pointed out by KEITH,
"Das Verhiiltniss des Statute of Westminster von 1931 zum internationalen
Privatrecht," 6 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1932) 301, 308 and op. cit. supra n. II4 at 193;
EASTMAN, "Australian Nationality Legislation, Nationality of Married
Women," 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 179. A more radical develop113
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specify the law of one of the several component states or
provinces of the dominion in question.
However, unanimity is still to be found in one group of
cases, viz., where the individual is domiciled at some place
within the entire territory of the country whose legal system
is divided, or where, as to matters of inheritance, the individual was there domiciled at the time of his death. The rule is
quite generally recognized that the law of such place constitutes his personallaw. 116 Thus, the principle of domicil has
retained a further supplementary hold in Europe.
Although this rule is well settled, it is nevertheless not certain whether it follows that "domicil" is to be defined under
the law of the forum and not, as in the first case described
(where interlocal rules exist), in accordance with the conceptions existing in the territory where the individual is said
to reside.
Third case: Where no interregional rule exists and the individual is domiciled outside his national country.
A troublesome situation arises where there are no interregional rules, and the individual is not domiciled in any part
of his national country. Several opinions have been put forward.
(a) The prevailing doctrine in Germany, 111 followed by
the Swedish legislation, 118 applies the law of that district
ment toward the criterion of local citizenship for personal status might be
expected with respect to Eire.
116 I ZITELMANN 405 at n. 7; RAAPR 36 (b); MELCHIOR 452 § 3II n. 3·
With respect to their interprovincial rules, the Court of Cassation of Rumania (March 3, 1937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (I939) 654, Clunet I938, 946 held that
divorce is governed by the law of the domicil of the parties at the time of the
action, not by that of the place of celebration of the marriage nor by that of
the origin of the parties, and, therefore, applied the Austrian Civil Code to
the divorce of parties domiciled in Bucowina (the actual local law of that
province).
1 17 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 68; LEWALD I3; RAAPE 36; MELCHIOR
452·
118 Swedish Int. Fam. L. of I904 with amendments, c. 7 § I par. 2; Law of
March 5, I937 on Conflict of Laws in regard to Succession, c. 3 § I. See I I
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of the national's country where the individual now domiciled
abroad had his last domicil 119 or, if he never had any domicil in his national country, the law in force at the capital of
that country. 120
This doctrine is satisfactory in certain cases. The connecting factors evidently were borrowed from procedural
models; 121 to allow nationals domiciled abroad to sue or be
sued locally, jurisdiction, ordinarily based on actual domicil,
in emergency cases may be based upon the last previous domicil or, as a final resort, may be assumed by the courts of the
capital. Such provisions make sense in the intranational rules
of a country like Rumania. Rumanian citizens are not subject
to foreign personal laws even when domiciled abroad and
therefore must be connected with one of the territorial laws
of Rumania. A French or German court, adhering to the
same principle of nationality, may very well agree to locate a
Rumanian citizen somewhere in Rumania. For analogous
purposes, in order to secure Frenchmen living abroad a domicil in France in case they need one, the French private draft
of 1930 establishes an artificial domicil: (i) at the Frenchmen's last domicil in France, (ii) subsidiarily at his last residence, (iii) otherwise at his birthplace, and ( iv) in the last
resort at any place chosen by him in a declaration before a
French consuU22
On the other hand, such subsidiary rules of the forum are
obviously unsuitable for connecting a British subject with a
determinate part of the British Empire. As a matter of fact,
Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 937, 39 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 158. Similarly the Portuguese Draft C. C. ( 1951), art. 32.
119 RG. (Nov. 30, 1906) 64 RGZ. 389 at 393; OLG. Karlsruhe (May 6,
1898) 9 Z.int.R. (1899) 311, 315.
12 KG. (Aug. 20, 1936) JW. 1936, 3582 (Soviet Russian subjects); LG.
Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Rumanians).
121 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 68; German Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 15,
27 par. 2, 6o6 par. 2, 642, 648.
122 Art. 5 par. 2, 26 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. (1930) 176; cf. NIBOYET, 26
ibid. 78.
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no German or French court is likely to apply them to a British subject. Where an Englishman is domiciled in France,
French courts as well as other Continental courts apply
French law, by renvoi.
(b) Italian courts reject renvoi 123 and are confronted
with a problem that has been called insoluble. When the
Courts of Cassation of Florence and Naples, in leading cases
of I 9 I 9 and I 920, respectively/ 24 proclaimed the anti-renvoi
doctrine, they recognized at the same time that the British
laws did not contain any rules linking British subjects domiciled abroad with any British legal system. The only possible
result was to adopt the law of the domicil of origin. 125
Thus, the English judgments in the cases of Johnson and
0' Keefe, 126 which in fact (by renvoi) resort to the domicil of
origin to determine the distribution of the estates of British
subjects who die domiciled in Italy, are not without support
in Italian law.
But, of course, it does not correspond to the spirit of British laws that a person firmly settled in Naples for forty-seven
years should be traced back to the origin of his father; at
least, even in the eyes of a British court, the domicil of origin
of the father of Miss O'Keefe was undoubtedly superseded
by the domicil of her choice. For this reason alone the solution of the 0' Keefe case is absurd. 127
1 28 This well-known rule was stated by Luxmoore, ]., In re Ross [I930]
I Ch. D. 377, 403. It is expressly confirmed by the Italian Civil Code (I942)
Disp. Pre). art. 30.
124 Cass. Firenze (July 2I, I9I9) Giur. Ita!. I9I9 I I I040.
12 5

BuzZATI fully approving of the Naples decision, Cass. Napoli (Jan. 5,

1920) Foro Ita!. I920 I 348. The same suggestion is made by CHESHIRE, "Decisions of National Tribunals Involving Points of International Law," 12 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (I93I) I74 at I76, and in his Private International Law
193; 8CHMITI'HOFF IOI.
126 In re Johnson, Roberts v. Att. Gen. [I903] I Ch. 82I per Farwell, ]. ;
In re O'Keefe, Poingdestre v. Sherman [I940] Ch. 124 per Crossman, J.
127
FALCONBRIDGE, I9 Can. Bar Rev. (I94I) 324, 326, Essays 2I3, supra n.
I02; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law I32, who advocates to treat a British subject

for the purposes of renvoi as stateless, if he cannot be connected with any
country within the British Commonwealth. Another argument is advanced by
GRASSEITI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (I935) II 3, 7, supra n. Io6.
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(c) Recent Italian writers, with Falconbridge's approval,
conclude that it is impossible to fix the status of a British subject living abroad and suggest that the Italian court apply the
lex fori, viz., Italian municipal law. 128 Such a gesture of
despair seems to be uncalled for, however, if proper regard
be paid to the historical development of the personal law;
domicil was replaced by nationality in the nineteenth century,
but not so as to exclude the test of domicil whenever the new
test of political allegiance should fail to operate reasonably.
Certainly, reference to domicil is preferable to a resigned resort to the lex fori. The practical consequences illustrate
what the choice of law means in this case:
Suppose a Can:;~.dian dies domiciled in France, and an Italian court has to determine the intestate succession to his
movables. If the Italian court were to apply Italian inheritance law qua lex fori, instead of French law qua lex domicilii,
the solution would be senseless and completely destroy harmony between the conflicts rules of the forum and those of
the domicil, as well as with those of the Canadian courts
which seek to follow any solution chosen by the court of the
domicil but are unable to follow the law of the forum of a
third country.
(d) Zit elm ann suggested taking domicil alone as the
test/ 29 He would limit the reference to nationality to the case
where the actual domicil is situated within the national country. It has been objected that this view runs directly counter
to the principle of nationality, 130 but this argument is evi12 8 DE NovA and GRASSETI'I, supra n. 102, DE NovA, "II caso In re O'Keefe
e Ia determinazione della lex patriae di un cittadino britannico domiciliato
all'estero," Festschrift Raape (1948) 81; this author means the lex residentiae which in the cases discussed by him happened to be also the lex fori
(see his solution of a case essentially identical with the one adduced in the
text infra, 46 Revue Crit. (1955) 14) and FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev.
( 1941) 323, Essays 208 supra n. 102.
129
I ZITELMANN 405, followed by WALKER 105 n. 57·
180 RAAPE 37·
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dently wrong. It is true, on the other hand, that the lex domicilii and the theory of renvoi result in the same decision in
this case and are often hardly distinguishable from each
other. But the case of a British subject domiciled in Italy induced the leader of the Italian school of international law
and the prominent opponent of renvoi, Dionisio Anzilotti, to
abandon his opposition. 131
Adoption of the law of domicil by the Italian courts, either
as an independent secondary test or, more appropriately, as
the result of renvoi, is the only way leading out of the impasse. Renvoi is the better method, since harmony is preserved with the British rules, especially in relation to the definition of domicil. One cannot reject renvoi and hope for anything tolerable.
It has been observed that the law of domicil has not the
same domain of application in all Briti5h countries. 132 This,
however, involves only special points immaterial for the general rule.
(e) The problem is not much different with respect to
American citizens. If an American citizen is domiciled within
a state of the United States, the reference to his "national"
private law means the law which will be applied to him by a
court sitting at his domicil. It has been properly noted in
Europe that in this case the nationality principle needs no
supplementary rule, because such domicil constitutes local
citizenship in the state.
Where an American citizen is, however, domiciled in a
131 ANZILOTI'I, in approving notes to Trib. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1918) in 12
Rivista (1918) 81 and App. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1919) in the same cause, ibid.
288. The judgments were reversed by Cass. Firenze, supra n. 124.
182 FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, Essays 206, supra n. 102.
His example, however, that under the primary rule in Quebec the lex loci
actus, not the lex domicilii, governs the formal validity of a will, is not
entirely relevant, since in this situation the law at the place of contracting is
recognized-alone or optionally-by the Continental conflicts rules, and to
such extent no renvoi problem is involved.
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foreign country, renvoi has been adopted by numerous European courts upon the erroneous view that the conflicts law
of the American state in which he had his last American
domicil, referring to the law of his present domicil, 133 applies.
The conception in this country is that such an individual is
still an American citizen but no longer a citizen of a particular state. 134 Consequently, if there were Federal rules of conflicts, they might appropriately be resorted to in such case by
a Continental court. But there are no such rules. Since the Supreme Court's decisions requiring Federal courts in diverse
citizenship cases to follow the conflict rules of the states
where they are sitting/ 35 it is doubtful to what extent an independent Federal system of conflicts law can be developed.136 However, in the United States, the scope of the law
of domicil is substantially more uniform than in the British
Commonwealth, with exception only of certain peculiarities
in the law of Louisiana. Hence, it seems quite justified 187 for
133

See the critical exposition by RHEINSTEIN, I Giur. Comp. DIP. 141.
See Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 Fed. Cas. (1851 C. C. N.D. N.Y.) 1278, per
Nelson, J.; Hammerstein v. Lyne (1912 D. C. W. D. Mo.) 200 Fed. 165.
135 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938} 304 U. S. 64; Sampson v. Channell
( 1940 C. C. A. 1st) no F. (2d} 754 and notes in 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev.
( 194o-I94I) II9; 128 A. L. R. 405; and now especially Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co. (1941) 313 U. S. 487 and Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313
u. s. 498.
136 Supra p. 42.
13 7 Professor Lawrence Preuss has attracted my attention to a somewhat
similar problem which has been discussed in matters of extradition. Under
the treaties, extradition usually depends on the recognition, by both the requesting and the requested countries, of the criminal character of the alleged
offense. How is the "principle of double criminality" to apply to the United
States where the administration of criminal law has not generally been unified? Is "country" in such case the United States or the state involved? In the
case of Factor v. Laubenheimer and Haggard ( 1933) 290 U. S. 276, 28 Am.
]. Int. Law ( 1934) 149, the United States was requested to extradite to
England, Factor, who had been found in Illinois. The Supreme Court, by a
six to three vote, held it sufficient that the criminal character of the act was
recognized in twenty-two states, although not proved to be such in Illinois.
(It has even been said that the number, twenty-two, is too high; see HUDSON,
"The Factor Case and Double Criminality in Extradition," 28 Am. J. Int.
Law (1934) 274, 303 n. 120.) BoRCHARD, "The Factor Extradition Case,"
ibid. 744, has given the more cautious explanation that the considerable rec134
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French, German, Chinese, and other foreign courts to treat
the questions that are generally decided in American courts
by the municipal law of the domiciliary state, in the same way
and under the same construction of domicil.
Conclusion. To summarize, where nationality alone is insufficient for ascertaining the applicable law, resort must be
had in the first place to the rules respecting interregional relations of the country whose national the individual is. If no
such rules have been established in that country by an authority covering the entire national territory, the spirit in which
its courts generally solve the problem of demarcation between the legal systems included may reasonably be followed
by foreign courts. Where, as in the United States and in the
British Empire, domicil is generally decisive, a court of any
other country has good reason to apply the same criterion
with all of its implications. Only in the last resort need independent conflicts rules be applied, based on a former domicil
of choice or some other contact.
Except for the last point, the attitude of the forum may
thus be similar to that observed in dealing with religious,
racial, or class differentiations.

IV.
I.

DETERMINATION oF NATIONALITY AND DoMICIL

Determination of Nationality

Whether a person is a national of a certain country is a
problem that is determined exclusively by the law of that
country, 138 a settled rule of international law confirmed by
ognition in American state statutes was evidence of the American recognition of the criminality in question. The dissenting judges and HUDSON, loc.
cit., maintain the older conception that the law of the state where the fugitive is finally arrested is decisive. Evidently our own problem is easier to
solve.
138 See Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) 169
U. S. 649, 668. MAKAROV, Allgemeine Lehren des Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts
( 1947) 59, 161.
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the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930. 139
No other law than that of Brazil determines whether or not
a certain individual is a Brazilian national; no other law than
that of the United States answers to the question whether
an individual is a citizen of the United States. The statement
in a former American nationality law that "any American
woman marrying an alien shall take the nationality of her
husband," 140 if taken literally, surpassed the powers of the
United States. 141 The same formula was incorporated, however, in many old European statutes, as for instance, article
19 of the CodeN apolion, sometimes interpreted to the effect
that the wife should be subject to the personal law of the husband, irrespective of whether she acquired his nationality by
the law of his national country. 142
The principle that acquisition and loss of nationality depend exclusively upon the law of the country concerned, is
universally recognized not only in public but also in private
international law; it is expressly stated in recent codifica13D Art. 2: "Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality
of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that
State."
140 Act of March 2, I907, ch. 2543, sec. 3, 34 Stat. I228, repealed by the
Cable Act, Sept. 22, I922, ch. 411, sec. 7, 42 Stat. I02I and later statutes; cf.
8 U. S. C. ( I940) ch. I, notes to §§ I-IS.
141 See WALDO E. WALTZ, The Nationality of Married Women (I937) 2I
notes I5 and I6.
An analogous charge of trespass upon foreign sovereignty has been made
by several authors with respect to legislations attaching a certain foreign nationality to corporations. See TRAVERS, 33 Recueil I930 III 25; CAVAGLIERI,
II diritto commerciale internationale 203; 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 460, no. I79·
To the same effect I PONTES DE MIRANDA 460 objects to the Polish Law of I926
on international private law, art. I par. 3, and P.G.R. of Liechtenstein, art.
235, on the ground that these provisions choose the business center of a corporation, even if in foreign territory, as the contact for determining the
personal law of the corporation, although contrary to the local law of the
place, and that the Liechtenstein provision seems in this way to determine the
nationality of the corporation. This attack is unjustified at least inasmuch
as merely the determination of private law rules is meant and renvoi is
applied. See infra vol. 2, c. I9 IV.
1 42 COLMET-DAAGE, I Revue de droit fran<;ais et etranger (I844) 401.
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tions. Occasionally, however, there have been refusals to
recognize certain foreign nationality regulations deemed to
be contrary to public policy. French courts, for instance, have
declined to recognize a Brazilian law of December 14, r889,
which bestowed Brazilian nationality upon all foreigners
who resided in Brazil on November rs, r889, and who did
not expressly object to such en bloc naturalization. 144
This rule of international law is applicable without doubt
to the determination of status under the nationality principle.
In two cases, moreover, the conflicts law itself is affected:
Suppose a divorced French woman goes through a second
marriage ceremony in France with a Catholic Spaniard. To
ascertain whether the woman by this marriage acquires Spanish nationality, Spanish law exclusively is consulted by all
courts. Accordingly, as ( i) Spanish matrimonial law prohibits the marriage of a Catholic with a divorced person, and
(ii) under Spanish conflicts law this nullifying prohibition is
extended to foreign marriages of Spanish nationals, consequently (iii) by Spanish nationality law the wife does not
acquire the nationality of Spain. Thus, a French court, in
determining the question, would not apply its own conflicts
rule designating the law applicable to the validity or invalidity of the marriage. This is a remarkable case; the preliminary question relating to the marriage apparently is
answered in accordance with the law applied in deciding the
main question. 144a On the other hand, for some other purpose
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 29.
C6digo Bustamante: arts, I2, I4, IS.
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. 29.
Convention of the Hague on Conflict of Nationality Laws of I930: art. 2.
144 Trib. civ. Seine (July I3, I9I5) Revue I9I6, 67; cf. WErss, I Traite 768;
the Brazilian law has been recognized, however, by Ct. Sup. Lisbon (May IS,
I934) Nouv. Revue 1935, 424. In another case the same tribunal refused to
recognize the acquisition of nationality by birth under a foreign country's jus
soli: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. I, 1916) Revue 19I6, 2I7. Contra: JoRDAN, 4
Repert. 675 no. I44·
144a A number of statutory conflicts rules designed for preliminary questions
143
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the same court may declare the marriage valid under French
law. The distinction between these two solutions has baffied
some writers unduly.
When according to this rule that nationality depends on
the municipal law applied by the country involved, 145 the nationality of an individual has been ascertained (or found
unascertainable), the ordinary conflicts rules of the forum
determine his status. In a second group of problems, however, the French courts, considering that French nationality
is at stake, have gravely altered their conflicts rules.
The decision of the French Supreme Court in the Mareschal case illustrates the practice. 146 An illegitimate child was
acknowledged in Switzerland by his Swiss mother's declaration on the birth register. Under Swiss law, an illegitimate
relationship was created between the child and the mother,
and the child acquired Swiss nationality. 147 French conflicts
law would have recognized this state of affairs, had not the
father who was of French nationality ultimately also acknowledged the child in a document sufficient under French
law. Because this entailed a question of French nationality,
the court examined the entire situation from the viewpoint of
French municipal law, under which the mother's recognition
was found insuffi'cient. Accordingly, the father's was the first
and decisive acknowledgment, and the child was deemed a
French national. This doctrine subjects the determination of
private law questions relating to acknowledgment, to considerations derived from a nationality law instead of the law
of conflicts. 148
of nationality laws are collected by MAKAROV, Quellen, Index under VIII
(I) (d).
1 4 5 See, as to German law LEWALD 8 no. xo; MELCHIOR 253 § 169.
146 Cass. (civ.)
(Feb. 25, 1930) D.I930.I.II3, S.I930.1.321. See infra p.
663, n. 40.
147 Swiss C. C. art. 324; cf. BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE.I 230, 232.
1 48 COLIN, Note D.I92I.I.I and in his report to the Court of Cassation,
Clunet 1923, 89, 93; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE no. 349 A. The principle of the
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That this is not a foregone conclusion is demonstrated by
the German law respecting legitimation, which, only if valid
under the German laws, 149 including German conflicts rules/ 50
is a ground for acquiring German nationality, and not inversely. The conflicts rules operate independently and determine whether there is German citizenship.
2.

Determination of Domicil

Variety of domicil concepts. In much of the literature, the
diversity of domicil concepts is emphasized. 151 It is opportune
to note just what the differences are. Primarily, the British
doctrine of domicil is to be distinguished from that of all
other systems; it is more or less unique, first, because of the
abnormal place occupied by the domicil of origin, second, because of the prevalence of tendentious casuistry. The English
writers, recognizing that the decisions of the House of Lords
have done much to alienate the legal concept of domicil from
its natural lines, 152 are frankly unhappy with the artificial
character of their doctrine and its arbitrary results. On the
Mareschal case is now for the preliminary question in filiation embodied
in the French Code of Nationality of 1945, art. 27.
149 German Nationality Law of July 22, 1913, § 5·
150 RAAPE 562.
151 See the surveys given by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23 Recueil 1928
III 121; LEVASSEUR, Le domicile et sa determination en droit international
prive (1931); WERNER voN STEIGER, Der Wohnsitz als Anknupfungsbegriff
im internationalen Privatrecht (Bern, 1934) II9; VITTORIO TEDESCHI, II domicilio nel diritto internazionale privato ( 1933) and the same author's review of
STEIGER'S book, IO Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 1067; see also NEUNER, 8 Z.ausl.PR.
(1934) 89-92. On the differences of municipal conceptions of domicil see the
comparative study by VITTORIO TEDESCHI, Del domicilio ( 1936).
152 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard (Nov.
1935) 4, 5· In the Winans case, [1904] A.C. 287, KEITH recalls, the propositus
had not found a domicil in England during 37 years; Ramsay, in Ramsay v.
Liverpool [1930] A.C. 588, lived from 1891 or 1892 to 1927 in Liverpool and
ordered himself buried there, but the Lords unanimously declared him domiciled in Scotland and seemed astonished that another view should be taken.
By request of the Lord Chancellor, the newly appointed Private International
Law Committee in its First Report of February 1954 (Cmd. 9068) proposed
a Code of the Law of Domicile as guidance for future legislation which
would remedy the oddities; the text is reprinted by SCHMITTHOFF 491.
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other hand, in some countries, such as Denmark, the notion
of domicil is undeveloped.
Apart from these anomalies, however, it should not be
supposed that in the doctrines of the great majority of countries there exists no common simple idea of domicil, at least
at bottom. It would be unfortunate to press to such conclusion the multitude of learned definitions of domicil. 154 All
countries deriving their laws from Roman conceptions agree
in requiring both physical presence or actual abode (residence) and intention to maintain this residence for an indefinite time on the part of the person concerned. The American
law shares this view, although terminology and definitions
sometimes vary. Despite the frequent use of the term "residence" in American statutes involving questions of status, 155
it is the general opinion that an appropriate intention is also
required; in the Restatement, it is made plain that the proper
term is "domicil." 156
The apparent divergence of cases concerning the domicil
of choice is due not so much to national diversities as to the
broad latitude of discretion which the courts all over the
world seem to reserve to themselves in determining where a
person is or was domiciled. In part, this is attributable to the
desire of the courts to decide individual cases in accordance
with what they regard as fair justice; the individualized exercise of such discretion has often given the appearance of an
arbitrary or inconsistent handling of the problem. 157 But in
HOECK, Personalstatut 6, but see BoRUM 93.
MAHAIM, reporter to the Institute of International Law, I93 I, has collected fifty different definitions of domicil given in the world literature. See
Annuaire I93I II 180. He thinks this shows, against the current belief, that
the concept of domicil is far from being similar in all countries. On the contrary, it shows that the literature has spoiled a fairly uniform subject by scholastic definitions.
155 I BEALE 110 § 10.3; 4 Proceedings American Law Institute (1926) 348.
156 Cf. Restatement § 9 e and the use of the term "domicil" as indicated by
the Index sub "domicil."
1 5 7 For instance, Englishmen and Americans are declared to be domiciled
153
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part the courts also seem to react against the exaggerated
generalization by which one basic notion of domicil apparently has been adopted for such different fields as jurisdiction
and venue, taxation, poor relief, exercise of civil rights, voting, and conflicts law. 158
Where an individual is not free to establish his domicil but
is subject to the interference of legal rules, differences are
more deeply rooted. Thus, the domicil of dependent persons,
particularly of married women, gives rise to problems. 159
Again, the former singular provision of the French Civil
Code (art. 13) that a foreigner had to obtain authorization
by the French government to have a domicil in France,
greatly disturbed the international order. A British subject
who was permanently located in Paris but had not obtained
such authorization, for the purposes of the French courts,
was not there domiciled, although so regarded under German, Italian, and even English standards. Thus, the English
courts declared that Mrs. Annesley acquired a domicil of
choice in France, although she never had applied for government permission. 160 By law of 1927, this peculiar doctrine
was repealed, and the French courts proceeded in accordance
in France (see NIBOYET 610) or in Switzerland (as in the decision of the
Trib. Zurich, Oct. 25, 1935, 32 S]Z. 202 no. 41 and others of the same tribunal) in order to assume jurisdiction for divorce. The same occurs daily in this
country. Thus, for example in the famous case of Gould v. Gould ( 1923) 23 5
N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 the matrimonial domicil for obvious reasons was declared to be in New York, although the divorce decree of Paris was recognized (infra p. 507, n. 40).
158 This is well known; cf. 3 Proceedings American Law Institute (1925)
224, esp. W. W. CooK, ibid. 226; CounERT, "Some Considerations in the Law
of Domicil," 36 Yale L. ]. (1927) 949; Restatement, New York Annotations
6. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Texas v. Florida (1939)
306 u. s. 428.
1 59 For illustration take the case of German RG. (Jan. 12, 1939) HRR.
1939, no. 376 (the legal domicil of a child whose legitimacy is attacked, but
is not yet avoided, is determined according to the conflict law of legal paternity (EG. BGB. art. 19), whereas the court of appeal had applied the
lex fori). See in respect of the wife, below, pp. 333 ff., of the child, below,
p. 648.
160 In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692. See also the discussion in Harral v. Harral ( 1884) 39 N. ]. Eq. 279·
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with the ordinary concept of domicil. In 1938, a French decree had required an alien to possess a police identification
card allowing him to stay in France for more than one year,
in order to acquire, exercise, or enjoy statutory rights presupposing French domicil or residence; 161 the celebration of
marriage was expressly subjected to it. 161 " This requirement
has been abolished under present law, 162 except that a temporary foreign resident needs a prefectural authorization
for marriage in France. 163
Finally, the dogmas that every person must have a domicil, and that no person can have more than one domicil at a
time 164-in force in British countries, the United States,
France, Switzerland, Argentina, etc.-have been discarded
in the German Code as contrary to the realities of life. 165
Despite these embarrassing variances, it should not be impossible to arrive at a reasonable unification of the conditions
under which domicil may be acquired. This is demonstrated
by those bilateral international treaties that incorporate a
definition of domicil in their text, as well as by the determinations of domicil by international courts for the specific purpose of treaties lacking such definition. 166 A far-reaching uni161 Decret-loi {Nov. 12, 1938) J. Off. 12-13 Nov. 1938, art. 1; SrREY
I939·4·Io8o, D.I939·4·I62-I63, Clunet 1939, 315.
1 611l Art. 7 of the decree. Cf. TAGER, "Statut des etrangers," Clunet 1939. 278,
288, critical of the marriage prohibition and the immature character of the
decree.
162 Ordinance of Nov. 2, 1945, J. Off. Nov. 1945, 35 Revue Crit. ( 194o-46)
144·
163 Art. 12 of the Ordinance and Decree of Feb. 21, 1946, J. Off. 22 Feb.
1946, 35 Revue Crit. (194o-46) 319. But a violation of the provision does
not affect the validity of the marriage, cf. BATIFFOL, Traite 189 n. 12.
164 NEUNER regards this dogma as the chief reason for the confusion complained about by the lawyers of the common law countries, see NEUNER,
"Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942)
479 at 494·
165 BGB. § 7· For Denmark BoRUM 93·
16 6 Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment of May 25, 1926,
Serie A no. 7, 79; Arbitral Decision (July ro, 1924) of President Kaeckenbeeck, 33 Z.int.R. (1924-1925) 321; cf. TEDESCHI, Domicilio 105-112.
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fication has been achieved in this country, as a result of the
insertion of the topic in the law of conflicts instead of regarding it as a matter of domestic law. The rules provided in
sections I I to 4I of the Restatement are uniform rules of
private law, transferred into conflict of laws. The British
common law countries and the countries unified by the Treaties of Montevideo have attained an analogous result.
Which law decides? As the answer to the question of
domicil thus may vary, the question arises under what law a
court should define the elements constituting domicil. 167 This
problem is of evident interest in the countries where domicil
is the general test of status rights, but it is also of importance
elsewhere; for instance, in France and other countries succession to movables upon death depends on the law of the
last domicil of the deceased. That this problem usually is
identified by writers and courts with the question under which
law domicil (or residence) required for judicial jurisdiction
must be determined, is unfortunate. In consequence, the application of the lex fori, natural where jurisdiction is concerned, has been advocated as if it were equally natural in
matters of choice of law.
Lex fori. Thus, the English courts, after some vacillations,
now take it for granted that they have to apply the English
concept whenever they determine an individual's domiciU 68
The same approach seems to prevail in the United States/ 69
where it has been adopted in the Restatement. 170 The courts
of the Netherlands likewise determine domicil in accordance
See literature, supra n. 151.
In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900] P. 2II, 227; In re Annesley,
Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692; Fleming v. Horniman ( 1928) 44
T.L.R. 315; GRAVESON 77; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 212; in the latest edition the
relevant section is missing, apparently by accident, as the author gives only
four, instead of the promised five, general rules (p. z66).
169
Harral v. Wallis (1883) 37 N. ]. Eq. 458; Harral v. Harral (r884) 39
N. ]. Eq. 279. Cf. x BEALE § ro.r; GooDRICH 52.
110 Restatement § ro.
167
6
1 8
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with the concept of the forum and refuse to apply the national law of the person, because they believe that the definitiOn of domicil does not pertain to the functions of the personallaw.111
In a broad way, the same result has been reached through
the theory that the determination of a person's domicil is a
problem of "characterization" and therefore must be answered in accordance with the lex fori. 172 This means that the
conflicts rule of the forum referring to the law of the domicil
necessarily refers to the law of the place considered to be
the domicil under the private law of the forum. If, for instance, an American citizen resides in Paris, a French court
would determine at what place he is domiciled solely in accordance with the French concept of domicil, as indicated by
examination of the French law.
Yet, in the common opinion, 173 it is not inconsistent with
this theory that, to use the same example, the American and
not the French definition of domicil should be decisive for
171 H.R. (Jan. 5, 1917) W.10073· It must be noted, however, that the case
dealt with jurisdiction, in a suit against a ward of German nationality; for
this purpose the minor was considered domiciled with his Dutch guardian,
according to BW. art. 78, irrespective of German law; recently Rb. Amsterdam (Apr. 9, 1926) Clunet 1928, 1296; Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 26, 1926)
Clunet 1928, 1293; Rb. Dordrecht (Dec. 9, 1936) W. 1937, no. 921 (domicil
by operation of law for a minor foreigner in the Netherlands with his
guardian, BW. art. 78); see also Rb. Almelo (May 13, 1936) W. 1937, no.
258 (German illegitimate child, but domicil for the purpose of the child's
bastardy proceedings).
17 2 See MELCHIOR 177 n. 7; DE NovA, 30 Rivista (1938) 388, at 399·
LEWALD, Regles Genchales des conflits de lois 91 n. 23 (with other citations).
173 See particularly KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 66; also in 30 ]he rings J ahrb. ( 1891)
76; NIBOYET 686 no. 565 and 3 Traite no. 1002; BATIFFOL, Traite 458; 2
ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) 58 If. no. 14 sub. (3) (with restrictions, n. 15) ; and
among the French decisions Cass. (req.) (Dec. 30, 1929) D. H. 1930.65; Trib.
sup. Colmar (Nov. 30, 1921) Clunet 1922, 379; App. Colmar (Jan. 14, 1925)
Clunet 1925, 1044; Trib. civ. Seine (Apr. 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, 901. Cf.
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 625. RG. (June 2, 1932) 136 RGZ. 361, 363; RG.
(Apr. 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103; OLG. Karlsruhe (Jan. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1930,
no. 89 (British subject died in Freiburg; his domicil has to be ascertained
according to British rules relative to British subjects born in India). Contra:
LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE no. 261.
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the problem of renvoi. Where an American citizen lives in
France at the time of his death, a French (or German) court
in determining succession to his movables, will consult first
his national law, i.e., the American, which is deemed to refer
to the inheritance law of the last "domicil." To comply with
this reference, the court must ascertain whether the last residence constitutes a domicil in the meaning of the American
rule, because this is the rule (of back reference, loi renvoyante) to be applied. 174 This construction of domicil is not
considered an exception to the supposed principle of characterization according to the lex fori, for in this case it is the
American conflicts rule, not that of the forum, that applies
and with it the American concept of domicil.
Is it not strange, however, that, to determine the status of
a person according to his domiciliary law, a court in State X,
when in doubt whether such person is domiciled in Y or Z,
should follow its own internal law in localizing the domicil? 175
Even in the French school of thought, in which the doctrine of characterization of legal concepts according to the
law of the forum has gained its strongest foothold, other
theories have been advanced in startling variety. Some of the
older authors, emphasizing the nationality principle, have
proposed that domicil be defined in accordance with the national law of the individual. 176 Recent discussions have put
174 Great Britain: In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692,
707.
France: Affaire Forgo, Cass. (req.) (Feb. 22, 1882) Clunet 1883, 64; Cour
Rennes (July 24, 1923) Clunet 1924. 410; Trib. Civ. Seine (Dec. 19, 1927)
Revue 1928, 511. But there are controversies in literature and in the courts.
See J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 167 at 184.
NrBOYET 610 thinks even that in most cases domicil of Englishmen was assumed in contrast to English conceptions.
175 In contrast to the domiciliary principle itself, see NIEMEYER, Das IPR.
des BGB. 69; NEUNER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1934) 90.
176WEISS, 3 Traite 321; VALERY 113 no. 116; cf. LEVASSEUR, op. cit. supra
n. 151. Some writers claim that the Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902,
art. 5 no. 2 has adopted this view, and some decisions, including German RG.
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forward two further points of contact. One opinion is that
the law of the place of actual residence should be consulted
to determine whether such residence constitutes domicil; this
law is sometimes called the terri to rial law 177 and is favored
as such by neo-territorialists such as Niboyet. 178 Another
opinion, or rather formulation of the same trend, postulates
that the law of domicil which should govern under the choice
of law rule of the forum should determine also where the
domicil is. 179 In fact, the Swiss rule referring the status of a
Swiss domiciled abroad to the legislation of the domicil is
said to imply the notion of domicil in the foreign law. 180
A similar interpretation-on doubtful grounds-has been
given to the Argentine domiciliary rule by the court of Paris;
in the eyes of the Argentine legislator, the domicil acquired
by an Argentine national in Paris, if not authorized by the
French authorities and therefore not recognized under the
then French law, is insufficient to determine the law applicable to his inheritance. 181 Actual residence in the foreign
country is presupposed, however, in such cases. In these polemics, the main argument against the lex fori is that domicil,
like nationality, establishing a social and political tie between
an individual and a state, should be construed under the law
(Apr. 5, 1921) 102 RGZ. 82, 84, have followed these writers. See MELCHIOR
180 n. 3 j 3 FRANKENSTEIN 520.
17 7 I BROCHER 247 If. His theory was advocated also by I ZITELMANN 83,
178, and adopted by the C6digo Bustamante arts. 22 and 25, the Guatemalan
laws on Foreigner~ of Jan. 25, 1936, art. 18, and on Judicial Power of Aug.
3, 1936, art. XX, as well as (in respect of jurisdiction) by the Swedish Law
of July 8, 1904 with amendments, c. 7 § 3·
178 See infra n. 183.
179 STEIGER, op. cit. supra n. 151, especially at 161; TEDESCHI recognizes this
law as determining domicil for certain status questions as a broad exception
to the lex fori doctrine.
180 Swiss NAG. art. 28; HUBER-MUTZNER 403.
181 Argentina: C. C. art. 3283 (new 3317); Cour Paris (May 10, 1929) Clunet 1930, 405, Revue 1930, 126, affirmed by Cass. (March 7, 1938) Revue
Crit. 1938, 472, Nouv. Revue, 1938, 143 j cf. J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, "Le
renvoi et !'affaire de Marchi della Costa," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939)
167.
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of that state. Particularly, it has been considered strange to
determine an individual's personal status on the ground of
his domicil in a country which does not recognize him as one
of its domiciliaries. This is the argument anticipated in
Westlake's statement that "no one can acquire a personal
law in the teeth of that law itself," 182 a consideration which
has much impressed Niboyet, formerly the strongest advocate of the lex fori doctrine. 183
A draft treaty worked out by the League of Nations 184 attempted to eliminate the "conflict of the conflict of laws relating to domicil" by combining the theory of "territoriality"
with the lex fori principle. A similar spirit is shown in the
rules adopted in 1931 by the Institute of International
Law, 185 according to which the courts in each country determine under its own domestic legislation whether an individual is or is not domiciled therein; the Institute also provides
for the case where two or more foreign laws conflict in respect of domicil and declares that, between two or more
voluntary domicils, the place of actual residence, if any,
should be preferred. The Institute has shown a possible solution through this auxiliary conflicts rule. Further progress
toward unification of "domicil," considered as a connecting
factor, will perhaps be reached if future writers not only
distinguish the concept as a category of status law from
other meanings of domicil, but also differentiate rules dealing
182

WESTLAKE § 254·
NmoYET in S. 1929.2.162; S. 1930.2.129; Revue Crit. 1935, 762; and
among others I Traite (1938) nos. 514-515, 552 ff.
184 See Publ., League of Nations C.343·M.IOI.1928.V: BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES, Memorandum, p. 14 and Draft Convention for the Settlement of Conflicts of Laws in the Matter of Domicil, p. 17 art. 2: Questions connected with
change of domicil except such as concern a person's capacity at law or the
existence of a domicil by operation of law shall be settled in conformity with
the law of the court if the latter be that of one of the States concerned, otherwise, in accordance with the law of the place in which it is claimed that the
last domicil was acquired. Cf. also Draft by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23
Recueil 1928 III 138.
185 Annuaire 1931 II 239·
183
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with capacity of contracting, succession upon death, recognition of foreign judgments, etc., in order to ascertain which
kind of domicil is a desirable connecting factor for each of
these separate matters. 186

V.

CHANGE OF PERSONAL LAW

Under the system of personal law, a person's status is
changed whenever he changes his nationality or, where the
domicil principle prevails, when he changes his domicil.
I.

Change of Nationality

In the countries that determine personal status in accordance with the law of the country of which the individual is a
national, the problem arises how a change of nationality
affects an individual's status as a person of full age. Under
German law, infancy is terminated upon an individual's completing his twenty-first year of life. 187 In Illinois a woman is
regarded as of age when she has completed her eighteenth
year .188 When a nineteen-year-old American girl from Illinois
is naturalized in Germany, is she again reduced to the status
of infancy? Article 7 paragraph 2 of the Introductory Law
to the German Civil Code contains an express provision by
which this result is prevented. 188a Even though she is now
subject to German law as her personal law, the girl continues
186 Cf. FRANCIS, "The Domicil of a Corporation," 38 Yale L. J. (1929) 335,
341 and TEDESCHI, Domicilio 8. GUTTERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in
Matrimonial Suits," 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1938) 19, 26 ff. thinks a
worldwide definition of domicil for the exclusive purpose of jurisdiction for
divorce quite possible.
187 German BGB. § 2; in Eastern Germany the age of majority has been
reduced to 18 years (Law of May 17, 1950).
18 8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, 3 § 283.
1 88 a This rule has been adopted in several other countries:
Czechoslovakia: Law on Private International Law of 1948, s. 2.
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 42 par. 2.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 23 par. 2.
Poland: Law on International Private Law of 1926, art. 1 par. 2.
China: Law of Aug. 5, 1918, art. 5 par. 3·
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to be treated as of age by the German courts. Can the same
result be reached without such a provision of the new personal law, for instance under article 3 of the Japanese Law
of I 898, which, although following literally the German
article 7, has omitted the said paragraph 2? This question
has been answered in the affirmative/ 89 but it has been objected that full age does not constitute a vested right and
would have to be reacquired under the new statute. 190
2.

Change of Domicil

Since domicil can be changed more easily than nationality,
the problem is even more acute in those countries where an
individual's personal status is determined in accordance with
the law of the country where he is domiciled. That a once
acquired status as a person of age is preserved in spite of a
change of domicil to a country where infancy is terminated
at a later age, has been recognized in the conflict of laws of
several countries, 191 as well as in one of the Scandinavian
treaties 192 and in the Treaty of Montevideo. 193
189 Austrian decisions, see WALKER 128 n. 42 j I BAR § I44 j NIEMEYER, Das
IPR. des BGB. 126; ROLIN, 2 Principes I96 n. 655; PoULLET 319 n. 2.
19 0 WEISS, 3 Traite 344 j I FRANKENSTEIN 426 n. 82 j RAAPE 79 j and French,
Italian and other German writers quoted by these authors.
191 Argentina: C. C. art. I39·
Guatemala: Constitutive Law on Judicial Power (Aug. 3, I936) art.
XVIII; Law on Foreigners (Jan. 25, I936) art. IS.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI par. 2.
In German interzonal law applying the law of the domicil or the residence
in questions of personal status, full capacity once acquired under East German law at IS years (supra n. I87) has been preserved after establishment
in West Germany in spite of the there prevailing age limit of 2I years:
KG. (Berlin-West) (March 29, I951) IZRspr. I945-53 no. 33; OLG. Dusseldorf (June I2, 1951) IZRspr. 1945-53 no. 35·
1 92 Convention on Private International Law regarding Marriage, Adoption, and Guardianship, Feb. 6, I 93 I, Final Protocol sec. 2 ( 126 League of
Nations Treaty Series 148).
1 9 3 Treaty on international civil law (1889) art. 2, provides that change of
domicil does not affect capacity acquired by emancipation or coming of age.
The new text of 1940 reads to the effect that change of domicil does not affect
capacity.
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In the United States, however, capacity is generally independent of domicil; in the exceptional case where domicil is
determinative, it seems that the actual domicil alone is taken
into consideration.

VI.
1.

RATIONALE

194

Tradition

Before modern states arose and developed the concept of
allegiance, the only and obvious test of personal law was
domicil, either of origin or of choice, special considerations
applying to dependent persons.
This test is still important in those states where private
law is divided into different systems. Domicil is still the na~ural criterion in the British Empire and in the United States,
as it formerly was in France before the Revolution, in Italy
before I 866, and in the old German Empire and in most
parts of the second German Empire before the Civil Code
took effect on January I, I900. It goes too far, however, to
pretend that the principle of nationality is absolutely impracticable for a country that lacks uniformity of private law
throughout its territory. 195 In such a country, domicil is the
best element of contact in the relations between the several
territories, but in the relations of the country as a whole to
foreign countries either test may be used. As a matter of fact,
in I926, Poland chose the domicil test for interlocal relations
among her several territories under Warsaw-Polish, Russian, German, Austrian, and Hungarian laws, but declared
nationality to be decisive for problems of personal law in
international relations. Thus, a foreigner domiciled in
194 Mere reference is made to the selected bibliography and the treatment
of old and recent so-called "theoretical arguments," by 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2)
28 ff. no. 9·
195 See I BAR § 9I at 267, 268 discussing WHARTON §§ 20 ff., whose arguments against nationality have been reassumed, however, by POLLOCK, Book
Revue, 3 I Law Q. Rev. ( I9I 5) 106 and 3 BEALE I934·
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Poland stands under his national personal law, and a Polish
citizen living abroad has to obey the laws which Poland applies to all her nationals as well as the law of that Polish
territory where he had his last domicil, or in the absence of
any former domicil, the laws of the state capital. Such a system would be theoretically conceivable for other composite
countries. In the United States especially, despite the fact
that states constitute the territories of private law, the constitutional circumstances are somewhat analogous, considering that state citizenship has become subordinate to federal
nationality; the American system has been determined, however, by other elements.
2.

Political Considerations

An important role has been played not only by tradition
but also by political considerations which have influenced the
law-making agencies of the various countries, consciously as
well as unconsciously.
The unilateral rule of article 3, paragraph 3 of the French
Code, although reflecting traditions of the old coutumes,
represented the idea that a French citizen should enjoy the
achievements of the great Revolution wherever he might
happen to be and that he should be bound everywhere by its
laws by virtue either of tacit agreement or simply by natural
law. Mancini held the idea that, in contrast to the strict
territoriality of public law and public policy, the needs of an
individual were served best by rules of family, inheritance,
and status law of universal application; since the laws dealing with these topics are the product of all those factors that
determine a people's national character, the laws of a person's national community should be considered most suitable
for him wherever he may live. These notions of the French
revolutionists and of Mancini were widely discussed; they
appealed to the trend of nationalism of the nineteenth cen-
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tury; and they were widely adopted in the numerous national
codifications of the period. When the German Civil Code
was enacted in 1896, the test of nationality had won such a
firm hold that the traditional system of domicil could be discarded almost without discussion. Whenever new waves of
national feeling were stirred up in the twentieth century, they
resulted almost invariably in the adoption of the principle of
nationality as best fitted to protect the needs of the national
community. 196
3· Economic Considerations; Migrations
While these ideological arguments have been working in
favor of the principle of nationality, the domicil principle has
found support in the desire of immigration countries to incorporate new immigrants into the legal life of their country
as soon as possible, and thereby to avoid the difficulties that
would arise if each new immigrant prior to naturalization
were to be judged in accordance with the laws of his home
country. These considerations have been of crucial influence
in the United States, 197 as well as in Switzerland and Argentina.198 They have been gaining ground in Brazil: 199 the new
Introductory Law of September 4, 1942, has radically substituted the principle of domicil for that of nationality, pre196 Cf. PILLAUT, Revue 1916, 14, 32, and see National-Socialist writers such
as REu in 57 RVerwBI. (1936) 521 and HoRST MuLLER in DJZ. 1936, col.
1065. LoRENZEN, in a Book Review, 33 Am. ]. Int. Law (1939) 427 observes
that RAAPE'S recent manual on German international private law greatly extends the principle of nationality.
197 See 3 BEALE 1935.
198 Argentina, which had adopted the principle of nationality in 1857 and
re-affirmed it in 1862, later went over to the domiciliary law in the C. C. of
!869.
199 RoDRIGO OCTAVIO, 0 direito positivo e a sociedade internacional (Rio de
Janeiro, 1917) n3, quoted by 1 V1co 365 no. 424; Report of the Brazilian
Delegate (EsPINOLA) to the Third Commission of the Sixth Panamerican Conference, see Diario de Ia Sexta Conferencia Internacional Americana (Habana, 1928) no. 30 p. 420; cf. BusTAMANTE, La nacionalidad y el domicilio
(1929).
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viously incorporated in the code. 200 A few other South American countries have changed in recent years from nationality
to domicil, obviously yielding to the influence of immigration
policy. 201
Especially in France, where considerable masses of foreigners had come to live before the outbreak of World War
II, the advantages of the domiciliary system for an immigration country began to be appreciated. Characteristic of the
change of mind is the attitude of the treaties edited by Niboyet. As late as 1928, he reprinted the opinion of Pillet 202
explaining the French doctrine as follows:
The French sovereignty has no interest in subjecting all individuals in France to the provisions of the Civil Code in
matters of status and capacity. It has, on the other hand, a
marked interest not to let its nationals evade the operations
of its laws . . .
But at the same time he declared 203 the problem to be more
political than doctrinal and shortly thereafter became the
leader of a movement aiming to control all inhabitants of
France by French law. Extended discussions of the Comite
Fram;ais de Droit International Prive were devoted to this
2 00

Lei de Introduc;ao, 1942 Decreto-Lei no. 4657, art. 7·
Guatemala had the nationality rule in its Law on Foreigners of 1894,
art. 48, 2d sentence, and adopted the principle of domicil in the C. C. of 1926,
libro I, art. 12, from which the provisions on conflicts law were transferred
in 1936 to the Constitutive Law of Judicial Power, and more recently to the
Law on Foreigners of 1936, arts. 17 and x8. See MATOS nos. 136, 172.
In Peru, the Civil Code of 1852 had no express rule but was often interpreted in the sense of nationality test. Despite Peru's participation in the
Montevideo Treaties of x889, the Commercial Code of 1902 seemed to confirm this theory, art. xs, following art. 15 of the Spanish Commercial Code
and determining the capacity of foreigners according to their lex patriae.
Draft and text of the Civil Code of 1936 have followed the domiciliary system; cf. supra pp. 128 ff.
202 NIBOYET 699. See moreover PILLET, 2 Manuel (ed. x) sxs: how would
we conceive that an individual minor in his country of origin could become
capable or incapable according to the countries where he would be contracting?
203 NIBOYET 702 n. 587.
201
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endeavor, which almost all French experts seem to approve.204
Countries from which large portions of the population
emigrate, are attracted, on the other hand, by a principle
which tends to preserve the ties between the emigrant and his
home country. Great Britain furnishes a striking illustration
of this tendency, namely, the doctrine of domicil of origin,
which has often been compared with the bonds effected by the
principle of nationality, a doctrine maintained and developed
to satisfy the natural desire of a home country from which
innumerable colonizers have gone out into the world. Even
in the United States where in theory only one kind of domicil
is known, courts usually have been reluctant to recognize
that an American citizen has transferred his domicil to a
foreign country, especially when there are assets in this country to be distributed or taxes to be assessed. 205 This, in practice, is a domicil of origin.
Similar considerations have contributed to the popularity
of the nationality principle itself in Germany and Italy, from
which millions emigrated to the New World in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. However, this circumstance
should not be overestimated. Until very recent times, neither
Germany nor Italy pursued any consistent policy in preserving relations with their emigrants. Until 1913, a German
citizen living abroad even lost his citizenship after ten years,
zo4 See Travaux du Comite fran<;ais de droit int. prive, Annees 1-4 ( 19341937) and in Revue Crit. 1939, 171, report on the meeting of May 23, 1938,
concurring "le statut de l'etranger." These studies started significantly with
an Exposition by M. Louis-Lucas on the territoriality of law and the new
tendencies towards it. NIBOYET, Traite Vo)s. I and 2 j LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 248; BARBEY, Le Conflit 215, and respecting the question of capacity,
see below.
zos CouoERT, "Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil," 36 Yale L. J.
(1927) 949, 961; comments in 37 Yale L. J. (1928) II27, II29, and particularly the cases commented upon by CoUDERT: Matter of Spencer, N. Y.
L. J. June 2, 1908 (not reported); United States Trust Co. of New York v.
Hart (1912) 150 App. Div. 413, 135 N.Y. Supp. 81, aff'd (1913) 208 N. Y.
617, 102 N. E. 1115.
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unless he had himself expressed his desire to retain allegiance
by formally registering with the German consulate. 206
Wherever in those countries the principle of nationality
did not satisfy nationalistic tendencies, there could scarcely
have resulted a change from the principle of nationality to
that of domicil but rather an extension of the application of
the principle that "laws of public safety and police" apply to
every person sojourning within the territory of the forum.
By such an order of ideas, the principle of nationality is
maintained for nationals abroad and narrowed with respect
to foreigners living in one's own territory. This unhappy
result has been achieved in the Latin American codifications
indicated above. 207
4· Practicability
Respecting the practicability of the alternative tests, it has
often been alleged that citizenship is not changed so easily
nor so often as domicil or residence, and in consequence that
a law based on nationality could not be evaded so smoothly
as a law based upon domicil. The former is therefore said
to be better fitted to govern the conditions of such transactions as marriage, adoption, or testament, than a law which
the propositus can voluntarily renounce. Moreover, nationality is credited with being a relatively clear and simple concept compared with the uncertainties and multiformity of
domicil, especially in its British varieties. Recent critics in
England have admitted that the English conception is "both
artificial and complex." 208 The force of this argument is
somewhat questionable, in view of the complexity of modern
206 German Law on Nationality of 1870 (Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz), replaced by Law of July 22, 1913.
zo1 See supra pp. 126-129.
zos FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16
Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84 at 85.
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citizenship laws and the circumstance that the British domicil
of origin is not a domicil at all. On the other hand, it has
been argued in favor of the principle of domicil that it is
closer to facts and more consistent with the principle of territoriality. 209 But neither are these considerations in themselves
advantages. It is noteworthy, however, that, after the first
World War, the practical difficulties caused by the consideration of strange or obscure foreign laws under the principle
of nationality were acutely felt in Germany. For this reason,
the same suggestions were made, as in France for reasons of
immigration policy, that the local law should again govern
the status of domiciled foreigners. 210
So far as outside parties are concerned, either system
opens the door to prejudicial mistakes respecting the legal
capacity of foreigners.
The perplexity of the situation is illustrated by the strange
fact that while many Continental writers are quite set upon
restoring the principle of domicil, 211 it has been said in
England that "the best course would seem to be to adopt the
doctrine of nationality as applied on the Continent." 212 All
agree, however, that for the time being there is no hope of
any such radical modifications. It may naturally be concluded
that efforts should be directed to fundamental improvement
of both criteria.
209 NIBOYET, in 2 Melanges offerts a M. Mahaim 679 ("chant de Ia terre")
quoted by VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 294, 296.
210 See 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 390 on proceedings of the law commission of the
Prussian Chamber of Representatives (particularly p. 396 on marriage requirements, see infra p. 314) and 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 633 an opinion of
Schilling recommending retention of the domicil principle for the Baltic
States.
211 Also in the Netherlands, an address by Kollewijn in Batavia (1929)
against the "degenerated" principle of nationality is regarded as a characteristic sign; cf. OFFERHAUS, in Gedenkbo_ek 1838-1938, 705.
212 FosTER, 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84. Cf. supra p. u6, n. 23.
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5. Efforts to Reach a Modus Vivendi Between the Two
Principles
The contrast between the two systems of determining personal status is deeply rooted in traditions and policies, and
the near future holds no prospect of its elimination. It appears therefore the more necessary to devise ways and means
to achieve practicable decisions in individual cases in spite of
the coexistence of the two different systems.
(a) The most effective means has proved to be the renvoi,
of which, in fact, the chief field of application is status and
capacity to engage in transactions.
(b) The Hague Conferences simply adopted the principle
of nationality; the Treaty of Montevideo adhered to the
domicil principle. During the making of the C6digo Bustamante, serious but inadequate proposals were made to bridge
the gulf: 213
First, the principle of the Hague Convention on Marriage
that the national law should govern except where it refers to
another law (renvoi); second, an analogous idea, advocated
by the Uruguayan delegate, Varela, that the law of domicil
should govern, except where it refers to another law, particularly to that of nationality; and third, the notable suggestion of De Bustamante that every contracting state shall
apply to a national of another state that law which is applied
to him by the state to which he belongs. Cubans would thus
be treated in all states according to the national principle,
and Argentinians according to the law of domiciJ.2 14 This
would give nationality a certain preference in the outcome,
quite as the renvoi theory does, and evidently produce an
adequate solution.
213 BusTAMANTE, Tres Conferencias sobre derecho internacional privado
(1929) 46 ff.
214 BusTAMANTE, La Nacionalidad y el domicilio (1927) 61. In twenty different situations ten times nationality, and ten times domicil would result as
test ( pp. 64, 67).
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More recently, however, at the Scandinavian Convention
of February, I 93 I, establishing conflict of laws rules for
matrimonial relations, adoption, and guardianship, 215 the
problem was more successfully resolved. Sweden and Finland
apply nationality as the test, while Denmark, Norway, and
Iceland retain domicil as controlling. To regulate the relations between the five countries, the Convention admits the
law of domicil in the first instance and secondarily the law
of nationality. Article I provides, for instance, that where a
national of one of the participant states is domiciled in one
of the other states for at least two years, his marriage is governed by the law of the state of domicil; otherwise, the law
of the state to which he belongs controls.
At its meetings in Cambridge, I93I, and Oslo, I932, the
Institute of International Law, formerly a strong supporter
of the principle of nationality, attempted a compromise with
a marked tendency toward the Anglo-American doctrine;
but the issue did not appear hopeful. 216
The Hague Conference, in I 9 5 I, has adopted a Convention for the regulation of the conflicts between the national law and the law of the domicil. It provides, in essence,
that the reference of the national law of a person to the law
of his domicil is binding for the domiciliary state and for
third countries (art. I) ; if both the domiciliary and the national law declare the same law applicable, this reference is
binding on third countries (arts. 2, 3). Thus, harmony between the two rival principles is sought by resort to renvoi
though the term itself has been carefully avoided.
(c) The following case illustrates a recurrent problem,
which particularly needs efficient relief:
Cf. BLOCH, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 627.
See BRIERLY, observations on the Draft mentioned above, n. 184, Publ.
of League of Nations C.343.M.Io1. 1928. V p. 19. From the British angle,
GuiTERIDGE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1938) 15; cf. TEDESCHI, Domicilio 17.
215

216
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A marriage between German parties was dissolved by a
divorce decree of an American court. Subsequently, the husband became an American citizen and married another wife
in this country. The judgment not being recognized in Germany because of alleged lack of reciprocity of recognition,
it seemed certain that, in Germany, the second marriage
would be held invalid, the issue thereof illegitimate, and as
such not entitled to share in the husband's estate. However,
the court of appeals in Berlin upheld the validity of the second marriage for several reasons, of which the most effective
seems to have been the court's desire not to upset a factual
situation that had been established in the United States. 217
Judgments of this kind, if more frequent, would hollow out
the extraterritorial effect of the personal law. But the problem is comprehensive. States with nationality as the test extend their regulations beyond their frontiers to their citizens
abroad, more often than not colliding with the states of immigration imposing different rules upon the same persons. 218
Even if this extension of authority, so much resented in Latin
America, were justified in itself, it should certainly not be
allowed to produce effects beyond the time of acquisition of
a new nationality by a former citizen of the forum. But even
without a change of nationality, it is shocking that the national law should lay hold of a man who abandoned his country many years ago, and of his children and grandchildren,
who live in different surroundings and never think of themselves as subject to any law other than that of their new
country. If the principle of nationality is to survive, its claim
should cease at least when the propositus has established
217 KG. (Jan. 13, 1925) JW. 1925, 2146; cf. MELCHIOR, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929)
745, also MELCHIOR, Grundlagen 414 § 279· See, moreover, LG. Berlin (Aug.
6, 1934) 7 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. 28 (a German national was divorced and
remarried in Czechoslovakia; the court recognized the divorce only because
of the foilowing remarriage); contra: MASSFELLER, StAZ. 1936, 335; EcKSTEIN, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 33·
218 This is seen by FEDOZZI 230, arguing with CAVAGLIERI 145.
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himself in a new country and has founded new family relations, or simply when considerable time has elapsed. The
Harvard Research in International Law in its Draft Convention on Nationality has proposed to restrict the acquisition of nationality by birth (jure sanguinis) to the second
generation of an emigrant. 219 This solution would be of some
help, but the pretensions of the old personal law should be
limited even more strictly.
6. Conclusion
We may well conclude that both systems of testing the personal law are seriously defective. The principle of nationality, however, suffers not merely from its complicated nature.
We shall see that its unpopularity, so conspicuous in the
French literature, has reached critical proportions in court
decisions and legislation, in particular with respect to divorce.
There is one more circumstance apt to destroy what usefulness nationality may still have as a criterion for status.
Many millions of people have emigrated in the course of the
war, in the estimate of some experts as many as thirty millions in Europe alone, and others will do so; millions have
also lost their former citizenship or will not be able to prove
to which state they belong. In European countries where the
nationality principle had its origin, a formidable intermixture
of populations is about to render it obsolete. Moreover,
should federations be created, the relation of individuals to
the federal governments will be so important as to offset the
ties of nationality.
Thus, domicil, the dominant concept of the English-speaking part of the world and the emergency concept considered above in connection with the cases of apatrides, holders
of several nationalities, citizens of composite empires, etc., in
Europe, might resume its old importance, if only it were not
of such uncertain nature.
219

23 Am.

J. Int. Law Spec. Supp.

(Harvard Law School) (1929) 13, art. 4·
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Can the domiciliary test be improved? It should be possible to obviate at least the clandestine establishment of a
domicil of choice, which renders doubtful the determination
of so many cases. In Europe, it would seem quite feasible to
require that any voluntary change of domicil be reported to
a public authority empowered to investigate. In European
countries, residence and domicil of individuals are constantly
being controlled by official agencies for the purposes of defense, police, and taxation. Little innovation is necessary to
establish the personal law by a formal record. In this country, such intrusive bureaucratism is probably out of the question. But the divorce statutes present an alternative method
of assuring that one party is actually domiciled at the forum;
they usually require, not a public record of the establishment
of domicil, but the lapse of a certain period, ordinarily a
year, during which domicil must have existed. 220 Very remarkably, the Polish Interlocal Law of 1926 has generally
provided that a person changing his domicil from one part
of Poland to another, only after the lapse of one year, becomes subject to the law of his new domicil with respect to
his capacity, his family relations and his inheritance. 221 An
analogous idea appeared in the above-mentioned French decree of 1938 requiring that in order to avail themselves of
their French domicil or residence, foreigners should possess
police permits to sojourn in the country for more than a
year. 222 However questionable this novelty, a product of
prewar apprehensions, may appear, it is true that the existence of a voluntary domicil can be better ascertained, if a
period of factual residence is added to the ordinary requisites, as in the American divorce law, or if the individual has
secured official authority to reside more than a year in the
country, as prescribed in the French emergency decree.
220
221
222

See 2 VERNIER § 82; infra pp. 437-440, 495·
Law on interlocal private law of Aug. 2, 1926, art. 2.
See supra p. I53·
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5

Specific Applications of the Personal Law
I.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

N the conflict of laws, especially in civil law countries,
the sphere of application of the personal law is extensive. The branches in which the personal law is of the
greatest importance are the law of family relations and that
part of the law of contracts and other transactions which regards capacity. The application of the personal law to these
branches of the law is to be discussed separately. The present
chapter is concerned only with its application to the remaining personal relations.

I

r. General Capacity to Have Rights and Duties
While in the days of slavery personality was not enjoyed
by all human beings/ it is now taken for granted that every
human being is a person and as such capable of having rights
and duties. However, some exceptions still persist. Under
the canon law of the Roman C atholic Church, an individual
is deemed to lose his personality upon joining certain monastic orders. In a few countries, this rule of the canon law is
still recognized as exerting an analogous effect in the temporal order of affairs. 2 The German Reichsgericht once de1

Restatement § 120 comment d.
For instance: in Ecuador C. C. arts. 92-94. In the Chilean C. C., arts.
95-97 have been canceled by Law no. 7,612 of Oct. II, 1943, art. 2.
In Argentina the canon law rule is expressly denied recognition C. C. art.
103·
In Austria a monk was held incapable of acquiring any new rights; the
assets owned by him at the time of his entry into the order were placed under
curatorship, I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ ( 1925) 161 § 70.
1

2
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cided, applying the rules of the then prevailing principle of
domicil, that the personality of a woman who had become a
nun in a Russian convent was extinguished to exactly the
same extent that it was under her personal law, i.e., the law
of the place of the convent. 3
A few countries and states, among them several of the
United States, have retained the old punishment of civil
death. The meaning of this term is quite doubtful under the
modern statutes. Constituting a penal measure, such a diminution of a person's legal status is generally disregarded by
other states or countries. 4
Capacity of having rights and duties includes capacity to
sue and be sued in the sense of what the Continental doctrine
terms capacity of being a party 5 or of "standing in court." 6
As individuals generally have full personality, they enjoy
such capacity, while it may be wanting in the case of unincorporated associations. It seems that procedural rules
everywhere acknowledge that capacity to sue and to be sued
in this sense is determined by the personal law, in this country the law of domiciV The question is entirely distinguishable from that of the procedural capacity of a person, i.e., to
effectuate procedural acts on his own behalf or on behalf of
another person, a capacity that is affected by incompetence. 8
For a long time, Continental authors have discussed socalled "special capacities." 9 This term covers a variety of
s RG. (July 13, 1893) 32 RGZ. 173, 175 (capacity of a Russian Catholic nun
to be a party to a German lawsuit, decided according to the law of the place
of her nunnery).
4 For details see Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1939) 288.
5 See, for instance, German Code of Civil Procedure,§ so: Capable of being
a party to a lawsuit is he who is capable of having rights.
6 "Stare in judicio" (Roman law), "ester en justice" (French law), "capacity to stand in judgment" (Louisiana lawyers).
7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 17 (b).
8 Cf. German Code of Civil Procedure, § 52 and infra p. 197.
9 Cf. 8AVIGNY § 364; for French theories of BOULLENOIS and FROLAND see
2 LAINE 2071 211; for a theory of BROCHER cf. GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN 70.
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different problems which preferably should be discussed individually.
The term "special capacity" has been used, first, to indicate those characteristics which an individual must possess
in order to qualify, for instance, for the office of guardian or
administrator or for membership in a cooperative association
or for eligibility as a member of a board of a corporation.
Such requirements, not affecting the individual's general personal standard, are regulated by that law which determines
the other incidents of the legal relation in question. 10 Hence,
a person's capacity to serve as administrator of a decedent's
estate is determined by the law of the state in whose court
the estate is being administered, and a person's capacity to
be a member of a corporation is determined by the law of
the state of incorporation.
The term "special capacities" is used, secondly, as referring to the numerous rights and privileges enjoyed by a country's citizens as opposed to resident or sojourning aliens. As
said before, this vast topic, traditionally covered in the
French books on private international law, exceeds the
boundaries of the law of conflicts and pertains to internal
administrative law.
The term "special capacities" is employed, finally, to designate requirements for certain transactions, such as that of a
certain age for marrying or that the parties be not married
to each other as a condition for the validity of a gift. Where
such requisites are not regarded as mere applications of the
personal law, they must be considered separately.
2.

Beginning and End of Personality

The determination of the exact moment at which an individual's personality begins 11 is generally referred to the
10 German courts, see LEWALD 39, no. 43, NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. I) § zo;
GuTZWILLER I626.
11 The various municipal laws are not all alike in this respect. § I of the
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personal law, which also determines the legal status of a
child en ventre sa mere. 12
Difficult problems of conflict of laws are caused by the
differences of municipal laws with respect to absentees. The
two world wars have given this subject ominous importance.
Most laws follow one or another of three different systems:
First: the rebuttable presumption of the common law, according to which an individual is presumed to be dead when
he has been absent without being heard of for a stated number of years, for instance, seven years;
Second: the French system, according to which a person's
unexplained absence for a stated period of time is judicially
investigated· and established and certain effects similar to
those of death are incurred; 13
Third: the German system, of much influence upon recent
legislations, according to which the legal effects of death take
place when and only when a judicial decree has been issued
providing that the absentee shall be regarded as dead ( declaration of death) and as having died at a certain moment. 14
German Civil Code provides, for instance, that an individual's personality
(Rechtsfiihigkeit) begins with the completion of his birth. According to the
Civil Code of Spain (C. C. art. 30), however, an individual is not recognized
as a person until he has lived at least twenty-four hours.
1 2 Art. 28 of the C6digo Bustamante reads:
"Personal law shall be applied for the purpose of deciding whether birth
determines personality and whether the unborn child shall be deemed as born
for all purposes favorable to him, as well as for the purpose of viability and
the effects of priority of birth in the case of double or multiple childbirth."
(Translation in 22 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. {1928) 276). Brazil C. C., Introductory Law, art. 7 par. r. See also HUBER-MUTZNER 410.
On the other hand, art. 53 P.G.R. of Liechtenstein applies the law of that
principality to persons born within its territory, in matters governed by
Liechtenstein law. Application of the territorial law is also advocated by
GEMMA, Revue 1930, 48, and by FEDOZZI 370.
1 3 This system prevails in most countries whose private laws follow the
general pattern of the French Code, including Italy. For Switzerland, where
it has been modified in several respects, see below n. 16.
14 German BGB. §§ 13-19, War emergency laws of 1916, 1917, and 1925,
all abrogated now by Law of Jan. 15, 1951. Although French writers had
disapproved of this institution, it was imitated in both World Wars for
persons missing in war and was, after World War II, generally adopted
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A workable solution of some of the most important problems of conflict of laws respecting absentees has been provided by article 9 of the Introductory Law to the German
Civil Code, as modified by the Law of January I5, I95I,
§ I 2, which may be summarized as follows:
(I) An absentee is declared dead by a German court in
accordance with German law, if he was a German citizen at
the time of his disappearance ( § I 2 par. I ) ; a foreign declaration of death will not be recognized in such case by a German court. 14a
( 2) Upon the application of a spouse, an absentee of
foreign or without nationality is declared dead by a German
court in accordance with German law, if the spouse is domiciled in Germany and is a German national or, in case of a
wife, was a German national before her marriage ( § I 2
par. 3) ; these provisions are designed to enable the spouse
to remarry.
(3) Irrespective of whether or not he has been a resident
of Germany, a foreign absentee is declared dead pursuant
to German law with respect to such of his assets as are situated in Germany and to legal relations governed by German
law (§r2par.2).
( 4) An absentee, who had lost his German nationality
without acquiring another, is declared dead by a German
court under German law, if there exists a legitimate interest
(§ I2 par. 4).
into the C. C. (arts. 87-92, as amended by Ordinance of Oct. 30, 1945); see
AUBIN, 15 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1949/50) 545· Shortly before World War II in 1939,
Germany and Italy modified their laws on absentees according to the model
of the rules concerning persons missing in war; see R. ScHMIDT, "Das neue
italienische Verschollenheitsrecht," 13 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1940) 103. Italy (C. C. 4873) as well as Spain (C. C. I81-198, as amended by law of Sept. 8, 1939),
while retaining the declaration of absence, recently have added judicial declaration of death. Recent changes and emergency laws are collected by
ScHNITZER 284.
l4a LG. Kreu2nach (April 4, 1950) IPRspr. 1950/51 No. 7· Czechoslovakia:
Code of Civil Procedure (1950) § 638 (d).
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These rules have been used as a model in several countries,
either for statutory enactments 15 or in judicial practice. 16
In Austria, rule ( 3) has been interpreted quite liberally for
the benefit of refugees so as to give a stateless spouse of a
missing person an opportunity to remarry.H
The principles that problems of the law of absentees
should be determined in accordance with the personal law of
the absentee, and that jurisdiction for judicial action belongs
primarily to the state of which he is a national or domiciliary,
as the case may be, have been recognized in France 18 and
Italy 19 and in many other countries. 20 Hence, for instance, the
Austria: Law on the declaration of death of 1950, § 12.
Czechoslovakia: Law on Private International Law of 1948, §§ 3-5; Code
of Civil Procedure (1950) art. 617.
Greece : C. C. art. 6.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 57 par. 2.
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 4·
China: Law of 1918, art. 8.
] a pan: Law of 1898, art. 6.
Siam: Law on Private International Law of 1939, art. I I par. 2.
16 Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (July 13, 1939) cited by VAN HILLE, 66 Rev.
Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 758, 760.
Switzerland: particularly, the third rule stated above is followed, see App.
Basel-Stadt (Feb. 19, 1932) 30 S]Z. (1933-1934) 269 no. 53 (a man born in
Basel, naturalized a citizen of Minnesota, not heard of since 1906; assets inherited by him in 1910 were taken in public deposit; in absence of a written
rule, the judge decides as in the case of a Swiss citizen); cf. Just. Dep. I,
BBl. 1933, II 75 no. 9, 30 SJZ. 120 no. 94i FRITZSCHE and PESTALOZZI, 9
Z. ausl.PR. (1935) 702; SCHNITZER 139· On other controversial points see
BECK, NAG. 424.
17 The Supreme Court has considered the marriage of stateless persons,
even if only the wife has residence in the country, as a legal relationship
under Austrian law, thus enabling Austrian courts to pronounce a declaration of death: OGH. (May 26, 1948) 21 SZ. (1946-48) no. 96.
18 Trib. civ. Seine (April24, 1931) Clunet 1932, 83, Revue 1931, 504. Swiss
law was applied not only with respect to the family relations of a Swiss absentee but also with respect to his property. The decision has been criticized
by}. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 436, 437·
A declaration of death under French law can be pronounced for foreigners, if they have disappeared on French territory or on a French ship
or plane (C. C. art. 88 par. 5, as amended by ordinance of Oct. 30, 1945).
19 See FEDOZZI 271; no decisions seem to have been published, however.
20 The Belgian Trib. Antwerp (July 13, 1939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44
no. 8 excepts the first period of absence from being exclusively governed by
the Polish law, but contra the opinion of the State Attorney Van Hille and the
note, ibid.
15
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Austrian law was applied in both Germany and Switzerland
to determine whether the former Austrian Archduke Johann,
who had become a ship's captain, had assumed the name of
Johann Orth and had disappeared without being heard of,
was to be regarded dead. 21 Local rules are in force, however,
practically everywhere, providing for temporary care and
custody of the property of a foreign absentee. 22
Under the principle of personal law, a court recognizing
a declaration of death pronounced by the competent national
court, will also recognize restrictions imposed upon the
effects of such a declaration. Thus, the wife of a Czechoslovakian national declared dead in Czechoslovakia was not
permitted to remarry in Germany, since an additional decree
was necessary to dissolve the marriage under Czechoslovakian, though not under German, law. 23
The approach which regards a man as either alive or dead
for all purposes is more satisfactory than to regard the same
person as alive for some purposes and as dead for others.
For instance, whether a missing heir or legatee is to be regarded as dead can more consistently be answered in accordance with his personal law than in accordance with the
laws governing the descent or the distribution or the adminisThe Hungarian-Czechoslovakian Treaty on Judicial Assistance of March
6, 1951, art. 22, and the Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty of Aug. 8, 1953, art. 22,
adhere so strictly to the nationality principle that, even in the exceptional
cases in which the jurisdiction of a court of the other Contracting Party is
admitted, this court has to apply the missing person's national law; see
DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. Law (1956) 491; cf. also the Czech-East German
Treaty on Judicial Assistance of Sept. n, 1956, art. 26.
2 1 German RG. (June 28, 1893) 4 Z.int.R. ( 1894) 72; Swiss BG. (Jan. 22,
1897) 23 BGE. I 166, 171. The remarriage of the wife of a missing Russian
husband was held invalid by a German court because the Russian absentee
was not declared dead and was deemed to be living under Russian Jaw;
OLG. Kiel (Nov. 30, 1926) Schlesw.-Holst. Anz. 1927, I45· See also LEWALD
4I no. 47 and NussBAUM, D. IPR. 117.
2 2 See I VICO 433 no. 499 with respect to the countries of Latin America.
2 8 Czechoslovakian Law of June 30, I92I, art. V; KG. (Sept. 25, I93I)
IPRspr. I932, no. 12; cf. WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (I934) 238 n. I.
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tration of assets, possibly lying in different jurisdictions. 24
Limited international co-operation in clearing the fate of
innumerable persons who had disappeared during World
War II was achieved by the United Nations Convention on
the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons from April 6,
1950. 24a Without containing conflicts rules, the convention
only provides for the notification of every proceeding instituted under its terms to an International Bureau (art. 9)
and for the recognition of the ensuing declarations of death
as prima facie evidence of death in the contracting countries
(art. 5).
There also are different rules in the case where two or
more persons perish in a common disaster: some laws presume that the deaths have taken place in a certain order,
others reverse that order, and in a third group no presumption exists. Is this problem a question of the personal law?
Writers are in disagreement. 25 The Brazilian Law suggests
2 4 The law governing the distribution of the estate has been applied in the
following cases: German RG. (]an. 7, 1890) 25 RGZ. 142, Clunet 1892, II91;
KG. (May 31, 1897) 9 Z.int. R. (1899) 468, Clunet 1900, 163; OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 27, 1896) Hans.GZ.Beibl. 1897, 243; OLG. Colmar (June 12,
1912) Els. Lothr. J. Z. 1913, 38. The personal law of the absentee has been
applied by Ob. Trib. Stuttgart (July 8-10, 1862) 15 Seuff. Arch. 321; Bay.
ObLG. (May 17, 1890) 13 Bay. ObLGZ. 50 no. 17 (a man who had emigrated to the United States in 1869 and was declared dead in 1886, was
considered to have inherited a share in the meantime, as he was presumed
living at the time of the succession under the law of his last German domicil). A third solution was adopted by OLG. Dresden (Dec. 20, 1909) 66
Seuff. Arch. 68, 70. The application of the lex successionis has been approved
by LEWALD 41 no. 46, and M. WoLFF, IPR. 97, and disapproved by NussBAUM, D. IPR. II7.
24 a 119 U. N. Treaty Series 99, ratified by Belgium, China (National Republic), Germany (Federal Republic), Guatemala, Israel, and Pakistan.
NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, United Nations Convention on the Declaration of Death
of Missing Persons (New York 1951).
25 Cf. WEISS, 4 Traite 572 and DESPAGNET 1046 no. 365 (advocating personal law); 2 BAR § 365, p. 3II, tr. by GILLESPIE 805 (law of succession on
death); VALERY 1194 no. 842 and NUSSBAUM D. IPR. II7, n. 2 (lex fori).
Recently studies of FRAGISTAS, "Die Kommorientenvermutung im internationalen Privatrecht," Festschrift Laun (1953) 693-705 (personal law); DE
NovA, "La commorienza in diritto internazionale privato," Festschrift Lewald (1953) 339-347, II Giur. Comp. DIP (1954) 263-269 (lex causae).
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application of the national law; the C6digo Bustamante also
applies the national law, but only to the field of distribution
of estates, a limitation of the principle which has been criticized.26 Similarly, the English case In re Cohn determined
survivorship according to the law governing the succession. 26a
3· Name
(a) Individual name. Beale has stated that the determination of an individual's personal name is not regarded in
common law countries as a problem of status, since a person
is traditionally free to assume a name and to change it at
his discretion. 27 However, today most American states allow
special court proceedings to aid and confirm a change of
name, and a name thus acquired cannot again be changed
without the intervention of the court. 28 Moreover, the right
to use a name is governed by important legal rules. 29 In civil
countries it is well recognized that a person's name is determined by law and that, therefore, problems of conflict of
laws can arise with respect to the determination of an individual's name and to the manner and extent of his protection against abuse of his name. Traditionally, these questions are decided in accordance with the individual's personal
law, 30 except such as are controlled by imperative local regulations. 31
2 6 C6digo Bustamante art. 29; cf. the criticism by PONTES DE MIRANDA, 39
Recueil 1932 I 555, 622, 671.
2 Sa In re Cohn [1945] Ch. 5·
27 Linton v. First National Bank (1882) 10 Fed. 894; Application of Lipschutz ( 1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 264. Cf. 2 BEALE § 120.3.
2 8 COHEN, "The Law Concerning Change of Personal Names,'' 2 Conn.
B. J. (1928) IIo, II5 n. 14; Note, 16 Chi. Kent Rev. (1937) 65, 66 n. 15.
2 9 See 65 C. J, S. Names 23 § 13.
30 Germany: RG. (April II, 1892) 29 RGZ. 123, 127; RG. (Dec. 12, 1918)
95 RGZ. 268, 272. KG. (April 22, 1927) IPRspr. 1927, no. 19. KG. (April 15,
1932) JW. 1932, 2818, IPRspr. 1932, no. II. Manner and extent of protection of a foreigner's name are governed by German law: BGH. (Jan. 15,
1953) 8 BGHZ. 318.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 28; BG. (Oct. 24, 1907) 33 BGE. I 770, 776; BG.
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Thus, it has been held by German courts that an individual's right to use a title of nobility is to be determined by his
nationallaw. 32 Such titles having been entirely abolished in
Czechoslovakia, a citizen of that country is denied the right
to call himself a count in Germany. On the other hand, the
Reichsgericht has held a Swiss citizen entitled in accordance
with Swiss custom to append to his own name the titled name
("von B") of his wife. 33 Whether a foreigner's change of
name is recognized depends on the recognition or non-recognition of such change of name by the country of which he is
a national. 34
In suits for damages for abuse of a person's name, or in
suits for an injunction against such abuse, a tendency exists,
(July I4, I9Io) 36 BGE. I 39I, 395; BG. (Nov. 22, I934) 6o BGE. II 387, 388.
G!ESKER-ZELLER, Der Name in Internationalen Privatrecht (in Festschrift fiir
Georg Cohn (Ziirich, I9I5) I67 ff.); HUBER-MUTZNER 419.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 28, I935) D.H. I935· 276; aff'd by Cour
Paris (Dec. 15, I936) D. H. I937·72, Revue Crit. I937, 690 (Prince ColloredoMansfield, right of divorced wife to carry the name of her former husband).
Italy: FEDOZZI 362, quoting a decision of Cass. pen. Feb. I7, I928.
Brazil: C. C., Introductory Law of I942, art. 7 par. 1.
Albania: Law on personal names of May 21, I948, art. 4 par. 1.
Yugoslavia: Law on personal names of Dec. I, I947, § 4 par. 1.
3 1 The reported judgment of the court of Paris (n. go) supposes French
laws respecting names possibly to have public interest but discounts expressly
any influence of French public policy.
An Austrian prohibition on using any Austrian or foreign titles of nobility
was held inapplicable to an Austrian woman who by marriage had acquired
her German husband's name "von B." and afterwards reacquired Austrian
citizenship. The Austrian OGH. (May 28, 1952) 25 SZ. (I952) no. 147, So
Clunet ( 1953) 166, qualified the title of nobility according to German law as
part of the surname; in accord, the Austrian Administrative Court (July 14,
1954) 9 Erkenntnisse des Verwaltungsgerichthofs, Neue Folge, 49 (no. 3476
[A.]).
'
32 KG. (Sept. 19, 1904) I5 Z.int.R. (1905) 329; KG. (Dec. I9, I907) 19
Z.int.R. (I909) 244; KG. (April 15, 1932) JW. I932, 28I8, IPRspr. I932,
no. 11.
33 RG. (Dec. I2, 19I8) 95 RGZ. 268, 272.
3 4 Switzerland: The Justice Department refuses, in the case of a child of
Swiss nationality (BBl. 1907, I 539), and recognizes in the case of a German
child (BBl. 1921, III 836), the name given to the child by a German stepfather according to a German institution unknown to Swiss law (viz., the
cantonal law in 1907 or federal law in 192I).
Dutch decisions; see VAN HASSELT § I.
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however, to resort to the local law, or to the law applicable
to delictual actions, even where the personal law provides
actions on other theories. In Germany it has been held, for
reasons of public policy, that the measure of damages in a
foreigner's action for wrongful appropriation of his name,
is not higher than in an analogous action by a German national.35 It has also been suggested that it should never be
lower. 36
Within the realm of application of the personal law,
doubts have arisen with respect to families whose members
are not all of the same nationality. Where, for instance, a
wife's nationality is different from that of her husband, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal has held her name to be determined
by her own nationallaw, 37 while in Germany the general rule
governing marital status presumably applies, and the wife's
name is determined in accordance with the national law of
the husband. 38
(b) Commercial name (firm). In Germany 39 and Switzerland,40 it is held that the firm or official name of a commercial enterprise is determined by the law of the principal
35 KG. (April 29, 1920) JW. 1921, 39; KG. (April 8, 1914) Leipz. Z. 1915,
1327; RG. (Nov. 29, 1920) roo RGZ. 182, 185 (both referring to the "Gervais" case). Cf. EG. art. 12 restricting tort actions against German nationals
to what may be claimed under German law.
36 RAAPE, IPR. 6o6; see also J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 437·
37 BG. (July 14, 1910) 36 BGE. I 391, 395; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no.
15.
3 8 GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN 183; RAAPE 290; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 125.
The Reichsgericht (Nov. 23, 1927) II9 RGZ. 44 has applied in an analogous
way to the name of an illegitimate child the law governing illegitimate relationship rather than the child's personal law. An obscure rule is in force in
Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 45·
The Albanian Law on personal names of May 21, 1948, art. 4 par. 2, entitles and obliges a foreign wife who has agreed with her Albanian husband,
according to Albanian law, to retain her maiden name to use it by placing it
before her husband's name; similarly, but preserving the priority of the
husband's name, Yugoslavia: Law on personal names of Dec. r, 1947, § 4
par. 2.
39 RG. (Oct. 2, r886) 18 RGZ. 28; RG. (Nov. 13, 1897) 40 RGZ. 61, 64;
RG. (May 31, 1900) 46 RGZ. 125, 132.
40 2 MElLI 262 § 167; tr. by KUHN 450. Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 1044.
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establishment. On the other hand, in Belgium, national and
foreign firms are equally protected under the locallaw. 41 In
France, a foreigner is held not to be entitled to any protection of his commercial name, unless such protection is provided by treaty or reciprocity is otherwise assured. 42 The
most important treaty, to which France, together with the
majority of the commercial countries of the world, is a party,
is that of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial
Property. 43 Under article 8 of this convention, the commercial name of a citizen or corporation of any signatory country is protected in every other signatory country without any
preliminary registration, deposit, or other formality being
required.
4· Status as Merchant
In most of the countries of the European Continent and
of Latin America, merchants are subject to duties which are
not incumbent upon other individuals and, correspondingly,
entitled to special privileges not enjoyed by non-merchants.
Special rules also apply to numerous types of contracts where
the parties, or in certain cases one of the parties, belong to
the class of merchants. Wherever such special rules are in
force, the determination of a person's status as merchant or
non-merchant is generally regarded as a problem of personal
law. However, in consonance with the traditions of the law
merchant, in the determination of the personal law nationality is disregarded in favor of the law of the "commercial
Cass. beige (Dec. 26, 1876) Pasicrisie 1877.1.54; POULLET 150 no. 150.
also Argentina: Camara Federal de Ia Capital (May 12, 1941), aff'd by
Supreme Court (May 22, 1942), 192 Fallos de Ia Corte Suprema 451,464.
42 Decisions in Clunet 1902, 304; Trib. Bordeaux (Aug. 4, 1902) Clunet
1903, 866. In the Netherlands, however, protection to a foreign commercial
name depends on a Dutch Law of July 5, 1921 (S.842) cf. the liberal decision
of H. R. (May 31, 1927) W. 11675, VAN HASSELT 653; to the contrary effect
Kg. Amsterdam (Sept. 30, 1924) NJ. 1925, 142.
43 English text in U. S. Treaty Series, No. 834.
41
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domicil," i.e., of the place where the business is established. 44
The French Committee for Private International Law, after
full discussion, recently voted a legislative motion to amend
the French law accordingly. 45
Distinguishable from the quality of being a merchant is
the capacity of carrying on a business as a prerequisite to becoming a merchant; this question is commonly regarded as
governed by the law determining the legal acts of minors,
married women, insane persons, etc. 46
Insofar as the character of a transaction as commercial or
non-commercial ("civil") is determined by elements other
than the status of the parties, the law that governs the contract in general is held to be decisive. 47

S· Infancy
Another situation regarded by civil law lawyers as pertaining to status is that of infancy. An infant's capacity to
engage in transactions is limited; he is subject to parental
power or guardianship; his domicil is fixed by operation of
44 Germany and Italy: dominant opinion cf. FICKER in 4 Rechtsvergl.
Handwiirterb. 462.
Poland: Law of I926, art. 2.
Switzerland: cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 420.
Argentina: cf. 3 V1co, nos. 22I, 243, etc.
Treaty of Montevideo on international commercial law of I889, art. 2;
Treaty of Montevideo on international terrestrial commercial law, text of
I940, art. 2. More detailed provisions in C6digo Bustamante arts. 232 ff.
Other opinions:2 BAR §290 (2) at I30 and in I Ehrenberg's Handbuch des
gesamten Handelsrechts (I9I3) 330; MELCHIOR I5I § 105; NusSBAUM, D.
IPR. 211; ScHNITZER, Handelsr. I34, 151; ARMIN JON, Precis de droit international prive commercial (1948) 32, 37·
45 Travaux du Comite fran.;ais de droit international prive, Seconde annee
( 1935) 132, on the capacity to be a merchant in international relations (text
of proposition at 169). See also the resolution of the Institute of International
Law in Cambridge (1931), 36 Annuaire II 1931, 181, on NIBOYET's proposal.
Against the unfortunate application of the lex fori in the Hague Draft of
1925 on Bankruptcy, see NIBOYET 519, no. 426.
4 6 BAR, I Ehrenberg's Handbuch 343; 3 VIco, nos. 234, 237·
47 DIENA, I Dir. Commer. Int. 62; contra: ARMIN JON, supra n. 44, 22
(lex fori).

186

PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS

law; his position as a party to a lawsuit is peculiar; and a
variety of other special rules apply to him. Hence, the personal law determines the age at which infancy generally
terminates, as well as the events which may affect the individual's position during infancy.
A basically similar view obtains in England and has sometimes guided American courts, for instance, in affirming the
power and duty of the domiciliary state to decree custodianship 48 or to terminate guardianship 49 over infants. It has occasionally been recognized that attainment of majority at the
domicil is sufficient to terminate ancillary administration of
a minor's property in another jurisdiction. 50 Story, however,
speaking of the disabilities of minors as well as of other incapacities, associated himself with those among the statutists
who, in this then much debated question, 51 instead of conceiving infancy or majority as aspects of personal status, regarded incapacity to take part in legal transactions as incidental to specific contracts or other acts. 52 As indicated
below, this has become the general doctrine of this country.
(See Chapter 6.)
In the Continental discussion, the two following points
have attracted interest:
(I) In certain jurisdictions, marriage ends the period of
infancy, whether of females or of both males and females,
either unconditionally or with certain provisos. This is illustrated by the statutes of twelve American jurisdictions 53
as well as by a number of European laws. 54 Under the Euro48

Griffin v. Griffin ( 1920) 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598, 604.
In re Honeyman (1922) 117 N. Y. Misc. 653, 192 N. Y. S. 910.
5o For cases see 2 BEALE 663 n. 2.
51 See STORY, throughout c. IV; 1 FoELIX (ed. 3) c. II 181.
52 STORY § 103.
53 5 VERNIER § 271.
54 The Netherlands: BW. art. 385.
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 21 par. 3·
Switzerland: C. C. art. 14 par. 2.
Turkey: C. C. art. I I par. 2.
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pean conflicts rule, such attainment of majority by marriage depends upon the personal law of the infant. Since, for
instance, under Hungarian law women reach majority by
marriage, a seventeen-year-old Hungarian girl who marries
an American and, by this fact, neither acquires American
citizenship nor loses Hungarian citizenship, will be regarded
as being of full age by every court applying the nationality
test. 55 On the other hand, a young Englishman marrying in
Italy is not emancipated, as the Italian rule on emancipation
does not apply to his status. 56 The case of a bride who acquires her husband's nationality on marriage under the nationality law of the husband's country is more doubtful. If
a Swiss girl of seventeen marries a German and thereby
changes her nationality, is the Swiss rule, "Marriage imports
majority," able to terminate her infancy, although she abandons her Swiss personal law at the very moment of her
marriage? Affirmation of this question is favored in recent
German literature. 57
( 2) Under the German and related systems the status of
a person of full age may be granted to an infant by decree
of a court or an administrative agency-"declaration of
majority" "8-whereas in France, Italy, Spain, etc., less effec55

RAAPE 69.
DIENA, 2 Prine. II5·
57 WALKER I28 n. 39, 788; WAHLE, 2 Z.ausi.PR. (I928) I42, mentwnmg
Austrian decisions to this effect; RAAPE 77; M. WoLFF, IPR. IOI. Contra: I
FRANKENSTEIN 423, 3 FRANKENSTEIN 235 n. 3I; LEWALD 57; BECK, NAG.
I75 no. 72.
As to the effect of a newly acquired nationality of the bride, see RG. (Jan.
10, I9I8) 9I RGZ. 403, 407 dealing with the question of whether guardianship
over a German girl ended by her marrying a Russian in Czarist times. It
seems that the court classified the question as one of the effects of marriage;
this is why it quoted EG. arts. I4 and I5 and the Hague Convention of July
I7, I905 on Marriage Effects, arts. I and 2.
58
Germany: BGB. §§ 3-5.
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ I74, 252.
The Netherlands: BW. arts. 473 ff.
Brazil: C. C. art. 9; cf. PONTES DE MIRANDA, 39 Recueil I932 I 622.
56
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tive forms of "emancipation" are provided. 59 Similarly, at
common law and under certain American statutes, a judicial
decree may eliminate a part of a minor's disabilities. 60 At
civil law, jurisdiction to render such a determination is generally held to rest with the country which furnishes the personal law of the infant. 61 This law also determines whether
emancipation is possible at all, for what causes it may be
conferred, and what effect it produces; it decides in particular
whether the minor thus emancipated enjoys unlimited legal
capacity or whether he needs special authorization or consent in particular situations. 62 As will be discussed in detail
below, the general rule of capacity in this country forms part
of the law of the contract, while in the Continental system
it refers to the personal law.

II.

PuBLIC PoLICY

Foreign law in the field of "status" is more often denied
application on account of local policy considerations than in
any other field of law. Regrettable as the disharmony caused
thereby may be, it is a common trait of existing laws, a trait
nowhere more distinct than in France where, to quote Julliot
de la Morandiere, each day the application of the personal
law is progressively restricted in favor of French law. 63
France: C. C. art. 477·
Italy: C. C. (I865} art. 3II; C. C. (I942) arts. 390ff.
Spain: C. C. art. 322.
60 5 VERNIER § 282.
61 On general principles, it would not appear unthinkable for a decree of
emancipation to be rendered by a court of a country not that of the nationality, in accordance with the substantive law of the infant's national law. On
this question I FRANKENSTEIN 427; STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. 7; RAAPE 9I
(who thinks that could be done where the procedure required by the personal
law limits the cooperation of an authority to mere recordation (blosse Beurkundung).
62 DIENA, 2 Prine. II4; 0. VON GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht (Leipzig,
I895) 22I ff.: WEISS, 3 Traite 342, and following these writers Swiss BG.
(May 23, I9I2) 38 BGE. II I, 3 (the declaration of majority is governed by
the national law).
63 Colombia, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil (I939-I94D) 2I8.
59
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However, a peculiar doctrine has been expressed by Dicey
and repeated in America by Beale and the Restatement
( § I 20), that a foreign status of a kind unknown at the
forum (English or American law respectively) will not be
recognized. 64 No other authority exists for this proposition
than a few English cases which have been critically destroyed
by Cheshire. 65
Thus, prodigality is "not a status at common law." 66 If a
Frenchman domiciled in France is judicially declared a spendthrift by a French court, American courts will certainly
recognize those effects of the decree which relate to transactions carried on in France. 67 But the question is whether an
American court will ascribe effects to the French decree with
respect to American transactions. In France, for instance,
the spendthrift can bring a lawsuit only through a committee
(family council). Can he sue without any guardian in the
United States or in England? No doubt, appointment of a
conservator in one American jurisdiction under a local statute, has been said to be inoperative on transactions in another jurisdiction, a statute being bare of extraterritorial
meaning under an ancient statutist doctrine. 68 Whatever the
actual merits of this antique rule, a French interdiction of a
prodigal does intend to restrict the capacity of the individual
everywhere. Dicey and Beale derive their thesis that such
decree can not be recognized in a common law jurisdiction
from an English decision, Worms v. De V aldor, 69 in which
64 DICEY 53 I Rule I36 (I); 2 BEALE § I20.I; contra: DICEY (-WELSH),
rule I II, p. 46 5, 467.
65 CHESHIRE I 56. He thinks that In re Selot's Trust [I9o2] I Ch. 488 is to
be explained upon other grounds and that Worms v. De Valdor (I88o) 49
L. J. N. S. {Ch.) 26I has been decided wrongly.
66 2 BEALE § I20.8.
67 Restatement § I2o comment c; 2 BEALE §I20.I: "The existence of the
foreign status is a fact and should be recognized as a fact by a court in
any state."
68 Gates v. Bingham {I88I) 49 Conn. 275·
69 {I88o) 49 L. J. N. S. {Ch.) 26I; followed in In re Selot's Trust [I902]
I Ch. 488.

190

PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS

Frey, J., erroneously reasoned that the French adjudication
of prodigality did not change the status of the person, although he asserted in addition "that if a change of status
were effected by an order of a French court, this (English)
court would not take notice of a personal disqualification
caused by such change of status." No such problem is known
in civil law. A French decree declaring an individual of
French nationality and domicil a spendthrift is recognized
in any other country, including Guatemala 70 and Chile, 71 as
affecting the individual's personal status. The principle has
been well formulated by the Swiss Department of Justice
with respect to foreign declarations of death, which are unknown to Swiss law; if not contrary to public policy, the
foreign decree must be granted the same effect as conferred
upon it by the foreign law. 72
With respect to legitimation and adoption, the implications of the Dicey-Beale theory are even more serious. Is
such an act, performed abroad, not to be recognized by a
court whose domestic law has not yet introduced the institution of legitimation or adoption? If such institutions are
known to the forum, but the particular variety adopted by
the foreign law is not, should the effect of the foreign act be
limited to that given locally to the most nearly related type,
rather than simply recognized to the same extent as in the
foreign jurisdiction? 78 American cases show a strong tendency to limit recognition of the foreign institution. An
analogous opinion is widely held in the case of a foreign
business organization whose exact type is not included in the
See MATOS nos. 218, 219.
Chile: App. Santiago (Nov. 7, 1934) 34 Revista Der. ]. y Cien. Soc.
(1937) II sec. 2, 14 (interdiction by judgment of the Italian Court of Genoa;
exequatur granted by the Supreme Court).
72 BBl. 1916, II 522 no. 5·
73 See GOODRICH § 146; 8TUMBERG 338; see also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349
no. 340. But see FALCONBRIDGE, Case Note, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 37, 39·
70
71
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domestic commercial order. 74 Or, in accordance with a recent
suggestion, should the "status" created in a foreign country
be recognized but its specific "effects" or "incidents" be reserved for close inspection under the light of the internal law
of the forum? 75 This line of thought seems to result directly
or indirectly in an extensive application of public policy,
much as French courts and writers invest the provisions of
the Code N apolion with the dignity of international public
order. 76 A foreign adoption of an infant was not recognized
in France before such act was permitted in France in 1923 by
an internallaw. 77 The Codigo Bustamante declares that none
of its provisions relating to adoption will apply to states
whose legislations do not provide for adoptions. 78 All such
rules are indefensible, inasmuch as they deny effect to foreign
institutions without an urgent national interest in the particular case, a point clear to most French writers but often
ignored by courts. Why should a country's own civil code
rule the world?
On the other hand, English courts, before the Legitimacy
Act of I 926, did not hesitate to recognize legitimation by
subsequent marriage executed under foreign domiciliary
law/ 9 and at present they recognize California legitimations
by recognition, though unknown to English statutes. 80 Argentine courts have treated foreign adoptions in the same way,
their internal law notwithstanding. 81 The Portuguese Su74

This will be discussed in the second volume.
This theory has been proposed by TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy
and Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 691 at 708.
76 Cf. NIBOYET nos. 382, 66o and note in Nouv. Revue 1935, 425.
77 See App. Paris (Jan. 2, 1936) Gaz. Pal. 1936.1.551.
78 Codigo Bustamante art. 77·
79 In re Wright's Trusts (1856) 25 L. J. (Ch.) 621, 2 K. & ]. 595·
80 In re Luck [1940] A. C. Ch. D. 864.
81 2 V1co no. 172; ROGER, 6 Repert. 683, no. 44· Camara Civil 2a de Ia
Capital (Dec. 22, 1948) 54 La Ley 413. By law no. 13,252 of Sept. 23, 1948
adoption has been introduced into Argentine law; cf. R. GoLDSCHMIDT, 17
Z.ausl.PR. (1952) 26o, 261.
75
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preme Court, recognizing a Brazilian adoption under analogous circumstances, held it a constant international rule
that the non-existence of an institution in the lex fori does
not prevent the rights flowing from it from being given
effect. 82 The legal situation of a French illegitimate child
recognized by a parent is enforced in Germany where this
type of status is unknown. 83 The prevailing opinion certainly
favors simple recognition of foreign legal situations without
provincial restraint.
A third problem is illustrated in the Restatement by an
English case, Atkinson v. Anderson: 84
"By the law of state X, the inheritance tax imposed upon
'strangers in blood' who inherit is at a higher rate than that
imposed upon inheriting relatives and the term 'strangers in
blood' is construed as including natural illegitimate children.
The status of 'recognized natural child' exists in state Y but
not in X. A dies domiciled in Y, bequeathing chattels in state
X to C, who, according to the law of Y, is A's recognized
natural child. C, on taking the chattels in state X, pays a
succession tax as a stranger in blood." 85
However, this is an interpretation of a tax law and not a
problem of international private law. It may well appear
that an inheritance tax statute is intended to apply a higher
tax rate to all illegitimate children. In such case, it would
make no difference whether such children are or are not
"recognized." Hence, the English decision in the case of
Atkinson v. Anderson may be an entirely correct interpretation of the English tax statute, but it is not at all necessary
to resort for its justification to a general theory of non-recognition of a foreign status unknown to the lex fori. For ex82

Sup. Trib. Lisbon (May 15, 1934) Nouv. Revue
Prussian Minist. Ord. of Aug. 29, 1924 (StAZ.
522. Law of Civil Status,§ 29a (as amended by Law
8 4 Restatement § 120 comment b; 2 BEALE § 120.1
Anderson (1882) 21 Ch. D. 100.
85 (1882) 21 Ch. D. 100.
83

1935, 424, 427.
1924, 198): cf. RAAPE
of May 18, 1957).
relies on Atkinson v.
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ample, the Argentine tax on gratuitous transfer of property
has been held applicable to a foreign adopted person "by
simple interpretation of the tax statute" without regard to
a conflicts rule. 86
86 App. Buenos Aires (Dec. 10, 1926) 23 J. A. 856.
In a similar case, the Dutch Supreme Court has classified a German
adopted child as "child" and not as "foster child" in the sense of the Dutch
Inheritance Tax Statutes (adoption then being unknown in the Netherlands)
taking into account the effects of adoption under German law, H.R. (Dec.
20, 1950) N. J. 1950 no. 40.

CHAPTER
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Capacity
I.

OBJECT OF THE DISCUSSION

T

HE laws of the various countries differ widely with
respect both to the grounds on which certain individuals are denied normal competence and to the
scope of the disabilities imposed. Also, the term, "capacity,"
is not used with quite the same meaning everywhere. For the
purpose of the conflict of laws, distinction should be made
between a general rule of capacity and numerous exceptions
thereto defined by special rules.
The purpose of the general rule is to determine the law
that is to govern a person's ability to bind himself by contract
with other parties or by unilateral acts. In most countries, the
general rule applies also to dispositions of property, though
in some the law governing title to property, especially tangible assets, movable and immovable, extends to capacity. 1
The most important qualifications of the general rule are as
follows:
(a) The personal characteristics necessary to hold a per-

1 For the United States see 2 BEALE n8o § 333·3; GooDRICH § 148. Also
art. 10 of the Argentine C. C. seems to have been drafted in accordance with
STORY §§ 102 and 424, and, following this model, to determine capacity with
respect to immovables by the law of the situs; this has been demonstrated by
CHAVARRI 76 nos. 67 ff., contrary to various opinions hitherto held. Expressly
in this sense the Siamese law on private international law of 1939, art. IO
par. 3· For Hungary, VON SzLADITS in 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, 28 explains that
every woman, whether of Hungarian or foreign nationality or domicil, has
free disposition of immovables on Hungarian soil. This subject is very difficult and cannot be treated here. A comparative discussion of cases in CLARENCE SMITH, "Capacity in the Conflict of Laws," I Int. Camp. Law Q, (1952)
446, 467.
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son liable in tort are generally subject to the law governing
tort. 2
(b) The effects upon property interests of such events as
marriage, bankruptcy, or appointment of a committee are
the object of special conflict of laws rules. 3
(c) Questions pertaining to the borderline zone between
the law of capacity as a general topic and the law of distribution of estates, must be discussed in connection with the
latter subject. But it may be noted that the provisions in the
French law designed to protect minor heirs in the distribution of a decedent's estate have been declared to be a part of
the personal law of the heirs and therefore to be inapplicable
to foreign heirs. 4 In the United States, provisions that protect infants against the effects of statutes of non-claim apparently are considered part of the procedural law of the
state where the assets are administered; 5 the parallel with
the French law is, of course, not perfect.
(d) Capacity to marry and to engage in other transactions of family law constitutes a particular topic to be discussed below.
In numerous countries, married women are still subject
to restrictions of various kinds upon the legal effectiveness
of their promises. The Restatement classifies the problem to
what extent a married woman is subject to such restrictions as
a problem of the law of contracts, which, both in accord with
the general approach of the Restatement and in agreement
2

To be treated in succeeding volume.
Restatement §§ 237, 238, 289, 290; Germany: M. WoLFF, IPR. 101.
4
Cass. (civ.) (April 13, 1932) 8.1932.1.361 and Note by AUDINET;
D.1932.1.89 with Note by BASDEVANT; Revue 1932, 549 Cf. J. DONNEDIEU
DE VABRES 507. The estate of the late Robert of Bourbon, Duke of Parma,
was distributed in accordance with the family statute of the house of Hapsburg-Lorraine, which was recognized as his personal law by Austria, the
country of which he was a national. Hence, the French Supreme Court held
that his family statute determined what protection was to be extended to
minor heirs.
5 Cf. Restatement § 498.
3
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with the majority of decisions, is declared to be determined
by the law of the place of contracting. 6 There is respectable
authority, however, for the view that the state where a married woman is domiciled is justified in holding her incapable
of contracting under its own rules, even where the contract
was made in another state under whose law such contract
would be binding upon her. 7
Recognizing that limitations on the contractual capacity
of married women are closely connected with the structure
of the family and are motivated to a large extent by a desire
either to protect families against financial ruin or to safeguard the dominating position of the husband as family
head, the European laws tend toward classifying the problem
of contractual capacity of married women as a problem of
the law of family relations. Consequently, the law by which
these problems are determined is that applying generally to
the personal relations between husband and wife. This law
need not necessarily be the personal law of the wife. 8
(e) The legal consequences of insanity are determined by
the personal law. Under the system of domicil, however, the
voluntary acquisition of domicil by an insane non-resident
presents difficulties,u and the claim of the law of the domicil
to govern transactions in such situations has been doubted. 10
(f) The capacity of an individual to determine the conduct of a lawsuit to which he is a party, as distinguished from
capacity to be a party, which has been treated above, 11 seems
to be considered in this country as a matter of procedural
law and governed, in consequence, by the internal law of the
6

Restatement § 333 comment.
Union Trust Co. v. Grosman ( 1918) 245 U. S. 412, per Holmes, J.;
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1936, 597, 619-621.
s See infra pp. 325-326.
9 CHESHIRE 424.
1° CHESHIRE 426 proposes the law with which the transaction of an insane
person is most closely connected.
11 See supra p. 174.
1
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forum. In the eyes of a Continental lawyer, this is a question of capacity to exercise rights, and therefore the answer
depends on the personal law. Thus, it has been decided in the
Netherlands that Swiss law governs the question whether a
Swiss married woman can bring a lawsuit in a Dutch court
without the consent of her husband. 13 In an analogous way,
the Swiss Federal Tribunal has declared that the power to
do so affects capacity and therefore in the case of Swiss nationals is to be governed by the Swiss federal statutes rather
than by the cantonal laws of procedure. 14 However, as an exception to this rule the German Code of Civil Procedure
declares that a foreigner lacking procedural capacity under
his national law is deemed to have it when he would possess
it under the law of the court. 15
12

II.

THE LAw GovERNING CAPACITY

r. Capacity Governed by the Law of the Place of Contracting
The notion that the permanent characteristics of an individual are all to be regarded as incidents of his "status" and,
therefore, all governed by the individual's personal law, is
not current in the United States.
In this country, excepting Louisiana, the almost universal
rule, clearly supported by commercial expediency, is, as
stated by Goodrich, that the capacity of married womenwhich is typically involved in capacity cases-is governed by
the lex loci contractus. 16 "Some authorities seem to hold that
12 See Restatement § 588 and cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 17
(b) and (c).
13 Hof Amsterdam (July 13, 1923) W.1II63, N. ]. 1924, II8. Belgium:
Trib. comm. Bruxelles (Oct. 30, 1890) Pasicrisie 1891.3·5·
14 BG. (Dec. 27, 1916) 42 BGE. II 553, 555; BG. (April 7, 1922) 48 BGE.
I 24, 29.
15
German C. Civ. Proc. §55; KG. (March 3, 1936) ]W. 1936, 3570
(English minor), see infra p. 201, n. 38.
16 GOODRICH 313; Restatement § 333a; Milliken v. Pratt (1878) 125 Mass.
374, 28 Am. Rep. 241.
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capacity is to be determined by the 'law of the contract,'" 17
which may be different from the law of the place of contracting; but "many courts hold that capacity is governed by
the lex loci contractus, even while they assert that some other
law may govern the obligation and validity (in other respects) of the contract." 18 At present, it is true that some
courts of agricultural states are inclined to protect married
women domiciled in the forum against their out-of-state
creditors. This is scarcely a domiciliary rule; it represents
rather a public policy of the forum in preference to a recognized conflicts rule. But the law of the domicil also has its
advocates, especially when it agrees with the lex fori. 19
In the less frequent cases relative to the capacity of infants, the law of the place where the infant acts is generally
applied. 20 Minor 21 explains the rule by the particular character of the infant's disability, evidenced by the fact that his
contract is not void but only voidable; the infant is not incapable "in his person" but has a privilege to disaffirm the
contract. Beale 22 denies the existence of a status of minority
at common law because "the effects of minority are not so
uniform or clearly fixed as to be described as the incidents of
a status." These are obscure arguments. The true reason of
the rule, commercial expediency, has been well indicated by
Story himself 23 and has been accepted by the courts as necessary in a country where a large part of the population is
constantly moving from one state to another.
In consequence of the rule, an individual reaching full age
17 GOODRICH 313, excluding the possible influence of the intention of the
parties, because a circulus 'llitiosus would result.
18 2 BEALE § 333·3 at 1177.
19 Cf. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman ( 1918) 245 U. S. 412; STUMBERG 241;
and supra p. 111, n. 7·
20 GOODRICH 314.
21 MINOR § 72; cf. §§ 5, II.
22 2 BEALE § 120.11.
23 STORY § 102 a, b, quoting Burge; cf. § 76 at p. 97, n. 2.
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at his domicil, for instance at the completion of his eighteenth year or by marriage, is nevertheless treated as an
infant, even at his domicil, with respect to transactions executed in a state where full age is attained only at twenty-one
years of age. 24 Capacity for the purpose of contracts relative
to immovables, correspondingly, is governed by the lex
situs .25 And a decree based on a local statute, which in part
removes an infant's disabilities for certain purposes, does not
enlarge his capacity for acts in another state. 26
The American view 27 has been keenly observed in recent
years in Europe 28 and has served as a major argument for
the opponents of the traditional European approach.
The notion that capacity should not be separated from
other problems of validity of contracts was once advocated
by a few statutists, such as John Voet 29 and Bijnkershoek, 30
24 O'Dell v. Rogers (I878) 44 Wis. I36 at I8I (majority of a woman conferred by marriage).
25 Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75·
26 State v. Bunce ( 1866) 65 Mo. 349 (authorization of Arkansas court);
Philpott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (1884) 85 Mo. 164 (emancipation
in Texas); Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 35I, 119 S. W. 75 (authorization in Oklahoma to sell).
7
" Beauchamp v. Bertig ( 1909) 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75; Deason v.
Jones (1935) 7 Cal. App. (2d) 482, 45 Pac. (2d) I025. This approach is
consistently followed by the Restatement; capacity to contract is declared to
be determined by the law of the place of contracting (§ 333); capacity to
transfer land and chattels by the law of the situs (§§ 2I6 and 255, respectively), capacity to marry by the law of the place where the marriage is
celebrated ( §§ 121 ff.) ; see also the statement about capacity to be held responsible for a tort implied in § 379· With respect to the theoretical basis of
BEALE's opinion, see his Summary, §55, 522, and the criticism by WIGNY,
Essai I9, 103.
28 The American cases down to 1933 have been collected and analyzed
by RuooLF MUELLER, "Die Geschiiftsfiihigkeit nattirlicher Personen in der
international-privatrechtlichen Rechtsprechung der Vereinigten Staaten," 8
Z.ausl.PR. ( 1934) 885.
29 See STORY § 54 a.
30 BIJNKERSHOEK ( 1673-1743), I Observationes Tumultuariae (edited by
MEIJERS, DE BLJ"!COURT and BoDENSTEIN, 1926) no. ]I expressly invokes
Joannes Voet. He applied the lex loci actus as to capacity to marry; see LEE,
"Bijnkershoek's Observationes Tumultuariae," 17 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1935)
38 at 43·
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and applied during the first half of the nineteenth century in
Denmark. 31
The rule that capacity to contract is simply determined by
the law of the place of contracting is also said to prevail in
the Soviet Union. 32
2.

Capacity Governed by Personal Law

Outside of the United States and the Soviet Union, problems of capacity are generally treated as belonging to the
domain of personal law. Even in the United States, this approach is followed in Louisiana, 33 although it appears weakened recently. 34 A peculiar position is occupied by Switzerland, where problems of capacity are determined by the
national law of the individual, 35 while problems of personal
status in general are referred to the law of the domicil.
Since Mancini's time, the European rule has been justified
upon the ground that the country of nationality is the one best
qualified to determine whether and to what extent restrictions
should be imposed upon the individual citizen in his own and
his family's interest. Rules determining capacity are regarded as the very core of the rules that permanently determine an individual's legal status. It is obvious, of course, that
incapacities accompanying an individual wherever he goes
may endanger others who bona fide enter into transactions
with him, but the principle is based upon the consideration
that anyone who engages in a transaction with another must
ascertain at his own risk whether such other party has suffia1 See BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 21.
32

See MAKAROV, Precis 190; but see supra p. 129 n. 77a.
Marks v. Loewenberg (1918) 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444i Lorio v. Gladney
(1920) 147 La. 930, 86 So. 365; National City Bank of Chicago v. Barringer
( 1918) 143 La. 14, 78 So. 134·
34 See as to capacity to sue Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (1942) 202 La. 505,
12 So. (2d) 253, Note, 18 Tul. L. Rev. (1943) 319, 321.
35 BG. (Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 741; BG. (May 23, 1912) 38 BGE.
II 1, 4i BG. (Feb. 7, 1934) 61 BGE. II 12, 17 (2).
33
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cient legal capacity, or, as stated in the Roman maxim, Qui
cum alia contrahit, vel est vel debet esse non ignarus condicionis eius (Dig. so.q.19). (He who contracts with another either knows or ought to know the other's condition.)
In interstate or international transactions, the results of this
maxim are even harsher than in transactions involving parties both subject to the same law. While it may often be difficult to ascertain whether an individual is under age, married,
or of unsound mind, it may be more difficult to find out that
he is a foreigner and that his capacity is restricted by his
personal law.
As a matter of fact, in order to alleviate embarrassments
to national business life, exceptions to the rule have been
found necessary for transactions contracted wholly within
the territory of the forum.
(a) In the famous Louisiana decision, Saul v. His Creditors, it was recognized that a foreigner twenty-two years of
age, a minor under the law of his domicil, could not plead
this foreign law against a contract entered into by him in the
state. 36 The same rule was adopted occasionally in other
jurisdictions at a time when the law of domicil was held to
govern capacity. 37
(b) In the Prussian and other German codes since the
eighteenth century, the validity of transactions in which consideration is given and the capacity of standing in court, were
in one way or another declared independent of foreigncreated disabilities. 38 By the German law (EG. art. 7 par.
36 Saul v. His Creditors (I827) 5 Mart. N.S. 569, I6 Am. Dec. 2I2, discussed by LIVERMORE, Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the
Contrariety of the Positive Laws of Different States and Nations 32 § I7;
STORY § 76 j I WHARTON § I I4 ff.
37 See in particular Woodward v. Woodward (I889) 87 Tenn. 644, II
s. w. 892, 897·
38 Prussian Allg. Landrecht of I794. Einleitung §§ 35, 38, 39 provides that
the rules of the Code shall be applied to foreign-domiciled persons engaging
in contracts within the territory if these rules are more favorable to the
validity of the contract than the laws of the domicil; cf. DERNBURG, I Lehr-
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3), it is provided that a foreigner who engages in a transaction in Germany is considered to have the same capacity as
he would have if he were a German, even if his capacity be
more limited under his own national law. This provision, designed to protect German business, is not applicable to transactions concerned with land outside of Germany, family
relations, or inheritance, but applies to donations between
living persons. 39 Moreover, this provision is strictly limited
to transactions made within Germany, and does not protect
anyone when he contracts in a foreign country. Varying provisions of this type have been adopted in numerous codes. 40
Another kind of rule of more general scope was contained
in article 84 of the German Bills of Exchange Law of 1848,
and now appears in the Geneva Conflicts Rules on Bills of
buch des Preussischen Privatrechts (ed. r, 1875) 46; Prussian Allg. Gerichtsordnung of 1793, I § 5: the capacity of a foreigner to stand in court is determined by the law of his domicil, § 6: but if he has completed his 25th
year, it is immaterial whether the law of his domicil, or of the situs of the
res, or particular acts that have not been presented to the court determine
a later coming of age.
Baden: C. C. of r8o8, art. 3 (a).
Saxony: C. C. of r863, § 8.
Germany: Code of Civil Procedure (1877) §53·
Greece: C. C. of 1856, art. 4 par. 2.
39 After removal of doubts, the Italian C. C. ( 1938) Disp. Pre!. art. 7 par.
2, C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 17 par. 2 states the same rule, see Relazione
1938, no. 7·
40 Switzerland: art. 7b, par. 1 of NAG. provides that a foreigner who has
engaged in a transaction in Switzerland cannot plead his lack of capacity if
he would have capacity under Swiss law.
Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 9·
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 17 par. 2.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 3 par. 2.
Iran: C. C. art. 962.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 24.
Montenegro: C. C. art. 788.
Siam: Law of 1939, art. ro par. 2.
Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty on Judicial Assistance of Aug. 8, 1953, art.
21, see DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. Law ( 1956) 487, 489.
For Hungary see SZLADITS, 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, 25, 27.

CAPACITY
Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930. 41 Article
as follows:

203

2

reads

"The capacity of a person to bind himself by a bill of exchange or· promissory note shall be determined by his national law. If this national law provides that the law of
another country is competent in the matter, this latter law
shall be applied.
"A person who lacks capacity, according to the law specified in the preceding paragraph, is nevertheless bound, if his
signature has been given in any territory in which according
to the law in force there, he would have the requisite capacity."
Under these provisions the signature is valid not only in
the country where it has been made but also in every other
country signatory to the Convention. The country of which
the signer is a national is allowed, however, to treat the signature as invalid. 42
Under neither of these provisions does it matter by what
law the contract is generally governed, of what country the
parties are nationals, or where they are domiciled. Nor is it
relevant whether the incapacity of the foreigner was known
or unknown to the other party. A purely objective test is
believed best to serve the interests of commerce; this policy
of disregarding individual circumstances in laws intended to
protect trade was consistently carried out in German law
before 1933.
(c) A subjective test is applied in France, however, as
established by the Court of Cassation in the celebrated
Lizardi case. 43 A twenty-two-year-old Mexican, being still
a minor under Mexican law, bought jewels in Paris; he
would have been of full age had he been a Frenchman. The
41

See supra p. 38.
Germany has availed herself of this permission: German Bills of Ex·
change Act of June 21, 1933, art. 91 par. 2, 2d sentence.
4 3 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 16, 1861) S.186I.I.305.
42
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court, considering that the seller had acted "in good faith
and without negligence or imprudence," declared the buyer
bound by his contract. This decision has been followed consistently by the French courts. 44 Under this so-called "doctrine of national interest," protection is given against excusable ignorance of foreign incapacities, dependent upon the
circumstances of each individual case. 45 Accordingly, the
courts are disinclined to accord the benefit of the doctrine to
bankers or other businessmen who can reasonably be expected to investigate the personal status of their customers.
Relief is generally granted, on the other hand, against a foreigner who fraudulently represents that he has his capacity. 46
This French approach is well-known throughout the Latin
countries, but opinions are divided. 47
More emphatically than the French courts, the Swedish
Law of 1904, as amended June 27, 1924 (c. 4 § 5), provides
44 Cour Paris (Feb. 8, I883) Clunet I883, 29I; Trib. civ. ~eine (July I,
I886) Clunet I887, I78; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 23, I89I) D.I892.I.29; Cour
Paris (July 22, I933) Gaz.Pal.J933·2.724, Clunet I934, 9IO. In the last-mentioned case, a contract was made in France by a Rumanian married woman,
who exhibited to the other party an instrument purporting to be a judicially
legalized general power of attorney of her husband. The instrument was ineffective under Rumanian law. The court characterized the conduct of both
spouses as "truly tortious" ("un veritable quasi-delit"). }. DONNEDIEU DE
VABRES 509 in discussing this case, notes an increasing tendency of the courts
to limit exceptions from the application of the personal law to such grave
situations.
45 This "serious defect" of the French solution has been admitted by 2
ARMINJON no. 2I.
46 France: SuRVILLE, Clunet I<J09, 625.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (April 2I, I892) 7I Sent. 504.
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 866, I04I.
47 Especially in Italy, the doctrine was not adopted by the courts and has
been advocated by only a few writers, such as ANZILOITI I 53 no. 2; I FIORE
no. 449· Now the German model has been followed, supra n. 39· In Belgium,
PERROUD's hostile attitude (Clunet 1905, 305) has been followed by the
authors of Novelles Belges, I D. Civ. 221 no. I57·
Recently, the French rule has been adopted by the new Civil Codes of
Egypt ( I948), art. I I par. I, and Syria ( 1949), art. I2 par. I; cf. SZASZY,
Droit international prive compare (1940) 235· Also the Benelux Convention,
art. 2 par. 2. Even an English writer has been impressed by it, CLARENCE
SMITH, I Int. Comp. Law Q. (I952) 470, supra n. I.
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that transactions shall be valid in cases where the other party
has not known of and has been unable to ascertain the incapacity.48
(d) A combination of the German and the French rules
has been undertaken in article 3 of the Polish Law of 1926
on private international law, prescribing that the capacity
of a foreigner who lacks capacity under his personal law and
who in Poland has entered into a transaction intended to
have effect in Poland, is to be determined in accordance with
Polish law when such determination is necessary for the
security of honest commerce. This provision is as complicated and impracticable as that recently proposed by the
Institute of International Law. 49
(e) These various exceptions to the principle of the personal law have resulted in widespread doubts on the propriety of the principle itself. Nevertheless, the only exception
basically affecting the principle is the provision of the Uniform Geneva Conflicts Rules noted above. Other existing
exceptions are intended strictly to protect businessmen (and
not even all of them) operating in the state of the forum,
while the rule shields the forum's own nationals who engage
in transactions abroad. 50 Indeed, a German court would
allow the plea of incapacity of a twenty-year-old Frenchman
who contracts an obligation in Switzerland (because of the
principle of nationality), although he would be barred from
such a plea in a Swiss court (because of the Swiss provision,
48 The provision does not apply, however, against a foreigner who is a national of a state which is a signatory to the Hague Convention of June 12,
1902 (Ord. of Oct. 10, 1924).
In Norway, the domiciliary law is applied without exception. See CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 573 no. 99·
49
Resolution of Cambridge 1931, Annuaire 1931, II 69-93, 237; cf. on
Resolution of Oslo 1932, BAAK in Revue 1932, 820.
50 See for instance Trib. civ. Seine (June 30, 191'9) Clunet 1920, 184 (a
Frenchman who was placed under guardianship in France entered upon a
contract abroad; when he was sued in France his defense of incapacity was
sustained). Cf. also for Bulgaria, GHENov, 6 Repert. 189 no. 48.
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analogous to the German exception) .51 On widely different
theories, writers have criticized the exceptions as well as
their limits. 52

3. Mixed Systems
(a) English law. No English decision has decisively
settled the question whether an individual's capacity to contract is to be determined in accordance with his personal law,
i.e., the law of his domicil, or in accordance with the "proper
law of the contract." Dicta can be quoted for either approach.53 The text writers increasingly tend toward advocating the application of the proper law of the contract insofar as mercantile transactions are concerned. 54 This opinion
has been followed by a Canadian court. 5 5 Both Cheshire, who
is the most vigorous advocate of this view among the text
writers, and the Saskatchewan court seem to be influenced
by American ideas. There remains, however, a twofold
difference from the American rule: on the one hand, not all
contracts are exempted from the law of the domicil; on the
other hand, the law of the place of contracting is not followed unless it governs the whole of the contract. We shall
RAAPE 84, 85; PLANCK, 6 Kommentar zum BGB. ( ed. I) art. 7, no. 6 (d).
Cf. NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 125; WALKER III ff.; LEWALD 59, no.
74; M. WOLFF, IPR. I04. Only NEUBECKER 62 believed that the exception
stated by EG. art. 7 par. 3 could be extended by interpretation.
53 For application of the domiciliary law: Udny v. Udny (I869) L. R. I Sc.
App. 44I, 457; Sottomayor v. De Barros (no. I) (I877) 3 P. D. C. A. I, 5;
Cooper v. Cooper (I888) I3 App. Cas. 88.
For application of the proper law of the contract: Sottomayor v. De Barros
(no. 2) (I879) 5 P. D. 94, IOO, per Sir James Hannen; Ogden v. Ogden
[I908] P. (C. A.) 46; Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67; Simonin v. Mallac
(I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67, per Sir Cresswell Cresswell. Cf. also ALLEN, "Status
and Capacity," 46 Law Q. Rev. (I930) 277 at 294,309.
54 DICEY 637 Rule I58 Exc. I, now DICEY (-KAHN-FREUND) 6I9 Rule I39;
WESTLAKE 40; CHESHIRE 223, who cites the Scotch case of M'Feetridge v.
Stewarts and Lloyds [I9I3] S. C. (H. L.) 773, and the old and doubtful
English case of Male v. Roberts (I8oo) 3 Esp. I63.
55 Bondholders Securities Corp. v. Manville [I933] 4 D. L. R. 699 (Sask.).
Cf. FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. I55, I56. There seems no doubt, on
the other hand, that the law of the domicil governs capacity for engaging in
other transactions, see I JoHNSON I83.
51

52
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have to examme this latter point when discussing the law
governing contracts.
(b) Former Italian system. The rule that an individual's
capacity is determined by his personal law is clearly established by the Italian Civil Code. 5 6 Hence, a contract made by
a married woman of Italian nationality is held valid by the
Italian courts, even if made in a country where a married
woman cannot contract without her husband's authorization,57 and her husband happens to be a national of that country. So far as mercantile transactions are concerned, however, article 58 of the Commercial Code of I 8 8 2 provided
that capacity of the parties is determined by the law of the
place of contracting. 58 The coexistence of these two different
rules raised some minor problems that might have been overcome. But the fact that the two rules are theoretically antagonistic was much stressed. Recent critics have expressed
their preference for the rule of the Commercial Code which
is based upon the consideration that commercial transactions
are concluded speedily and without the felt necessity of inquiring into the other party's nationality and capacity. 59
Nevertheless, the commercial rule has been sacrificed to the
nationality principle in the recently recast legislation. 60

Ill.

PROBLEMS RAISED BY INCAPACITATING PROVISIONS
OF THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF CONTRACTING

A peculiar problem arises when a person who is fully capable under his personal law makes a contract in a foreign coun56
Italy: C. C. (r865) Disp. Pre!. art. 6; C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 17
par. r.
57 DIENA, Clunet 1920, 77. Under Italian law a married woman as such is
no longer subject to any incapacity {Law no. II76 of July 17, 1919).
5B See DrENA, Clunet 1920, 79.
59
See FoRMIGGINI, 29 Rivista ( 1937) 39, 40 n. r; he criticizes art. 2 of
the Geneva Convention, where the national law is adopted as the general
rule (see supra pp. 202-203), as a step backwards.
60 Art. 58 of the Comm. C. has been repealed by art. II2 of the R. D. of
April 24, 1939, containing provisions for the introduction of the First Book
of the Civil Code.
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try where persons of his class are not capable of contracting.
This case presents no difficulty to a court which follows the
personal law principle, as his personal law gives this individual capacity.
What, however, is the position in a court applying the law
of the place of contracting? Does it consider the contract
invalid?
This question has been discussed in connection with the
former Italian commercial rule (C. Comm. art. 58), which
established the principle of the lex loci contractus, as well as
with reference to the exceptional rule contained in the
Uniform Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention. By prevailing opinion, it has been answered in favor of the validity
of the transaction, in view of the basic function of the nationallaw.61
The considerations involved may be illustrated by the following hypothetical case :
A Swiss national, twenty years old, having his domicil in
Geneva, Switzerland, goes on a trip and buys a car on the installment plan:
(a) in Paris;
(b) in London;
(c) in New York.
Being of full age under Swiss law, he is considered of age in
France under the nationality principle and in England under
the domiciliary principle (if applied), in respect to all three
contracts. Therefore, he would probably pe held capable also
by an American court in cases (a) and '(b), although this
decision would amount to a sort of renvoi. In the third case,
the propositus is incapable under the law of the place of contracting. It would hardly be correct within the meaning of the
theory of vested rights to consider the full age required by
61 FoRMIGGINI,

29 Rivista (1937) at 46 n. 2, supra n. 59·
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the young man in his country as a "right." Such an approach
has been refuted in analogous situations. 62 In the case of a
married woman who is incapable under the law of the place
of acting, but capable under her domiciliary law, the American authorities tend to hold her incapable, 63 and contracts of
a person of full age in his own state, who acts in a state where
he is regarded as a minor, seem generally to be held voidable,64 except under the domiciliary system of Louisiana. 65
A similar question arises where an American who is
domiciled in the United States and is more than twenty-one
years old, contracted an obligation in Chile, while the old
law was in force under which minority lasted until the completion of the twenty-fifth year. 68
Must an American court prefer in these cases the place of
contracting to the domicil? Lorenzen's 67 suggestion that
capacity should be determined by domicil in international
transactions, as contrasted with interstate business, would do
justice in these situations.

IV.

CoNCLUSIONs

The proper approach to capacity problems in conflict of
laws has been repeatedly discussed in recent years in Europe,
and an approximation toward the American system of lex loci
62 See change of domicil, supra p.
63 Burr v. Beckler ( 1914) 264 Ill.

160, n. 190.
230, 106 N. E. 206; Nichols & Shepard
Co. v. Marshall (1899) 108 Ia. 518, 79 N. \V. 282; Pearl v. Hansborough
(1848) 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 426; criticized in II Col. L. Rev. (19II) 157;
DeFur v. DeFur (1928) 156 Tenn. 634, 4 S. W. (2d) 341. Cf. 2 BEALE 674
n. 3·
64 See I WHARTON § II4 and cases supra n. 27, probably not allowing the
doubt expressed by I Wharton § usa after n. 5·
6 5 Saul v. His Creditors (1827) 5 Mart. N. S. 569, I6 Am. Dec. 212, states
the case expressly, as similarly did Woodward v. Woodward (1889) 87
Tenn. 644, II S. W. 892, 897.
66 C. C. art. 26, modified by Law no. 7,612 of Oct. u, I943·
67 LoRENZEN, "Uniformity Between Latin America and the United States
in the Rules of Private International Law Relating to Commercial Contracts," I5 Tul. L. Rev. (1941) 165 at 168, 170.
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contractus has been advocated in various quarters. In particular, Batiffol who studied American conflict of laws in the
United States, recommended in 1934 in the newly founded
French Committee of Conflicts of Laws, a cautious application of other criteria than nationality. 68 Some critics of the
present European system have expressed themselves in favor
of the proper law of the contract or, for special cases, that of
the place of contracting, while others have wished to substitute the law of domicil for the national law.
The main argument against subjecting capacity to the law
of the place of contracting or to the proper law of the contract is that either alternative greatly facilitates evasion of
the statutory disabilities imposed by the domiciliary or national law. In addition, the domiciliary or national courts
employing either conflicts rule are confronted by the dilemma
whether to observe this rule and sanction evasions or to enforce their statutory provisions on grounds of public policy.
Such a casuistic approach causes a great deal of uncertainty.
In this country, the uncertainty is somewhat mitigated by
the circumstance that a sizable majority of the courts unqualifiedly prefer the law of the place of contracting to any
domiciliary policy. Dissenting cases exist, however, and there
is increasing emphasis on the interests of the domiciliary
state. Moreover, if the advice of Cook were to be heeded, the
picture would change. He recommends that statutes restricting the capacity of married women be examined to determine
whether they involve only married women domiciled and
acting within the state, or also foreign domiciled women acting in the state, or acts of locally domiciled women out of the
state, or all these categories. 69 This suggestion seems to favor
68 Travaux du Comite fran~ais de droit intern~tional prive, Premiere annee, 1934, 21-66. Cf. BARBEY, Le Con flit 35; BATIF~OL 325 no. 363 ff. Contra:
J. DoNNEOIEU DE VABRES 510, who defends the French case law, described
above, p. 203, as infinitely more flexible and more richly detailed than the
American system.
69 CooK, Legal Bases 438 ff.
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as narrow as possible a construction of the statutory prohibitions. Its effect would probably reduce the scope of the restrictions upon capacity, whether under the law of the place
of contracting or under the law of domicil, whichever is applied. Nevertheless, statutes do not easily lend themselves to
such construction; although the results may be beneficent,
this method of inquiry would considerably complicate the
task of the courts and, at least for the time being, render it
more difficult to ascertain the validity of contracts.
A retrospective view of these various attempts to solve this
old and not yet liquidated problem, indicates a compromise
useful in all countries and adequate to all interests concerned,
which also promises more definite results than those reached
thus far in the two opposite camps. The transactions in which
an incompetent individual participates should, by reference to
an objective criterion, be divided into two groups: one in
which local interests prevail sufficiently to justify the application of the law of the contract; another in which the domiciliary or national protective policies are entitled to be effectuated everywhere by means of the personal law. For the
purpose of conflicts rules, business contracts already are distinguished from transactions regulating family relations and
decedents' estates in the statutes of Germany, Switzerland,
Poland, Italy, etc., as well as in the English doctrine, though
particulars vary. Following this lead, capacity to engage in
transactions should be determined, consistently and without
exceptions, by the law governing personal status, when family relations and other personal matters are concerned, and
by the law governing the contract in general, when exchange
of property or services is involved. This approach, which
would need to be elaborated more specifically, could be further refined by a carefully developed distinction between
those incapacities which businessmen may justly be expected
to investigate, and disabilities which may justifiably be ig-
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nored. Where the interests of third parties empirically appear worthy of protection, there should be no room whatever
;for interference by the personal law. !7ice versa, the American rule extends the law of the place of contracting beyond
any possible justification. It is even applied to the capacity to
marry.
The law thus in part replacing the personal law should
conveniently be the law governing the contracts as a whole
rather than the law of the place of contracting. 70 This is evident in the case where a contract is clearly localized in a
place other than that of execution.
70 Lorenzen's suggestion (supra n. 67) of a compromise between North and
South American laws also tends toward the law governing the validity of
contracts in general, rather than that of the place of contracting. He assumes,
moreover, that the domicil of persons engaged in international trade is sufficiently stable to furnish a standard. The proposition above may not be far
away from his idea.

PART THREE
MARRIAGE

CHAPTER

7

Marriage 1
I.

ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY

No American case seems to be in point. We have to deal,
therefore, with foreign conflicts rules only.
I.

Groups of Conflicts Rules

NTIL recently the problems arising out of an engagement to marry have received little attention
in the conflict of laws. Insofar as they have been
dealt with at alVa their treatment has suffered from divergency of classification in the various municipal laws.
Numerous countries treat a betrothal as a contract pertaining to the field of family relations and similar to the contract of marriage itself. Where this notion prevails, as for
instance, in England, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, the choice of law rules
concerning the subject matter have been developed by anal-

U

1 For surveys on the substantive marriage laws see: HERMAN CoHN, The
Foreign Laws of Marriage and Divorce, Part I, The Countries of the European Continent (Tel-Aviv, 1937); LESKE-LOEWENFELD, Rechtsverfolgung im
internationalen Verkehr, vol. IV, 1. Teil, Das Eherecht der europiiischen
Staaten und ihrer Kolonien (Berlin, ed. 2, 1932-1937); BERGMANN, Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht, 2 vols. (Frankfurt a.M., ed. 3, 19521953) ; Articles "Ehe," "Ehehindernisse," "Eheliches Giiterrecht," "Ehescheidung und Ehetrennung," "Eheschliessung," "Ehevertrag," by different
authors, in 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (Berlin, 1929-1938); EVERSLEY's
Law of the Domestic Relations, ed. 6 by ALEXANDER CAIRNS (London, 1951) ;
LE BRAS, Divorce et Separation de corps dans le monde contemporain (Paris,
1952); IRELAND and GALINDEZ, Divorce in the Americas (Buffalo, N. Y.,
1947).
Ia A comprehensive survey of the conflicts problems involved by DE NovA,
"Gli sponsali in diritto internazionale privata," 8o Foro Ita!. ( 1955) IV
25-38.
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ogy to those relating to marriage. 2 Formal requirements are
accordingly treated as being determined by the law of the
place of celebration/a whereas the intrinsic validity of an
engagement to marry is determined in accordance with the
personal law of the parties. 3 Sometimes, however, an old
view is still followed, according to which engagement and
marriage are treated like ordinary contracts; consequently
the conflicts rule concerning rescission of contracts is applied. 4
The personal law is also applied for the determination of
the consequences of a breach of engagement. In this respect
the difficulties that arise wherever the parties have different
personal laws are particularly noticeable, for the various
national laws attach widely different consequences to a breach
of promise to marry. Now here, it is true, will a promise to
marry be enforced by a decree o'f specific performance, 5 but
2 In the United States also, the action f~r breach of promise is recognized
as being "in form at least ex contractu," although damages are awarded as
in tort matters. See DAGGEIT, Legal Essays 44, 78.
In Italy the contract theory has been defended by FUNAIOLI, 9 Annuario
Dir. Comp. (1934) 3, 383; 5 Giur. Comp. Dir. Civ. 55.
2 a Trib. Sondrio (Feb. 21, 1953) 79 Foro Ita!. ( 1954) I 408, Rivista 1954,
613.
a Germany: the rule has been applied in all cases; for particular applications see footnotes infra n. 6 and n. 7·
Switzerland: App. Ziirich (May x, 1905) Bl.fZiirch.Rspr. (1905) 247 no.
159 (in the absence of a federal conflicts rule resorting to the former
Ziiricher Privatrechtl. Gesetzbuch).
The Netherlands: Rb. Almelo (Dec. 2, 1925) W.11568, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929)
531; Rb. den Haag (April 11, 1935) W.1936, no. 409, I I Z.ausl. PR. (1937)
204.
Iceland: Law of domicil, EYJOLFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761.
4 Switzerland: the law of the place of performance, identified with the
common domicil of the parties and, in the absence of such, the intended first
marital domicil; see BECK, NAG. 177 no. 76, followed by App. Luzern (Oct.
19, 1938) 36 S]Z. (1938-1939) 219 no. 150.
England: Intention of the parties, indicated by intended matrimonial home;
see Hansen v. Dixon [1906] 93 L.T.R. 32; Kremezi v. Ridgway [1949] I All
E. R. 662.
5 Even the mere unenforceable obligation to marry has disappeared from
the canon law, still in force in several countries in Latin America and
formerly in Eastern Europe, under the Codex Juris Canonici, c. 1017 § 3,
which instead grants damages for rescission of an engagement without just
cause.
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with respect to the duty to pay damages the laws vary from
non-recognition of any such duty to recognition of a duty to
pay compensatory damages for special injury, damages for
mental pain and suffering, or even punitive damages. In this
wide variety of domestic laws, the two solutions most frequently advocated are to determine the extent of either
party's liability ( 1) by his own personal law 6 and ( 2) as
limited to the extent to which liability is recognized by the
personal laws of both. 7 Both opinions are influenced largely
by a regard for the law of the forum, for in most cases the
personal law of the defendant is that of the forum. 8
The majority of the countries following the French system, consider liability for breach of promise to marry to pertain to tort law. Consequently, in conflicts cases the law of the
place of the wrong is held to be applicable, 9 but no clear rules
exist for the determination of the place of the wrong in such
instances. 10
The C6digo Bustamante 11 and other recent codifications 12
simply declare the law of the forum to be applicable.
6 OLG. Kiiln (Dec. 4, I925) Leipz.Z.I926, 6o2, IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 63;
KG. (Feb. 23, I933) IPRspr. I934 1 no. 4I; particularly KG. (Feb. 7, I938)
]W.I938, I715, Nouv. Revue I939, 26o; KG. (Jan. u, I939) Dt. RECHT I939,
I012. See also ZrTELMANN 801; M. WoLFF, IPR. 185; RAAPE 266, 270 (contra,
however, in IPR. 266).
1 OLG. Miinchen (March I3, I929) IPRspr. I929, no. 69; KG. (May 2,
1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 66; LG. Hamburg (Nov. 5, 1954) NJW. I955, 548;
see also NEUMEYER, IPR. ( ed. I) I9; M. WoLFF, Familienrecht ( I928) § 7;
(but seen. 6, supra); LEWALD 77; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 272 n. 8.
8 Cf. the dicta quoted by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 46 n. 34; ibid. 47 n. 42. The
Kammergericht, however, in its decision of Feb. 23, I933, supra n. 6, applied
the personal law of the Turkish defendant without regard to the law of the
forum.
9 Trib. civ. Valenciennes (Dec. I9, I935) Nouv. Revue I936, 325 (French
law applied to Polish parties living in France as the law of the place of
wrong, and Polish personal law rejected).
10 In France receipt of a "letter of rupture" by the fiancee regarded as de·
cisive: Trib. civ. Seine (June I6, I936) Gaz. Pal. I936.2.744.
11 Codigo Bustamante art. 39·
12 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, on certain family relations of international
character, § 46; Siam: Law on Private International Law of I939, §IS. In
the English case of Hansen v. Dixon (I906) 23 T. L. R. 56, English law was
applied with scant justification.
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2.

Cases

The functioning of the various choice of law rules may be
illustrated by the following cases, one hypothetical and one
real.
(a) A Frenchman, engaged to marry a French girl, repudiates his promise, while 'both he and his fiancee are
temporarily residing in Germany.
If an action for breach of promise is brought against him
in a French court, German municipal law, as the law of the
place of the wrong, would have to be applied. The fact, however, that the German law treats liability for breach of promise to marry in the fourth book of the Civil Code, which is
entitled "Family Law," has led a text writer 13 to believe that
French courts, in view of their treatment of breach of promise to marry as a tort, would apply not the rules applicable
under the German classification, but rather the German rules
on torts. Strange consequences would result from this view.
The defendant could be held liable, only if shown to have
been aware that his conduct would cause pecuniary damage
to his fiancee and, furthermore, his behavior constituted a
violation of good morals. Then the additional question might
be raised whether this is to be determined by German or
French standards. Obviously, the French court would do better to apply the rules of family law provided for the case in
the German Civil Code.
If the case arose in a German court, the German judge
would have to apply French law as the personal law of the
parties; but inasmuch as the French law would regard the
question as one of tort and refer it to the German law as the
law of the place of the wrong, the German court would accept the renvoi so as to apply the provisions of the fourth
book of the German Civil Code. Thus, although the courts in
13 RAAPE

267.
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France and Germany would start from different premises, the
decision would be the same in both. 14
(b) An American citizen domiciled in New York, while
temporarily residing in Germany, seduced a German girl by
promising to marry her and subsequently repudiated his
promise. The German court denied the girl's action, holding
that the German conflict of laws rules referred to the law of
New York as the personal law of the defendant, under which
actions for breach of promise to marry are not recognized. 15
3· Public Policy
In those countries where choice of law rules refer the
courts to some foreign law, the lex fori is frequently resorted
to in order to prevent the enforcement of liabilities regarded
as contrary to the public policy of the forum. In the Netherlands, for instance, damages allowed by German law for
breach of the contract to marry could not be recovered unless
the marriage banns, a prerequisite to such suits in theN etherlands, had been published. 16 Enforcement of penalties agreed
14 Decisions, subjecting one party to a law recognizing liability and the
other to one which does not, were considered inequitable, by M. WOLFF, IPR.
( ed. I) II 5; contra, RAAPE, loc. cit. This latter author's more recent book
(Internationales Privatrecht 266) proposes use of the choice of law rule
applicable to obligations neither contractual nor delictual, i.e., roughly the
quasi-contractual obligations of the common law, as once used by the Reichsgericht, (Oct. 21, 1887) 20 RGZ. 333 and (Feb. 28, 1889) 23 RGZ. 172, and
by the Trib. Baselstadt (Sept. 9, 1891) II
Schweiz.R. N.F. 64. There is,
however, no choice of law rule generally recognized that can be used for the
purpose. RAAPE's own suggestion is to apply the domiciliary law of the innocent or, alternatively, the female party. This, indeed, would be a universal
ru~
.

z.

15 New York Laws 1935, ch. 263 amending C.P.A. by inserting art. (2a).
The German case is KG. (Jan. n, 1939) Dt. Recht, 1939, 1012.
16
Dutch BW. art. I13 par. 2. See Hof s'Hertogenbosch (Jan. 5, 1932)
W.12416, I I Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 204; Rb. Rotterdam (May 12, 1922) W.10996
and (July 27, 1932) W.12584, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 204. These decisions were
criticized by VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1927, 108 j ibid. 1924, 123, at 125 and
OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek t838-1938, 713, but recommended for Italian law by
FEDOZZI 401.
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upon in the contract of engagement is generally denied. 11
Some countries consider damages for breach of promise to
marry, whether based on domestic or foreign law, as contrary to public policy. 18 Even where public policy is resorted
to more sparingly, doubts have been expressed with respect
to such enormously high claims as are allowed in England
and in some American states. 19 A recent Finnish statute expressly limits the amount recoverable to that allowed by both
the plaintiff's personal law and the law of Finland. 20 On the
other hand, a foreign law occasionally has been denied application because it failed to recognize a claim for damages for
breach of promise to marry, 21 to that extent frustrating the
elimination of such suits by the so-called "heart balm" statutes. Almost all these applications of public policy are obviously arbitrary.
4· Conclusion
An Anglo-American writer recently suggested application
of the foreign characterization of a breach of promise where
the foreign systems of law applicable to the situation concur
in characterizing it (as breach of contract or as tort), but
17 Penalties are still used in Greece; see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 274. They are
considered contrary to public policy by the German KG. (Jan 23, 1901) z
ROLG. 132, I I Z.int.R. (1902) 99, Clunet 1902, 629 and by most other courts.
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 45·
18 Norway: see LUNDH in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 717.
More often it is alleged that the law of the forum fixes the maximum damages that can be awarded, e.g.:
Italy: FEDOZZI 401.
Iceland: EYJ6LFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761.
19 Against awarding: NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 131 n. 2; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS
274 n. 15; contra: DEMERTZES, Family Law 91, § 24, cited by STREIT-VAL·
LINDAS; RAAPE 271.
2o Law of Dec. s, 1929, § 46.
21 OGL. Koln, cit. supra n. 6; contra: M. WoLFF, IPR. 185 n. 4· The decision of the Kammergericht of 1939 (supra n. 6), declares expressly that
the American statute denying a claim for seduction of a betrothed woman is
not contrary to the international public policy of the court, though contrary
to the German Civil Code.
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where the engagement and the breach occur in two foreign
jurisdictions having different characterizations, that the
forum should apply its own characterization. 22 This exception to the author's theory of lex fori characterization is inconsistent with any general theory, nor does it help in the
more important cases.
It would be preferable for the conflicts rule to be free
from interfering substantive law; the rule should simply refer the rights and obligations flowing from an engagement to
the law of the place regarded under the circumstances as the
center of the social relation between the parties at the time of
engagement.

II.

THE CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS

Experience has shown that marriage must be defined in
the conflict of laws in broader terms than those in which it is
understood, legally and sociologically, 23 in the several systems of municipal law. Two groups of cases have been given
practical consideration.
r. Soviet Marriage
In 1929 a man was sued in the Probate Division of the
English High Court for separate maintenance by a woman
with whom he had entered into an agreement of marriage in
the Soviet Union. The defendant contended that this socalled marriage did not correspond with the English notion
of marriage because, under the Soviet law at the time in question, such a marriage could be dissolved by the simple uniRoBERTSON, Characterization 76-78, 177.
On the relation between the sociological and the legal concept of marriage and the function of law with respect to the regulation of sex relations,
see LLEWELLYN, "Behind the Law of Divorce," 32 Col. L. Rev. (1932) 1281,
33 Col. L. Rev. ( 1933) 249·
22
23
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lateral act of either party without the necessity of any reason
being specified. Following this argument, Hill, J., held that
the relation existing between the parties was not such as to
constitute a marriage and, therefore, that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover. The Court of Appeals reversed this
decision on the grounds that, although Soviet law may thus
permit the relation to be voluntarily dissolved, the parties
may be presumed to have intended it to be permanent. Thus,
the relation created in the Soviet Union was not considered
to be fundamentally different from the English notion of
marriage. 24 The Supreme Court of Hungary, on the contrary,
declared a Soviet marriage not in accord with humanity and
ethics, constituting nothing more than concubinage. 25
In virtual agreement with the English Court of Appeals,
the Reichsgericht recognized first a "recorded" 26 and later
a "non-recorded" Soviet marriage, 27 considering it essential
that, although the Soviet law does not recognize any mutual
rights and duties between the spouses, yet they have intended
to unite themselves for a life to be lived in common. The
court, indeed, has felt it impossible to deny validity to all
Russian marital unions.
The possibility that a marriage of non-Russians, and especially of persons subject to the law of the forum, might
occur without formalities, was not at issue. This matter and
the common law marriage will be discussed in connection with
the formalities requisite for marriage.
24 Nachimson v. Nachimson [1930] P. 85; [1930] P. (C. A.) 217; Kenward v. Kenward [1951] P. (C. A.) 124, 134 per Evershed, M. R.
25 Hungarian Royal Court (Feb. 23, 1926) P. III r6r6/1926, German translation in Z.f.Ostrecht 1927, 62o; cf. 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 783, Clunet 1929,
1202; Hungarian Royal Court (Nov. 6, 1928) P. III 8411/27, cf. ]W. 1931•
167. In 1945, the Hungarian Decree no. 86oo expressly validated the Soviet
marriages. ARAT6, "Die Anerkennung der Sowjetehen in Ungaro," 15
Z.ausl.PR. ( 1949/50) 439-456.
26 RG. (Oct. 22, 1930) ]W. 1931, 1334 no. 1. Similarly Brazil: App. Rio
de Janeiro (June 10, 1932) Clunet 1932, 1124.
27 RG. (April 7, 1938) 157 RGZ. 257, 262, 265.
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Polygamous Marriage

Polygamous marriages formerly were absolutely excluded
from recognition, inasmuch as English doctrine limits the
notion of marriage to "Christian marriage," which is necessarily monogamous. On numerous occasions, however, British courts have had to concern themselves with the polygamous marriages of Mohammedans, Hindus, Chinese, and
other peoples not belonging to the realm of Western civilization,28 while in the United States Indian tribal marriages and
those formerly practiced by the Mormons have been recognized. Whereas the celebration of such unions within the
forum is rigidly prohibited, it is neither workable nor convenient to deny that foreign marriages of such a nature function within the territories of the peoples concerned. 29 Moreover, there is not sufficient public interest to do so in cases
where the existence or nonexistence of a foreign marriage is
only a consideration preliminary to the decision of a problem
of property law, tax law, or some other matter not immediately affecting the mores of the forum. 30

III.

FoRMAL REQUIREMENTS oF MARRIAGE

r. Survey of Problems: Requirements of Form and In-

trinsic Validity Distinguished
It has been customary from old times to permit foreigners
to marry; the churches have not made distinction on account
28

For details see 2 BEALE § 12I.I and CHEATHAM, Cases 871 no. 5·
See the basic exposition by KAHN, I Abhandl. I6I ff.
30 See GooDRICH 370. The cases are discussed by BECKETT, "The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages under English Law," 48 Law Q. Rev.
(1932) 341; cf. FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of
Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 88; more recently, a comprehensive paper by MoRRIS, "The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in
English Law," Festschrift M. Wolff {1952) 287-336, 66 Harv. L. Rev. (1952/
53) 96I-IOI2. An interesting discussion has been held in Canada: see FALCON BRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R I9 and contra: I JoHNSON 312. The
view adopted in the text, as explained by FALCON BRIDGE in Rivista Dir. Priv.
(1932) I 297-307, now Essays 779 et seq., has been recommended for Italian
use by FEDOZZI 456.
29
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of nationality in the administration of marriage ceremonies.
It was a singular exception to this usage that the French decree of 1938, mentioned earlier, disallowed the marriage of
foreigners unless they possessed a police permit of sojourn
for more than a year. 31 On the other hand, nationals may
marry abroad, although they may have to observe certain
prescriptions of their national laws.
In legal systems outside of the United States, conflict rules
distinguish the form and the intrinsic validity of marriage.
The former is referred to the law of the place of celebration
and the latter to the personal law of the parties. This difference is steadily gaining in favor in the literature of the
United States.
Generally defined, the terms "formal requirements" and
"formalities" of marriage mean the external conduct required of the parties or of third persons, especially public
officers, necessary to the formation of a legally valid marriage. These formal requirements are distinguished from the
substantive conditions for validity such as age, race, religious
affiliation, or health of the parties.
The purpose of the distinction in the conflict of laws is obvious. On the one hand, the personal law of the parties leaves
the determination of formalities to the law of the place of
celebration but reserves to itself the determination of the
intrinsic conditions of marriage. On the other hand, the law
of the place of celebration scrupulously takes into consideration the requirements of the personal law as to intrinsic conditions but disregards its prescriptions as to form.
The borderline between the two categories, however, is
not traced uniformly in the various systems of municipal law.
Although differences of such classification in the conflict of
at Circular letter of the Garde des Sceaux of Dec. 13, 1938. concerning the
marriage of foreigners in France, ]. Off. Jan. 6, 1939; cf. Nouv. Revue 1938,
935 and supra p. 153, n. r6_ra.
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laws systems are not accentuated, there is sometimes a tendency to classify certain conditions precedent as substantive
merely for the purpose of giving these conditions extraterritorial effect. This is a natural tendency where social policies
or ecclesiastical conceptions are regarded as too important
to be sacrificed in any instance, irrespective of where the marriage may be celebrated. Internationally relevant rules, however, should be expressed in an adequate common language.
To deal with such divergences in classification, two methods
are available. One is to let each court accept as formality
what internal law regards as such; the ensuing chaos evoked
criticism long ago. 32 The other is to define the notion of formalities in a universally acceptable sense. As a matter of fact,
although there seem to be four principal points which have
occasioned difficulties for an international understanding, it
does not appear that agreement to eliminate them would be
impossible. These are controversial matters:
(a) Proclamation of banns and similar proceedings preliminary to the celebration of a marriage were occasionally
classified in early times as sub~tantive requirements. But it is
now generally agreed that they are to be regarded as mere
formalities. The same opinion prevails with respect to recordation and similar acts required under some laws when
parties have married abroad.
(b) Except in England, the requirement of parental consent to the marriage of a minor is universally characterized
as closely connected with the intrinsic requirement of consent
of the party. The English qualification itself is open to criticism.33
(c) Classification of the requirement of freedom from mis8 2 NIEMEYER in 26 Z.int.R. ( 1916) 3, MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, 22 Z.int.R.
(1912) 364, and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 130, who attempt various other solutions.
NIBOYET 732, however, follows the lex fori, though he is exclusively concerned with the point mentioned, infra p. 231.
sa See below, p. 287.

226

MARRIAGE

take has caused some writers difficulty. 34 Their doubts can be
resolved easily when two different situations are kept separate. On the one hand, due form requires that the parties
make their declarations at the time and in the words or by
the conduct demanded by the applicable law. If, for instance,
A says "no" but is understood to have said "yes," the law
governing "formalities" should be resorted to in order to determine whether there exists a validly declared consent. On
the other hand, whether a declaration of intention must be
supported by an intention in fact or whether the declaration
is to be considered valid even where the intention of the party
does not coincide with his expression, is a matter which concerns the essentials rather than the formalities of the contract. Thus, if both parties use the correct ceremony but have
secretly agreed to be married only nominally (simulation),
the law governing substantial requirements should determine
whether or not they are bound in marriage. This has been
denied by canon and English law but affirmed by Italian law
and the German Code before its amendment. 35
(d) The last and most discussed problem concerns the requirement made in some, but not all, of the states which still
regard marriage as an essentially religious institution: that
their subjects observe the religious ceremony even when they
celebrate marriages abroad. In these countries, dependence
on the religious rites is considered to affect the capacity of
the parties and, hence, to be properly a matter of the personal law. In the rest of the world, comprising by far the
majority of states, the religious celebration, whether indis34 CHESHIRE 354 classifies a "fundamental mistake" as pertaining to formalities and hence refers it to the law of the place of celebration, while he
classifies "capacity" only as personal law. This reasoning neglects the essential distinction between intention and declaration of intention. In accordance
with the text, e.g., ]EMOLO, Matrimonio 97·
35 See infra p. 294·
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pensable or not, is treated as a formality. This point will be
examined later. 36
The domain of formality as distinguished from that of
procedure has been considered with respect to the rebuttable
presumption of British law that a man and a woman having
cohabited and having enjoyed the reputation of being married are deemed to have been duly married. A presumption
of this kind has been characterized as relating merely to the
manner of proof and therefore as a rule of procedure of the
forum. 37 A contrary decision of British Columbia, however,
has been defended 38 and seems to be the right answer. If the
core of a law suit depends on whether a man and woman
have been merely regarded as married in the eyes of their
community or whether they were, by being so regarded or
otherwise, legally married, then the essential elements constituting marriage are involved. Moreover, it would be impractical to try to submit to different conflicts rules the existence of a marriage by repute and the choice of facts
determining the existence of such a marriage.
2.

Locus Regit Actum

Formalities of marriage have been, from the middle ages,
a particularly important field for the application of the
maxim locus regit actum, a maxim not everywhere understood in quite the same sense nor applied with entire consistency. We may distinguish in the following survey three types
of provisions:
(a) Compulsory rule. In one group of countries, including
the United States, 39 England, Denmark, and Japan, 40 the law
86

See infra p. 23 I ; cf. pp. 2 50 ff.
See particularly FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 2I4, but Essays 3I4.
3 8 Leong Sow Nom v. Chin Yee You (I934) 49 B. C. R. 244, [I934] 3
W. W. R. 686, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP, no. 90, with approving note by CANSACCHI
2I3.
39 For the state statutes see I VERNIER § 32; for the cases 2 BEALE 67I ff.
40 England: Berthiaume v. Dastous [I930] A. C. 79·
87
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of the place where a marriage is celebrated is decisive, irrespective of whether the marriage be concluded within or
without the territory of the forum. No other law is allowed
any influence on the formalities of marriage. The personal
laws of the parties are irrelevant, and the parties have no
choice other than to select the place of celebration. In countries following this principle, the marriage ceremonies of
their own countries or churches are not available to the parties, unless these formalities happen to coincide with those
permitted at the place where they are being married.

Illustration: Under Danish matrimonial law a marriage
may be celebrated before a minister of some religious denomination. But a marriage of two Danish subjects before a
minister of their church in Berlin will not be recognized in
Denmark because in Germany civil marriage is compulsory. 41
(b) Optional rule. Most countries adhere to a double
system: parties celebrating a marriage within the forum
must comply with the domestic formalities; parties marrying
abroad must observe either the formalities prescribed at the
place of contracting or those of the personal law or laws. 42
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 218 no. 38; MuNCH-PETERSEN,
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 745 n. 78.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 13 par. 1 sentence 2.
The Austrian Supreme Court has held the same way beginning with a decision of March 11, 1913, 50 GlU. NF. 6345; see decisions of Sept. 20, 1927,
9 SZ. no. 127; Oct. 24, 1934, Zentralblatt 1935, no. 1; May 21, 1937, 66 J. Bl.
(1937) 296; even after the conclusion of the Austrian Concordat with the
Holy See, a marriage celebrated before a Catholic clergyman in a country
where civil marriage ceremony is compulsory, is invalid in Austria; this decision, however, adds: "at least if one party is a foreign national." Cf.
WALKER 666.
Presumably Liechtenstein, where Austrian marriage law is still in force,
follows the same doctrine, but it has been ranged within the group described
under (b) by an official German handbook; see BERGMANN, Der Auslander
im Deutschen Recht (1934) 66 n. 70.
41 See BORUM and MEYER in 6 Repert. 219 no. 40. See another example
under (b).
4 2 Instead of the personal law, a former system had the law of the place of
"performance," which was understood as the intended matrimonial domicil,
as an alternative to the local law. In this sense the Law of the Baltic Prov.,
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This system also is adopted in article 7 of the Hague Convention on Marriage. Where the parties are of different nationalities, in accordance with the opinion prevailing in most
countries, 43 the Convention provides, however, that a marriage not complying with the formal requirements in the
country of celebration must satisfy the national laws of both
parties in order to be recognized by other participant states. 44
The practical difference between the two systems described
so far may be illustrated by a case decided a few years ago by
the Privy Council. Two Catholics domiciled in the Province
of Quebec participated in a marriage ceremony before a
Catholic priest in Paris. The marriage was void in France but
would have been good if performed in Quebec. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, speaking as the final appellate court of Canada, felt itself compelled to hold the marriage invalid. 45 If, however, the parties had been Swedes
marrying in Paris before a minister of the Swedish Established Church, their marriage would have been held valid in
Sweden. 46
An analogous question is apt to arise when a marriage by
mere consent is invalid under the local law but may or may
not be recognized by a personal law which admits such marriages.47
in trod. art. XXXVI was applied in 1928 in Latvia; cf. BERENT in 4 Leske,Loewenfeld I 576 n. 211.
43 See, e.g., Austrian OGH. (May 2I, 1937) I9 SZ. no. I66 (Austria was
not a participant in the Hague Convention).
44 An illustration of the difficulties arising from this rule is the decision of
the German Reichsgericht (April 6, 1919) 88 RGZ. I9I·
45 Berthiaume v. Dastous (1929) [1930] A. C. 79, [1930] I D. L. R. 849,
99 L. ]. (P. C.) 66. Cf. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 8.
For the same reason Italian courts and writers consider a religious marriage of Italian Catholics in France invalid, even after the Concordat; see
BALLADORE-PALLIERI, Dir. Int. Eccles. 211 against an isolated decision of Trib.
Milano (April 27, I938) cited by him.
46 Sweden: Law of I904 with amendments, c. r § 8 par. I.
The problem is well known in Latin America; cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ
110 no. I97·
47 A third case where a marriage invalid under the local law could satisfy
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(c) Rule modified by religious requirements. The principle, locus regit actum} compulsory in every case under the
first system described above, (a), and optional in foreign
marriages under the second system described above, (b), is
profoundly modified in a group of countries emphasizing the
importance of religious rites. This group of countries, which
is characterized by strong ties between the state and an established church, formerly included Turkey, Czarist Russia,
Bulgaria, parts of Poland, Lithuania and Yugoslavia. 48 Today it embraces Israel in part, Greece, Egypt, 49 Malta, Cyprus,50 Iran, and after 1938 with respect to Catholics also
Spain.~ 1

Since in these countries a religious ceremony is required, a
marriage celebrated abroad by civil ceremony is not recognized. In Greece it was doubted whether this rule applied to
citizens other than those of the Greek Orthodox faith, but
it is now agreed that it includes Roman Catholics, Moslems,
and Jews. 52 Moreover, it is held sufficient that one of the
the requirements of the personal law is construed, quite hypothetically it
seems, by BEcK, NAG. art. 7 f no. 36, and RAAPE 251 {b) par. 3·
48 For details of the former very complex legal situations, see the reports
in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I: on Serbia, by PERITCH at 982, {see also PERITCH in
40 Bull. Inst. Int. {1939) I, 186, 41 Bull. Inst. Int. {1940) 1); on CroatiaSlavonia, by LOVRIC at 1034; on Bosnia-Herzegovina, by EISNER at roso; on
Montenegro, by EISNER at 1056.
4 9 Under their own law however, Moslems and Oriental Jews may marry
simply before witnesses of their people without any religious ceremony; see
GOADBY 148.
5 0 For Cyprus see the facts in the English case of Papadopoulos [1930] P.
55 {infra n. 68); where only one party, however, is of the Greek Orthodox
faith and the other a member of another church, certain difficulties have been
cleared away by the Marriage (Validation and Amendment) Law, No. 3 of
1937, s-4 and s.s (e).
51 Law of March 12, 1938; C. C. art. 42 allows marriage before the municipal judge to non-Catholic and such Catholic parties who declare not to
practice the Roman Catholic religion.
52 See 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 319 n. 36, who quotes the former opinions (317
n. 32).
The rule was generally applied in former Russia too; see MAKAROV in 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 488, as well as under the Marriage Law of 1836 of the
Kingdom of Poland until 1926. See infra n. 56.
On Lithuania see Z.f.Ostrecht 1931, 65; RoTENBERG in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld
I sos.
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parties be of the Orthodox creed in order to necessitate the
attendance of a priest (pope) of this denomination. 53
Grave complications are bound to occur when a national
of a country where such an imperative rule is in force attempts to marry in a country where observance of a civil
ceremony is indispensable. 54 The only certain way for the
parties in such case to effect a valid marriage is to go through
both ceremonies, the civil one prescribed by the local law and
the religious rite required by the personal law. 5 5
It is noteworthy that this conflict is often designated by
theorists as an insoluble conflict of qualifications. In connection with the idea that marriage is a sacrament to be administered in the proper way and with the attendance of the
persons required by the particular denomination, it has been
denied that these religious conditions of marriage can be
treated like other forms of contract; rather must they be considered part of the personal status of the party concerned.
This position was once taken by the Czarist Russian Church, 56
and it is so firmly rooted in Greece that in the new Civil Code
the necessity of a religious ceremony was not formulated as
an exception to the maxim locus regit actum, since this maxim,
applying to formalities only, does not include the necessity
ss See 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 310, 320 and the evidence in the case of
Stathatos v. Stathatos ( 1912) [1913] P. 46.
For Bulgaria see KG. (Jan. 19, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 16.
54 See infra p. 2 so If.
55 Civil officials are required so to advise the parties in Prussia; see BERGMANN, Der Auslander im Deutsch en Recht ( 1934) 66 n. 70.
In Switzerland the parties must even give assurance that the religious
ceremony will follow; see GMtiR, Familienrecht art. n8 n. 6.
56 Decision of the Civil Department of Cassation (April 15, 1898) Decisions 1899, no. 39· This conception was maintained in Eastern Poland until
the Polish Law on international private law of 1926, which made the law
of the place of celebration govern the form of foreign marriages. But it
took a decision of the Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Meeting on April 12,
1929 (Z.f.Ostrecht 1930, 512) to state that "forms" include the ecclesiastical
manner of marriage; for details see OsTROWICZ, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 445
n. 252; WERMINSKI, Note, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 106.
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of a religious ceremony regarded as a substantive condition. 5 7
Formerly as well as recently, 58 some Western writers, too,
have been greatly impressed by this characterization. For a
time, French courts considered a civil marriage celebrated in
France by a Greek Orthodox or Catholic foreigner, if not
recognized in his homeland, invalid even under French law. 59
But no such concessions to foreign laws are made any longer
by any country requiring its own subjects to observe a civil
marriage ceremony. The true reason for this attitude is not,
or at least should not be, any method of characterization. 60
By classification as "mere" form, the secular ceremony is not
degraded but, on the contrary, is emphasized as the objective of an intransigent public policy, quite as cogent as
the mandatory requirement of a religious ceremony. Indeed,
those countries that regard ecclesiastical acts either of marriage or divorce, even in the case of foreigners, as private
transactions without legal effect so far as the state is concerned, have been accused of intolerance. 61 Nevertheless,
while, on the one hand, the dominant American conflict rules
concerning marriage minimize the personal law of the parties, it certainly is not clear, on the other hand, why the
forum should yield to the pretensions of foreign countries to
regulate local marriage ceremonies.
The problem of classification in this case is not more than
a mere question of terminology. For the purpose of technical
understanding in matters of international law, it is submitted,
religious marriage, including the participation or mere pres57 MARIDAKIS, 11 Z.ausl.PR. ( I937) 121. For complete literature see z
STREIT-V ALLINDAS 3 I 8.
58 UNGER, I System 2IO; 2 FIORE no. 528; PERROuri, Clunet I922, 5; I
FRANKENSTEIN 524; 3 ibid. I33; RAAPE 253· Contra: I BAR § I69; WALKER
662 n. 55, and in I KLANG's Kommentar 3 37; NEUMANN-ETTENREICH and
SATTER in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 206 and particularly BALOGH, 57 Recueil I936

III 685-702.
59 See infra p. 23 5 n. 69.
60 NIBOYET 731 no. 623 applies this very method.
61 3 FRANKENSTEIN I37·
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ence of an ecclesiastical officer, like any secular solemnization,
constitutes a formality in which the contract is "clothed."
This conception is traditional in almost the whole world and
has been confirmed for the Catholic Church by the Codex
Juris Canonici, which clearly distinguishes form of celebration (c.I094-II03) from impediments (c.ro3s-ro8o) and
defects of consent (c.ro8r-ro93). 62 For international terminology, such a common denominator of formalities is the
only convenient one. Formalities have more than one function
-among others, those of guaranteeing the finality and seriousness of the solemnized act, of publicizing the marriage,
and of furnishing trustworthy evidence of its occurrence. All
such purposes are common to any kind of marriage ceremony. Furthermore, the fact that an omission of the prescribed words or acts may adversely affect the validity of the
transaction is not peculiar to religious marriage. At any
rate, the policy of Greece and the other countries enumerated above on page 230, is sufficiently summarized by saying
that these countries regard the religious form as essential for
all marriages of their nationals.
3· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to Domestic Marriages

General rule. In spite of doubts occasionally expressed, the
almost general rule is that a marriage celebrated within the
territory of the forum is invalid, unless the formalities prescribed by the matrimonial law of the forum are satisfied.
62 The same classification has, quite naturally, now been confirmed by the
Italian writers on the Catholic marriage with civil effects, established by the
Concordat of 1929 with the Holy See, Bosco, "Le Nuove leggi sui matrimonio," 22 Rivista 1930, 363, 372: FEDOZZI 418 n. 2. To the same effect in other
Catholic countries, see in 6 Repert.; for Austria: KuNz, no nos. 199-201; for
Belgium: J ANNE 149 nos. 46-48; for Brazil: BEVILAQUA 166 no. 39. This means
that a purely ecclesiastical ceremony of Austrian Catholics in Italy was invalid in Austria, despite canon marriage being the prescribed form in the
Austrian Allg. BGB.; see for instance OGH. {May 21, 1937) 66 J.BI. (1937)
296, and below, p. 251, n. I37·
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The forms of marriage which a state places at the disposition
of the parties are available to foreigners and citizens alike,
but no other forms are allowed. If the law of the place of
celebration leaves the parties free to choose between solemnization by a minister of the gospel or a priest and solemnization by a civil officer, a judge, or a civil commissioner, as
is done in almost all Anglo-American countries, Sweden,
Italy, 63 and others, foreigners can easily satisfy both the local
and the personal law by choosing that ceremony which will
be recognized by their personal laws. Hardships may arise
where civil marriage is compulsory at the place of celebration.
The rule that the domestic formalities are exclusive is expressly contained in the following statutes, among others:
Germany, EG. art. I3 par. 3·
Italy, C. C. (I 86 5) art. I03; C. C. (I 942) art. II 6.
Poland, Law of I926, art. I3 par. r.
Sweden, Law of 1904, c. I § 4 par. r.
Switzerland, NAG. art. 7c par. 2. 64
Brazil, Introductory Law of 1942, art. 7 § I.
Ordinarily the rule is treated as unquestionable and justified as being required by elementary public policy. 65 Every
state is said to have decided, after careful deliberation,
whether marriages shall be solemnized in religious or temporal form, or parties shall be permitted to marry without
any formality at all. From this point of view, it is understand6 3 The form of marriage ceremony provided for by the Italian Concordat
with the Holy See, viz., an ecclesiastical marriage recorded by the state civil
registrar, is available to foreigners, according to the general opinion, which
is contested, however, by BALLADORE-PALLIERI, 175 and Dir. Int. Eccles. 220;
MoNACo, L'efficacia IZ9; MoRELLI, Elementi 106.
64 To this effect BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453; Just. Dep. April 30,
1924, BBl. 1924, II 25; BBl. 1940, 1462 no. 9 (no marriage by proxy for
foreigners prevented from entering Switzerland); HuBER-MUTZNER 434;
contra: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7c no. 26.
65 Cf. 2 FIORE no. 541; RoLIN, Principes 79 ff. nos. 576, 578, 581; TRfAs DE
BES, 6 Repert. 252 no. 101; I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 109 no. 196.
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able that states should not wish to see exceptions made within
their territories in favor of aliens. Not quite so obvious, however, is the necessity of permitting foreigners to avail themselves of local ceremonies which are at variance with their
personal laws. Doubtless, it is believed appropriate to render
marriage possible for alien residents.
An exception to the general rule requiring marriages celebrated within the country to comply with the prescribed
formalities is that of foreigners in Greece who are permitted,
according to an old doctrine, to avail themselves of all public
solemnizations provided for by their personal laws. This rule
permits all sorts of religious and consular marriages, excluding, however, simple consensual contracts of the common law
or Soviet type. 66
Ill us !rations:
(a) P alidity of marriage in municipal form: In the English case of Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos, P., domiciled in
Cyprus and belonging to the Greek Orthodox church, married a woman of French nationality before a registrar in
London in compliance with the formalities of English law.
His marriage was held valid in England, although it was not
recognized in Cyprus because not celebrated in a church by a
priest of the Orthodox church. 67
There is abundant authority to the same effect in other
countries. 68
66

Cf. 2 STREIT-V ALLINDAS 306, 3I 5·
[1930] P. 55·
68 Belgium: Cass. (Jan. 19, 1852) Pasicrisie 1852.
1939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44·
61

I.

85; Antwerp (July 3,

France: In a series of decisions beginning with App. Douai {Nov. 18, 1903)
Clunet 1904, 394, down to a particularly objectionable decision of the Trib.
of Metz {Oct. 30, 1929) StAZ. 1930, 198, the marriage has been held invalid
if the formalities of the personal law were not observed. More recently, how·
ever, the trend favoring territoriality rather than the personal law has won
the upper hand, and it is now well established that a marriage celebrated in
France in accordance with the French formalities is valid, while a marriage
celebrated in France in accordance with religious formalities is invalid. See
Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, 1912), aff'd Cour Paris (Dec. 22, 1921) in Clunet,
1922, 135; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 7, 1922), aff'd Cour Paris {Nov. 17, 1922)
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(b) Invalidity of religious marriages not provided for by
the municipal law: Thus, in a German case, Jewish subjects
of Czarist Russia went through a religious ceremony in Germany before a rabbi. Although good in Russia, the marriage
was held nonexistent in Germany, as no ceremony was performed before a civil officer. 69 Similarly, a marriage was celebrated in Germany according to religious formalities by a
Greek and a Serbian subject. Although valid in both Greece
and Serbia, the marriage was held nonexistent in Germany. 70
(c) Invalidity of common law marriage: Two American
citizens from New York live together as husband and wife in
Belgium without a marriage ceremony. Belgian courts will
hold the marriage invalid. 71
Apparent exceptions. Obviously, it is not inconsistent with
the rule of compliance with local formalities for France and
Spain to authorize or compel 72 their nationals in their respective colonies to marry in compliance with the formalities
of the mother country.
Neither is it an exception, when a French court applies
Spanish law in deciding whether or not a French woman has
acquired Spanish nationality by marrying a Spanish citizen
Clunet 1923, 85; Trib. civ. Nice (June 26, 1923) Clunet 1924, 670. All writers
agree.
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 139; RG. (Nov. 16, 1922) 105
RGZ. 363; OLG. Dresden (March 13, 19II) 7 Siichs. Arch. (1912) 272 and
OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 46.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453·
69 OLG. Miinchen (March 10, 1921) 42 ROLG. 98. To the same effect:
RG. (2d criminal section, Dec. 10, 1912) 18 DJZ. 1913, 588; Bay. ObLG.
(March 22, 1924) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (]an. 31, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925·3.129.
Switzerland: BECK, NAG. art. 7c no. 86.
70 RG. (3d criminal section, Feb. 16, 1914) Leipz. Z. 1914, 869.
71 Belgium: POULLET 425 no. 365.
72 In French Morocco, the Dahir of II-13 of August, 1913, declared that
Frenchmen and foreigners are unable to marry except in accordance with
the formalities permitted by their national law or those which will eventually
be determined for l'etat civil in the French Protectorate. The latter formalities have been determined by the Dahirs of Sept. 4, 1915, and Sept. 13, 1922,
to be identical with those of the Civil Code. Since then, the French form of
marriage is compulsory for French nationals, as the Court of Cassation held
in two decisions of March 3, 1937, Revue Crit. 1938, 86, 88.
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in France. The court may find that the marriage is invalid
under Spanish law because the religious ceremony was not observed and that therefore the wife has not become a Spanish
citizen, although it is certain that the marriage is valid in
France. 13
The Japanese Civil Code limits its own provision to the
marriage of nationals without mentioning the marriage of
foreigners. Probably, foreign parties may use any formalities
agreeing with their national law or laws. 74
Consular marriages performed within the forum. Where a
consular or diplomatic agent is endowed by the state represented by him-the sending state-75 with the power of officiating at marriages, a marriage performed before him is
valid in the receiving state only if the latter state has agreed
to his acting in this capacity. Numerous marriages celebrated
in an embassy or consulate have been declared invalid by the
courts of the countries involved, because this function of the
diplomatic agent or a priest officiating in a legation was not
recognized.' 6 Hence, for instance, a marriage celebrated by
73 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I920) Clunet I92o, I98; (Nov. I9, I920) Clunet I92I, I84; (March 29, I928) Clunet I929, 402. Comments expressing
controversial opinions by PERROUD, Note, Clunet I929, 404, and J. DoNNEDIEU
DE VABRES 455· See supra p. I48.
74 See BATY, "The Private International Law of Japan," in I Melanges
Streit (I939) I03 at 106.
75 Where a marriage was celebrated before the consul of Guatemala in
Paris and it appeared that, according to the law of Guatemala, representatives of that state had no authority to officiate at marriages, the act was declared null also under French law. Trib. civ. Seine {March IS, I932) Revue
Crit. 1935, 436.
76 Austria (one party Austrian): OGH. (Aug. I7, I88o) 18 GIU. no. 8o66,
Clunet 188I, 171.
Belgium (one party Belgian): Trib. Antwerp (Aug. 4, 1877) Clunet 1881,
84.
France (one party French): Trib. civ. Seine (July 2, 1872) S.1872.2.248,
Clunet 1874, 71; Trib. civ. Seine (Sept. 2, 1920) Revue 1921, 165 n. 2; (June
21, 1873) Clunet 1874, 73; cf. infra n. 83, and Note AuniNET, S.1924.2.65. See
also the case of Hay v. Northcote [1900] 2 Ch. 262, 69 L. ]. (Ch.) 586, where
the English court, though referring to a French judgment which had declared the marriage void, held it valid under English law.
Italy: App. Firenze (July 31, 1877) Ann. Giur. Ital. 1877, 3, 283 (an
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two British subjects before a British consul in Switzerland is
held nonexistent in Switzerland, 77 though it is considered
good in England. 18
Although some states are unwilling to consent to this function of diplomatic agents, numerous treaties embody agreements to recognize consular marriages performed within territory of the forum. 19 In some countries, consent is deemed to
be given even without any express declaration. This is the
case in Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Greece, Peru,
Rumania, Spain, Turkey, and elsewhere, 80 particularly in
France, where by "traditional customary law" 81 foreigners
American man and an Italian woman at an American consulate); see also
Trib. Roma (May 6, 1936) Giur. Ita!. 1936, I, 2, 465.
Switzerland: Just. Dep. BBl. 1924, II 25, no. 5; Answer of Federal Council
to the British Legation, BBl. 19II, I 431, no. 12, where it is added that the
British Legation in a note showed its willingness to make British consuls in
Switzerland conform to the Swiss conception.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 12, 1899) 66 Sent. 169 (Frenchman at the Anglican Church of Puerto Rico, then a Spanish colony).
Argentina: Camara Civil xa de Buenos Aires (Aug. 9, 1948) 194 Gac. del
Foro (1948) 625, 629 (a Hungarian woman and an Ecuadorian man before
the Ecuadorian consul).
Brazil (one party Brazilian): Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 9, 1943) 98 Rivista
Forense ( 1944) 614.
See, furthermore, Rb. Rotterdam (June 17, 1935) W. 1936, no. 633 (Egyptian consul). Decisions relating to Portuguese, Turkish, and Russian consulates j cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 170 n. 176.
11 Just. Dep. BBl. 1924 II 25; SCHNITZER 326.
18 British Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, § 1.
19 See infra p. 257; see also the Colombian Law, No. 266, of Dec. 21, 1938.
80 Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (May 29, 1852) Pasicrisie 1852.2.237; Note,
Clunet 1907, 335, 339; PouLLET 426 no. 366.
The Bolivian Law of December 15, 1939; continues to recognize marriages
celebrated by diplomatic or consular agents of foreign powers, but requires
recording in the register of civil status.
Brazil: Lei de Introdu~;iio (1942) art. 7 § 2.
Bulgaria: Law on Persons and Family of Aug. 5, 1949, art. 3 par. 3·
Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 315.
Peru: customary law for Catholics and Congressional Act of Dec. 23, 1897,
art. 7 for non-Catholics (on the condition of subsequent registration).
Rumania: Trib.Ilfov (March 21, 1890); see PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 66 no.
183.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Feb. 21, 1935) 217 Sent. 567 implicitly: see TRfAs DE
BEs 8 5 no. n8.
Turkey: see SALEM, 7 Repert. 267 no. 218.
81 WEiss, 3 Traite 563.
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belonging to the same country are permitted to marry before
their consul. This liberal exception to the French system does
not extend, however, to religious marriages before a priest
or chaplain attached to a diplomatic mission, sanctioned in
former times by the so-called freedom of the Chapel. Hence,
French courts have invalidated a marriage celebrated before
an Orthodox priest of the Greek legation in Paris and a marriage celebrated before a Protestant minister authorized by
the King of Sweden. 82
The validity of consular marriages as determined by the
law of the sending state will be discussed in connection with
other foreign marriages. 83
4· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to Foreign Marriages
In general. All states, except those which require a religious marriage for their nationals abroad and, to a certain
extent, Spain, recognize as valid a foreign marriage celebrated
in compliance with the formalities prescribed by the local
law. 84 Such compliance is compulsory according to the Eng82 France: Circulaire du Garde des Sceaux, Aug. 27, I879, Bull. Off. Min.
Just. I879, I46; Trib. civ. Seine {June 6, I893) Clunet I893, 88o; Trib. civ.
Angers (July 27, I896) and App. Angers (May 3I, I898) Clunet I898, 9II;
Cass. (civ.) (July 30, I9oo) S.I902.I.225, D.I90I.I.3I7, Clunet I9oo, 969;
App. Douai (Feb. 2, I899) Clunet I899, 825. The marriage of two Greeks,
celebrated according to their religious formalities at their legation, was held
valid by Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, I920) Revue I92I, 226, but the judgment
was reversed, Cour Paris (March I, I922) S.I924.2.65; cf. ARMIN JON, Revue
I926, I69; AuorNET, II Recueil I926 I 209.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 12, I889) 66 Sent. 169 (French parties in the
Anglican chapel of Puerto Rico).
83 lnfra pp. 255-259.
84 In most countries this rule is not questioned.
In Soviet Russia the statutes are interpreted to the same effect by FREUND
in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366, with some reservations, however.
In Spain the Supreme Court held on May I, I9I9, I46 Sent. I76 and again
on April 26, I929, I88 Sent. I286 concerning Spanish couples having married
in Argentina and Habana respectively, that non-Catholic Spaniards may
marry only in accordance with Spanish formalities before a Spanish consul or
vice-consul; LASALA LLANAS I07 and TRIAS DE BEs, in 3I Recueil I930 I 654,
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lish and American conflicts rules but optional under the laws
of most other countries.
The local form, including the proper officer 85 and the
proper ceremony, must be observed in its entirety as de.
termined by the law of the place of celebration. 86 In Morocco, Egypt, and parts of China, religious ceremonies are
customary but dependent on certain conditions with which
foreigners accordingly have to comply in order to satisfy
their national laws. On the other hand, Swiss authorities recognize a Japanese temporary marriage (the famous Madame Butterfly marriage), entered into by a Swiss national, as
valid without time restriction, the Swiss law disapproving
such restriction. 87
Under the Concordat of 1929 between Italy and the Holy
See, Italians may marry in Italy either in accordance with the
Civil Code or in accordance with the ecclesiastical ( "canonic") formalities, provided, however, that the ecclesiastical
marriage is recorded by an Italian civil officer. 88 Since this al673, and in his Sistema espafiol de derecho civil internacional, nos. II I, 112
state this to be the actual law, but restrict the unwelcome rule to the cases
where both parties are of Spanish nationality, or the man is a Spaniard and
the woman is not a national of the country of celebration. Moreover, in a
country prohibiting consular marriage the parties are believed to be free
to choose the local ceremony. GoLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 287 thinks that nonCatholic Spaniards may use a civil local form abroad if they have received
a certificate of acatholicy from the competent Spanish diplomatic agent or
Catholic parish.
For Eastern Poland, see supra n. 56, and for Turkey, SALEM, 7 Repert. 268
no. 221; but cf. GouLE, Mariage, 8 Repert. nos. 41, 288, and 382.
85 Where a French Catholic woman married an orthodox Serb in a Catholic
church in Yugoslavia, the marriage was held invalid in France, because according to the local law it should have been celebrated before an orthodox
priest; see Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, 1937) Revue Crit. 1937, 650.
The American decision in In re Lando's Estate (1910) 112 Minn. 257, 127
N.W.1125, is based upon the same principle. The court was mistaken, however, when it interpreted EG. art. 13 par. 3, as permitting a marriage in
Germany before a minister of a religious community. Cf. KESSLER, 1 Z.ausl.
PR. (1927) 865 n. r.
86 2 BEALE § 121.4; § 122.1.
87 Just. Dep., BBl. 1925, II 143.
88 Hence, an unrecorded religious ceremony performed in Italy will not be
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ternative does not exist outside of Italy, a marriage of Italian
nationals abroad before a Catholic priest is not valid, even
under the Italian conflicts law, unless it has been performed
in accordance with the formalities established by the forum. 89
Special problems: (a) Common law marriages. Since some
formal marriage ceremony is required in almost every
European country, 90 the question has been presented whether
the principle of locus regit actum could be extended to a common law marriage of nationals of a European country celebrated in a jurisdiction where common law marriage has not
been abolished. Despite objections, the validity of common
law marriages celebrated in the United States has been upheld not only by English courts 91 but also for their respective
nationals by the courts of Belgium, France, Germany, and
Italy. 92 Gretna Green marriages, too, have been recognized
in England 93 and other countries. 94
considered sufficient by a foreign court; cf. Austrian OGH. (May 21, 1937)
19 SZ. no. 166.
89
See Bosco, 2Z Rivista (1930) 469 ff.; FEDOZZI 419 ff.
90
Except until recently in Soviet Russia and in Scotland.
91
Rooker v. Rooker ( 1863) 3 Sw. & Tr. 526; In re Green, Noyes v. Pitkin
(1909) 25 T. L. R. 222. 1 JOHNSON 299, however, has express doubts concerning the validity of such marriages celebrated by domiciliaries of Quebec who
go abroad for this purpose.
92
Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 13, 1886) J.d. Trib. 1886, col. 311; App.
Bruxelles (July 29, 1909) Clunet 1912, 583; POULLET 419 no. 360; WIGNY,
58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1931) 341 at 346.
France: Continually so held since Cass. (req.) (Dec. 20, 1841) S.1842.1.32I;
see WErss, 3 Traite 531; Cass. (req.) (Jan. 13, 1857) S.I857-I.8I; Trib.
civ. Seine (April 20, 1891) Clunet 1891, 932; Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 3, 1894)
Clunet 1895, 374; Trib. civ. Seine (]an. 17, 1924) Revue 1925, 226; Cour
Paris (Nov. 20, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1050.
Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, 1932) 138 RGZ. 214, 218, IPRspr. 1932, no. 8 at
25; LG. Tiibingen (July 25, 1934) ]W. 1934, 2802, IPRspr. 1934, no. 57
at 130; RG. (April 7, 1938) 157 RGZ. 257 at 262, ]W. 1938, 1716.
Italy: Trib. Ariano (Feb. 4, 1898) and App. Napoli (March 31, 1898)
cited by FEDOZZI at 426 n. I, who himself requires that the conclusion of the
marriage be proved by an act of consent, excluding inference from the subsequent conduct of the parties. Trib. S. Angelo dei Lombardi (March 4, 1940)
32 Rivista (1940) 476.
93
Compton v. Bearcroft ( 1769) 2 Hag. Con. 444; Bach v. Bach [1927]
43 T. L. R. 493 (by implication).
94 Prussian Obertribunal (Jan. 15, 1855) 29 Entsch. Kgl. Ob. Trib. 380
no. 51.
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Furthermore, recorded marriages entered into by nonRussians in Soviet Russia have been recognized in other jurisdictions,95 and even non-recorded marriages have been declared valid by the German Reichsgericht on the ground that
it was often difficult for German parties resident in Russia
to reach a German consulate. 96 The court stated, however,
that strict proof that the marriage was a true marriage and
intended to be permanent was necessary in each case. 97
(b) Tribal marriage. As a rule, marriages of white persons, in accordance with the formalities of uncivilized native
tribes, are not recognized. 98 Colonial practice has, however,
recognized various exceptions. 99
(c) Marriage by proxy. Marriage by proxy, where permitted by the law of the place where the proxy participates
in the marriage ceremony, has been recognized in the United
States and in England. 100 A Turkish immigrant to the United
States, for instance, was allowed to marry by proxy a woman
living in his native country, thus enabling her to join him in
95 Czechoslovakia:

S. Ct. (1931) no. V. 10.644, 6 Z.ausi.PR. (1932) 448.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, 1927) Revue 1928, 332 (Spanish man
and Russian woman).
Germany: RG. (Oct. 22, 1930) JW. 1931, 1334, IPRspr. 1931, no. 57; RG.
(Oct. 26, 1932) 138 RGZ. 214 at 217, IPRspr. 1932, no. 8 at 25.
Switzerland: see BECK, NAG. 222 no. 12.
9 6 RG. (April 7, 1938) 157 RGZ. 262 at 265.
9 7 138 RGZ. at 218; 157 RGZ. at 266.
9BJn re Bethell, Bethell v. Hildyard (1888) 38 Ch.D. 220. Contra: Cour
Paris (April 24, 1926) D.1927.2.9 held void a marriage of a French explorer
in Mongolia and an American girl before a Belgian Catholic missionary, as
Mongols do not use religious marriages. This was, however, an unusual case
due to the remote place, see EsCARRA, ibid.; infra n. 179.
9 9 On French practice in Indo-China and Tunisia, cf. J. DoNNEDIHU DE
VABRES 447· On marriages of white persons and Indians in the United States
and Canada see GooDRICH 372; r JOHNSON 32o-327. On the very precarious
position of a white woman marrying a native in the British Empire or even
a member of an Oriental religion or of a Hindu caste, cf. memorandum of the
British Foreign Office transmitted by the British Consul in Berlin, printed in
StAZ. 1923, 31; see also 2 BERGMANN (ed. 2) 75·
100 See Restatement § 124. See LORENZEN, "Marriage by Proxy and the Con·
flict of Laws," 32 Harv. L. Rev. (1919) 473, 484; Barrons v. United States
et al. (1951) 191 F. (2d) 92; Apt v. Apt [1947] P. 127, affirmed by the Court
of Appeal [1948] P. 83.
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101

this country. A similar case was that of a German prisoner
of war in Morocco who married by proxy an Austrian woman in Austria. 102 Although section 124 of the Restatement
requires only that the absent party consent to the marriage,
Continental courts seem to require also that this consent be
expressed in advance in an instrument in writing, stating the
name of the other party. Provisions to this effect are contained in many codes, as for instance the Austrian and the
Cuban 103 and, for soldiers, in the new Italian Code. 104
If these precautions are taken, there is no room for the
objection that marriage by proxy does not fulfill the requirement of consent. The party for whom the proxy acts must
observe the regular form of consent. The proxy himself is no
more than a messenger, and whether or not a party may
express his consent by messenger is clearly a matter of formality.105
101 Cf. GooDRICH 353; United States ex rei. Modianos v. Tuttle ( I926) 12
F. (2d) 927; see also Clunet I929, 205. It is true that according to s. 28 (n.)
of the Immigration Act of May 26, I924, the terms "wife" and "husband" do
not refer to a proxy or picture marriage, but on the interpretation see HAcKWORTH, 2 Digest of International Law ( I94I) 367 s. I64. On the contrary,
Canadian federal and province authorities do not recognize any marriage by
proxy for the purpose of immigration; see note of the Canadian Government
to the German Government, 2 BERGMANN ( ed. 2) 78.
102 Opinion of the Saxon Government of May 24, I9I6, cited by LEWALD 86
no. 117.
1 3
0 AIIg. BGB. § 76, first sentence, abrogated in I938.
Cuba: C. C. art. 87.
In the Netherlands, BW. art. I 34 requires royal permission. DEUC.HLER,
"Die Handschuhehe im internationalen Privatrecht," Festschrift Raape ( I948)
83-92, 83 enumerates 27 countries.
104 C. C. ( I942) art. I 11.
See also the German war-time provisions of I9I6 and I939·
105
Cf. RAAPE I76, 255; but also 3 FRANKENSTEIN I 54· Apt v. Apt [I947J
P. I27, I47·
German writers are divided, whether to regard as places of the marriage
ceremony both the place where the proxy has been authorized by the
absent spouse and the place where the proxy participates in the ceremony
(DEUCHLER, Festschrift Raape, supra n. I04, 83-92; RAAPE, IPR. 242; LG.
Kiel (May 20, 1946) IPRspr. I945-I949 no. I9, IS Z.ausi.PR. (I949/5o) 578;
LG. Hamburg (July I4, I954) StAZ. 1955, 61) or whether only the place of
the ceremony is relevant (NEUHAus, 15 Z.ausi.PR. (1949/50) 58o; BEITZKE,
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Prevention of secret marriages. Elaborate precautions
have been taken in the municipal laws of Western and Central Europe to prevent prohibited and secret marriages. Marriages may not be celebrated without prior publication of
banns, and after celebration all marriages must be recorded
by civil officers. These acts, both that preceding and that following the main ceremony, are regarded as formalities 106
and, therefore, as a general principle, are governed by the
law of the state of celebration.101
(a) .Provisions by the state of celebration. To prevent
prohibited and secret marriages numerous countries endeavor to make sure that the marriage is not prohibited by
the personal law of the parties. Thus, banns are required to
be published not only at the place of celebration but also in
the country or countries where the parties reside or have resided at some time prior to their marriage. Foreigners are
commonly not permitted to marry unless they can show a
certificate of their own country that no impediment to the
marriage is known. 108
(b) Banns prescribed by the personal law. In addition,
some countries have established analogous provisions for
their nationals abroad. Under the French Civil Code, which
contains the prototype of all such regulations, a French national who intends to marry in a foreign land must, under
3 Jahrb. Int. Recht (1954) 162; M. WoLFF, IPR. 193; also DE NovA, 11 Giur.
Comp. DIP. (1954) 144; Apt v. Apt [1948] P. 83, 85, 88).
In Brazil, the admissibility of marriage by proxy is regarded as a question
of consent, subject, therefore, to the personal law of each of the future
spouses, AZEVEDO, 92 Revista Forense (1942) 61.
106 It is not true, as often alleged, that banns are considered part of the
formalities only in Germany but not in France.
101 This principle is followed in Switzerland by the regulation of banns in
the case of a foreign marriage of Swiss nationals; no banns are required
unless the authorities at the place of celebration ask for a Swiss certificate
showing no known impediment to marry, in which event banns are published
for the purpose of granting the certificate. See BBl. 1899, I 361 no. 4; id.
1912, I 507 no. 15; BEcK, NAG. art. 7c no. 95·
108 See below, p. 307.
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certain circumstances, have banns published in France, particularly if he has resided in France in the six months preceding his marriage/ 09 The Code itself imposes no sanction
for the performance of this duty. The courts, however, have
pronounced null the marriages of parties who intended to
keep their marriage a secret in France or who intended to
evade the prohibitions of French law. 110
Although the provisions of the French Code have been
copied by Italy, the Netherlands, anti other countries, few of
these countries 111 have followed the French decisions directed against fraude la loi, since the French courts have
interpreted these provisions in their peculiar manner and
have assumed discretionary powers of doubtful validity.
In reconciling these variations, the Hague Convention on
Marriage provided that the requirements of the national
law concerning publication must be observed, with the proviso that omission of publication does not invalidate the marriage except in a state whose law has been violated. 112

a

C. C. art,. r70 and 63.
(req.) (March 28, 1854) S.r854.1.295; Cass. {req.) (Nov. 20,
r866) S.r866.I.H2i Cass. {req.) (March 8, 1875) S.r875·1.171; Cass (civ.)
(June 15, r887) S.r89o.r.446; Cass. {req.) (July 5, 1905) Clunet 1906, 1145,
S.r9o6.r.r41, Revue 1905, 714; Cass (req.) (Jan. 3, 1906) Clunet 1906, 1149,
Revue 1907, 2rr; and particularly Cass. (civ.) (July 13, 1926) S.r926.r.263.
Cf. on this peculiar practice NIBOYET 725 ff. no. 6r6; Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 9,
1953) 43 Revue Crit. (1954) 389.
111 To the same effect as the French decisions:
Belgium: C. C. art. 170 as amended by law of July 12, 1931, art. 13. (Seems
clearly to require observance of the local foreign formalities only.)
Quebec: Durocher v. Degre ( 1901) 20 S. C. 456, criticized by Charbonneau,
J., in Hebert v. Clouatre ( 1912) 41 S. C. 249, 258 ff.
Contra: Italy: C. C. (r865) art. roo par. 2; C. C. (1942) art. 115; the
consequence of omission is not nullity but only a penalty, Cass. Napoli (June
26, r883) Legge r884.r.r4; App. Messina (Nov. 9, 1927) cited by FEDOZZI
419 n. 2; Trib. Pesaro (June 14, 1928) 21 Rivista (1929) 420. Cass. (Aug. 2,
1935) Rivista Dir. Pubbl. 1936, II 204.
The Netherlands: BW. art. 138 requiring banns is generally understood as
meaning banns in the Netherlands. Non-compliance was believed to result in
a nullity but not since the decision of the H. R. (May 31, 1872) W. 3484 and
the Law of July 7, 1906, S. no. 162, art. 6.
112
Hague Convention on Marriage of 1902, art. 5 par. 3, followed by
Sweden, Law of 1904, with subsequent amendments, c. r § 4 par. 2.
IOU
11

°Cass.
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(c) Recordation prescribed by the personal law. A French
national who had married abroad, moreover, had to have his
marriage recorded at his French place of residence within
three months after his return to France. 113 This provision of
the French Code has likewise been widely imitated. 114 No
sanction is provided, 115 except that the Portuguese provision
that a foreign marriage can be proved only if recorded in
compliance with law 116 has had some following. 117
A steadily increasing number of states in this country require residents who go elsewhere to be married and who
return to reside within the state, to file a certificate of their
marriage with the proper officer. 118
In the Soviet Union, a circular of the Commissariat of
Justice of the U.S.S.R. required all Soviet nationals marry113 French C. C. art. I7I, no cause of nullity; App. Aix (Dec. 20, I900)
Clunet I903, 639; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 27, I92I) Clunet I92I, 940. The
provision was abrogated by law of March Io, I938.
114 Belgium: C. C. art. I71.
Haiti: C. C. art. I 56.
Italy: C. C. (1865) art. IOI, abrogated by the new C. C. (I942).
Eritrea: C. C. art. 112.
Monaco: C. C. art. I39·
The Netherlands: BW. art. I39·
Neth. Indies: C. C. art. 84.
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. Io6, 525.
Venezuela: C. C. (I942) art. 103.
11 5 See for Belgium: App. Liege (April 8, I925) Clunet I926, 502; Italy:
Cass. Palermo (Aug. 5, I905) Foro Ital. I905, I, I443; I Rivista (1906) 586;
App. Mc;ossina (Nov. 9, I927) see supra n. 112.
116 Portugal: C. C. art. 2479 and Law of Dec. 25, I9IO, arts. 6o, 6I. CUNHA
GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 685 explains that the marriage is considered valid
as to effects in the country of celebration, and with respect to bigamy even
in Portugal.
1 17 The similar view of the former C. C. of Peru, art. 159, has been abandoned in the C. C. of 1936; cf. APARICIO y GoMEZ, 2 Codigo Civil, Concordancias 324 and 356 (14).
Mexico: C. C. for the Federal District and Federal Territories art. I6I
par. 2 is characteristic of laws declaring that the civil effect of the marriage
is retroactive to the time of the celebration only if it is recorded within
three months.
11 8 Maine Rev. Stat. (1954) c. I66 § 7; New Hampshire Rev. Laws (I955)
sec. 457.30; North Carolina Gen. Stats. (1950) § 51-2; Vermont Stats. (1947)
sec. 4I35; Virginia Code (1950) §20.29; West Virginia Code Ann. (1955)
c. 48 § 4692·
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ing abroad to have their marriages recorded at the office of
the diplomatic or consular representative of the U.S.S.R. But
the code of only one Soviet Republic, the Ukraine, has expressly declared compliance with this provision essential for
recognition of the marriage. 119
Defective celebration. The law of the place of celebration
establishes the formalities and what constitutes failure to
comply with them. It is universally agreed that the same law
also determines the effect of such failure of compliance on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.
It is interesting that this principle is more firmly settled
than two broader principles of which it would seem to be an
application.
First, it is fairly well established, although not without
some opposition, that the same law determines the causes as
well as the effects of the nullity of a marriage.120 This broader
rule, which includes formal and substantive requirements for
marriage, has been adopted by the Restatement§ 136:
"The law governing the right to a decree of nullity is the
law which determined the validity of the marriage with respect to the matter on account of which the marriage is alleged to be null."
In England these problems are ordinarily discussed under
the heading of jurisdiction. If, however, a marriage has been
celebrated abroad, English courts are prepared to respect the
119
Circular letter of July 6, 1923, no. 144, The Weekly for Soviet Justice
622; Ukrainian Family Law of 1926, art. 105; this provision seems not to
apply, however, unless both parties are Soviet citizens. Cf. FREUND, 4 LeskeLoewenfeld I 366-9. Dr. V. Gsovski states that the requirement is not in any
recent Soviet code and seems not to have been enforced.
120
Germany: RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. 161, IPRspr. 1931, no. 23;
OLG. Dusseldorf (Oct. 31, 1922) JW. 1923, 191; KG. (Jan. 29, 1934) DJZ.
1934, II58, IPRspr. 1934, no. 16.
France: Ch. civ. Douai (March 28, 1928) Clunet 1929, 400; Ch. civ.
Montpellier (June 21, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1062, cited by Gouu!, 9 Repert.
82 no. 423·
The Netherlands: see MuLDER 38, 109.
Switzerland: see GAUTSCHI, 27 SJZ. (1930-1931) 321. 325.
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jurisdiction of the forum loci actus, and therefore the result
now stated for the first time in modern form by Cheshire is
the same as that in other countries. 121
Second, the results of a formally defective transaction of
any kind are said to be determined by the law whose formalities have not been properly observed. 122
Although both general rules, and particularly the second,
have been opposed on the ground that either the law of the
forum or the lex causae should prevail, in the particular case
of a formally defective marriage the rule is virtually unchallenged.123 The forms of marriage vary too much, indeed,
for one jurisdiction to determine the sanctions for violating
the formal requirements of another.
Consequently, the law of the place of celebration determines whether or not a defect is material to the validity of
the marriage and, if so, whether it renders the marriage nonexistent, void, voidable, or annullable (whatever may be
meant by these terms) ; whether an omission can be cured
by some additional act, as for instance, recording or factual
121 See Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. 641; CHESHIRE
353-358.
122 See GooDRICH § 109; 2 ARMIN JON, no. 49·
128 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 115, RAAPE 183, I FRANKENSTEIN 561,
3 FRANKENSTEIN 183, and MANNL, I I Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 786, have advocated
the lex causae. RAAPE 186, and MANNL, however, admit that this theory is
impracticable for marriages, and it has been formally rejected "at least with
respect to the conclusion of marriage" by the Reichsgericht (June 22, 1931)
133 RGZ. 161, 165. Likewise, J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 461 seems to agree
that the Court of Montpellier (supra n. 121) was right, although he defends
the predominance of the personal law in determining sanctions for defects in
marriages in general. In still another opinion, it was thought that the law
more favorable to the marriage should be followed, but no decision seems
to have applied this illogical thesis.
However, a Jewish religious court in Palestine upheld a marriage, celebrated according to Jewish rites in Germany and therefore invalid under
German law, after the parties moved to Palestine, Neussihin v. Neussihin, 4
Law Reports of Palestine ( 1937) 373; cf. Tennenbaum v. Tennenbaum, 13
ibid. (1946) 201 and the note by TEDESCHI in I I Giur. Comp. DIP. (1954)
463.
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124

cohabitation;
and whether or not an annulment has retro125
active effect.
There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. The most significant exist in Switzerland. According to article I 3 I of the
Swiss Civil Code, no marriage may be annulled on the
ground of a formal defect, if it has been celebrated before a
public marriage officer. Nor may a Swiss court annul a marriage, unless the ground of nullity is also recognized by Swiss
municipal law. 126 Thus, a Swiss court will not annul a foreign marriage of Swiss nationals celebrated before a public
officer, although a formal defect invalidates the marriage
under the local law, nor will a foreign annulment in such case
be recognized in Switzerland. 127
Another exception exists in France. On the theory of "possession of status" (possession d' hat), article I 96 of the Civil
Code prohibits an annulment on the ground of formal defect,
when the marriage is commonly reputed to exist and the
record of celebration before a civil officer can be produced.
While the Court of Cassation has refused to apply this provision to marriages celebrated abroad/ 28 there is a tendency
to extend it to all marriages celebrated before a French civil
officer and to all marriages of French nationals. 129
124 In Starkowski v. Attorney General [1952] P. 135, affirmed by the
Court of Appeal [1952] P. 302 and the House of Lords [1954] A. C. 155, the
retroactive validation of a religious marriage in Austria by virtue of recordation under a special Austrian Order was recognized, though the parties
before the recording had acquired domicil in England. Reference was made
to Cour Bordeaux (Feb. 5, 1883) 10 Clunet (1883) 621, 623. Cf. Rb. Middelburg (Aug. 8, 1951) N. J. 1952 no. 508.
12s RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. 161, 165.
126 NAG. art. 7 f par. 2.
127 BECK, NAG. art. 7 f no. 172.
128 Cass. (req.)
(May 9, 1905) D.1905.1·367, Revue 1905, 349; followed
by Cour Paris (May 15, 1931) Gaz.Pal.I931.2.262; Trib. civ. Seine (March
15, 1932) Revue Crit. 1935, 436.
129 PILLET, I Traite 563 no. 265; LEREBOUR5-PIGEONN!ERE (ed. 4) 388 n. I.
Exceptional: Cour Paris (March 13, 1954) Gaz. Pal. 154 I 308 (marriage of
French woman with an Englishman before the English consul in Spain).
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Where the conflicts rule of the national law makes observance of the local ceremonies optional, a celebration, defective
under the law of the place of celebration, may be considered
valid in the homeland.
Evasion of formalities. Apart from the requirements of
some countries concerning publication and recording by their
nationals (see above at page 244), parties are generally
free to choose for an intended marriage a place anywhere in
the world and may thus avoid the formalities prescribed in
their own country:
"No exception is made to the principle even where the sole
object of the parties in marrying in a foreign country has
been to evade some troublesome formal requirement of their
lex domicilii." 180
This is a rule well recognized in England and in all other
countries not prescribing compulsory religious marriage.
An occasional exception exists where, as in Arkansas, 131 a
marriage out of the state is not recognized, unless the parties
actually resided in the foreign state or country at the time of
the marriage.

5. Religious Ceremony Considered Essential by the Personal
Law

Point of view of the personal law: (a) Foreign civil marriage. Those countries which consider marriage essentially a
religious institution, such as Greece, Liechtenstein, et cetera, 132 treat as null and void a marriage celebrated abroad
by one of their own subjects in accordance with civil formalities. This rule has been expressed repeatedly by the highest
authorities of Czarist Russia 183 as well as by the attorney
18

°CHESHIRE 323.

Ark. Stats. ( 1947) sec. 55-uo.
See supra p. 230.
133 Decisions of the Cassation Departments, penal, x889, no.

131
132

2;

civil, 1899,
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general of Greece/34 who in an opinion stated that such a
marriage is simply nonexistent, i.e., that anyone may invoke
its validity, no decree of nullity being necessary.
The Hague Convention on Marriage (art. 5 par. 2) expressly reserved to the states prescribing religious formalities the right to treat marriages celebrated abroad by their
nationals in disregard of such prescriptions as invalid.
(b) Foreign religious marriage. Under Greek law a
Greek national may marry abroad in accordance with the formalities of his church, no matter what the local law provides.135 A similar rule was in force for subjects of Czarist
Russia. 136 In other countries, such as Croatia, which was
governed by the older Austrian law, a foreign marriage of
Catholic nationals had to comply with the formalities established by the Catholic church at the place of celebration. 137
Point of view of the local law. Where a Greek national
marries before a civil officer in Germany and does not go
through an additional religious ceremony, the marriage is
valid in Germany and invalid in Greece. 138 This situation is
apt to give rise to puzzling problems under the law of the
country where the celebration took place, i.e., Germany. It
has been held that such a "limping marriage" (matrimonium
no. 39; of the first Plenary Meeting of the Senate, Aug. u, 191 I; Circular of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Representatives in Germany of
February 25, 1889, no. 1384; Decree of the Consistorium of St. Petersburg,
May 20, I9Il; cited according to MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 488 n. 105.
134 Opinion of Mr. GIDOPOULos, procurator at the Areopague, to the Ministry of Justice, no. 54 (Dec. 28, 1936) Clunet 1937, 902; for the literature
and cases in point see 2 STREIT-VALL!NDAS 317 n. 32.
135 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 321: a Greek may marry a Bulgarian girl before an
Orthodox priest in Germany.
136
MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfe\d I 488; MAKAROV, Precis 325.
137 See LovRu\ 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 1031, 1034. After World War II, a
uniform, secularized marriage law was introduced in all Yugoslavia (Law
of April 3, 1946).
This seems to be the rule in Colombia also, as art. I2 of Law 57 of April
I 5, 1887, declares that marriages celebrated according to the Catholic rites
produce a\1 civil and legal effects. Cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ III no. 202.
138
See supra n. 69.
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claudicans) can be dissolved by a German decree of divorce,
although generally divorce presupposes a marriage valid
under the personal law of the parties. 139 In this case, the
grounds for divorce are fixed exclusively by German law. But
many related questions are open to discussion. What happens if one of the parties marries another person in Greece?
Is he or she punishable for bigamy in Germany? And shall it
be held that remarriage is allowed even in Germany, since
German law provides that a person's capacity to marry is determined by his national law? 140 Prevailing German opinion
is to the effect that the marriage ought to be binding in Germany in every respect, the personal law notwithstanding. 141
Furthermore, if the female party to the marriage was a German national, she formerly, on account of the marriage, lost
her German nationality, 141a though she did not acquire that
of Greece.
While the same basic principle with regard to an English
marriage was clearly adopted in English precedents such as
the Papadopoulos case, a strange modification was caused by
recognizing a marriage annulment pronounced at the husband's foreign domicil for the mere reason that the marriage
lacks the proper ecclesiastic form. 141b Hence, after such foreign annulment, the wife cannot obtain her rights as a spouse
nor can she sue for divorce. 142 This attitude of the English
courts has been influential in Canada and Scotland. 143

Cf. KG. (Dec. II, 1933) JW. 1934, 619.
EG. art. 13 par. J,
See LEWALD III no. 158; NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 162; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 214;
RAAPE, IPR. 284.
Contra: RAAPE 383, 400·
141 a According to West German practice under the Bonn Constitution
( 1949) art. 3 par. 2 and art. II7 and under the East German Order of
August 30, 1954, § 2 par. x, the wife today would retain her German citizenship.
141 b In Chapelle v. Chapelle (1949) [1950] P. 134, Willmer, J., did not
recognize a Maltese nullity decree because only the husband was domiciled
in Malta.
142 See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," x6 Bell Yard
139

14 0
14 1
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Another problem concerns the consequences of such a marriage, valid under the law of the place of celebration and invalid under the personal law. Are marital property rights
and other incidents of the marriage governed by the personal
law of the parties, 144 although this law treats the parties as
not married? The more reasonable answer seems to be in
the affirmative, 145 because this is just the normal consequence
of considering the parties married.
Point of view of third countries. What is the position of a
third country when a conflict arises between the state of celebration and the national or domiciliary state of the parties?
The answer is clear when the third state adopts locus regit
actum as the absolute binding rule, which is the case in Great
Britain and the United States. A marriage celebrated by a
Greek citizen before a city recorder in San Francisco 146 is
certain to be recognized in England. On the other hand, a
religious marriage of the same man celebrated in France
would be considered invalid in the United States, because it
is invalid in France.
Where, however, a court must follow the national law of
the parties, ascribing to the law of the place of celebration
only an optional role, it is doubtful which law is applicable
when they are in conflict. Prevailing opinion favors the solution afforded by article 5 of the Hague Convention on Marriage according to which a marriage formally valid at the
place of celebration is formally valid in all third countries,
the national country alone being entitled to consider it void
( 1935) 15. Today, sec. 18 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, provides for
the jurisdiction of an English court; see infra p. 500.
143
See infra p. 453·
144
Cf. EG. arts. 14 ff.
145
See RAAPE IPR. 284, in conflict with KG. (May 3, 1937) JW. 1937,
2523, Bay. OLG. {April 20, 1955) 45 Rev. Crit. (1956) 86, and several
writers.
146
Case of OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 15, 1926) Hans.GZ. 1927, Beibl. 4,
IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 28.
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because of the lack of a religious ceremony. On the basis of
this rule, the Reichsgericht recognized as valid in Germany
a marriage celebrated before a civil officer in Brazil between
a Turkish national of Roman Catholic faith and a stateless
woman who had once been a national of Prussia, non-recognition of the marriage under existing Turkish law notwithstanding.147 It also upheld a marriage entered into before a
Norwegian civil officer by a Greek national of Orthodox
faith and a Norwegian woman. 148 The Swedish statute and
the C6digo Bustamante have adopted the same rule/ 49 and
French and Belgian decisions are to the same effect. 150
In the opposite case of a marriage invalid in form under
the law of the place of celebration, article 7 of the Hague
Convention provides that it "may" be recognized by third
countries, if the formalities of the national law or laws of
both parties are satisfied. A marriage celebrated in accordance with the religious ceremony prescribed by the personal
law, but not in compliance with the civil formalities of the
place of celebration, is regarded as valid in France, Germany,
and the other countries following the optional rule. 151
141 RG.
148 RG.

(April 6, 1916) 88 RGZ. 191.
(Oct. 1, 1925) ]W. 1926, 375, IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 27. See also
OLG. Karlsruhe (April 18, I9I7) 35 ROLG. 343; OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 15,
I926), supra n. I46.
Contra: RAAPE 253, 172; 3 FRANKENSTEIN I60.
149 Sweden: Law of I904 with amendments, c. I § 6.
C6digo Bustamante art. 4I.
150 Belgium: Antwerp (April 20, I927) Clunet I928, 488; (Pole whose
national law required religious ceremony and Belgian woman marrying before the registrar in London): Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 3I, I925) Clunet
I926, soo.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. IS, I922) Clunet I922, 396; Trib. civ. Seine
(June I7, I927) Revue I928, 332; Trib civ. Seine (April 27, I933) Revue
Crit. 1935, 759·
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7 f, whereby marriages celebrated abroad are valid
if in accordance with the law of the place of celebration, is applied also to
foreigners by STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. w, and others, but interpreted otherwise by BECK, NAG. 230 no. 48.
151 France: PILLET, I Traite 552 no. 259; BASDEVANT, Revue I9D8, 284 (on
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Except for this instance of reference to the personal law,
the few countries which require their subjects to follow a
religious ceremony even when marrying abroad find themselves isolated. Their requirements are observed neither by
the countries of celebration 151a nor by third countries. The
difficulties involved are illustrated by such cases as the recent
sequel to the famous Papadopoulos case, which revealed a
first marriage in England and a second in Greece, the man
being married to two women for ten years. 152
6. Other Tests

Foreign consular marriage: (a) In general. We have had
occasion to deal with the position of the forum as concerns
marriages at which a consular or diplomatic agent of a foreign power has officiated within the territory of the forum. 153
Consent by the receiving country to such official action of a
foreign representative is indicated either by liberal custom, as
for instance, in France or Greece, or by an express clause of
an international treaty. Now we are concerned with the
status of a "consular" (or "diplomatic") marriage in the
sending state.
Recently, the institution of consular marriage has been
used primarily by Europeans and Americans marrying in
Oriental countries, where marriage forms depend on the various religious denominations or national groups. Treaties aloccasion of an Austrian decision) ; AUDINET, II Recueil I926 I 202 If., LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 35I no. 325.
Germany: EG. art. I3 par. I; art. II par. I.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Dec. IS, 1913) Revue 1914, 6II, approved by
PoULLET 428 no. 367.
151 a Cour Alexandrie (April 9, 1950) 6 Revue egypt. (I95o) 236, holding
void one of the numerous marriages between Orthodox Greeks and Catholic
Italians, celebrated in Egypt before a Catholic minister, has not been followed: Trib. Alexandrie (June 23, I953, Feb. 23, I954) 9 Revue egypt.
( 1953) I 58, 10 ibid. I5I, the latter invoking the ordre public.
152 Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos (no. 2) (I935) [1936] P. 108; cf. supra
n. 68 for the first Papadopoulos case [I93o] P. 55·
153
Supra pp. 237-239·
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lowing representatives of Western powers to exercise nonlitigious jurisdiction have partly superseded the old system of
capitulations. The recent increase in provisions concerning
consular marriages, however, seems to indicate other needs.
Switzerland, for instance, though generally prohibiting consular marriages, specially authorizes her representatives to
officiate when located in remote countries or when Swiss nationals are unable to marry according to local formalities and
the country of celebration is not likely to object. 154 Thus, relief might be given a Swiss couple who had obtained a divorce in Switzerland and wished to remarry each other in
Spain, since Spain, ignoring the divorce, could make no
technical ceremony of remarriage available to them, although a form of reconciliation is in such case provided. 155
A remarkable concession for the sake of international cooperation was made by the participant states in the Hague
Convention on Marriage. By article 6, paragraph 1, second
sentence, the signatory powers bound themselves not to oppose a diplomatic marriage, even though it would offend their
own laws on remarriage or religious impediments. Thus, if
both parties are aliens, the second marriage of a divorce or
even the marriage of an ordained Catholic priest is valid,
although it would otherwise be considered repugnant to local
policy. 156 In England, also, foreign marriages of aliens, celebrated before the consul of their common country, are regarded as valid, notwithstanding their invalidity according
to the law of the place of celebration. This concession to the
154 Cf. Swiss Rev. Consular Regulation of Oct. 26, 1923, art. 63. This was,
indeed, the situation in Peru for non-Catholics until the Law of Dec. 23,
1897·
Cf. German RG. (June 9, 1883) 9 RGZ. 393 at 402.
And in Turkey for parties of different religions until the Civil Code of
1926; see SALEM, 7 Repert. 268 no. 220.
155 BBl. 1919, IV. 310, no. 21.
156 WALKER 656, and others very inappropriately call this concession
strange.
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law of nationality is masked by the fiction that the parties
have met on extraterritorial territory. 157
(b) Authority granted by the sending state. As a condition of consular marriage, the solemnizing official must be
empowered by his own state to officiate at marriages in general or at specific marriages. Such authority is given either by
law, as in Great Britain, France, and Italy/ 58 or by administrative acts based on legislation, as in Germany. 159 A few
states do not allow their agents any such function. 16° Consular officers of the United States are authorized to witness
and certify marriages if the parties are domiciliaries of the
District of Columbia, a territory, Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or if they are United States citizens domiciled
abroad. 161 Other countries require either that both parties be
their subjects 162 or that at least one party belong to the send157

See FosTER, 65 Recueil I938 III 444, no. 25.
Great Britain: Foreign Marriage Act, I892, I947·
France: C. C. art. 48; Decree of Oct. 26, I939·
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. 368; Law on Consular Jurisdiction (Jan. 28, I866)
art. 29, 36-41.
159
Germany: Laws of May 4, I87o, §I; Feb. 6, I875, § 85; Law on Consular Jurisdiction of April 7, I900, § 36 par. 2.
Switzerland: C. C. art. 4I par. 3; Rev. Consular Regulation (supra n. I 54).
160 Austria was in this group, see WALKER 647 (whose mention of Sweden
and Portugal, however, is wrong).
Argentina seems disinclined to allow diplomatic marriages; see ENNIS,
Derecho lnternacional Privado (I953) I93 n. 4· Likewise: Guatemala, cf.
Trib. civ. Seine (March I5, I932) Revue Crit. I935, 436; El Salvador, cf. I5
Bull. Inst. Int. (I926) I6o. Venezuela: TOVAR-LANGE, Los Matrimonies Celebrados en Embajadas, Legaciones o Consulados (I948). On Colombia see
RESTREPO HERNANDEZ III, § 200 n. I; on Peru, ROGER, 7 Repert. 30 no. 53·
A survey in NASCIMENTO, "El Matrimonio Consular," 57 Revista Der. Int.
(1950) I7I.
161
Congressional Act of I86o, Rev. Stat. § 4082, 22 U. S. C. II72 (I949),
Code of Fed. Regulations, Title 22 § I09. I4, 15 (I949); Mass. Gen. Laws
(I932) II c. 207 §43; Conn. Gen. Stat. (I930) c. 276, § 5I50. The solemnization of marriages is expressly forbidden by the State Department, Code of
Fed. Regulations 22 § I09.I3 (I949); cf. PARRY, "A Conflict Myth: The
American 'Consular' Marriage," 67 Harv. L. Rev. (I953/54) II87-I2I2.
162 The Netherlands: Consular Law of July 25, I87I, as redrafted on July
IS, I887; Spain: C. C. art. IOO par. 3; Portugal: Law of Dec. 25, I9IO, art.
58 § 2, etc.
158
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ing state. 163 Still others permit consular marriage even of
foreign couples; Great Britain does so when the country of
celebration consents and both parties are nationals of the
same country/ 64

Illustration: France,
of marriage between a
before a French consul
invalid in France; 165 it

not having authorized a celebration
French party and a Bulgarian party
in Bulgaria, declares such marriage
is therefore invalid in Bulgaria too.

States should not be entirely free, however, and most
states do not feel free, to fix the permissibility of consular
marriages. In case both parties are not nationals of the sending state or, at least, where one party is a subject of the receiving state, the consent of the latter istate should be required. A satisfactory rule has been laid down by the Hague
Convention on Marriage, article 6 paragraph I, first sentence:
"In respect of formalities the marriage is to be recognized
everywhere, if it is concluded before a diplomatic or consular
representative in conformance with the laws of his country,
provided that neither of the spouses is a citizen of the state
where the marriage is celebrated and that this state does not
oppose the celebration." 166
163 France: C. C. art. 170 pars. 2 and 3, as completed by the Decree of
March 8, 1937 ( Clunet 1937, 649), listing remote non-Christian countries
only; Germany: (supra n. 159) including denizens; Great Britain: Foreign
Marriages Order in Council, 1913, arts. I, 2. Switzerland: Bundesrat requires
as to marriages in China that the husband be a national, BEcK, NAG. 223
no. 19. The Belgian law of July 12, 1931, art 7 par. 2 permits by exception
marriages between Belgian men and foreign women "in the countries where
the local legislation prevents the celebration of marriages of the kind." Perhaps the idea is related to that prevailing in Switzerland (supra n. 154).
164 See Bailet v. Bailet (1901] 17 T. L. R. 317.
165 Cf. Trib. civ. Seine (May 7, I937) with note in Clunet I938, 522, 525:
Trib. civ. Seine (March IS, 1932) Revue Crit. 1935, 436 (marriage celebrated before Guatemalan consul in Paris, who acted without authorization
from his government, declared void).
1 6 6 This provision is supplemented by arts. 6 and 7· Sweden: Law of 1904
with amendments, c. I § 7 adopted the same solution. Great Britain and Belgium, supra n. 163; and Italy: Consular Law of Jan. z8, I866, art. 29, take
into consideration the consent of the receiving state.
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Section 126 of the Restatement requires more simply that
the marriage should be performed "in accordance with the
law of the country where it takes place or with a treaty to
which that country is a party."
Unfortunately many states are not so considerate. 161
A peculiar feature of a few laws is that a religious minister
may be authorized to ofliciate. 168
The treaties are as varied as the statutes or customs of the
sending states. Usually they require either that both parties
belong to the sending state 169 or that one be a national or
domiciliary of the sending state, the other belonging to a
third state. 170
(c) Law of third states. Except for article 6, paragraph
I, of the Hague Convention, courts will, according to the
principle of lex loci celebrationis, follow closely the position
taken by the local law. 171 In this regard, section I 26 of the
Restatement expresses a rule of universally settled law. But
it must be borne in mind that most countries are satisfied
when the marriage form agrees with their own municipal
lG 7 Particularly Great Britain (cf. Hay v. Northcote, supra n. 76), although Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, s. 19, instructs the officer to refuse to
perform the marriage if the celebration would be contrary to the rules of
international private law or to the principles of international comity.
168 Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (1949) c. 365 § 7303.
Sweden: Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. I, § 5 par. 2, § 8.
Norway: Laws of May 19, 1922 and of June 2I, I935·
Denmark: Order of June 12, I950.
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, sec. 3 par. 2, sec. 6 par. 2.
169 See, for instance, the treaties of Germany with Italy (May 4, I89I),
Soviet Union (Oct. 12, I925), Panama (Nov. 2I, I927), Lithuania (Oct. 30,
I928), South Africa (Sept. I, I928), Bulgaria (June 4, I929), Turkey (May
28, 1929), and Haiti (MarchIo, I93o), the treaties with Bulgaria (art. I9)
and Turkey (art. 18) containing marriage regulations and the others conferring the right of the most favored nation. Recently the consular treaty between Greece and Lebanon (Oct. 6, 1948) 87 U. N. Treaty Series 35I, art. I9
par. 2.
170 See, for instance, the three consular conventions between the three Baltic
States of July 12, I92I (11 League of Nations Treaties (I922) 87, 99; 25
ibid. (I924) 299) art. I5.
171 This is the widely prevailing opinion; contra: 2 ZITELMANN 6I3 and
LEWALD in STRUPP, I Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatic 264.
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prescriptions. Hence, if both parties belong to the same state,
it suffices to observe the regulations of this state and, if they
are subjects of different states, to comply with the formalities
of both states. 171 a
(d) Ceremony. Respecting details of the ceremony, the
rules of the sending state are customarily followed in a
diplomatic marriage, 172 although Soviet law does not respect
this custom. 173
Marriage on the high seas. Insofar as the law of the place
of celebration is competent, marriages on board ship on the
high seas are governed by the law of the flag. 174 This rule
seems to be universally accepted. Most domestic laws, however, are reluctant to authorize such marriages on their own
vessels. Great Britain allows captains of vessels to officiate,
provided the parties were unable to take advantage of a local
law or consular intervention. 175 In the United States, it is
generally held that the marriage is valid, if in conformance
with the law of the shipowner's domicil. 176 To be sure, the
law of the flag may permit marriage by mere consent. 177
Marriage in remote places. The validity of a marriage per
verba de praesenti has been admitted where there was no
means of solemnizing the marriage under some local law,
e.g., in the Far East, 178 although there is less doubt about its
validity if an ordained priest or minister is present. 179
Cf. Cour Paris (March 13, 1954) Gaz. Pal. 1954 I 308.
C6digo Bustamante art. 42.
173 See MAKAROV, Precis 328.
174 Restatement §§ 127 and 45·
175 Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, § 12; and Foreign Marriages Order in
Council, 1913, art. 20(2); R. v. Anderson (1868) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 161.
176 See GooDRICH 355·
177 Cf. Fisher v. Fisher (1929) 250 N. Y. 313, 165 N. E. 460. See HAcKWORTH, 2 Digest of International Law ( 1941) 371 § 165.
178 See with respect to Japan: BATY, op. cit. supra n. 75 at xo6-109; China:
Wolfenden v. Wolfenden [1946] P. 61; Singapore: Isaac Penhas v. Tan Soo
Eng [1953] A.C. 304.
179 England: Lord Campbell in R. v. Millis ( 1843-1 844) 10 Cl. & Fin. 534,
171 a
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Military marriages abroad. Soldiers serving abroad in
time of peace or war, if allowed to marry at all, usually enjoy special privileges. There may be a special marriage officer, or soldiers may be allowed to marry by proxy or even
by their own written declaration filed at the marriage office
of the bride. 180
In France it is provided that only French soldiers with
brides of French nationality may appear before a civil officer
of the army, while foreigners have to comply with the local
formalities. 181 Military marriages abroad with a foreign woman have been held invalid by local courts as well as in third
countries for lack of compliance with the local form. 182

IV.

CoNCLUSIONs

This subject has presented an excellent illustration of the
thesis that a uniform conflicts rule is easily obtainable despite
fundamental differences in municipal legal systems-pro786; Catterall v. Catterall (I847) I Rob. Ecc. 580. Cf., on the ecclesiastical
form, Culling v. Culling, Law Rep. [I896] P. u6.
Canada: Re Sheran (I899) 4 Terr. L. R. 83; cf. Connolly v. Woolrich &
Johnson (I867) I I L. C. J. I97, I R. L. (K. B.) 253 (involving the Indian
marriage of a white man with an Indian woman). See also I JoHNSON 32I.
180 The method last mentioned was introduced by a recent German regulation of Nov. 4, I939, RGBI.I 2I63, §§ 13, I4: marriage in the absence of the
husband, which consists of separate declarations of the parties without proxy.
181 C. C. art. 93 par. 3, as amended by Law of Dec. 20, I922. The British
regulations do not apply to all parts of the army. E.g., the Foreign Marriages
(China) Order in Council, I938, excludes the solemnization by a marriage
officer in China of marriages between parties either of whom is serving in
China in His Majesty's Naval or Military Forces or the Royal Air Force.
182
Trib. civ. Bruxelles (July 9, I949) 79 Clunet (I952) 304 (marriage of
German officer with Belgian woman before German military court in Belgium); Bezirksgericht Andelfingen (Switzerland) (May I8, I949) 46 SJZ.
(I9SO) I4I (marriage of German officer with Swiss woman before German
military court in Rumania). Contra: The Court of Appeal saved the ceremony
of a Polish officer with a Polish woman celebrated before a Polish army
chaplain in Italy and invalid there as well as under the Polish law of the
parties' domicil as a "Common Law marriage": Taczanowska v. Taczanowski [1957] 2 All E.R. 563.
Marriages before the occupation authorities were expressly authorized in
Germany by Law of the Control Council no. 52 of April 2I, I947 (Marriage
Law of I946, § ISa) and were validated in Austria (Law of May 2I, I947).
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vided that these differences do not prevent mutual tolerance.
The only serious disturbance in this harmony is attributable
to the attachment of a few countries to the traditional claims
of certain religious denominations. In view of the general development in the last century and a half, such perseverance is
hardly justifiable, although it reflects deserved gratitude for
the civilizatory work of the churches during many centuries.
Catholic countries such as Austria, Italy, Colombia, and Ecuador, which at present have or had a short while since marriage rules largely accommodated to the conceptions of the
Roman Church, nevertheless agree in the conviction that
their nationals should not be prevented from using the marriage ceremonies that are legal in foreign countries. The
Spanish Supreme Court, criticized by the literature, requires
Spanish nationals to marry at the consulates, but not on the
ground of religious law.
It may be hoped that the period of readjustment following the present war will stimulate reconsideration of these
basic problems of international relations.

CHAPTER

8

Substantive Requirements for Marriage
I.

SURVEY

r. Terminology

N THE traditional language of the canon law and most
modern codifications, marriage requirements not concerned with formalities are labeled "impediments ( obstacles) to marriage." According to their effect upon the
validity of the marriage, they are divided into impediments
merely capable of postponing its celebration-impedimenta
impedientia, directory requirements-and those rendering
the marriage void or voidable-impedimenta dirimentia,
mandatory requirements. This division is well known in
every law. ( Cf. Restatement §§ 9, I 22.)
The term "requirements," which is frequently used today,
is more convenient and more correct, because it includes the
conditions of consent to marry, while "impediments" fails to
include defects of consent.
"Capacity" to marry far from covers the whole concept.
It denotes the general ability of a person to marry at all, for
instance as defined by requirements of age and parental consent, but it does not refer clearly to an individual's being permitted to marry a specific person or a person of a determinate class. Nor does the term, capacity, include the requirement of sufficient consent of the parties; for this reason, in
the text of the Hague Convention on Marriage, article I, the
words "The capacity to contract marriage" were replaced by
"The right to contract marriage." 1 As short terms, however,
both terms are and may be used.

I

1 For this discussion see decision of the German RG. (Dec. 15, 1930)
IPRspr. 1931, no. 58 at 119.
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2.

Two Rival Basic Principles

Not only are the municipal rules on intrinsic requirements
of marriage extremely different, but also the rules relating to
the conflict of municipal laws are confusingly varied. A few
observations may help us to find our way.
There are two main principles, both coming from the
statutists:
(a) One principle, represented in its purest form by the
dominant conflicts law of the United States, points to the law
of the place of celebration; a marriage good where contracted is good everywhere, and vice versa. The practice of
applying this maxim, 2 which clearly originated in the ordinary contract theory,S to the substantive requirements of a
contract creating a status, was in defiance of the traditional
doctrine of status. The reason for this custom is perhaps that
the machinery of marriage licensing has seemed inadequate
to meet the unknown laws of the respective domicils of the
parties. And an avowed purpose of the principle has always
been to make marriage possible for persons who could not
marry under their domiciliary laws.
(b) In the European systems, the personal law of the
parties controls the intrinsic requirements. Under this system
the personal law may be determined either by the domicil or
by the nationality of the parties, as the status rule may be.

Illustration: A sixteen-year-old girl of Serbo-Yugoslavian
nationality is married in Michigan. She has capacity to marry
under rule (a) and also according to English law based on
domicil (under rule b) but is incapable according to her national law applied under rule b.
By certain regulations, however, both these points of contact, and sometimes even that of the place of celebration as a
2 ULRICH HUBER, De conflictu legum in diversis imperiis, no. 8 (GUTHRIE,
translation of SAVIGNY 512) "Si licitum est eo loco, ubi contractum et celebratum est, ubique validum erit effectumque habebit."
a See JoHANN STEPHAN PuTTER, 3 Auserlesene Rechtsfiille, part I (Gottingen, 1777) §§ 11-1 5·
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third element, are combined with each other, with obscure
complexities resulting from the combination. Other serious
complications are bound to arise under this system when the
personal laws of the parties are different.
3· Influence of Public Policy
Both basic principles have proved one-sided, each being
closely limited by numerous exceptions. Whatever principle
a country may have adopted, there will be a marked tendency
not to apply a foreign marriage rule which conflicts with the
matrimonial law of the forum. Marriage is one of the favorite objects of tenacious local custom and of more or less
singular enactments. Once almost every town in Central Europe had its own law of marriage. Although centralizing
states have always succeeded in unifying a multitude of matrimonial systems with almost no resistance except for the
claims of churches, still each existing international private
law is influenced (and if we except the United States, even
greatly influenced) by the idea that its domestic rules alone
are morally justified and form an indispensable gift to its
own subjects. If we observe how varied marriage laws are
and how antiquated or arbitrary many of them appear, we
understand the reluctance of states to recognize each other's
laws.
The matter is further complicated because more than one
country may be involved, and in consequence different countries may apply their own public policies. There is the country
where the parties intend to marry, the country which considers one or both of the spouses its subjects, the country where
a lawsuit for annulment is brought, the country where recognition of the marriage or recognition or execution of an annulment is sought, and there may be other countries interested in the status of children.
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The question of public policy depends on which of the two
basic principles mentioned is adopted.
Under the main principle accepted in the United States,
the substantive requirements for marriage are determined by
the law of the state where the marriage is to be or has been
celebrated. But apart from certain elementary exceptions,
such as the rejection of polygamous and incestuous bonds,
there has appeared a "substantial" and "growing" body of
cases to protect the law of the domicil of the parties. 4 Moreover, important legislative attempts have been initiated to
curb "evasions" of the domiciliary policy of marriage.
In various other countries on the American continent,
where the same basic principle prevails, the influence of the
personal law has made itself felt even more pronouncedly.
Conversely, in a country allowing foreigners to marry only
if the marriage is not prohibited by their domiciliary or national laws, additional requirements are established to satisfy
local public policy (prohibitory public policy) and certain
foreign prohibitions are disregarded as offending the local
order (permissive public policy).
The phenomena mentioned above will be treated in the following pages. The situation arising when the validity of a
marriage is examined in a lawsuit or when a foreign judgment on its validity or invalidity is presented for recognition,
will be dealt with separately, since the problem is essentially
the same for intrinsic and formal requirements.
4· Ecclesiastical Courts
A particular position is taken by ecclesiastical courts of all
faiths. As the churches claim universal efficacy for their rulings, the tribunals constituted by them apply their own laws
4 See Note, 26 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1913) 536 and GoODRICH 356; BEALE and
others, "Marriage and the Domicil," 44 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1931) 501, 527, n. S5,
notice "a growing consciousness of the power of the domicil."
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exclusively, irrespective of whether the marriage is celebrated in one country or another. Conflicts rules are lacking,
and in some parts of the world the resultant confusions are
considerable. 5

II.
1.

LAW OF THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION

The Principle

The United States. In the United States, 6 the law of the
place of celebration has greater influence on the substantive
requirements of marriage than in any other country. In this
country, this law is applied by the marriage officials and
judges of the state where the marriage is to be or has been
celebrated, by the courts of the state or states where the parties had their domicils at the time of the marriage, and finally
by the courts of any other state. In other words, from the
standpoint of the domiciliary state or the standpoint of the
state of celebration, the rule is the same for domestic and
foreign marriages and for domiciliaries as well as for foreigners.
Philippines. The Civil Code of I 949 (art. 7 I), under
strong American influence, provides for the validity of all
marriages if valid where contracted abroad. However, foreigners celebrating marriage in the Philippines have to comply with the requirements of their nationallaw. 6 a
Argentina and others. The law of the place of celebration
has also been adopted in a group of Latin-American countries but its application is greatly restricted, as each of these
countries requires those persons whom it regards as its sub5 On Bulgaria, cf. DANEFF, 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (I938) 5; on Palestine,
GOADBY 143 ff., and supra p. 248 n. I24·
6 Restatement § I2I. Cf. BisHoP, 1 New Commentaries on Marriage
§§ 84I ff.; I WHARTON § I65a; MINOR § 73; 2 BEALE §§ 121.2 1 I2I.6, I2I.7;
KESSLER, I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 858 n. 5·
sa C. C. ( 1949) art. 66 implicitly by requiring a certificate of legal capacity
to marry by the respective diplomatic or consular official before a marriage
license can be issued; cf. SALONGA 239·
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jects (by domicil or nationality, respectively) when marrying
abroad to observe all its prescriptions or a large number of
them. This group includes Argentina, 7 Guatemala, 8 Paraguay, Peru, and Costa Rica. 9 In this spirit the Treaty of
Montevideo of 1889 (art. II), recast in 1940 (art. 13 par.
I), formulates the principle as follows:
The capacity of persons to contract marriage, the form and
the existence and the validity of the marriage act, are determined by the law of the place where it is celebrated.
The article enumerates a number of essential defects on account of which annulment may be sought, provisions with
which we shall deal later. The main rule for substantive requirements seems, however, unqualified with respect to the
marriage of two foreigners. In this case, the rule is applied
regardless of whether the marriage takes place within or
without the country. The same result was implicitly adopted
by the Civil Code of Mexico for the Federal District 10 but
has not been repeated in the Code of 1932.
Chile and others. In another group of Latin-American
countries, a formula has been adopted similar to that of
Chile, as follows :
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with
the laws thereof, or with the Chilean laws, shall have in
Chile the same effects as if it had been celebrated on Chilean
territory. (C.C. art. 119 par. r.)
Apparently, an option is granted between local and national
law with respect to formalities as well as other requirements.
7 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 2, relating not merely to formalities as some writers have suggested; see ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 99; 2
Vrco no. 13; RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 277 and 2 Manual 30.
8 Guatemala: Law on Foreigners ( 1936) art. 36. See MATOS no. 228 at
342, 343·
9 Paraguay: Marriage Law {1898) art. 2;
Peru: C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. V, par. 2;
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9 {by implication) ; see ORTIZ 294·
1 C. C. (1884) art. 174; (1928) art. 161.

°
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But the more recent Chilean Law on Civil Marriage, of
January ro, r884 (art. 15 par. r), simply states:
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with
the laws thereof shall have in Chile the same effects as if it
had been celebrated on Chilean territory.
This text seems to indicate that requirements, both formal
and substantive, are controlled by the local law alone,
whereas Chilean subjects, according to an additional paragraph, must in addition obey the "prescriptions" or (in a
more recent wording) the "prohibitions" of the Chilean marriage law.
This group of countries, 11 therefore, seems to join the
group discussed above.
Brazil's recent law ( 1942), going over to the domiciliary
principle, contains two provisions: 12 In the case of any marriage celebrated in Brazil, Brazilian law is applicable to mandatory requirements ( impedimentos dirimentes) and formalities. In case the parties have different domicils, the validity of the marriage is governed by the law of the first
marital domicil. In the light of the foregoing parallels the
language suggests that marriages celebrated in Brazil are
exclusively governed by Brazilian law-correspondingly
with the rule in this country-but that capacity to marry in
foreign countries is determined according to the common
domicil of the parties rather than to the place of celebration.
The only available comment by a Brazilian author, however,
transfers from the system of the Hague Convention to the
11 Ecuador: C. C. art. I04 par. I is similar to the older Chilean text; it is
added, as it was formerly in the Argentine C. C. art. I64, that any annulment of a foreign marriage by an ecclesiastical authority must be respected.
Uruguay: C. C. (I868 as amended I893 and I9I4) art. IOI, par. 1 and Act
of May 22, I885, are certainly to the same effect, as Uruguay is a participant
in the Montevideo Treaty.
12 Lei de Introdm;ao ( I942) art. 7 §§ I and 3·
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new rules the consideration of the impediments established
by the nationallaws. 13
The obscurity of drafting in all these enactments is regrettable.
Denmark. In Denmark, likewise, the primary rule refers
to the law of the place of celebration. This rule is not exclusive, however, since a marriage official may not preside at
the marriage of two nonresident foreigners, if some impediment established by one of the domiciliary laws is proved to
him. 14 But where a person domiciled in Denmark enters upon
a marriage in a foreign country, the Danish law does not
claim any influence, unless a strong public policy, such as
that regarding bigamy or incest, requires attention. 15
C6digo Bustamante. A singular application of the law of
the place of celebration is made by article 48 of the C6digo
Bustamante. While this code invokes as a general principle
the personal law of the parties, article 48 provides that coercion, fear, and abduction as causes of nullity of marriage are
governed by the law of the place of celebration.
Switzerland. Whereas the American rule, as conceived by
the Restatement, refers exclusively to the municipal law of
the place of celebration, in Switzerland a parallel rule is established 16 for foreign marriages of Swiss nationals, with
the distinct implication that, above all, the conflict law of the
place of celebration shall decide what legal order applies to
the case. This rule, which indicates an unusually broadminded policy, has not always been correctly applied by nonSwiss courts. Taking into account the diversity of conflict
13 ESPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 820 no. 203. In the sense of the text apparently
TENORIO, Lei de Introduc;;ao ao C6digo Civil Brasileiro (ed. 2, 1955) 268 If.
14 BORUM, Personalstatutet 424, 427, 440; see also HOECK, Personalstatut
16; BoRuM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 218 nos. 34 and 37; MuNCH-PETERSEN,
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746. (These writers do not entirely agree with each
other.)
15 BoRUM, Personalstatutet 457; 6 Repert. 218 no. 37·
1a NAG. art. 7 f.
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laws, Swiss conflicts law gives way to any other conflicts rule
of the foreign domicil. As a matter of fact, the draftsmen
realized that in the statistical majority of cases the foreign
conflicts rule would, on the basis of the nationality principle,
refer the case to Swiss matrimonial law to govern the substantive requirements for Swiss nationals. The decision, however, is left to the local law, the intention being to rule out
any conflict with the law applicable under the local conflicts
rule. It follows that a marriage of Swiss nationals in the
United States, if good at the place of celebration, is good
under Swiss law too. It is immaterial whether the parties are
domiciled at the foreign place of celebration. 11
There is much doubt, however, whether this rule applies
only where both parties are Swiss nationals or whether the
local law governs mixed marriages as well. Sometimes the
courts have extended the rule to the latter case/ 8 but generally it is argued that only where both spouses are Swiss can
the Swiss concession succeed in avoiding conflicts; where another legal order is involved, the nationality principle is preferred.19
Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia applies her marriage laws to
all persons, including foreigners, who marry within the
U.S.S.R. 20
2.

Exceptions: Prohibitive Public Policy

The United States: Policy of the forum. Exceptions to the
rule that a marriage validly contracted at the place of celebration is valid everywhere are made by common law practice
as well as by statute.
17
18

BECK, NAG. 23I no. so, ibid. 275 nos. IS-23.
BG. (Dec. IS, IS75) I BGE. IOI; BG. (March IS, IS76) 2 BGE. 32;
BG. (Oct. 2S, ISS1) 7 BGE. 65S, 662.
19 BG. (Nov. II, I954) So BGE. I 427 (foreign husband); BECK, NAG.
220 nos. 10 and II; HuBER-MUTZNER 427 n. I7I.
20 See FREUND in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366; MAKAROV, Precis 327; LUNZ
30I.
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A marriage is held invalid when it is, in the opinion of the
forum, contrary to the general principles of Christendom.
The only applications concern polygamous and incestuous
marriages, and both are dealt with discriminately. Practical
cases of polygamy are those of the so-called "progressive"
sort, viz., where a party has gone through a second marriage
after a divorce recognized at the place where granted but not
recognized at the forum. 21 Incest is not a characteristic of
every marriage between near relatives prohibited at the
forum; but such has been assumed in a few cases of marriage
between nephew and aunt 22 or even the widow of a nephew
and an uncle. 23 The decisions respecting marriages of first
cousins are in conflict. 24
A further exception is made by common law on behalf of
"a distinctive national policy of the forum." On this ground,
miscegenation is considered a cause of invalidity in all Southern and some Northern and Western states. 25
Policy of domicil. Though the subject of endless controversy, a few other requirements established by the law of the
domicil of a party have been enforced regardless of the local
law; thus the provisions of Oklahoma and New York about
nonage 26 and certain prohibitions against remarriage. 27 The
21 Restatement § 132 comment a; 2 BEALE § 132.1.
22 Restatement § 132 comment b; Campbell v. Crampton (C.C.N.D., N.Y.,
r88o) 2 Fed. 417; State v. Brown (1890) 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747;
Laughran v. Laughran (1934) 292 U.S. 216. England: (uncle and niece) De
Wilton v. Montefiore [1900] 69 L. J. (Ch.) 717, [1900] 2 Ch. 481.
23 Osoinach v. Watkins (1938) 235 Ala. 564, r8o So. 577·
24 For validity: In re Miller's Est. (1927) 239 Mich. 455, 214 N. W. 428;
Schofield v. Schofield (1912) 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564. For voidness: Weinberg
v. Weinberg (1927) 242 Ill. App. 414; Johnson v. Johnson (1910) 57 Wash.
89, ro6 Pac. 500.
25 Restatement § 132 comment c; Dupre v. Boulard ( 1855) ro La. Ann. 411;
State v. Bell ( 1872) 7 Tenn. (Baxt.) 9, 32 Am. Rep. 549; Kinney v. Commonwealth (1878) 30 Va. (Grat.) 858, 32 Am. Rep. 69o; Eggers v. Olson
(1924) 104 Okla. 297; 231 Pac. 483. Cf. Jackson v. Jackson (1895) 82 Md.
17, 33 At!. 317. Denying extraterritorial effect: The Inhabitants of Medway
v. The Inhabitants of Needham (1819) r6 Mass. 157, 8 Am. Dec. 131.
26 Ross v. Bryant ( 1923) 90 Okla. 300, 217 Pac. 364, criticized in 23 Col.
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Restatement does not hesitate to generalize in this respect;
every time a state makes it clear that it regards a prohibition
as arising out of a "strong public policy"-what in Europe
is called extraterritorial or international public order-the
prohibition limits the rule that the local law governs. If this
extension of the force of the law of domicil were accepted
unanimously, the situation would be somewhat clarified. Under no theory, however, would the law of the place of celebration be excluded in any jurisdiction by a domiciliary prohibition that, though of mandatory character or of public
interest, is not held to be clearly of primary importance. 28
Under the common law, apart from the general function
of public policy, the fact that the parties attempt to elude
their domiciliary prohibitions is immaterial. The law of the
place of celebration is applicable, as Judge McSherry stated
in Jackson v. Jackson, "even when they have left their own
State to marry elsewhere for the purpose of avoiding the
laws of the domicil." 29 Thus, infants domiciled in Wisconsin,
marrying validly in Minnesota, are considered validly marL. Rev. (1923) 782; Cunningham v. Cunningham (1912) 206 N.Y. 341, 99
N. E. 845 (where, however, the parties had not cohabited). Contrary result in
Massachusetts: Levy v. Downing (1913) 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638.
27 Cf. Restatement §§ 130, 131; 2 BEALE § 130.1; STUMBERG 286.
28 Cf. Restatement§ 132 comment a; Sturgis v. Sturgis (1908) 51 Ore. 10,
93 Pac. 696, on marriage without parental consent. Fensterwald v. Burk
( 1916) 129 Md. 131, 98 At!. 358, on the prohibition in Maryland of marriage
between uncle and niece.
~ 9 (1895) 82 Md. 17, 29; cf. Fensterwald v. Burk (1916) 129 Md. 131,
cited above in note 28. Danelli v. Danelli (1868) 4 Ky. (Bush) 51 (widow
and brother of late husband marrying in Switzerland contrary to their domiciliary Austrian law); Stevenson v. Gray (1856) 17 Ky. (B. Mon.) 193, and
BISHOP, I New Commentaries on Marriage § 843. A similar statement in
McDonald v. McDonald ( 1936) 6 Cal. (2d) 457, 58 Pac. (2d) 163, that the
intention of the parties to evade a requirement is entirely immaterial, has
shocked BATIFFOL 1 the distinguished French writer, in spite of his familiarity
with American conflicts law; see his spirited comment on this case in 32 Revue
Crit. 1937, 16o, 167 ff. French law especially is accustomed to repression of
fraude a la loi.
Contra the general rule, e.g., Pennsylvania, see In re Stull's Estate (1898)
183 Pa. 625, 39 Alt. 16, Maurer v. Maurer (1948) 163 Pa. Super. 264, 6o
A. (2d) 440.
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ried in Iowa, although the marriage is invalid because of
nonage in Wisconsin under its evasion clause. 30 In the same
spirit, the Civil Code of Argentina, article I 59, expressly establishes the law of the place of celebration as governing,
"even where the marrying parties have left their domicil in
order not to be subjected to the formalities and laws there
in force."
By statute, however, specific provisions against evasion
have now been introduced in seventeen states. 81 Five of these
states 32 have adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act
of I 9 I 2, section I of which reads as follows:

"If any person residing and intending to continue to reside
in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting
marriage under the laws of this state shall go into another
state or country and there contract marriage prohibited and
declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall
be null and void for all purposes in this state with the same
effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered
into in this state."
This provision presupposes prohibitions rendering the marriage void under the home law; if it be understood as referring solely to voidness ab initio, the provision may be criticized as ineffectual. 33 At least it is not confined to single
enumerated prohibitions as are some other evasion statutes; 34 hence, it would not be impossible to bring child mar30

Boehm v. Rohlfs (1937) 224 Iowa 226, 231, 276 N. W. 105, xo8.
HARPER, TAINTOR, CARNAHAN and BROWN, Cases 258, distinguish the statutes enacting a subjective test of evasion, those enacting an objective test of
evasion, including the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, and those covering all
ceremonies between persons who intend to live in the state.
3 2 Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
33 RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State (1929) 196. As a matter
of fact, it seems that not every mandatory requirement is given extraterritorial effect even in interpreting the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act; see
Lyannes v. Lyannes (1920) 171 Wis. 381, 177 N. W. 683; cf. KESSLER, 1
Z.ausl.PR. ( 1927) 858, 861.
34 E.g., miscegenation (Montana), capacity (Connecticut), blood relationship (West Virginia).
81
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riages under its protection, though no such decision is
known. 35 Nor does the Uniform Act require, as three states'
enactments do, 36 that the parties intend to evade a prohibition.
The Uniform Act has extended its scope remarkably by
adding section 2, whereby an evasive marriage is prohibited
by the state of celebration itself. Further repression of evasive marriages can obviously be accomplished by reciprocation among the states sharing the policy of preventing evasion; in fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has declared
void a marriage celebrated in Indiana in defiance of the marriage prohibition and the evasion statute of Illinois, the parties being domiciled in Illinois. And other cases seem to promote this approach, 37 which has been properly construed as a
renvoi to the conflicts rule of the domiciP 8
Under common law principles also, bigamy, incest, and
miscegenation, when subject to a "strong" domiciliary policy,
are sufficient cause for annulment in the courts of any third
state having the same distinctive public policy. The Restatement again achieves a broad generalization. According to
section 132, wherever a statute at the domicil makes a mar35 Recently all jurisdictions have established statutory rules on age. Evasion
of such provisions was one of the principal purposes of marriage out of the
state; cf. the enumeration of motives for such marriages by GOODRICH 357·
There are still marked variances among the statutes.
3 6 Indiana Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1952) § 44-209.
Maine Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 166 § 9 (intention of returning).
West Va. Code (1955) c. 48 § 4695 [17].
3 7 Hall v. Industrial Commission ( 1917) 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312;
note that Wisconsin has adopted the same Uniform Act as Illinois. In L.
Meisenhelder v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company ( 1927) 170
Minn. 317, 213 N. W. 32, a Kentucky marriage between first cousins, valid
where celebrated, invalid at the domicil in Illinois under the evasion statute
in force there, was held invalid in Minnesota. See also People v. Steere
(1915) 184 Mich. 556, 151 N. W. 617, criticized in 13 Mich. L. Rev. (1915)
592, but cf. GooDRICH 365 n. 57· See for comment TAINTOR, "Effects of ExtraState Marriage Ceremonies," 10 Miss. L. J. (1938) 105.
38 GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) n65 at II99 ff.
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riage void even though celebrated in another state, the marriage is void-not only at the domicil but also in all third
states and even in the state of celebration, for section 13 2
says "everywhere." 39
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section 3, provides
the following additional precaution: the licensing official
must ascertain that a party residing in another state is not
prohibited from marrying by the laws of the jurisdiction
where he resides. 40 Yet no independent verification of the
allegations of candidates is usual. 41
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section r, prohibiting the parties from going "into another state or country,"
was probably intended to be applicable in any country as part
of a domiciliary law. Under this assumption, the marriage,
celebrated in Florida, of an American or an Englishman
domiciled in Illinois with his first cousin, is invalid under the
laws not only of Illinois but also of France, where the principle of nationality requires the application of the law indicated by the national law of the person. 42
It may be noted that, except for miscegenation, the notion
of evasion apparently is not extended to the case of parties
effectively changing their domicil, i.e., abandoning their old
place of residence and establishing themselves for the time
being at the foreign place where they have their wedding. If,
for instance, the parties are forbidden at their domicil to
marry within a certain time under the sanction of nullity,
they may transfer their domicil to another state and validly
3 9 It has been repeatedly stated that no support can be found in the cases
for this view, cf. e.g., VARTANIAN, Foreign Marriages-Recognition, II7
A. L. R. ( 1938) 186, 188.
40 Improved in Wyoming Comp. Stat. (1920) § 4960, amended by L. 1931,
c. 99 § 1; Rev. Stat. Ann. (1945) §so-ro6.
41 RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State ( 1929) 197, regretting
this and other deficiencies, advocate an efficient verification of assertions, state
supervision, and interstate exchange of records.
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marry under its law. 43 The marriage will be recognized even
in the former jurisdiction. 44
Denmark. A foreign marriage of Danish domiciliaries is
annulled when it contravenes the prohibitions against bigamous or incestuous marriages. 45
Philippines. The principle of lex loci celebrationis is expressly limited by a broad reservation against bigamous,
polygamous or incestuous marriages, to be qualified according to Philippine law. 46
Latin-American countries. Restrictions of much greater
significance are imposed on the principle lex loci celebrationis
in the Latin-American countries mentioned above (p. 267).
In some of these countries, the entire body of domestic
prohibitions is declared compulsory on subjects marrying
abroad. 47 In others, a broad catalogue of requirements is
similarly prescribed. 48 The Treaty of Montevideo of I 889,
article I r, recast in I 940, article I 3, had the task of limiting
the influence of public policy in the mutual relations of the
participant states. This convention, however, still reserved
to every state the right to consider void a marriage valid
where celebrated, in the event of any of the following
defects:
(a) Defect of age in one of the parties, the minimum required being fourteen years completed by the man and
twelve by the woman;
42

Cf.

KESSLER, r Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 858, 863.
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (1933) 210 Wis. 543, 246 N. W. 68o.
44 State v. Fenn ( 1907) 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417; Pierce v. Pierce ( 1910)
58 Wash. 622, 109 Pac. 45; GOODRICH 358 n. 30.
45
See BoRUM, Personalstatutet 451 and 6 Repert. 218 no. 37·
46
C. C. ( 1949) art. 71.
4 7 Chile: C. C. art. 119 par. 2.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9·
Ecuador: C. C. art. 104 par. 2.
48 Argentina: Civil Marriage Law ( r888) art. 2. Cf. ROMERO DEL PRADO,
Der. Int. Priv. 280 and 2 Manual 32.
Mexico: Formerly C. C. (r884) art. I75·
43
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(b) Relationship between the spouses in direct line by
blood or affinity, either legitimate or illegitimate;
(c) Relationship between the spouses of legitimate or illegitimate brother and sister;
(d) Having caused the death of one of the spouses of a
former marriage as perpetrator or accomplice in order
to marry the surviving spouse; 49
(e) A former marriage not legally dissolved.
Analogous reservations as made by some states, e.g., Argentina (C. C. art. I 59), are evidently meant to apply only
to their own subjects. The reservations contained in the Convention of Montevideo, on the contrary, seem to be standard
requirements, common to all participant states, which may be
raised by any participant state in any case of a foreign marriage. If this assumption is correct, the influence of public
policy has been correspondingly unified to a considerable extent.
In Ecuador (C. C. art. I04 par. I), a foreign marriage
that is valid at the place of celebration is recognized, although, however, invalidation by an ecclesiastical court must
be respected. 50
Switzerland. Swiss law is applicable in cases of evasion,
where the parties marry in a foreign place with evident intention to evade the grounds of nullity of Swiss law. 51 The
three premises for this rule are that only an artificial contact
with the foreign place of celebration existed, that mandatory
requirements have been evaded, and that both parties knew
the facts and manifestly intended to evade the Swiss prohibitions. All these three conditions are seldom proved in a single
49 The case of a married person causing the death of his or her own spouse,
must obviously be included.
50 No analogous consequence of th~ state's connection with the Catholic
church exists in Italy or Spain.
51 NAG. art. 7 f par. I.
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case. 52 A tacit fourth condition for the application of this
rule seems to be Swiss nationality or at least Swiss domicil of
both parties; 53 if the parties have in fact, and not merely
fictitiously transferred their domicil from Switzerland to a
foreign place, the provision is inoperative, just as the American evasion rules.
Apart from the rule just mentioned on evasion, which may
or may not be included in the idea of international public
policy, Swiss courts reserve to themselves the discretionary
power to consider a marriage void on grounds of public
policy. The Federal Tribunal, emphasizing the necessity of
such stringent national policy, has recently denied recognition to a foreign remarriage of a Swiss citizen who was still
married under Swiss law. 54 However, not all grounds for invalidity, opposed to the marriage of foreigners in Switzerland, are applicable to the foreign marriage of a Swiss subject.55 Particularly, the provisions preventing marriage between uncle and niece and aunt and nephew do not have the
effect of invalidating a marriage celebrated abroad, although
in such cases Swiss certificates that the candidates are capable
of intermarrying are not issued. 56
3· Exceptions: Permissive Public Policy
The United States. In the United States, it is a fairly well
settled policy that foreign penal restrictions upon freedom
are not recognized. This principle applies to penal legislative
52
In the practice of the Federal Tribunal there is just one decision, BG.
(Jan. 19, 1934) 6o BGE. II I, Clunet 1938, 984, where a lunatic and his
bride traveled to Brighton, England, to marry there, and NAG. art. 7 f was
invoked ad abundantiam.
53 Cf. SCHNITZER 322, and BECK, NAG. 241 no. 88, having different opinions. BECK, NAG. 241 no. 85, and others suggest that the husband must be
a Swiss citizen; I have disregarded this arbitrary opinion.
54
BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74·
55
BEcK, NAG. 232 no. 56 and ibid. 262 no. I 54·
56
BEcK, NAG. 232 no. 57.
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prohibitions on remarriage; extraterritorial effect is denied
to such prohibitions everywhere, even when they are established by the domiciliary state. 5 7 Disregard of racial prohibitions 58 falls in the same category.
Switzerland. Swiss law has established the following important general limitations on recognition of foreign marriage prohibitions:
A marriage contracted abroad, which is invalid according to
the law of the place of its celebration, may be declared invalid in Switzerland only if it also is invalid under Swiss
law. 59
The idea is that the domestic legal order is not interested in
annulling a marriage that satisfies Swiss requirements. It is
doubtful, however, to what group of persons this provision
is intended to apply. 60

III.
I.

PERSONAL LAW

The Primary Principle

Law of the domicil. The law of the domicil of either party
governs marriage requirements in Great Britain, according
to prevailing opinion, and in the British Empire, Norway,
and, as has been mentioned, to some extent in Denmark. 6 '
The Scandinavian Convention on Family Law also has established this as a primary rule.
The position of British law, it is true, is not quite clear.
English courts are accustomed to think in terms of jurisdiction rather than to distinguish competency of tribunal and
applicable law. They are supposed to recognize, however,
foreign judgments affecting the status of Englishmen domi57 Commonwealth v. Lane ( 1873) II3 Mass. 458; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall
(1881) 86 N.Y. 18; State v. Shattuck (1897) 69 Vt. 403, 38 At!. 81.
For further details see STUMBERG 286 ff.
58 State v. Tutty (C. C. S. D. Ga., 1890) 41 Fed. 753·
59 NAG. art. 7 f par. 2.
60 See discussion by BECK, NAG. 258 no. 143, and SCHNITZER 322.
61 Cf. supra p. 270; for Denmark, supra p. 277, n. 45·
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ciled within the jurisdiction of the foreign court. N evertheless, in Wilton v. M ontefiore (I 900), 62 a marriage between
a Jewish maternal uncle and his niece domiciled in England
was declared void, although it was alleged to be valid by
both Jewish custom and the law of the place of celebration.
In Sottomayor v. De Barros (I 877) ,63 it was held that a
marriage of first cousins domiciled in Portugal, prohibited
from marrying there, is to be deemed invalid also in the eyes
of an English court; a contrary result was reached in the
second case of Sottomayor v. De Barros in I879, 64 solely because it had then been established that the bridegroom had
his domicil in England when the parties married in England.
On the basis of this latter case, many writers have believed
that English courts would always apply domestic law, if the
marriage is celebrated in England and one party, or at least
the bridegroom, is domiciled there, irrespective of any incapacity by which the other party may have been affected under
his own domiciliary law. 65 Thus, whereas a domiciled Englishman marrying abroad would remain subject to the English rules on capacity, the foreign grounds of incapacity of a
person domiciled abroad would be disregarded. This alleged
rule has acquired world-wide notoriety; it has been labelled a
badge of "insular pride and complacency." 66 In fact, apart
from the unclear grounds of the court in the second Sottomayor decision and the entirely discredited case of Ogden v.
Ogden,S1 there is no reasonable support for such a unilateral
62

[I9oo] 2 Ch. D. 48I.
[I877] 3 P. D. I.
[I879] 5 P. D. 94·
65
WESTLAKE §§ 2I, 25; DICEY, Rule I69 Exc. I; 6 HALSBURY 376; less
decidedly, FOOTE I25.
66 CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 228; FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of
Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law { I935) 84, 88. See, e.g., BATY,
"Capacity and Form of Marriage," 26 Yale L. J. {I9I7) 444; GooDRICH 368
n. 70; and more recently GRAVESON, "Matrimonial Domicil and the Contract
of Marriage," 20 Jour. Comp. Leg. (I938) 55, 65; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 6o n. I7.
67
[I908] P. 46; cf. infra pp. 288-289 and n. 95·
63
64
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English doctrine. 68 That the place of celebration has no importance 69 was expressly stated in the second Sottomayor
case.
Cheshire criticizes the rule from another point of view,
suggesting that only the "matrimonial domicil" should be
decisive. We shall discuss the merits of this doctrine shortly.
At any rate, Cheshire himself believes that only the• second
Sottomayor case is in his favor; he admits that Sir James
Hannen did not base his decision upon the fact that England
was the matrimonial home and, further, that the grounds of
decision are unsatisfactory. 70 In any event, recent English
decisions, 71 overlooking Cheshire's opinion, adopt with better
foundation the prevailing doctrine that the domicil of either
party determines the capacity to marry.
N ationallaw. In the rest of the world, 72 the national law
of either party governs intrinsic marriage requirements. The
68 In Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67 the prohibition against intermarriage
between a Hindu Brahman and a foreigner was disregarded, but this disability was one that the person affected could discard at wiii (CHESHIRE
299). Moreover, it was considered inappropriate to assert such a prohibition
against an English marriage to an English partner, obviously because repugnant to public policy to do so.
69 However, BECKETI, "The Question of Classification ('qualification') in
Private International Law," I5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46 advocates the American principle.
7 CHESHIRE 3I6; contra, see GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (I938) 55,
cited supra n. 66.
n In re Paine, In re Williams, Griffith v. Waterhouse [I940] I Ch. D. 46,
[I939] I08 L. J. (Ch.) 427 per Bennett J., cf. Note, 56 Law Q. Rev. (I940)
22. BENTWICH, "Recent English Cases on Domicile in Matters of Personal
Status," 52 Juridical Review (I940) 284, 288 (English prohibition applied to
marriage in Germany of a man domiciled in Germany and his late first wife's
sister, previously domiciled in England). Pugh v. Pugh [I95I] P. 482, 493
et seq. (Englishman of full age, domiciled in England "incapable" of marrying a IS year old Hungarian girl).
72 Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § 6. OGH. (I907) 44 GIU.NF. no. 38n;
WALKER 597> 598.
Belgium: C. C. art. I70 ter, as established by Law of July I2, I93I, art. I4·
Bulgaria: Law of Aug. 5, I949, art. 24 par. 2.
Czechoslovakia: Law on Private International Law of March u, I948,

°

§ IO.
Egypt: C. C. ( I948) art. I2.
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929 on Family Relations of International Nature,
sec. I (Finns abroad); sec. 2 par. I (foreigners in Finland).
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Hague Convention on Marriage of

1902,

article r, and the

Codigo Bustamante, article 36 (for states following the nationality principle), adopted this rule, while the Scandinavian
Convention on Family Law acknowledges it as a subsidiary
rule.
If, within a state, religious law determines the personal
law, the substantive requirements of marriage are usually
included. 78
Renvoi. In the conflict of domicil and nationality principles
or of either of them with the law of the place of celebration,
renvoi is accepted in most European countries. 74
France: C. C. arts. 3 and I70.
Germany: EG. art. I3 par. I.
Greece: C. C. (I8S6) art. 4 par. 3; C. C. (I94o) art. I3·
Haiti: C. C. art. ISS (Haitians abroad).
Honduras: C. C. arts. I37-I39·
Hungary: Law no. IV /I952 art. 6 par. I; Decree-Law no. 23/I952 § I6.
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. IOO par. I; C. C. (I942) art. 115 (Italians abroad);
art. 116 (foreigners in Italy).
Luxemburg: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I70.
Monaco: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I 38.
The Netherlands: BW. art. I38; H. R. (Jan. 6, I911) W. 9125.
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. I02 and I03·
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. I2 par. I.
Portugal: Code of Civil Register of Dec. 22, I932 1 arts. 3 IS, 3I6; Regul.
Consular, D. no. 6462 of March 7, I92o, arts. I43, I44; see CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 678.
Spain: C. C. art. 9; Trib. Supr. (July Io, I9I6) I37 Sent. IOS (Spaniards
abroad). Spanish Morocco, Dahir de Ia condici6n civil de los espafioles y
extranjeros, art. IO.
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904 with amendments, c. I §§ I, 2, c. 7 § 4a.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7c (for marriage within the state).
Syria: C. C. (I949) art. I3.
Turkey: 7 Repert. 264 no. 209.
China: Law of I9I8, art. 9·
Japan: Law of I898, art. I3·
Siam: Law of March IO, I939 1 § I9.
Philippines: C. C. (I949) art. 66 (foreigners in the Philippines).
73 The rule that religious law governs the requirements for marriage is in
accordance not only with Catholic canon and Greek Orthodox law but also
"with Ottoman and Oriental tradition" in Palestine, as GoADBY, I 52, declares;
he cites, id., n. 8, Re Alison's Trusts (I874) 3I L. T. 638 (marriage in
Persia of an Armenian Christian woman held invalid under Armenian canon
law) and Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, infra p. 293, n. 118.
74 France: Cour Paris (March 23, I888) Clunet I889, 638; cf. WEISS, 3
Traite 478 n. 2.
Germany: EG. art. 27; RG. (Feb. IS, I9I2) 78 RGZ. 234, for further
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Illustrations: ( i) Two Swiss parties domiciled in Switzerland married in Brighton, England. Swiss law (NAG. art.
7f) refers the validity of the marriage to the English conflicts law, which, in turn, refers the question to the Swiss domestic law. Hence, Swiss law was applied by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 75
(ii) An American citizen domiciled in Germany married a
German woman, apparently in Germany. The German court
applied German law to the requirements for both parties, on
the erroneous basis that the American law referred the man's
capacity to marry to the law of his domicil; but the court
could have reached the same result through the application
of the American principle of lex loci celebrationis. 76
Contrary to its general attitude, the Hague Convention of
I 902, article 1, in deference to the aforementioned Swiss
rule, allowed an "express" reference of the national law to
another law, thus affirming the Swiss rule while condemning
renvoi in general.
2.

Problems Arising when Parties are Subject to Different
Personal Laws

Each law applied separately. The general doctrine is that
each party must be free from prohibitions to marry the other
party, this to be decided, in a country following the domiciliary principle, separately according to the law of the domicil of each party and, in a country following the nationality
principle, separately according to the national law of each
party. It must be noted, however, that this doctrine has had
and still has opponents.
Minority opinions. Savigny/ 7 at the time when the domirenvoi; Bay. OLG. (Jan. x8, 1918) JW. 1918, 375; KG. (March 22, 1906)
32 J ahrb. FG. A 28. On certain controversies see RAAPE 260.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7f, based on art. 54 of the Swiss Constitution.
75 BG. (Jan. x8, 1934) 6o BGE. II x.
76 OLG. Dresden (Jan. 15, 1912) 26 ROLG. 2II.
77 SAVIGNY § 379, tr. by GUTHRIE 291.
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ciliary principle was unchallenged, pleaded for the law of the
first matrimonial domicil, which he identified with the domicil of the future husband, unless the parties had in fact established their domicil at another place or intended to do so.
Savigny was followed by many writers of the early and later
nineteenth century, 78 but his view has finally been abandoned,
since long ago objections were made that it is unfair and antiquated to disregard the personal law of the bride. 79 It is
also frequently urged that the validity of the marriage cannot be tested by the law of the place where the parties establish their domicil after their marriage. Nevertheless, Cheshire explicitly invokes Savigny's theory for his resurrection of
the same opinion. 80
The Marriage Act of Hungary provided that in any case
where a Hungarian man marries a foreign woman, either at
home or abroad, her personal law is to be considered only
with respect to her age and capacity to consent, while in all
other respects the validity of the marriage is to be tested exclusively by Hungarian law. 81 The Civil Code of Honduras
even makes Honduran law obligatory on the capacity of both
parties to marry abroad, when one party is a citizen. 82 By
such laws, the influence of domestic public policy, described
below, is certainly exaggerated.
Another opinion, now discredited, urged the application
of the more severe of the two laws involved. 83 At present,
78
RoTH, I System 288; GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht 236- these two
fascinated by old German law; WINDSCHEID, I Pandekten {ed. 9) § 35 no. 4·
The rule was partly accepted by I BAR § I6o and is now advocated by BARTIN, 2 Principes I23.
79
WALKER 569.
8
CHESHIRE 3IO. Cf. also GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (I938) 55, 68,
supra n. 66. Contra: GooDRICH 367.
81
Marriage Law of I894, §§no, III, abrogated by Law no. IV/x952.
82 Art. I38.
83 ARMIN JON, 2 Precis 457 no. 2I4. Occasionally certain impediments usually
considered involving only one spouse are given a broader interpretation
affecting both spouses. See, e.g., 2 ZITELMANN 609 n. 300, KG. {Dec. 2I, I936)
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the only doctrine of importance is the general doctrine first
stated.
Doctrine of unilateral prohibitions. To apply to either
party his or her personal law has proved delicate. Following
the canon law and Savigny, 84 a distinction has been drawn between unilateral and bilateral prohibitions, although no settled definition of these terms exists nor even seems necessary.
Roughly speaking, some provisions of matrimonial law concern only one person, while others apply to both parties or
generally to the conclusion of the marriage. In the first case,
one of the parties lacks capacity, and this party alone is prohibited from marrying (unilateral) ; in the second case, the
prohibition resulting from the disqualification of one of the
parties includes both.
In consonance with the personal law, each requirement
must be observed just as it would have to be observed in the
homeland. Illustration is provided by the following four important unilateral prohibitions (a-d). A fifth example (e)
leads to the related question of the party who may bring suit
for annulment, the determination of which also depends on
the personallaw. 85
(a) Age required for marriage. 86 In all countries following the system of nationality, an Italian girl may marry on
attaining fourteen years of age, a German at sixteen, a Serbian at seventeen, and a Greek, Spanish, or Northern Irish
girl at twelve. It is immaterial what the law of the other
party prescribes.
(b) Consent in form but not in fact; defective intention.
Defects affecting consent to marriage, such as consent inJW.

1937, 2039 and Pugh v. Pugh [1951] P. 482, 493 (supra 11. 71); see
contra RAAPE, IPR. 230, 233 n. 7·
84 SAVIGNY § 379, tr. by W. GUTHRIE 291; "Denkschrift," 14 Z.int.R. (1904)
524, 525. KuRT STEINLE, Die zweiseitigen Ehehindernisse im internationalen
Privatrecht, Thesis (Munich, 1939).
85 For other cases in French practice, see J, DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 439 ff.
86 Germany: RG. (Dec. :u, 1916) JW. 1917, 364.
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duced by error, fraud, or duress, are exclusively determined
by the law of the spouse whose intention is alleged to be vitiated. The law of the partner is immaterial.B 7

Illustration: A Belgian man married a German woman.
He was mistaken as to her virginity. The man is not allowed
to avail himself of the German provision that a marriage
may be attacked upon the ground of error concerning the
personal characteristics of the other spouse, but is limited to
the Belgian provision which regards only an error in physical identity of the other spouse as relevant. 88
(c) Consent of parents or guardians. The consent of parents or guardians required for a marriage of parties who
have not reached a certain age, such as twenty-one, 89 and,
according to some laws, the duty of the child to notify his
parents of his intended marriage ("acts of respect"), 90 all
come under the general rule regarding the capacity of the
child or ward to marry. This is one of the requirements
87 France: Cases of mistake: Trib. civ. Strasbourg {Dec. 21, 1920) Clune!
1921, 933; App. Dijon (March 20, 1922) Clunet 1922, 409; Trib. civ. Seine
(June II, 1929) Revue 1930, 45S. For duress see AUDINET, "Les Conflits
de lois en matiere de mariage et de divorce," II Recueil 1926 I 175 at rSo.
Germany: RG. {May 3, 1917) Warn. Jahrbuch 1917, no. 210; RG. (Oct.
6, 1927) Revue 1930, 129; RG. (June 23, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, n. 65; RG.
(Feb. 16, 1931) ]W. 1931, 1340, and many decisions of lower courts collected by 3 FRANKENSTEIN S2 n. S6. In the case RG. (Feb. 6, 1930) JW. 1930,
1003, IPRspr. 1930, no. 64, the error of a Swiss husband was decided under
the Swiss Civil Code instead of the Swiss conflicts rule {NAG. art. 7 f), calling for the application of the German Civil Code; cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 59
n. 13·
Italy: Cass. Torino (July 31, rS83) Giur. Ita!. rSS3, I 617, Sirey rSS6.4.1
Switzerland: OG. Bern (Oct. 27, 1927) 64 ZBJV. (1927) rSs.
England: Way v. Way and three other cases [1950] P. 71, 7S, affirmed in
Kenward v. Kenward [1951] P. {C.A.) 124, 133 per Evershed, M.R.
88 German Marriage Law of 1946, § 32 {even broader than BGB. § 1333);
Belgian C. C. art. 1So; cf. Cass. Belg. (July 17, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1·370,
emphasizing that not even "dol," fraudulent misrepresentation, justifies an
action for avoiding the marriage, the same as in France, see Chambres
Reunies (April 24, 1S62) D.1862.1.153·
89
E.g., France: C. C. arts. 14S, rsS, 159; Germany: BGB. §§ 1303-I308,
Marriage Law of 1946, §§ 3 ff.; Quebec: C. C. art. II9.
9
France: C. C. art. 151. Belgium and Luxemburg: C. C. art. 151.
Spain: C. C. art. 47·
The Netherlands: BW. art. 99·
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called, according to the French doctrine, "formes habilitantes," understood in France to have nothing to do with
formalities. These requirements are governed by the same
law that is competent to declare a party incapable of marrying by his own will alone. Continental opinion has it that
these requirements are ruled by the national law and not by
the law of the place of celebration. 91 For example, the opposition of an American father to the marriage of his daughter, likewise an American national, has been rejected because
of her nationallaw. 92
This conception also seemed accepted for a time in England. English courts applied in accordance with their meaning foreign statutes requiring the consent of parents or similar acts, that is, the statutes were construed as in the countries of their enactment, either as postponing the marriage or
as threatening its validity. 93 At present, however, such permission is ordinarily regarded in England as a formal requirement and governed, for this reason, by the law of the
place where the marriage is celebrated. 94 It is again primarily
91 France: Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 4, I88o) Clunet I88o, 478; Trib. civ.
Seine (Dec. 2I, I88s) Clunet I886, 448; Trib. civ. Seine (July 28, I 90S)
Clunet I906, ns2; Trib. civ. Seine (June IS, I9Io) Clunet I9II, 212; Trib.
civ. Seine (Jan. 10, I9I7) Clunet I9I8, II92; Trib. civ. Seine (March 8, I920)
Clunet I92o, 206; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. I7, I926) Clunet I928, 404. Similarly, on consent of council of family and tutor ad hoc for a natural child,
Trib. superieur Papeete (June 28, I909) Clunet I9IO, I67; ratification of
marriage by parents, Cour Paris (May IS, I9I7) Clunet I9I7 1 I4I3; Trib.
civ. Seine (Jan. I8, I923) Clunet I924, n7.
Germany: RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. I9I7, 364; somewhat confused KG.
(March 22, I9o6) 32 J ahrb. F.G. A 28.
Greece: Law of May 28-29, I887, see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 29I n. 27.
Quebec: Agnew v. Gober (I907) 32 Que. S. C. 266, (I9I9) 38 Que. S. C.
3I3 (judgment revised); cf. I JoHNSON 283, 287.
92 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 30, I923) Revue I922-I923, 494·
93 Postponing impediments: Simonin v. M allac (I 86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67;
Gretna Green cases: see Brook v. Brook ( I86I) 9 H.L. I93; prohibitory impediment: Sussex Peerage Case (I844) I I CI. & F. 85.
94 DICEY, Rule 760, 765; WESTLAKE §§ I8, 25; FOOTE IOI; also FOSTER,
"Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year Book
Int. Law (I935) 84, 90 (although sharply disapproving of this view); 3
FRANKENSTEIN 85, and many other Continental writers. More hopeful of
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the decision of Ogden v. Ogden which led to this change, a
"very much discredited" authority indeed. 95 A better rule
would perhaps have been found, were it not for the misleading habit of English courts and writers, even such critics of
current opinion as Cheshire and Beckett, customarily contrasting mandatory requirements with formal instead of with
directory requirements. Instead of saying that in English
family law the want of parental consent does not invalidate
a marriage, every writer asserts that consent is a formal requirement in English matrimonial law; 96 therefore, discussion continues whether it is such also in English conflicts law.
Hence, it is not certain that ( 1) a marriage official in England is empowered to officiate at an attempted marriage of
foreigners that he knows is prohibited at their domicil because of lack of permission and that ( 2) a marriage celebrated in England would be held valid in the absence of parental permission, if this is an essential requisite under the
domiciliary law for the validity of the marriage. These assumptions would be necessary, if it were true that the power
given parents in Continental codes to interfere with their
future better advised decisions: BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1936)

+6, n-8o, supra n. 69.
Recently, the problem has been, if possible, still more confused by the question whether the matter pertains to "primary" or "secondary" characterization, see CHESHIRE 55-59; ROBERTSON, Characterization 239-245, CORMACK,
"Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," I.J- So. Cal. L. Rev. 221 at 235; an unfortunate controversy,
see also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," 19 Can. Bar
Rev. ( 1941) 311, 338, now Essays 74 ff.
95 [rgo8] P. 46, criticized by the Privy Council in Attorney General for
Alberta v. Cook [1926] A. C. 444, 455; by the House of Lords in Salvesen v.
Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. 641, 646; by WESTLAKE § 25,
CHESHIRE 58 f., BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 1936) 46, So ff., supra
n. 69; FALCON BRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. 235, 247, Essays 76; ROBERTSON, Characterization 242, and many others. Only I BEALE 510, 2 BEALE 674, 679 n. 3,
1103, approves this decision.
96
CHESHIRE ( ed. 4) 57, 306, but correctly ed. 5, p. 56 ff.; FosTER, 16 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1935) at 90, supra n. 94· This formulation is also to be
found in the critical report of FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. 89,
Essays 76, on the basis of a particular theory of classification against which
CANSACCHI, ibid., protests.
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children's marriages "cannot be tolerated in England or the
United States," as Wharton once asserted. 97 But at present
nobody seems to envisage such a public policy. Dean Falconbridge hopes that English and Ontario courts will recognize
the nullity of French and Quebec marriages in the absence of
the requisite parental consent. 98
Less radical, an unusual provision of the Civil Code of
Venezuela, article 134, had declared, apparently on grounds
of public policy (and not because of wrong classification),
that lack of permission or lack of an "act of respect" does
not invalidate a marriage, unless such permission or "act of
respect" is required in the interests of ascendants or guardians.9sa
The formality of notification, of course, is adjusted everywhere to the modes available locally. 99
Although form and substance need not be distinguished in
the United States, since the law of the place of celebration
governs both, on grounds of public policy the domiciliary law
is occasionally taken into consideration with respect to parental consent. 100 No such attention would be given to a mere
formality.
(d) Prohibition against remarriage. A prohibition to contract a new marriage, not because of another existing marriage but as an effect of a former dissolved marriage, is considered a unilateral incapacity.

Illustrations: (i) An Italian married a widow, a citizen of
Fiume, where Hungarian law was in force, before the expiration of the ten months' period prescribed by Hungarian law,
I WHARTON § 253 at 573·
Annotation [I932] 4 D.L.R. I at 35·
9Ba In the C. C. of I942, art. Io6, this provision has been changed into the
usual rule requiring parental consent in the case of minor foreigners according to their national law.
99 CuNHA GoNc;:ALVEB, I Direito Civil 679.
too Cf. the survey of cases given in Sturgis v. Sturgis ( I908) 5I Ore. w,
93 Pac. 696 and GoODRICH 3 64.
97

98
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the widow having obtained, however, a dispensation under
Hungarian law granted to her upon a finding that she was
not pregnant. The Italian Tribunal of Alba recognized the
marriage, 101 although Italian law did not admit such dispensation from its corresponding impediment.
(ii) A Belgian divorcee domiciled in Paris was held bound
by the three hundred days' delay of the Belgian Civil Code
(arts. 22 8, 296) and ineligible for dispensation under the
analogous French provision. 102 On the other hand, when the
French provision is more severe than that of the national
law, French courts are likely to insist upon the former. 103
(e) Impotence. Because of a personal characteristic of
one party, a statute may give to the other an exclusive right
to have marriage annulled. This is often assumed to be the
case when a spouse is found to be impotent, 104 although this
is not the only nor the most modern view. In consequence, it
has been contended 105 that if, e.g., a Brazilian, married to a
woman of French nationality, was affected by this condition, the wife could not avail herself of Brazilian law, and
French law would afford her no relief on this ground.
Doctrine of bilateral prohibitions. Many obstacles involve
both parties, even if founded on the qualities of one party.
In this event, each party may avail himself of the remedy offered, irrespective of whether it is established by his own personal law. In other words, the personal law of either spouse
decides whether a prohibition concerns one party or both; if
both, the ensuing conflicts rule gives full international weight
to the decision of the personal law.
(a) Social policy. Of such a bilateral nature are the enactTrib. civ. Alba (Feb. 27, I922) Giur. Ital. I922, I, 2, ISS·
Cour Paris (Nov. 30, I934) Revue Crit. I93S, 486; cf. BATIFFOL,
ibid. 6I6.
103 See infra n. I s2.
104 This was the justified construction of Italian C. C. (I86s) art. I07, but
has been changed by C. C. ( I938) art. I2I, C. C. ( I942) art. I23·
105 KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 63.
1o1
102
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ments that forbid bigamy/ 06 marriage between near relatives, 107 miscegenetic marriages/ 08 marriages of lunatics,
syphilitics, epileptics, drunkards, persons afflicted with contagious diseases, and the like. 109 Insanity falls into this category only when treated from the viewpoint of eugenics, not
when considered a defect of consent. 110
(b) Adultery. Doubts have been expressed concerning the
scope of statutes under which, in the case of an adultery
stated in a divorce decree, adulterer and paramour are forbidden to marry each other. 111
The German prohibition was considered bilateral under
the Civil Code, 112 and the oflicial comment on the recent
Marriage Act has confirmed this interpretation. 113 This
means that both guilty persons are involved in the prohibition, and therefore the marriage is forbidden if the unmarried accomplice is a German, even though the adulterous
spouse may be non-German.

Illustration: A German was divorced on the ground of
adultery, then became a Polish national and wished to marry
his paramour. The Prussian Ministry of Justice held that the
unmarried woman, who was still a German citizen, needed a
dispensation. 114
106 See RG. (April 22, I932) I36 RGZ. I42, I44-I45 and RG. (June 8,
I936) I5I RGZ. 3I3, 3I7.
107 E.g., under Swiss C. C. art. IOO no. I, uncle and niece are prohibited
from marrying if either one is a Swiss.
Swedish Marriage Law of I920, c. 2 §§ 7, 8.
Great Britain: Mette v. Mette (I859) I Sw. & Tr. 4I6.
108 Twenty-eight states of the United States, formerly Germany, Italy, etc.
109 Many states of the United States; Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and an
ever-increasing number of other countries.
110 See RAAPE, IPR. 233 n. 7, in opposition to KG. (Dec. 2I, I936) JW. I937
1
2039·
111 E.g., Belgium: C. C. art. 298, as amended by Law of April I6, I935
(limiting the period of prohibition to three years).
Germany: BGB. § I3I2 1 Marriage Law of I946, § 6.
The Netherlands: BW. art. 89.
112 RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. ( ed. I) 144.
113 Ordinance of July 27, 1938, RGBI. I 923 § 5(5); RAAPE, IPR. 232.
114 StAZ. 1934, 292.
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After the substitution, in East German law, of specific
grounds for divorce by one general clause, 114a West German
practice has settled that the mere mentioning of adultery in
the reasons of an East German divorce decision does not
create the impediment. 114b
In the Netherlands, this question is unsettled, but the
courts treat the impediment as an obligatory policy of good
morals, precluding marriage within the state by any guilty
party mentioned in a divorce decree, 115 no matter whether
the judgment be domestic or foreign and whether or not the
personalla w so provides. 116 In both Germany and the N etherlands, however, a marriage concluded in spite of the prohibition is not annullable.
(c) Impediments connected with religion. The famous
Austrian religious impediments were intended to be bilateral117 and were so applied in the countries where they were
in force. The same is true for the impediment of difference
of faith as it still exists in Egypt 118 and elsewhere. 119
Decree of Nov. 24, 1955, § 8.
LG. Bielefeld (Sept. 28, 1956) NJW. 1957, 64; Ministry of the Interior
of Hesse, Order of ] an. 31, 1957, StAZ. 1957, 68.
115
H.R. (April 16, 1908) W. 8718, KOSTER&-BELLEMANS 135, Clunet 1912,
293 and H.R. (June 2, 1936) W. 1936, no. 1013, criticized by ScHOLTEN, N. ].
1936, 1013 and ASSER-SCHOLTEN, Familierecht 64. This criticism probably
affects also the decision of Rb. Haag (Feb. 1, 1935) W. 12974, whereby the
prohibition does not concern a foreign woman who has received a dispensation from an analogous impediment under her own law.
116
Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 12, 1936) W. 1937, no. 270.
117 See the explicit exposition by WALKER 6o2 ff.; it may be remembered
that these impediments were not applied if the parties married abroad and
did not intend to go to Austria. Similarly, Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1916)
137 Sent. 105.
118 Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, Mixed Trib. (June n, 1913)
3 Gaz. Trib. Mixtes no. 428 (Egyptian woman, forbidden under Moslem law
to marry foreign Christian; marriage internationally invalid) ; Trib. Cairo
(Oct. 6, 1953) 10 Revue egypt. (1954) 148.
119
Poland: Supr. Ct. (July 22, 1924) Revue 1925, 440; Supr. Ct. {Nov. n,
1933) Z.f. Ostrecht 1934-1935, 444·
Czarist Russia and Lithuania: BuCHLER in StAZ. 1929, 192 to the effect that
Christians as well as Jews are prohibited by their respective religious laws
recognized by the state.
lHa

114

b
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The Spanish provision, now again in force, whereby no
one is allowed to marry a divorced person, also is a bilateral
prohibition directed against both parties to the intended marriage. Thus, under Spanish law, a French divorced woman
cannot marry a Spanish bachelor. 119 a In France, however, not
less than three different opinions have been expressed: 120
that the prohibition is unilateral but as such makes the marriage invalid; 121 that it is bilateral but the capacity of the
woman depends on French law alone; 122 and that Spanish
law is primarily applicable but eliminated by French public
policy. 123
(d) Sham marriages. An obvious but notable example of
a twofold defect is presented by the case of parties who go
through a ceremony of marriage for some purpose other
than that of creating a true marriage. Legislation that regards marriage essentially as a contract, is inclined to deny
validity to simulated consent to marry; thus canon law/ 24 as
well as French, Scotch, English, 125 and probably American
opinion/ 26 consider the marriage in such case void. Modern
codifications presume that a public formal declaration of
11 9 a Trib. Supr. (May 12, I944) Revista Critica de Derecho Immobiliario
I944, 754, also in GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema (ed. I) 554·
12 0 Special literature: CHAMPCOMMUNAL, in "Conflit de lois nouveau," Revue
I92I, 4I, 47 ff; SERIN, Les con flits des lois dans les rapports Franco-Espagnols
en matiere de mariage, de divorce et de separation de corps (Toulouse,
I929).
121 Trib. civ. Montpellier (March I8, I920) S.I921.2.n, Revue I92I, 79,
Clunet 1920, 633.
122 App. Aix (Jan. 24, I924) Gaz.PaLI924.I·507, Revue 1924, 99, 277, Clunet
I924, 670 (cumulating the various rationes decidendi) ; BATIFFOL, Traite no.
370.
123 Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, 1919) S.I92I.2.9, Revue I9I9, 543· Recently
prevailing opinion has favored this interpretation. Cf. AumNET, n Recueil
I926 l I75 1 I82; J. DONNED!EU DE VABRES 443·
Contra: Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (Dec. I4, I955) 46 Rev. Crit. (I957) 68.
124 Codex Juris Canonici c. I086 § 2.
125 M'Innes v. More (H.L. 1785) 3 Craig. & St. 40; Taylor v. Kello (I787)
3 Craig. & St. s6; also Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (I8II) 2 Hag. Con. 54. IOI,
I6I Eng. Rep. 665, 802 and H. v. H. [1953] 2 All E. R. I229·
126 Cf. BISHOP, I New Commentaries on Marriage §§ 328 ff.
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marriage should not be disavowed by revealing an intention
to misuse the marriage institution. But recently in Germany,
marriage for the sole purpose of procuring a name for the
woman 127 or merely to give her the nationality of the husband,128 has been excepted and considered void. In Switzerland similar rules were advocated 129 that have been adopted
in a changed practice of the Federal Court and the Swiss
Government and have recently been enacted. 130 The United
States has reacted against sham marriages designed to facilitate immigration; the Federal Act of May 14, 1937, simply
orders deportation. 130a In all these cases it is sufficient that
one personal law establish the invalidity.
Illustration: During World War I, a French girl married
an American in Turkey with the understanding that she
should escape internment in a camp and that the marriage
should serve no other purpose. The Tribunal of Grenoble declared this marriage void according to French law, regardless of the law of the domicil of the American husband. 181
Time element. It is well settled that the applicable personal law is the personal law as of the time of the celebration
of the marriage 132-not that to which a party is subject at a
time prior to or subsequent to the marriage.
127

BGB. § 1325a (Law of Nov. 23, 1933), Marriage Law of 1946, § 19.
Marriage Law of 1938, § 23 par. I; and RG. (April 7, 1938) 92 Seuff.
Arch. 311 no. 129. The provision was abrogated by the Marriage Law of
1946.
129 See EGGER in Festgabe fur Fritz Fleiner (1937) 85; RICHARD, "Les
mariages fictifs," 66 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (1937) 337·
130 BG. (November 9, 1939) 65 BGE. II 133 and (Oct. x8, 1940) 66 BGE.
II 225. In both cases a Swiss citizen had married a German woman threatened by expulsion because of her behavior; the courts stated in both cases
that the woman had not intended permanent marital community. The rule is
now embodied in C. C. art. 120 no. 4 (added by law of Sept. 29, 1952). The
Federal Council, by order of Dec. 20, 1940, article 2, par. 2 has even authorized the Just. Dep. to annul nationality acquired by such marriages; see
38 SJZ. (I94I) I73·
13oa U.S. Code (1953) 8 § I25I (c).
181
Trib. civ. Grenoble (July II, 1923) cited by J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES
440 n. I. Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 291 n. 28; RG. (Dec. IS, 1930) JW. 1931,
1340.
132
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, I9o8) JW. 1909, 78; RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) II3
128
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Consequently, a defect inhering in a marriage at its inception is not cured by the acquisition of a new domicil or a new
nationality; a void marriage remains void.
Exceptions have been made, however, in favor of validity.
Thus, the German Reichsgericht in a recent case 133 had to
deal with a marriage void under Austrian law on the ground
of disparity of cult (Christians and non-Christians), the
parties having changed their Austrian nationality for that of
Italy. The court saw no reason why it should invalidate a
marriage considered valid in the new homeland because of
public policy contrary to the impediment. Likewise the Kammergericht in Berlin stated recently 134 that, if both husband
and wife voluntarily acquired a new citizenship, their marriage could not be declared void on a ground not recognized
as an impediment under their new law. 135
Conversely, a valid marriage is not affected by a change
of personal law; for instance, where a former French Catholic priest married and afterwards became a citizen of Spain,
the marriage would not be invalidated under French law and
probably not under Spanish law.
RGZ. 38; RG. (June 23, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, no. 65; RG. (Dec. 15, 1930)
JW. 1931, 1340; 46 Z.int.R. (1932) 14; RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. 161,
and others.
France: App. Chambery (Feb. 7, 1885) Gaz.Pai.I885.1.703, Clunet 1888,
796.
133 RG. (May 16, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416, JW. 1932, 227. In this case the
Reichsgericht went so far as to reverse the principle, holding that the decisive time should be that when the action for annulment is brought. But this
can hardly be taken literally in view of the general rule illustrated in the
preceding note.
134 KG. (Aug. 5, 1937) JW. 1938, 855 (marriage celebrated in 1916 before
the German consulate in Adana, Chile, between a German woman and a
Russian who afterwards became a Chilean subject; error as to the personal
qualities of the husband entitled her to sue for nullity under German BGB.
§ 1333 but not under Chilean Law of Jan. 10, 1884, art. 33; she was held to
be deprived of the right under German law if she had become a Chilean national on her own application; if only the husband had applied, her citizenship would depend on the validity of the marriage. In a note MASSFELLER,
without protesting, expresses doubts).
135 BARTIN 2 Principes 122 suggests that a defect that can be cured according to prior law should be eliminated by a new law not retaining the
impediment but that an "absolute" voidness cannot be cured.
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A far-reaching deviation from this principle is implied by
the C6digo Bustamante, article 40, whereby any country is
entitled to deny recognition to a marriage, if the marriage is
contrary to certain expressly enumerated prohibitions of the
forum. This provision, taken literally, would entitle Brazil to
declare void a marriage celebrated validly in Chile between
an uncle and his niece, 136 if the parties became citizens of Brazil and perhaps even if they did not. Such an application of
public policy would be unreasonable, unless the court believed
the continuance of the marriage within the forum to be as
shocking as did the Ohio Supreme Court in the famous case
of State v. Brown. 137
3· Prohibitive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration
The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention on Marriage reduces the prohibitory effect of domestic marriage impediments to a few fundamental points. This was the main
achievement of the Hague treaty. It includes five prohibitions, entitling the participant states to prevent the celebration of marriages on grounds, not of the personal law of the
parties, but of its own local law:
(a) Absolute prohibition on account of relationship or
affinity;
(b) Absolute prohibition between parties to adultery,
provided the marriage of one of them has been
dissolved on the ground of this adultery;
(c) Absolute prohibition between persons who have been
convicted of a joint attempt upon the life of the
spouse of one of them;
(d) Prohibitions concerning a former marriage;
(e) Religious prohibitions.
The grounds for the first three prohibitions listed above are
136
137

Argued by M. WoLFF in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 403.
(1890) 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747·

298

MARRIAGE

contained in article 2, paragraph r ; the last two are implied
in article 2, paragraph 4·
An absolute prohibition is a prohibition which is not dispensable. In case of adultery, for instance, dispensation may
be granted in Germany; Swiss parties, their national law including no prohibition at all to marriage on account of adultery, may therefore marry in Germany. The Dutch courts,
however, consider adultery an absolute obstacle both for nationals and foreigners. 188
In the countries that have been or still are members of the
Convention, every prohibition of local law has been examined in this way to meet the test of article 2. The Convention
goes still further in limiting the local prohibitory rules. If a
marriage has been celebrated in violation of one of the prohibitions listed above but is valid according to the personal
law of the parties, it is valid everywhere with the exception
that it may be considered invalid in the state of celebration
(not in a third state) in the cases mentioned in (d) and (e) ,
not (a)- (c) above. 139
Hungary, for instance, may forbid an ordained Catholic
priest of Belgian nationality to marry within Hungarian territory; if he succeeds in doing so, however, Hungary may
consider the marriage void, but it is valid in Belgium and
therefore in all other participant states.
No prohibition other than those mentioned above is
proper ground for preventing a marriage of nationals of another member state. Hence, an Italian girl fourteen years old
or a Rumanian girl of fifteen may marry in Switzerland or
Sweden, where the age limits are seventeen and eighteen
respectively.
138 Settled doctrine, see H. R. (June 2, 1936) W. 1936, no. 1013, and cf.
II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 205.
13 9 The Polish Law on international private law of 1926, art. 12 par. 2, was
drafted less clearly; see Pol. Supr. Ct. (Jan. 7, 1931) 6 Giur. Comp. DIP.
(1940) no. 104, with a critical note by RENCKI.
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C6digo Bustamante. The C6digo Bustamante, article 38,
permits the local law to avail itself of (all) its prohibitions
which are not dispensable. Article 40 adds a rule for marriages already celebrated, whereby "the contracting states,"
i.e., as it seems each of them, may refuse recognition to a
marriage conflicting:
With their provisions relative to the necessity of dissolution
of a former marriage, to the degree of consanguinity or affinity, in respect to which there exists an absolute impediment, to the prohibition of marriage established in respect to
those guilty of adultery by reason of which the marriage of
one of them has been dissolved, to the same prohibition in
respect to one guilty of an attempt against the life of one of
the spouses for the purpose of marrying the survivor, and
to any other excusable grounds of annulment.

Trend. International literature, long critical of unlimited
local policy, has encouraged the trend towards restricting its
influence. This tendency is exhibited in the Polish Statute of
I926 (art. I2 par. 2) which confines the cases of overriding
local policy to four enumerated impediments. That the Italian Civil Code of I 8 6 5 (art. I 02 par. 2) reserved to the local law every prohibition contained therein (arts. 5 5-69),
was considered an "excessive and irrational" rule, 140 needing
a restrictive interpretation, 141 although hardly seeming to
permit it. 112 The new Code no longer tries to override the
nationality principle 143 to such an extent and enumerates the
prohibitions that are intended to apply to foreigners. 144 It is
true that foreign Catholics desiring a canon law marriage
140 UnrNA, 6 Repert. 513, no. 139; UnrNA, Elementi 177, no. 127.
141
KuHN, Comp. Com. 128.
142 ANZILOTII ( 1919) 236; UDINA, EJementi 178, no. 127 n. 2.
1
143 Relazione del Guardasigilli on. Solmi (Report of the Minister

Cf.

of Justice) in C. C., book I, Progetto definitivo (1936) 54·
144 C. C. (1938) art. II4 par. 2, C. C. (1942) art. u6 par. 2. The Minister
of Justice declined to include Italian provisions on nonage in the list of
inderogable impediments, where the personal law does not infringe public
policy. See Relazione 1938 no. 78.
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with civil effect must comply not only with civil requirements
but with all those established by the canon law and their nationallaws.145 In Spain, a similar position seems to be taken,
all the Spanish requirements for Catholic marriage being
added to those of the nationallaws. 146
Another example of increased understanding is that of a
recent Greek decision confining to Greek subjects the old prohibition of marriage between Christians and non-Christians.147
The Scandinavian Convention on Family Relations 148 incorporates chiefly nondispensable prohibitions arising out of
relationship and affinity, and the Finnish law of 1929 149 enumerates only relationship, affinity, and existing marriage as
obstacles under local policy.
But exaggerated mandatory local requirements are still
frequent. The period of delay instituted for women after the
dissolution of a former marriage figures in the list of compulsory prescriptions of local policy in Switzerland, 150 the
Netherlands/ 51 and France. 152 The most recent civil code,
145 FEDOZZI

425·
Spanish Trib. Supr. (July IO, I9I6) I37 Sent. IOS. Cf. TRIAS DE BES, 3I
Recueil I930 I 674.
147 Court of Athens (I937) no. 2462, Clunet I938, 902, on the ground of
Cod. Just. L. I, 9, 6 of A. D. 388; Basilica L. I Tit. I, 38, and Rule 72 of
the H. Synod. of Troullos.
148 Final Protocol no. I. According to no. 2 of the Final Protocol, persons
who have acquired full age by marriage under Finnish Jaw or by dissolution
of marriage under Icelandic law, may be prevented from marrying unless
.they are twenty-one years old.
149 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, on Family Relations of International Nature, § 2 par. 2, and § 6 par. 3·
150 See Swiss C. C. art. I03 and BECK, NAG. I67 n. 53·
151 The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. II, I925) N.J. I926, 39I (Russian bride); H. R. (June 2, I936) W. 1936, no. IOI3 (applying Hague Convention on Marriage of 1902, art. 2 par. 2). A convenient exception was made
for a Norwegian woman, first separated under the Norwegian Marriage
Law of May 3I, I9I8, § 43, and then divorced more than a year later: Rb.
Rotterdam (Feb. 2, I937) W. I937, no. 482.
152 France: C. C. art. 228; Cour Paris (Feb. I3, I872) S.I873.2.II2, D.1873.
2.I6o, (public policy "of decency") ; WEISS, 3 Traite 486; PouLLET 407 no.
350. The same doubtful assertion was made even under the Hague Conven146
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that of Venezuela, has retained its long and exacting list. 153
Thus, the result is the same as when the law of the place of
celebration is taken as decisive, and therefore all requirements of the local law as well as of the personal law impede
the marriage of foreigners/ 54
Effect of treaties and conventions. Has the adherence of a
state to a treaty, such as the Hague or the Montevideo treaties, or a state's participation in the Scandinavian Convention,
any effect beyond the scope of the treaty, generally limiting
the realm of unyielding public policy? Some Italian decisions 155 and a few writers 156 have answered this question affirmatively with respect to the Hague Convention. They argue that states, having once subscribed in a treaty, for
example, to the principle that the domestic age limit is alterable for foreigners, can no longer allege the contrary with respect to nationals of non-member states. Such a construction
of an international treaty is not only untenable but would indeed endanger the conclusion of future treaties. Treaties are
binding upon states only within their limits.
4· Permissive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration

The Hague Convention. According to article 3 of the
Hague Convention, the law of the place of celebration may
permit the marriage of foreigners contrary to their national
laws, if these prohibitions are based exclusively on grounds
tion on Marriage of 1902, art. 2 par. 3· Prevailing opinion contra in Switzerland, cf. BECK, NAG. 289 no. 17. In France this doctrine has been elaborated; the foreign law may be applied when it requires an even longer
delay. Cass. {Nov. 27, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1934, 796 (Swiss delay for divorced women; no curtailment by dispensation); Cour Paris {Nov. 30, 1934)
Nouv. Revue 1935, 49, Clunet 1935, 927.
153 Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. 132, C. C. (1942) art. 104 referring to all
mandatory requirements valid for nationals.
154
See supra n. 47·
155
See infra n. 157.
156 WEISS, 3 Traite 478 n. 2; PouLLET 410; AuDINET, II Recueil 1926 I
174, 186; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 113 n. 202; ibid. 195·
Contra German RG. (Dec. 21, 1916) JW. 1917, 364; M. WoLFF, IPR. 191.
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of a religious nature. The other states are entitled to deny to
a marriage contracted under such circumstances recognition
as a valid marriage.
Which impediments are of religious nature? The question
has been extensively discussed in the countries whose liberal
doctrine denies recognition to foreign discriminations on account of religion. In agreement with the dominant opinion
of these countries, the commentators on the Convention
ascribe religious character to prohibitions based on:
(a) Difference of religion ( disparitas cultus) ,157 such as
the canon law prohibition of marriages between
Christians and non-Christians in Spain and Greece,
formerly also in Austria, Poland, and Bulgaria;
the prohibition of marriages between Christians
and pagans in Sweden; between Moslems and nonMoslems according to the laws of Islam; and between Jews and non-Jews under Jewish law.
(b) The relation between godfather and godchild (cognati spiritualis) under canon law 158 and in Rumama.
(c) The vows of priests or monks, endowed with civil
157 Not recognized: by enacted law in Venezuela, C. C. (194-2) art. 105; by
the courts in:
France: Cour Paris (Nov. 17, 1922) S.1924.2.65, Clunet 1923, 85, Revue
1923, 437 (Serbian).
Switzerland: Kreisschreiben (June 30, 1928) n. 13, 25 SJZ. 183.
Italy: Trib. Livorno (May 5, 1894) Clunet 1898, 415 (Jewish law); Trib.
Torino (Oct. 18, 1910) Clunet 1912, 288, and Corte di Venezia (Dec. 7,
1910) Clunet I9II, 1326 (Austrian); App. Trento (March 8, 1928) Foro
Ita!. Rep. 1928, II7I, no. 27 (Austrian); Cass. (May 19, 1943) Foro Ita!.
1943 I 930 (Austrian); Cass. (Aug. I, 1946) II Giur. Comp. DIP. (1954)
12 (Greek).
Germany: A much cited decision of the OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 6, 1908) 18
Z.int.R. ( 1908) 541 is to the same effect, but the prohibition was recognized
by the OLG. Karlsruhe (March 28, 1917) 35 ROLG. 358 (marriage celebrated in London); and finally by the RG. (May 16, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416,
418 and RG. (Oct. 10, 1935) 148 RGZ. 383. Cf. RAAPE 239·
158 Cf. the controversy between SATIER, 32 Z.int.R. (1924) 69 n. 88, and
3 FRANKENSTEIN II4 n. 204.
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effect in Spain and formerly in Austria, parts of
Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. 159
It is doubtful, however, whether article 3 applies to a former marriage still considered existent for religious reasons
despite a divorce (Italy 160 and for Catholics, Spain, formerly also Austria and the Warsaw district).
No other prohibition established by the national law of a
party may be neglected, not even the politically inspired impediments which the Western tradition is accustomed to disregard.lGl Thus, military deserters and conscientious objectors from Austria and Germany, prevented from producing
a certificate of ability to marry, had to be refused the right
to marry in other member states. 162 To France this result
seemed so intolerable with respect to the emigrants from
Alsace and Lorraine, that France left the Hague Convention
on May 31, 1914, followed by Belgium on May 31, 1919.
The Hague Conferences of 1925 and 1928 tried in vain to
win these countries back by permitting a member state to
ignore prohibitions arising from military obligation or from
the status of a prince who needs the consent of the head of
his house.
The Swiss authorities apply these prohibitions as well as
the provisions of an Italian law of r 93 8 requiring governmental authorization for the marriage of an Italian to a per159 Not recognized in France (contra: AUDINET, II Recueil 1926 I 174,
184).
Great Britain, cf. DICEY, Rule 169 Exc. 2.
Italy: Cass. Roma (July 31, 1924) Monitore 1924, 727.
160 Viewed as a religious impediment by WALKER s87, sSS; SATTER, Note
opposing App. Liege (Feb. 2, 1937) 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 13 n. II. Many
writers think that art. 3, compared with art. 2 par. 3, and art. 6 par. x, excludes the impediment of former marriage from the conception of religious
impediments.
161
See supra pp. II4, 279·
162 Cf. Swiss Fed. Dep. of Justice, BBl. 1917, III 575, no. 14: canton governments may grant license to marry (under NAG. art. 7e par. 2 to foreign objectors and deserters only if they are subjects of states having not adhered
or having left the Hague Convention).
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son of other nationality. 163 On the same ground, German
writers claimed that the German legislation on difference of
race must be recognized by all other participants in the
Convention. 164
It is, of course, left to the law of the place of the intended
celebration whether or not it will respect a religious prohibition of the homeland. Switzerland, e.g., respects such prohibitions in the case of non-resident foreigners, while it ignores
them in the case of domiciliaries. 165 Third states are equally
free to determine their position.
In general. Outside of the Hague Convention and apart
from the religious prohibitions which have already been
dealt with, all political and penal prohibitions of a foreign
country are generally ignored. This liberal doctrine underlies
the Civil Code of V enezuela/ 66 which expressly rejects prohibitions of marriage founded on differences of race, class,
or religion. 167
In view of the American discussions of the effect of remarriage prohibitions, it may be noted that the situation in other
163 Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. I940, I463 no. 13, referring to art. 2 of the Italian
Law of Nov. I7, I938, abrogated by Decree-Law of Jan. 20, I944, art. I.
164 Cf. the summary by RAAPE, 2 IPR. (ed. I) I59, I62. Cf. RowsoN, "Some
Private International Law Problems Arising out of European Racial Legislation, I933-I945.'' 10 Mod. Law Rev. (I947) 345, 355 ff.
165 BEcK, NAG. 293 no. I2.
166 Venezuela: C. C. (I9I6} art. I33, C. C. (I942) art. I05.
167 Hindu caste: Chetti v. Chetti [1909] P. 67. Racial prohibitions: Trib.
civ. Pontoise (Aug. 6, I884} Clunet I885, 296. The Danish Minister of
Justice, by Circular of Oct. I2, I937, informed interested officials that the
German racial laws were applicable if no party was domiciled in Denmark.
This seemed to indicate that a contrary policy was expected in the case where
at least one party was a domiciliary; cf. RAAPE, 2 IPR. ( ed. I) I6o n. 2, who
also notes the reaction of other countries to the German "law for the protection of German blood" of Sept. 15, I935·
An interesting combination of considerations may be illustrated by a SouthAfrican decision. In the Roman-Dutch law, the old rule of lex loci contractus
still obtains. In addition, the facts that the bride was domiciled and the marriage was celebrated in the forum, Natal, formed grounds to disregard the inability of the man, under the common law of his domicil in Transvaal, to
marry his late wife's sister. Friedman v. Friedman's Executors ( 1922) 43
Natal Law Rep. 259, at 264, 266.
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countries depends on analogous considerations. The first
problem is to determine whether the law forbidding remarriage is intended to be applied abroad and, if so, to what
marriages. 168 A prohibition meant to be applied extraterritorially may not be applied by another country because it is
regarded as penaU 69 Otherwise, it applies as part of the personallaw.170
Relation to the forum. The subject under discussion furnishes significant applications of the general doctrine of public policy. To enforce a domestic policy upon a case subject
to foreign law, a strong tie between the case and the forum
should be present. Thus, Swiss law quite appropriately entitles a foreigner domiciled in Switzerland to invoke the
Swiss Federal Constitution, as opposed to his national law, in
protection of his right to marry. Political or racial prohibitions, even if not specifically eliminated by the Constitution,
will be disregarded on behalf of a resident forei~er. A non168 For instance, German courts have discussed at length whether by the
enigmatic provision of the Argentine Civil Marriage Law ( 1888) art. 82,
parties who have married in Argentina and have been divorced abroad are
prohibited from remarrying only in Argentina or everywhere. See infra p.
464, n. 178.
·
169 England: Scott v. Att. Gen. ( 1886) 11 P.D. 128 declared inoperative the
South African restriction on remarriage by the guilty party.
France: Trib. civ. Marseiiles (Nov. 25, 1925) Clunet 1926, 388 refused
recognition to a Serbian episcopal decree of divorce, because it contained a
clause making remarriage dependent on the bishop's consent, which the court
deemed inseparable, but the court should have recognized the divorce without
the remarriage clause, see Note in Gaz. Pal. 1926. 1. 442; in accord Trib. civ.
Seine (May 14, 1956) Clunet 1957, 146.
Germany: KG. (May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750 refused to apply the delay
for remarriage imposed by a Swiss court in accordance with arts. 104 and 150
of the Swiss C. C. because of its penal ("somewhat disgracing") character.
Switzerland: Prohibition of remarriage declared in a divorce decree by a
Yugoslav bishop is not recognized, Just. Dep., BBl. 1928, II 309.
170 England: Warter v. Warter (1890) 15 P.D. 152 per Sir James Hannen,
Pres., recognizes a six months' delay after decree under the Indian Divorce
Act, No. 4 of 1869. But in Miller v. Teale ( 1954) 29 A.L.J. 91, decided by
the High Court of Australia, the three months' delay is regarded as an
incidence of the foreign divorce decree, the law of the spouse's domicil at
the time of the second marriage ceremony being expressly discarded. See also
supra p. 290.
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domiciled alien has no such right; on the contrary, the cantonal authorities are required to prevent him from entering
into a marriage not recognized by his homeland. 111
Some codes, it may be remembered, 172 following the example of section 4 of the Austrian Civil Code, are restricted
in their external effect to transactions intended to have effect
within the territory of the personal law. The Austrian Supreme Court declared valid, despite Austrian impediments,
a marriage celebrated abroad by an Austrian citizen, in the
absence of intention to return to Austria immediately. This
rule was applied even to former Catholic priests and to marriages between Christians and Jews. 173 Thus, a foreign court
had no need to resort to its own public policy to allow such
a marnage.
Consequences of a state's acts. A permissive policy of the
country of celebration may be based upon reasons different
from tho~e thus far mentioned. Shall the forum permit a
party locally divorced, which divorce is not recognized by his
personal law, to remarry? This problem arose in Germany
out of two apparently conflicting rules, viz., one determining
according to the personal law whether a person is married or
unmarried (EG. art. 13 par. I) and the other ascribing full
credit to a domestic divorce decree. 174 The second rule ought
to be enforced, if the authority of the state is to be main171
172

HuBER-MUTZNER 430, gives a clear picture; BECK, NAG. 205 no. 49·
SuPra p. 126, n. 55·

173 OGH. (May 24, 1907) Spruch-Repertorium no. 198, 10 GIU.NF. no.
3787 and OGH. (July 17, 1906) 9 GIU.NF. no. 3485 (Austrian Catholic
marrying an Austrian Jewess in New York). Singular distinctions were developed. For instance, the Austrian prohibitions upon marriage were maintained where an Austrian abroad had a job, the loss of which would force
him to return to Austria, OGH. (Oct. 28, 1936) 55 Zentralblatt (1937) IZO
no. so; See also OGH. (July 23, 1937) 56 Zentralblatt (1937) 889.
1 7 4 Two opinions correspond to these two rules. The first opinion, stressing
the conflicts rule of EG. art. 13, was advocated by LEWALD n8; RAAPE 404;
OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 3, 1923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 57· The second opinion: KG.
(March 13, 19n) 24 ROLG. 19; REICHEL, 124 Arch. Civ. Prax. zoo; MASSFELLER, St.AZ. 1938, II2 1 IIS; Dt. }ustiz 1939, 1236ff.
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tained consistently. A state is not supposed to dissolve a marriage and yet deny the parties the advantage of the dissolution. In Switzerland, however, the majority opinion 4bas
taken this very position; 175 hence, a marriage between an
Italian and a Swiss woman may be dissolved in Switzerland,
but the right of remarriage is enjoyed only by the woman. 176

5. Sanctions for the Fulfillment of Intrinsic Requirements
Certificate of ability to marry. Officials issuing marriage
licenses or presiding at marriage ceremonies are in an unfavorable position to ascertain the impediments of a foreign
candidate. A large number of countries, therefore, require
foreign nationals or domiciliaries to exhibit a certificate issued by a competent officer in the country from which they
come, to the effect that to his best knowledge no impediment
is known to the prospective marriage. 177 Accordingly, in a
great number of states, measures have been taken, and offices
have been designated, 178 for the issuing of appropriate certificates to be used abroad. 179 The Hague Convention on Marriage, article 4, paragraph I, prescribed this precaution to
the extent that the Convention adopted the rule of national
law. Some important countries are unwilling to issue such cer175 BBl. I922, II 582 no. 14 (Spaniard); BECK, NAG. 464 no. 223; contra
Regierungstrat Zurich, S]Z I952, 376.
176
See for fuller discussion infra pp. 557-559.
177 E.g., Austria: Hofkanzleidekret of Dec. 22, I8I4, Justizgesetzsammlung
No. III8, now Marriage Law of I938, § I4.
Finland: Gen. Ord. of Dec. 28, I929, 1 BERGMANN (Finland p. 11).
Germany: BGB. § I3I5 par. 2, Marriage Law of I946, § 10. Cf. RAAPE 264,
on the complicated case of a foreign annulment not recognized.
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. 103, C. C. (I938) art. 114 par. I, C. C. (I942) art.
116 par. I, not abolished as had been proposed.
Sweden: Royal Ord. of Dec. 3, 19I5.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7e, BEcK, NAG. 185, 200.
178 BoscHAN in 5 Z.ausl.PR. (193I) 332 n. 2 gives a list of offices declared
competent in numerous states.
179 In some countries banns are issued before giving the certificates, as in
Luxemburg, and Switzerland.
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tificates; 180 therefore, either dispensation in the country of
celebration is frequently obtained, 181 or "certificates of cust~" are produced. 182
The underlying idea of this institution is clearly demonstrated in Switzerland; foreign citizens intending to marry
within the country must apply to the government of the canton for permission and, with the constitutional exception of
domiciled foreigners/ 83 are not permitted to marry unless it
is shown that the marriage would be recognized in the
homeland. 184
Dispensation. Dispensation, likewise, is governed by the
personal law. Not the law of the place of celebration but
the personal law determines what officials are competent to
grant dispensation from any prohibition to marry. 185
180 This is true particularly for Great Britain (excepting treaties concluded
on the basis of the Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906) though in practice
consular certificates even without statutory authority are issued (CHESHIRE
327) and almost all the states of the United States, except perhaps Wyoming,
where a provision corresponding to § 3 of the Uniform Marriage Evasion
Act is in force. (L. 1935. ch. 3 §I, Compiled Statutes, 1945. sec. 5o-I06, 107).
On the difficulties caused by this attitude see HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of International Law ( 1941) 356 § 161.
In France a "certificat de non-opposition" may be issued, but it is not recognized as equivalent to a certificate of "no impediment."
181 E.g., Switzerland in all cases of Americans, Federal Council, BBl. 1887,
III 700; Just. Dep., BBl. 1922, II 581 no. 13, in view of the recognition, in
the United States, of Swiss marriages celebrated according to Swiss law.
Germany: Allg. Verfiigung des Reichsministers der Justiz, Feb. 4, 1936,
Dt. Justiz 1936, 208 and Durchfiihrungs VO. no. I zum Ehegesetz of July 27,
1938, § 8; Runderlass des Bundesinnenministers, June 16, 1952, StAZ. 1952,
201.
1 8 2 Mostly through the diplomatic service of the country of celebration;
see Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. 1938, II 498 no. 7·
183 Swiss Federal Constitution art. 54 par. 3; NAG. art. 7e. Where the
bridegroom is of Swiss nationality, authorization is unnecessary, Just. Dep.,
BBl. 1925, II 143 no. 12.
184 HuBER-MUTZNER 433·
In Germany, besides the certificate of ability, other documents are required, such as a certificate that the husband's nationality will not be lost by
marriage under foreign law; another showing that the husband transfers
his nationality to the bride is probably obsolete. Moreover, it is remarkable
that where religious marriage is compulsory in the homeland of a party, Germany and Switzerland require a priest to declare himself ready to marry the
parties. Cf. supra p. 231, n. 55·
185 KosTERS 366 states this principle and exceptions thereto granted by Royal
favor in the Nether lands.
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Effect of violation of personal law. Because of the broad
scope of the personal law, it is necessary to determine what
law governs the effects of a violation of its prescriptions. As
we have seen in connection with formal prescriptions, the
dominant opinion is that the same internal law that establishes a requirement determines the effect of failure to comply with the requirement. 186 Covered by this rule are the
problems whether a prohibited marriage is valid in spite of
the prohibition or whether, if not, it is absolutely null (nonexistent), conditionally valid until annulment, or voidable at
the instance of certain persons; whether or not an annulment
has retroactive effect; by what persons action may be
brought; whether an annulment may be pronounced by persons other than judges; by what events the right to annul is
extinguished, etc. 186a
Where the parties have different personal laws, each of
the two laws must be consulted with respect to the consequences of a violation. The law of the husband may give him
an exclusive right to avoid the marriage or may perhaps entitle the wife alone to do so; sometimes both laws concur in
the same or in more or less similar effects. In addition to the
illustrations implied in the cases discussed above, the following may be of interest:
( i) Case decided by the Reichsgericht on January 20,
RGZ. 35): in I9IO two Swiss citizens, A (male)
and B (female) married in Salt Lake City, Utah. Without
having obtained a divorce from A, the wife B married C, a
German citizen, in Indianapolis, Indiana, in I 9 I 6. Nat until
I 9 I 8 was the marriage between A and B dissolved by diI928 (I20

Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. 1922, II 581 no. II points out: a Swiss cannot
marry his late wife's sister who is of Italian nationality, unless she receives
dispensation under Italian C. C. (1865) arts. 59, 68, and hence produces an
Italian certificate of nihil obstat.
l86 See citations supra p. 247, n. 121.
186
a In the result Trib. civil Bruxelles (June 18, 1949) Pasicrisie 1950
III 7 (Simulation of marriage).
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vorce. In I92I C, who had meanwhile returned to Germany,
received knowledge of B's previous marriage to A, and
thereupon B and C separated. Upon inquiry, C was told by
an American Military Commission in Germany that his marriage with B was null and void. Thereupon, in I 924 C went
through a German ceremony of marriage with D. When the
validity of this last marriage came up for determination by
a German court, this court, according to the German choice
of law rule, had to test the validity of the marriage between
B and C by the national laws of these parties, i.e., simultaneously by German and Swiss law. By article 7f of the Swiss
Law on Conflicts, the court would have been referred to the
law of Indiana. Under Indiana law, the marriage was absolutely nonexistent, while German law merely regarded it as
destructible ex tunc by decree of court. Following the general
Continental approach of applying to such cases the law establishing the more severe sanction, the court should have
found the second marriage void without any legal process
and the third marriage valid. By inadvertence, the Reichsgericht overlooked the renvoi of the Swiss statute on conflicts and, instead of Indiana law, applied as B's personal
law the law of Switzerland, which it held to be identical with
that of Germany. 181 Hence, the court held that C's marriage
to B was valid when he married D, that the marriage with
D, objectively considered, was adultery and that B would
be entitled to a divorce.
( ii) Let us assume that in I 9 I 6 B had married in Iowa 188
instead of in Indiana; 189 then the infirmity of the marriage
would have been cured by the divorce of 1918. The same
would have resulted if they had married in Sweden. 190
(iii) The following situation is quite different. A German
girl, fifteen years old and domiciled in Switzerland, marries
somewhere, her age being concealed. Germany claims her as
187 This finding was not entirely correct either. Under German law an
annulment of a bigamous marriage destroys the marriage ex tunc; it is effective only ex nunc in Swiss law. The sanction of the German law is the more
severe and should have been applied.
188 Iowa Code ( 1939) § 10445 subsec. 4, § 10486 sub sec. 3·
189 See Compton v. Benham (1909) 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365; Simms
v. Kirk (1924) 81 Ind. App. 515, 144 N. E. 146.
190 Swedish Marriage Law of June u, 1920, c. 10 § 1 par. 2.
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a national, Switzerland as a domiciliary. The marriage would
be considered void ( annullable) in Germany and voidable in
Switzerland.

Evasion of directive requirements. Since the effect of a violation of a requirement depends on the law establishing the
requirement, it follows that the effect is the same whether the
marriage takes place abroad or at home. Thus, the Dutch requirement of parental consent, being merely a directive prescription, does not invalidate a foreign marriage, although
the wording of the Dutch conflicts rule could be understood
to entail invalidity. 191 In other words, evasion of directive requirements by a foreign marriage is of no consequence. This
result is certain. It is obscured only by the usual idea that, in
a well-ordered system of civil status, even non-mandatory
rules of domestic marriage laws are securely protected
against violation.

IV.

CoNCLUSIONS

The law of the place of celebration, which governs without qualification the substantive requisites of marriage in the
United States and Argentina, contrasts with the personal law
observed as a matter of course everywhere else. The contrast is striking enough to offer a legislative problem, a problem aggravated by the limited knowledge we have of the
exact reasons at present for the American system. The historic background is obvious. Those of the statutists who
advocated the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, did no more than apply the rule they taught for
contracts in general, and their main impulse in establishing
the rule sprang from self-sufficient territorialism. We may
191 Dutch Supreme Court, H. R. (May 23, 1919) W.10436, N. J. 1919, 689,
in opposition to the questionable text of BW. art. 138.
Likewise, for instance, to avoid nullity Belgian citizens are bound to ob·
serve only mandatory requirements abroad, i.e., the requirements of age,
consent, relationship and affinity. See PAGE, I Droit civil beige ( 1933) no. 692.
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presume the same conception to have prevailed in America,
while it remained a country dependent on immigration and
pioneering. Requirements of the old countries were not to
impede the marriages necessary to new settlers. It was fair
to replace them by the demands of an honest Christian commonwealth. All this is understandable without much research.
However, for a considerable period, neither immigrants
nor pioneers have typified the shifting population of this
country. Nevertheless, while in each of the forty-eight jurisdictions the legislature occupies itself with enactments elaborately shaping the requirements for marriage, marriages out
of the state are fairly numerous, and the conflicts rule permits citizens to choose at pleasure any one of all these
statutes, to which to submit both the celebration and validity
of their marriages. This equation of intrinsic with formal requirements is no longer appropriate. While the various
forms of secular ceremonies solemnizing marriage are interchangeable, the very different kinds of marriage impediments
in the statutes are not thought of as equivalent in any way
in the mind of the legislators. Yet, under the conflicts rule,
they are all treated in the same way.
The harm done by indiscriminate application of local law,
however, involves more than trespassing on the domain of
foreign state legislation. First, social progress achieved in
one jurisdiction in the field of eugenics-as respects insanity,
medical certificates, etc.-is freely frustrated in others. 192
Granted that some reformers of marriage welcome the unbounded multitude of marriage statutes as an immense laboratory for social experimentation-an attitude rather ques19 2 The marriage of a fourteen-year-old girl from Wisconsin marrying in
Minnesota was declared in Iowa voidable only according to the Minnesota
statute of the time (cf. at present Minn. Stats. 1953, sec. 517.02, 518.02) despite
the prohibition and the evasion statute of Wisconsin. See, in contrast, supra
p. 275, n. 37·
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tionable-here freedom is converted into anarchy. Second,
if the state of the domicil reacts against foreign violation of
its policy, the great advantage of the principle that a marriage is good if valid at the place of celebration, disappears.
Nevertheless, the implications of the legislative power and
of specific marriage policies are being more distinctly realized, and the cases where a marriage is held void at the
domicil of a party grow more frequent.
Under these circumstances, the failure of the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act to rally the states to the principle that
marriages concluded contrary to the domiciliary law should
be avoided is most regrettable. Could it be that its reforms
were not sufficiently clear and adequate to be considered
worthwhile? Probably, they were regarded as inefficient in
the absence of more effort than the Act dared to require. No
machinery for enforcement was provided to prevent false
allegations by the parties and to effectuate interstate exchange of legal requirements and personal records. Nor has
the one state that adopted the section in the Uniform Act
requiring the license issuer to ascertain whether the proposed
marriage contravenes the home statutes of the parties, been
interested to prescribe investigation of the alleged facts. It
may have been premature to expect more. Today in many
jurisdictions, as a hundred years ago, marriage licenses are
granted with the greatest facility and promptness. While a
growing number of statutes stress the necessity of proofs of
age, parental consent, and freedom from dangerous diseases,
as well as banns or notice of intention to marry, others have
repealed the requirement, formerly obtained by social students, of a few days' interval between the advance notice
and the celebration. 193 A new species of state supervision may
be needed to insure to marriage legislation due respect by the
state's own officers as well as by other states. The developl93

See
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ment in foreign countries seems to suggest, however, that a
better interstate understanding would not require restrictions
on the legislatures, whether they prefer ultraradical or ultraconservative policies.
The chief rule of the civil law countries certainly is in extreme opposition to the American. While codes and treaties
are pathetically engaged in trying to conciliate clashing policies of two or more jurisdictions, the American method of
simply ignoring the problem by exclusively depending on the
law of the place of celebration is so far from the European
view that Diena called it "absurd." But, if simplicity indicates a sound law, the American rule is sound, and the European system hopelessly "absurd." Still worse than the complications themselves is the variety of the attempts to harmonize contradictory principles of the national and local laws.
The system of applying the personal laws of two parties and
the law of the celebration at the same time, if carried
through as initiated by the school of Mancini and embodied
in innumerable codes, is impractical. A thoroughly informed
representative of the Prussian Ministry of Justice told the
legal committee of the Diet in 1929 that the difficulties of
ascertaining the capacity of foreigners to marry had increased to a disturbing extent after the first world war,
strange results were occasioned by exotic religious laws, and
that the principle of nationality was far from furnishing the
certainty it was supposed to guarantee. 194
A remarkable remedy, however, may be noted. By international conventions, the scope of the requirements that
should be observed abroad has been narrowed. Further aid in
the same direction is supplied by modern enactments, such
as the new Italian Code, which spontaneously reduces the
causes of nullity of marriage when celebrated abroad. Indeed, if a statute insists on prohibiting marriage between
194

See supra p.

167,

no.

210.
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first cousins, which is allowed in most jurisdictions, why
should another country yield to this problematic proposition? The state enacting such a statute would do better to
limit the prohibition to domestic ceremonies. The Hague
Convention, the Treaty of Montevideo, and the C6digo
Bustamante agree in the division of domestic marriage impediments into two categories, one of international and the
other of merely national applicability. Only the gravest objections, shared by all participant states or raised by one
state and understood by the others, are considered sufficient
to prevent or nullify a marriage contracted outside of the
home state. The lists of internationally relevant impediments
so far established coincide in some obvious inclusions-as
for instance consanguinity between ascendent and descendent
or between brother and sister, or an existing marriage of a
party-and in other respects vary in a characteristic manner. The religious impediments that had so great significance
for the Hague Convention on Marriage are excluded from
consideration in the two Latin American treaties. Under
that of Habana (art. 40), any minimum age, including that
of eighteen years for male and sixteen years for female
parties prescribed in Brazil (C.C. art. I8J, XII), must be
observed in the other states. The Montevideo Treaty (art.
I I) does not oblige a state to respect a lower limit than
fourteen years for men and twelve for women. Although this
is unsatisfactorily low, the idea of fixing an international
age limit is excellent.
Finally, the existing contrasts suggest a compromise on
another basis. Suppose Italians visiting the United States. If
they are well informed, they may walk right from the pier
into a court house and be married at once. The permissibility
of their union will be judged exclusively under the law of the
state where they happen to stay during a couple of hours.
An American may be domiciled for forty years in Italy, but
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his capacity to marry at all, or to marry a certain person, will
be determined by all Italian authorities concerned, by searching the law of some forgotten home of his or of his father or
grandfather. One system is as abusive as the other. A state
should not want to join foreigners in marriage utterly disregarding their home laws. Nor should a state, using the
dubious test of nationality, exaggerate and perpetuate its
significance for the determination of civil status.
When is it reasonable to acknowledge the effect of a
change of circumstances upon the substantive requisites of
marriage? That the mere presence of parties ought not to
suffice to change the applicable law, is recognized, at least
in theory. But also the mere, though actual, change of domicil should not be regarded as enough. Evasion will not in
practice be eliminated if people who contemplate matrimony
may choose their marriage law by simple transfer of their
domicil. This is the danger also in making the first matrimonial domicil govern the substantive requisites.
All this leads to the proposition that the personal law of
the parties should continue to govern for a certain period
after the parties change their domicil. Marrying after this
time, they would be subject to the law of the place of celebration alone, with effect also in their home countries. In such a
simple system, no additional precaution is needed. If it must
be complicated by concessions to the actual conflicts law, the
method of shortened lists of international impediments is
unavoidable.

CHAPTER

9

Personal Effects of Marriage
I.
I.

EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE IN GENERAL

The Internal Conceptions

"EFFECTS of marriage" is a modern legal concept
corresponding to the comprehensive matrimonial
legislation which was developed in the course of
the nineteenth century. Following the model of the German
and Swiss codes, all recent European codifications of private
law contain a chapter concerning the operation of marriage
on the relations between the spouses themselves and between
the spouses and third persons. The consequences of this
arrangement are many and significant; the European doctrine attributes much importance to the fact of marriage and
considers many, if not all, the pertinent provisions as a
separate complex of rules within the system of law.
At present, the term "effects of marriage" refers both to
the personal relations and to the property of husband and
wife. 1 The older codifications, compiled at the turn of the
eighteenth century, acknowledged certain personal rights
and duties of spouses but did not contain any extensive body
of rules referring to the operation of marriage on property.
They customarily treated the problem of property interests
between spouses as it had been approached by the statutists,
that is, by discussing the effects of marriage settlements, at
that time customary among propertied classes. Characteristically, today the settlement is still called in France contrat
1
"Personal" and "property" relations, of course, as used above, do not
exactly correspond to their meanings in private law.
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de mariage and in German, Ehevertrag, although it is not a
contract of marriage but only a contract respecting property
relations made upon the occasion of a marriage.
Consequently, these codes and the literature of the period
treated the entire question of the effects of marriage on property as a question of contract. In the French Civil Code and
codes of other countries influenced by it, the subject is still
retained in the sections dealing with contracts. Not until very
recent times have some of these countries, particularly Italy,
Greece, and Peru, included in their new codes chapters on
patrimonial relations between the spouses, chapters placed
along with others dealing with the law of family relations.
Numerous topics pertaining to the effects of marriage, however, are still dispersed throughout the codes.
American law has not developed in this subject a body of
doctrine similar to that of the German Civil Code. The nearest approach to it is a collection of scattered topics connected with marriage, brought together under the heading
of "husband and wife" in the various treatises and casebooks
on family relations. By analytical comparison, we find an
important difference in that marriage in itself does not have
so many peculiar consequences in the present private law
of this country as it does in Europe. The emancipation of
married women, particularly as brought about by the equal
rights statutes of the common law states, has reduced the
effects of marriage to a comparatively small residuum.
Gradually, married women have been granted the power
to own and manage property in their own names and the
capacity to make valid contracts with and conveyances to
third parties; transactions between husband and wife have
been rendered possible; and the peculiar rules on liability for
torts committed by a married woman and on the husband's
liability for the wife's prenuptial debts abolished. Indeed,
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in a few states, the old disabilities of married women have
been swept away completely.
On the other hand, legislatures and courts of numerous
states have deemed it unwise to empower a married woman
to bind her property as surety for the debts of her husband
or to become his business partner. A considerable number of
states have found it necessary to protect creditors by forbidding or restricting property transfers between husband
and wife. In several states, the ancient institution of tenancy
by the entireties has been preserved. In several states of the
Middle West, a contract of a married woman does not bind
her assets, unless she expressly states her intention to do so.
vVith respect to torts, the recent family car doctrine has resulted in a revival of the husband's liability for certain torts
of his wife. In the field of property interests, statutory rights
have been substituted for the ancient rights of dower and
curtesy in the majority of states, in many cases with elaborated and strengthened provisions. The effects of marriage
upon the property relations of husband and wife, although
no longer so vital as they were at common law, are still
numerous and important. The changes from the old common
law have been so recent, however, so unsystematic, and so
different in the various states that no general doctrine has
thus far been worked out. Considering the undoctrinal or
even anti-doctrinal climate of American jurisprudence, we
can hardly expect the elaboration of any such doctrine in
the near future.
2.

Reaction on Conflicts Laws

This is only one of the many differences of structure
among the municipal laws, having distinct reactions on the
conflicts law. Above all, in the Continental international
private laws, the national law has come to govern the whole
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complex of relations growing out of marriage. Under the
German Introductory Law, which has been followed by many
other codes, the non-patrimonial rights and duties of married
persons are governed by the national law of the husband as
of the time when a particular relation is in question; effects
on property of the spouses are governed by the law of the
country of which the husband was a national at the time of
the marriage.
The American law of conflicts, on the contrary, contains
no separate body of rules on effects of marriage. The Restatement perfectly reflects the actual law, when it expresses
the "effect" of foreign marriage in one single sentence
( § r 33), saying that a state will give it the same effect as
"a marriage created by its own law." Duty to pay for necessaries, for goods bought, and for alimony are treated together with all other alimentary obligations (§§ 459, 460,
463). Effects on property of the spouses are considered
exclusively under the head of interests of husband and wife
created in each other's property, either immovable or movable, and are treated along with property in general
(§§ 237-38, 248, 289-293). Moreover, the capacity of
married persons to enter into antenuptial contracts (§ 238
comment b; §289 comment c), separation agreements, et
cetera, is part of the law of contracts ( § 333) ; the capacity
to commit torts, the right of one spouse to sue the other in
tort, or the right of the husband to sue a wrongdoer for
injury to his wife, are regulated by the law governing torts
( §§ 377 ff.). Finally, there are the rules on constructive
trusts, living trusts, and testamentary trusts, institutions
affording the main safeguards for the family interests of the
wealthy.
As we must follow here the European division into two
groups of effects, we encounter uncertainty about the borderline between them. Again, no substantial argument supports
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the theory that the lex fori, the distinctions of internal law,
should decide directly the scope of a conflicts rule on personal
or property effects. 2 The more important points will have to
be discussed one by one.
3· Person::tl Effects of Marriage
The conflicts rules to be discussed here refer either to the
law of the forum, the law of the temporary residence of the
spouses, of their domicil, or of their nationality. In order to
understand why these rules differ more than those on status
in general, we must remember the nature of personal marital
relations. Every legislator is conscious of the fact that such
duties as those of mutual fidelity, cohabitation, and obedience of the wife, have their foundation in morality or religion. Nobody would think today of enforcing such duties
through specific performance or compulsory execution. All
modern laws agree that, so long as a marriage is normal, the
law has no importance in these respects. Modern codifiers,
however, have decided to lay down rules that give these
duties a legal character; they wish to emphasize the social
importance of sound marriages and to grant a spouse as
much judicial help as possible, short of separation and divorce. That it is insufficient to speak of "spiritual effects of
marriage," as is done sometimes in Latin America, probably
for the sake of Catholic doctrines, is demonstrated by the
Codex Juris Canonici, which defines the conjugal duties in
terms of definite jural rules (c.rrro-IIIJ).
The more the legal nature of the mutual duties of a married couple is stressed, the more it is felt possible to resort
to a personal law determined either by nationality or marital
domicil. Where the personal effects of marriage are governed simply by the law of the directing court, marriage is
2 Still, this seems to be the prevailing opinion, also adopted in Latin
America by authoritative writers, such as 2 Vrco, nos. 52, 6o.
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thought to be ruled essentially by morals, which are naturally
evaluated according to local written or unwritten rules. We
shall see how both ideas are confused in some countries, for
instance, in France.

II.
1.

CONTACTS

Law of the Residence

The United States. In the United States, it is not quite
clear whether purely personal marital relations are governed
by the law of the forum or by the law of the place where the
spouses "live," although the equation "place where they live,
that is, the law of their domicil" 3 has probably been abandoned.4 As a matter of fact, in case both parties reside temporarily at a place, the court of that place apparently will
take jurisdiction and apply the local law. 5 Probably, the
Restatement ( § 133, Comment b) speaks of such a case,
stating that "the incidents which result from the existence
of the status are determined by the law of the place where
they are sought to be exercised," and declares by way of
illustration that the law of the place where they presently
live determines the question whether a husband is guilty of
battery when he uses force to control his wife. Other cases
may be too rare to be taken into account. In British countries
also, including Quebec, 6 the conception seems to be that the
husband's authority over the person of his wife is of a disciplinary nature and to be decided entirely within the limits of
the lex fori, jurisdiction being predicated upon residence, not
3 MINOR
4 KuHN,

§ 79; DUDLEY FIELD art. 554·
Comp. Com. 144. This point is settled implicitly by the Restatement §§54, I33·
5 Cf. 4 PHILLIMORE 359 cited with approval by I WHARTON 365 and KUHN,
Comp. Com. I44: "If the husband deserts his wife, refuses her maintenance,
or ill-treats her by violence, she has a right jure gentium to redress in the
tribunals of the place where they reside." Cf. also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 343
no. 310.
6 I JOHNSON 327.
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domicil. This rule embraces the questions of what amount of
forcible control the husband may use, as well as whether a
resident foreigner may apply to the courts for restitution of
conjugal rights. 7
Argentina. In Argentina, the test of domicil adopted by
the Civil Code (art. I 6o) and by the Treaty of Montevideo
of I889 (art. I2) was suddenly changed by the Marriage
Law of November 12, I 8 8 8 (art. 3), which referred to residence; hence the courts have been stimulated to apply the
law of the forum. 8 The literature criticizes this solution as
an unjustifiable infringement upon the domiciliary principle. 9
2.

Law of the Domicil

Domicil, as the test chosen for questions of status in general, is decisive also in the personal relations of the spouses
in Denmark/ 0 Uruguay/ 1 if not in Argentina, more recently
also Peru 12 and Brazil 13 and under the Treaty of Montevideo.14 Domicil in this connection is the marital domicil.
In Switzerland, likewise, in accordance with its general
rules, married persons domiciled within the country are governed by the municipal law; 15 Swiss nationals domiciled
7 Connelly v. Connelly (1851) 7 Moore P. C. 438; O'Leary v. O'Leary
[Alberta, 1923] 1 D. L. R. 949·
8 Even the former text, C. C. art. 160, was understood in the same sense
by DAIREAUX, Clunet 1886, 293· ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 105 explains that
in almost every case the law of the place where the conjugal rights and
duties are exercised is deemed relevant.
9 2 WEIS&-ZEBALLOS, Manual de derecho internacional privado ( ed. 5,
1912) 159; 2 VIcO no. 6o; ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 281, 285.
10 BORUM n6.
11
C. C. art. 2396. No discussion or problem exists as declares VALLADAO 65.
12 Peru: C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. V, agreeing with precedents for which see 8
APARICIO y SANCHEZ, C6digo Civil 70.
13
Brazil: Lei de Introdu~iio ( 1942) art. 7·
14 Text of 1889, art. 12, text of 1940, art. 14.
15
NAG. arts. 2, 32, as interpreted by the Fed. Trib. (May 29, 1908) 34
BGE. I 299, 316; cf. STAUFFER, NAG. 77 Vorbem. no. 7 to arts. 19 ff. The
Swiss domiciliary law has been emphatically re-emphasized in BG. (April
18, 1942) 68 BGE. II 9, 13, adding that the rules concerning the protection of
the marital union belong to public policy.
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abroad are subject to their national law, unless the domiciliary law declares itself applicable. 16
French writers are increasingly inclined to propose legislation that marital domicil be taken as the test. 11
3· Law of Nationality

The problem. In jurisdictions adopting nationality as the
test of status in general, personal husband-wife relations
have been controlled by the law of the state of which the
husband was a citizen. The simple reason for this rule originally was that in the countries concerned the wife at marriage regularly acquired the nationality of her husband. Yet,
although this effect of marriage upon the nationality of the
wife has been modified in an increasing number of countries,
the conflicts rule has been preserved and is the prevailing
rule. This attitude may be explained partly by the force of
tradition and partly by the fact that both the wife's acquisition of the husband's nationality and the application of the
husband's personal law are founded on the marital power of
the husband, which in some rudimentary form still exists
under most modern codes.
As a matter of fact, however, the cases where spouses
have different nationalities, either during the entire marriage or as a result of later changes, have become frequent
and this has had to be taken into account.
In the United States, the law of nationality has been modified several times. Under the provisions in force since I 9 2 2,
a foreign wife no longer acquires American citizenship by
marriage, and an American woman no longer loses her citizenship by marrying a foreigner. These rules also exist in
the Soviet Union and in Brazil. French enactments after
World War I provided that a French bride retained her
16
17

NAG. art. 28 and supra p. 87 note 45·
GouLJ!, "Mariage," 9 Repert. 89 no. 477·
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nationality unless she filed a declaration to the contrary; an
analogous provision is now in force with respect to foreign
women marrying Frenchmen. Other countries have followed
these models. Along the same line, repatriation of wives who
have lost citizenship by marriage is frequently facilitated by
reduction of the normal requirements. Another source of
different nationalities of husband and wife is that, subsequent to the marriage, husband or wife may separately acquire new nationalities.
The cases of split nationality were considered by the
Hague Convention on Marriage Effects of 1905.
The rule that the national law of the husband governs the
personal relations between husband and wife, is expressly
upheld in the case of divergent nationalities in the codes of
Germany, 18 Austria, 19 Greece, 20 Italy, 21 Spain, 22 Egypt/ 2 a
Syria, 22 b and Siam,Z 2 c by the C6digo Bustamante/ 3 and formerly the Treaty of Montreux concerning the jurisdictions
in Egypt 24 and recently the Benelux-Draft. 24 a In other countries, the same view still obtains by interpretation. 25 Prominent French authorities have also enunciated the rule. 26
18 EG. art. LJ- par. I, as now usually construed; LEWALD 88; RAAPE 275;
\VIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 6I n. 352, but see infra n. 28; art. I4
par. 2 adds that (;erman law applies also if the husband has lost his German nationality but the wife has retained hers.
l!i Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § 7·
2o Greece: C. C. art. I4.
~: Italr: C. C. (I 865) Disp. Pre!. art. 6; C. C. ( I942) Disp. Pre!. art. IS.
-- Spam: C. C. art. 9·
zza Egypt: C. C. art. I3 par. I.
22 b Syria: C. C. art. I4 par. I.
22 c Siam: Law on Private International Law of I939, art. 2I.
2 3 Codigo Bustamante art. 43·
24
Convention of Montreux of May 8, I937 on Egyptian Mixed Tribunals,
Regulations of Judicial Organisation, art. 29 par. 3, U. S. Treaty Series No.
939·
24a Benelux-Draft: art. 4·
25
See for instance for the Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I9I9)
W.Io 444, N.J. I032; for Guatemala: MATOS, no. 230; for Portugal: VALLADAO 70.
26 AUDINET, I I Recueil I926 I 2I2, considers this rule obvious; BARTIN, 2
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The rule is unquestionably applied when both parties acquire a new nationality by a common act. This mutability of
the applicable law is recognized everywhere (in contrast to
the immutability of the rules on marital property relations).
Where the national laws of the spouses are different, the
following efforts to modify the rule have been made:
Last common nationality. If the husband alone changes his
nationality, which until then has been common to both, it
seems inequitable that the wife should suffer a corresponding
change in her status. Therefore, the Hague Convention of
I 90 5 (arts. I and 9 par. 2) provided that the law of the last
nationality common to the spouses should govern. This solution has been followed by Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Italy, and Greece and has been approved by some writers. 27

Illustration: In Germany (RG. [April IS, I93S] I47
RGZ. 3 85) a Dutch husband acquired German nationality,
his wife remaining a Dutch national. His action for restoration of conjugal rights based on German law was denied
because this cause of action is unknown to Dutch law, which
continued to govern the duties of the parties according to the
Hague Convention.
The rule is understood as meaning that a change of nationality, in order to affect both spouses, must be voluntary on
the part of both, and not one which is voluntary on the part
of the husband alone and extended to the wife merely by
operation of law.
Principes 2I4 § 293, sees no room for hesitation; BATIFFOL, Traite 508 with
a qualification.
27 Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, §I subsec. 9; Czechoslovakia: Law of
1948 on private international law, § I4; Poland: Law of I926 on interna·
tiona! private law, art. I4; Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. I8; Greece:
C. C. ( I940) art. 14 and previously deci~ion of Epheteion Patron ( I922) 33
Themis 92 (Italians, the husband later being naturalized in Greece). OLG.
Kiel (Jan. 24, I93I) JW. I932, 599 (in relation to England, non-member
state). Cf. CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue I9I01 59; NIBOYET 736 no. 626; 3 ARMIN·
JON 2o; PoULLET 432 no. 372. Resolution of the Sixth Hague Conference,
1928; Rumanian Draft, art. 23.
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But this solution is useful only in the case where there has
been at least one common nationality. The Hague Convention is limited to this case; no uniform conflicts rule exists for
any other case.
Cumulative application of both national laws. To provide
a solution for every case of different nationality, an influential doctnne advocates the application of both national laws
cumulatively. Each party, it is argued, may have only those
rights and duties that are established by his or her own national law. Hence, what right the husband or wife may exercise depends on simultaneous approval by both marriage
laws. 28
It is rather generally felt, however, that such a cumulation
is difficult to determine and very undesirable. In every country, the law regulating the effects of marriage is drafted
to achieve a certain balance; to take out a single part because
that part has not been acknowledged by another state's legislation, destroys the consistency of the marital law and reduces its efficacy. 29
Emergency solutions. On the basis of the nationality
28 Finland: Law of Dec. s, 1929 on family relations of international nature,
§ I4 par. I.
Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. 19, 1913) 26 ROLG. 232; KG. (May
27, 1927) JW. 1928, 73; KG. (Feb. 24, 1936) JW. 1936, 2470; cf. OLG.
Stuttgart (March 31, 1905) I I ROLG. 287. 2 ZITELMANN 670; WALKER
742; M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 408, but apparently no longer
in his IPR. 197; contra: I BAR§ 172 and most writers, see RAAPE 275 (deminutia matrimonii). MASSFELLER, }W. 1936, 2472; ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur.
Comp. DIP. 7· The RG. {Feb. 15, 1906) 62 RGZ. 400, has not yet taken
sides.
Italy: ANZILOTII, Corso (1913) 250; cf. his arguments as to the parallel
problem of paternal relations, 2 Revista ( 1907) 116; CAVAGLIERI 219; UmNA,
Elementi 181; FEDOZZI 432; Bosco 229; contra: CANSACCHI, 3 Guir. Comp.
DIP. 275, with a good summary.
29 J. STRELITZ, Die Schliisselgewalt im internationalen Privatrecht, Thesis
( Gottingen, 1936) 42, tries, without success, to develop a more satisfactory
"cumulation." WENGLER, Book Review, I I Z.ausi.PR. ( 1937) 973, calls attention to the rules in French Morocco, under which the status of each spouse
is governed by his personal law. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 246 n. 85, suggests applying the law of the defendant.
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principle, relatively the best solution seems that of resorting
to the last common nationality which the parties may have
had, as was done by the Hague Convention of r 90 5. Where
the parties never had any common nationality, the best approach seems that of resorting to the law of the husband as
of the time of the marriage. This solution was suggested in
a draft issued by the Sixth Hague Conference of 1928.
Every other solution founded on nationality imposes excessive risks on all third persons who deal with a married
person. 30
Yet, would it not be preferable to abandon the principle
itself, at least in this particular field? A tendency toward the
domiciliary law seems strong; 31 it is of considerable weight
in Latin America. 32 This development is closely connected
with that of resorting to public policy with respect to foreigners domiciled in the forum, a trend which we shall consider in the following section.
4· Public Policy of the Forum
Law of the wife. In a number of countries, the rule that
the governing law is the national law of the parties or of the
husband, is reversed, and under certain circumstances the
30

POULLET (ed. 2) 479·
CASSIN, 34 Recueil 1930 IV 757 j LEREBOUR&-PIGEONNIERE 250 no. 239;
NIBOYET, Traite 361; FEDOZZI 238; cf. AuDINET, Clunet 1930, 328. The
problem was fully discussed with respect to the capacity of women to contract by AUDINET and others in Travaux du Comite fran~ais de droit international prive, Annee 4, 1936-37, 89 ff. The revised Czechoslovak draft
(Revue 1931, 187) § 17 par. 2, refers, in absence of a last common nationality, to the last common domicil of the parties; the law of 1948 (§ 16),
however, declares in this case the lex fori applicable.
The Institute of International Law deems applicable, in case of diversity
of citizenship, the law of the common "habitual residence" or of the last
residence or, as a last resort, the lex loci celebrationis, 46 Annuaire (1956)
176.
32 VALLAD.ii.o has devoted his book, Conflicto das leis nacionaes dos conjuges
nas suas rela~6es de ordam pessoal e economica e no desquite, to the defense
of this tendency. See particularly, 178 ff., on earlier views favorable to the
law of the domicil and conclusions, 205 ff. The Brazilian Lei de Introdu~ao
of 1942 has followed his doctrine.
81
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law of the wife is applied, at least if it happens to be the law
of the forum.
In Germany (EG. art. 14 par. 2), German law is applied
when the German husband acquires a foreign nationality and
the wife remains a German national.
In France, the case of a French bride marrying a foreign
subject but retaining her French nationality has attracted a
great deal of attention. While some authors have interpreted
the amendment of the nationality laws, under which the
French woman's French nationality is preserved,S 3 as designed to preserve her French private law rights in all cases, 34
others limit the application of French law to couples living
in France. 3 " A similar practice obtained in Brazil under the
nationality principle; Brazilian law was applied when one
of the parties to the marriage was a national of the country
and both, or even the husband alone, were living in BraziP 6
The like seems to be true of other Latin American countries
as well. 37 An attempt to clarify the situation by an express
statutory rule was made in France, in 1924, when the Chamber of Deputies voted upon a bill providing for the application of French law in all cases where either the husband is
a Frenchman or where, the husband being a foreigner, the
wife is a French national and the parties are domiciled in
France. 38 The requirement of French domicil was dropped
in the draft of the Societe d' etudes tegislatives ( 1930) 39 :
According to this, French law should govern the non-property effects of marriage as to both spouses, if one is French I
33

Law of Aug. ro, 1927, art. 8; Code de Ia Nationalite 1945, art. 94·
LEREBOUR5-PIGEONN!ERE; ( ed. 3) 390 no. 3 33, whereas in his latest
edition (ed. 6) 358 no. 332 the author advocates for this case the law of
the matrimonial domicil; cf. NIBOYET, Revue 1929, 193, 194, 209.
35
NIBOYET 734 no. 625.
36
VALLADAO 136, zoo.
37
E.g., Guatemala, MATOS nos. zu, zrz.
38
Revue 1924, 315 n. r.
39
Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 164, art. 19; cf. ibid. 76. Cf. NIBOYET,
Revue 1929, 193, zu and 4 Traite 366; BARTIN, 2 Principes 201 § z88.
34
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French courts. The courts in France go so far in applying
domestic law that it has been alleged that they would do so
every time a French party is concerned or any French interest is at stake. 40 However, this does not represent the
dominant opinion. For some time, the French courts have
been wavering between the two poles of national law and
public policy, the former having been strongly advocated by
Andre Weiss and his school, the latter appearing as a goal
of nationalistic post-war trends. At present, it seems that
certain effects of marriage are regarded as dependent on the
national law and others on the domestic law. The catalogue
of the latter group, as drawn up by Weiss himself 41 in 19 r 2,
has presumably been extended since. In 1928, the following
problems were enumerated by Niboyet 42 as governed by the
personal law: capacity or incapacity of the wife; mutual obligations of fidelity and assistance of husband and wife;
wife's duty to follow husband to his residence and the right
to bear his name; special capacity of the wife to dispose of
her salary; "putative marriage." 43
The realm where public policy prescribes the exclusive application of French law, was defined as follows: penal provisions; implied authority of one spouse to contract for the
other; alimentary obligation; desertion of family. 43 a
The same general pattern exists in the other countries following the nationality principle. 44 So many variations in de40 Trib. civ Seine (April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461. AUBRY, L'incapacite
de Ia femme mariee en droit international prive fran~ais (Paris, 1933) 57;
LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 356 no. 33 I, extending public policy to all moral
conceptions.
41 WExss, 3 Traite 584 ff.
42 NIBOYET 736 nos. 627, 628.
43 See infra p. 587.
43a Twenty years later, NIBOYET, 4 Traite no. 1503, extended the second
group by including the duty of the wife to obey her husband and to follow
to his residence; the mutual obligations of fidelity; and the exercise of a
profession by the wife.
44 Cf. for Spain: TRIAs DE BEs, 31 Recueil 1930 I 677 and 6 Repert. 253
nos. 103, 104; GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 299·
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tail exist, however, that we shall have to discuss every one
of the various effects of marriage separately.
Procedural law. It is a traditional proposition that domestic law is exclusively applicable in matters of procedure
and penal law. Exclusive domination of the lex fori in matters of procedure is recognized by the Hague Convention on
Marriage Relations of I 90 5. After stating as a general
principle that the rights and duties of the spouses in their
personal relations to each other are governed by their national law, article I adds the following proviso:
However, these rights and duties cannot be enforced except
by the means permitted under the law of the country where
their enforcement is sought.
According to this provision, the forms of action, judgment,
and execution are controlled by the local rules of the court, 45
but the court of the forum does not permit any cause of action that is not also recognized by the national law. 46 A
German husband, for example, is allowed under the German
civil and procedural codes to sue his wife for restoration of
conjugal rights, but he cannot bring such an action in Belgium. A Belgian husband, on the other hand, may not bring
an action of this kind in a German court, since he has no such
right of action under his nationallaw. 47
This rule, forbidding a country to grant a foreigner a
right of action not recognized in his national law, is a strange
limitation on local public policy, to which the signatories to
the Convention voluntarily submitted. A national of a nonsignatory country may well be permitted to avail himself
of a local remedy that is not recognized by his national law,
See also I BAR 481 § I7Z par. 3; z FIORE 103 ff. no. 598.
The methods of enforcement must be analogous but not identical: see
Actes de Ia Quatrieme Conference de Ia Haye, 1904, 178; German Denkschrift in I8 Z.int.R. ( 1908) s8o.
47
Cf. infra n. so.
45

46
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when the forum considers the granting of such remedy required by its own public policy. 48

III.

ScoPE OF THE RuLEs

In this section, we shall note the matters that have been
claimed either generally or in some legal system as within
the scope of the conflicts rule on personal marital relations.
I.

Duties of Conjugal Life

Where the personal law governs the relations between
husband and wife, it has been applied to determine the
spouses' mutual duties of fidelity and personal assistance, the
wife's duties of obedience and rendering services in the
household or in the husband's business, and similar matters.
It depends on the personal law 49 whether the husband
may forcibly control his wife's conduct, whether he may
open her correspondence or rescind her contractual obligations of personal work, and whether one spouse may sue the
other for restitution of conjugal rights. 50
As already mentioned, the local law is competent, however,S1 to bar an action that does not fit in with the local system or to refuse a method of enforcement not permitted by
48 See, for instance, for Italy: CAVAGLIERI 2I8; UDINA, Elementi I82 no.
I32· It has been contended, however, particularly by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 255,
that the public policy of the participant states was modified by the Hague
Convention. See this contention in another connection, supra p. 30I.
49 Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 350; NIBOYET 737 no. 627 (2).
50 Applying the personal law of the parties, German courts have accorded
this action (provided for in the German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I)
to Czechoslovakian spouses (RG. (June I2, I922) Leipz. Z. I922, 5I8) and
denied it to Belgians (LG. Giessen (Nov. I, I92o) 20 Jahrb. DR. 22I),
Swedes (LG. Stuttgart (April 4, I924) 23 Jahrb. DR. 442), and Dutchmen
(OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 23, I934) IPRspr. I934, no. 49; RG. (April I5, I935)
I47 RGZ. 385). A peculiar exception has been made by the RG. (Feb. I7,
I936) I50 RGZ. 283 (an Italian wife domiciled in Germany was granted
this action, unknown to Italian law, because she lacked the remedy she
would have enjoyed in Italy).
51 Supra p. 331· Thus, German courts would not assume the task of Swiss
judges of admonishing the parties and suspending their life in common,
Swiss C. C. arts. I69, I70.
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its procedure; it seems safe to assert also that no forcible
control by extrajudicial acts is granted unless permitted by
the local law. 52
Instead of resorting to the personal law, French courts
have sometimes simply applied the domestic law, especially
when the court was anxious to compel a husband to support
his wife. · French courts have also enforced the duty of
obedience to which a wife is bound under French law, irrespective of whether such duty was incumbent on her under
the national law of the spouses. 54 The C6digo Bustamante
seems to abandon the personal law entirely, when it states
that the obligation of the spouses to live together, to observe
mutual fidelity, and to support each other, is subject to the
local law (art. 4 5).
Domicil by operation of law. A problem deserving special
discussion is that of determining the law by which the domicil
of a married woman is fixed. The conflicts rule on marital
relations determines, as a matter of course, whether a wife
is obliged to follow her husband to his place of abode; 55 but
does it also determine whether her domicil necessarily coincides with that of her husband? The municipal laws differ
widely in answering this question. 56 While England and
52 Only occasionally, the action for restoration of conjugal rights has been
classified as of imperative public policy; thus RG. (Oct. 6, 1927) IPRspr.
1926-1927, no. 68 (Soviet Russians).
53 Trib. civ. Seine (May 3, 1879) Clunet 1879, 489; Cour Paris (April 20,
r88o) Clunet 188o, goo (action for goods received at the domicil of the husband); Cour Paris (Jan. 7, 1903) Clunet 1905, 208.
54 Trih. civ. d'Evreux (Feb. 15, 1861) D. 1862.3.39 and Trib. civ. Seine
(April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461. Concerning the latter, see infra n. 83.
55 Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. 19, 1913) 26 ROLG. 232 (American wife held obliged to follow her husband from New Jersey to Germany,
the law of New Jersey being in accord).
France: Cass. (req.) (June 25, 1923) Clunet 1924, 462 (in the application
of German BGB. § 1354 par. 2, it was held that a German wife in Alsace
need not follow her husband to an inconvenient dwelling place).
56 E.g., in America the older rule that a deserted wife is domiciled at the
new domicil of her husband, has not yet been abolished by the present
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 8, but
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Latin America still insist upon the ancient rule that the husband's domicil is necessarily that of his wife, other countries,
for instance, Norway and the Soviet Union, do not recognize
the wife's domicil as dependent on her husband's at all. 57
In Germany, prevailing opinion applies the personal law
(i.e., the national law of the husband) also to the question
whether the wife necessarily shares her husband's domicil. 58
The United States courts, as well as the Treaty of Montevideo, resolve this question, like all other questions concerning domicil, by resorting to the forum's own rules on
domicil, unified throughout the country, instead of referring
the problem to the law declared applicable by the forum's
choice of law rules. Thus the Restatement says:

"§ 27 . . a wife has the same domicil as that of her
husband."
"§ 28. If a wife lives apart from her husband without
being guilty of desertion according to the law of the state
which was their domicil at the time of separation, she can
have a separate domicil."
Except on the question of desertion, neither the municipal
law of the domicil nor that of the forum is decisive.
A case decided by the Tribunal civil de la Seine 59 involved
a citizen of Czarist Russia who had married an American
girl from Rhode Island before a civil official in Cyprus.
is abolished by the new draft of 1940, art. 9· The Restatement § 28, moreover,
permits the wife leaving her husband to establish a new domicil if she is not
guilty of desertion; statutory law permits the same even if she is guilty.
57 Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 570 no. 72. Russia; FREUND, 4 LeskeLoewenfeld I 340.
58 RAAPE, IPR. 3n; cf. the recent decision of the RG. (Jan. 12, 1939) HRR.
1939, no. 376, 159 RGZ. 167, on the child's domicil (infra p. 649, n. 261).
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 23 I, 503.
Similarly, Belgium: Cass. (March 19, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1.179; Trib.
Bruges (March 4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81. Cf. infra Divorce, Chapter II,
n. 71.
59 Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Revue Crit. 1935, 759, with note by
NIBOYET. Similar c'ases: Cass. (req.) (June 21, 1865) S.r865.1.313; Cass.
(civ.) (March 13, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 718, Clunet 1933, 639; Cass.
(civ.) (Dec. 4, 1935) Revue Crit. 1937, 189.
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Some time after the marriage, the husband went to Paris,
while the wife went to live in Capri, Italy, and never came to
France at all. The Tribunal, considering the question one
of "qualification" and following Bartin's theory on this subject, declared in conformance with the French law of the
forum that the domicil of a wife was necessarily that of her
husband. 60
It may be observed, however, that this decision, like many
others, 61 was concerned with domicil as a condition of the
court's jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the wife at
the domicil of the husband. In this connection, the local concept of domicil clearly has a better claim than in the choice
of law.
In line with the general tendency toward the domiciliary
principle, it has even been advocated that the law of the husband's domicil should decide the legal domicil of the wife. 62
Capacity of Married Persons

2.

Classification. Under the system of personal law, the question has been raised whether a married woman's disabilities
are part of the status of the wife, and therefore governed by
her own personal law, or rather whether they are part of the
specific effects of marriage, and therefore subject to the law
governing these effects, which may be the law of the husband,
that of the common nationality, or some other law. All bias
aside, this problem of classification depends on the specific
nature of the wife's incapacity. The conflicts rule concerning
status in general envisages legal incapacities presumed to in6

°Cf. NIBOYET,

61

Cf.,

Revue Crit. 1935, 762.
e.g., OLG. Stuttgart (May 8, 1908) 17 ROLG. 81, 18 Z.int.R. (1908)

453·
Uruguay: App. Montevideo (about 1938) Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. 1938, 210,
Clunet 1938, 841 (action for separation between American citizens, the husband being domiciled in Uruguay, the wife living in the United States).
62 NIBOYET, I Traite nos. 541, 551.

MARRIAGE
here in the female sex; the rule concerning personal effects of
marriage regards such disabilities as may be imposed in consequence of marriage. The principal illustration was the
former article 2 r 7 of the French Civil Code: A wife, even
when there is no community or in case of separation of property, cannot give, convey, mortgage, or acquire property,
either with or without consideration, without her husband's
joining in the instrument or his written consent. This rule,
imitated in many countries, was abolished in Italy in 1919,
in France itself in 1938, and in other countries, 63 but is still in
force in some other places. The probable motivation of the
draftsmen of the Code, 64 emphasized by modern commentators,65 was not a belief in the "frailty of the sex" but a desire to strengthen the leadership of the husband, who was
intended to enjoy his powers not only in his own interest but
in the interest of the family as a whole. Hence, the provision
affects not so much the status of the wife as the organization
of the family, i.e., the effects of marriage. An incapacity, such
as was imposed by the French Code, should be governed by
the conflicts rules on personal effects of marriage rather
than by those dealing with personal incapacities. 66 All these
observations seem equally true in regard to the common law
disabilities of married women. They were never designed
for the protection of the wife but were based upon the idea
of the merger of personalities and thus flowed from the marItaly: Law no. II76 of July I7, I9I9.
France: Law of Feb. I8, I938, J. Off. Feb. I9 1 I938, 2058 no. 42, also in
39 Bull. Inst. Int. ( I938) I45·
Belgium: C. C. arts. 2I2-226 bis, as amended by Law of July 20, 1932.
Rumania: Law of April I9, I932.
64 See HERCHENRODER, "The Capacity of Married Women in French Law,"
20 Journ. Comp. Leg. {1938) I97 n. I.
65 CoLIN et CAPITA NT, I Cours elementaire de droit civil fran~ais ( ed. 3)
6I8; NIBOYET 736 no. 627, and prevailing theory.
66 Dominant doctrine, see RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. {I93I) 267; M. WoLFF, 4
Rechtsvergl. Hand'wiirterb. 408; PILLET, I Traite 59 I no. 277; FEDOZZI 454·
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 232, because of his theory, and some of the Swiss
decisions because of the confused Swiss legislation.
63
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riage relationship. 67 A different characterization of similar
incapacities by the municipal law of the forum is irrelevant.
It is always possible, of course, that some statute, for instance, that of Florida, although on its face similar to the
provision of the French Code, requires a different construction. 88
Suppose a woman, a citizen of the United States, is married to a Belgian, both being domiciled in England, and she
procures a loan in Nice, France, without her husband's consent. A court following the nationality principle (German,
Cuban, etc.) will apply neither American law (as of her
status) nor the English (as of her domicil) nor the French
(as lex loci actus) but Belgian law (as governing marital
relations).
Where the wife has retained a personal law of her own,
the only consistent solution is to disregard this law. 69
Finally, personal effects of marriage must be distinguished
from the effects of marriage on property interests. Numerous
disabilities of a spouse as regards freedom of contract or
conveyance result from some matrimonial regimes, for instance, from the community property system or the systems
according to which the wife's general assets are managed
by her husband. Prevailing opinion does not link with personal effects of marriage the limitation of a married woman's
capacity, unless it results from the marriage itself irrespec67
See the most recent writer, JosEPH GINSBURG, "Contractual Liability of
Married Women in Nebraska," 20 Neb. L. Rev. (I94I) I9I, I92.
68
In Florida and Texas, the common law disabilities of married women
have only partially been removed; cf. 3 VERNIER 36 §I 52; in Florida the
Circuit Court may grant the wife power "to take charge of and manage
her own estate and propery," if the court is satisfied as to her capacity to do
so, Fla. Statutes Ann. ( I94I) §§ 62.38-62.56; cf. also § 708.08.
69
PILLET, I Traite 59 I; LEWALD 95; doubts have been expressed by M.
WoLFF, IPR. ( ed. I) I24, and RAAPE 289, but have been dropped recently,
M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) I98, and RAAPE, IPR. 3I3. However, the BeneluxDraft (art. 4) declares incapacities of the wife decreed by the husband's
national law relevant only to the extent that her national law agrees.
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tive of any matrimonial property regime. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal formulated this rule once by acknowledging such
effects on the personal relations, if these effects take place
even where the wife has no property at alP 0 Thus, the capacity to contract and to acquire property 71 granted to married women by the American equal rights statutes is a general
capacity and ought to be respected everywhere as an incident
of the marriage law involved insofar as that law is applied
at all to the relations between a husband and his wife.
Analogous observations apply with respect to limitations
on married men.
Married woman's capacity to contract. (a) As a general
rule, the personal law is applied everywhere in Europe. This
principle has been stated expressly by a recent Finnish statute and seems unchallenged throughout the civil law countries. 72 It was held in France, for instance, that, in accordance
with the foreign law of the time, an English wife was capable
70 BG. (Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742. For an illustration of the
double task of ex.amining first the personal capacity in general, then the possible restrictions by matrimonial property law, see the opinion by LYON-CAEN,
advocate general, Cour Paris (July 7, 1928) Revue 1929, 81 (Norwegian
spouses).
71 Cf. KG. (Aug. 2, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 44·
7 2 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, 1929 on family relations of international nature,
§ 14 par. 3, capacity of a married woman to act determined by the law of the
state whose citizen she is, except for art. 16, relating to third persons, and the
provisions concerning marital property.
France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 30, 1854) S.1854-1.27o; Cass. (civ.) (July 29,
1901) Clunet 1901, 971; and a great many decisions of the lower courts; see
WEISS, 3 Traite 588.
Germany: OLG. Kiiln (Dec. 5, 1898) Clunet 1905, 396; RG. (Oct. 12,
1905) DJZ. 1905, rr7o, Revue 1907, Sao (German wife contracting in Luxemburg, liable under German law); RG. (March 20, 1906) JW. 1907, 328,
Clunet 1908, 187.
Italy: Cass. Roma (May 2, 1908) Giur. Ita!. 1908, 1, 941, Clunet 1909, 563.
Switzerland: The national law of the wife, not the domiciliary law, is decisive; see BG. (Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 741, applying Handlungsfahigkeitgesetz (1881) art. ro par. 2, instead of NAG. arts. 32, 34; BG. (May 23,
1912) 38 BGE. II 3; capacity to contract is governed by the national law:
BG. (April 6, 1894) 20 BGE. 648 ff., 31 ZBJV. (1895) 173. 4 Z.int.R. (1894)
390 and 5 Z.int.R. (1895) 310; even if she is a former Swiss citizen: BG.
(Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742.
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3

of contracting without her husband's consent/ that an
Italian wife could act upon the basis of a general power of
attorney L·om her husband (contrary to French law), 74 and
that a wife from Wallis, Switzerland, needed an authorization of the court in case the husband was interested in the
transaction. 75
The capacity of married women under age to contract depends on whether, under the marital law, any powers are
reserved to her father or guardian. 76
(b) The law of the forum is seldom resorted to in this
matter. 77
(c) The law of the place of contracting is applied nowhere but in the United States and, perhaps as to mercantile
contracts, in England. 78
Capacity to sue and be sued. A woman's capacity to be a
party to a lawsuit (persona standi in judicio, capacite d' ester
en justice) is generally held to depend upon the personal
law/ 9 except in the United States, where it is determined by
the law of the forum (Restatement§ 588). 79 a
73 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 10, 1893) Clunet 1893, 530, obviously protecting
the French creditors, as the wife had made it clear that she contracted for
herself alone, not on behalf of her husband. The same is true for other decisions.
74
Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 5, x88I) Clunet I882, 6I7; conf'd Cour Paris (Dec.
17, I883) Clunet I884, 289; Trib. civ. Tunis (Jan. 29, 1908) Clunet I909,
745·
75 Cour Chambery (Jan. 9, I884) Clunet I885, x8o; Trib. comm. Seine
(May Io, I886) Clunet I887, I83; App. Chambery (Jan. 29, I934) Revue
Crit. I935, I33 (Swiss wife needed authorization under Swiss C. C. art. I77).
Correspondingly, Cour civ. Geneve (Nov. I7, I933) 56 Sem. Jud. (I934)
572 (French wife in Switzerland under French law).
76 RG. (Jan. IO, I9I8) 9I RGZ. 403.
7 7 France: PILLET, I Traite 588 no. 276; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 357
no. 33I; contra: Goudi, "Femme mariee," 8 Repert. 388 nos. I6, I7·
78 CHESHIRE ( ed. I) 297, advocating the proper law; cf. supra pp. 206, 207.
The cases are collected by CLARENCE SMITH, "Capacity in the Conflict of
Laws: A Comparative Study," I Int. Camp. Law Q. ( I952) 446-47I.
79 France: WEISS, 3 Traite 589 n. I, cites six French decisions and three of
Egyptian Mixed Tribunals.
Germany: never doubted.
The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (June 24, I9I9) W.xo566 (Italian law);
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The public policy of the forum has hardly ever been advanced to eliminate the personallaw. 80
Right of the wife to carry on a business or engage in a
profession. (a) Whether a wife needs the consent of her
husband to accept employment or to carry on an independent
business of her own, is decided according to the law that
governs her personal relations. For instance, an Italian wife
who had engaged in a profession in French Tunisia, was held
to have done so with her husband's consent, which was presumed to exist under article 13 of the Italian Commercial
Code, as worded at that time. 81 The rule includes the conditions for a wife's carrying on a business as a "sole trader." 82
The Tribunal civil de la Seine} however, consistently following its tendency to apply French law whenever possible,
awarded damages of so,ooo francs to an American husband,
domiciled in Chicago, Illinois, against the managers of a
theater in Paris who had employed his French wife, a former
music hall diva, against his prohibition. 83 It would be intolerable, the court said, if the wife could publicly challenge in
France the authority of her husband, even when he is a foreign subject. The right of a French husband to forbid his
Hof Amsterdam (July 13, 1923) W.11163, N. J. 1924, 118 (Swiss law);
Rb. Amsterdam (March 17, 1930) W.12151 and Rb. Arnhem (Jan. 23, 1933)
W.12710, first point (German law) and others.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. 13, 1885) 57 Sent. 45, Clunet 1888, 138, cf.
Clunet 1889, 771 (wife, party to a lawsuit in Cuba, on the ground of her
capacity under the law of the United States).
Canada: Trottier v. Rajotte (Dec. 22, 1939) [1940] S.C.R. 203, I I Giur.
Comp. (1954) 318.
79a However, the capacity of one spouse to sue the other for tort claims
is determined by the law of the place of the wrong, irrespective of the law
of the domicil, though occasionally the public policy of the forum intervenes. Cases collected in Annotation, 22 A.L.R. (2d) 1248.
80 One case is known: App. Gand (Dec. 24, 1902) Clunet 1903, 980, criticized by STOCQUART, ibid. 977·
81 Trib. civ. Tunis (March 28, 1908) Revue 1909, 227.
8 2 Cf. the American statutes collected by 3 VERNIER § 187 and for Europe,
HARTENSTEIN, "Handelsfrau," in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwi:irterb. 156, on conflicts law ibid. 161.
83 Trib. civ. Seine (April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461.
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wife to engage in separate professional activity has been
preserved by the reform act of 1938, which, however, subjects the exercise of this right to the approval of the courts. 84
(b) The law of the forum simply is applied in the United
States.
Prohibition of certain transactions with third persons. In
former times, a married woman was often forbidden to become a surety or to pledge or mortgage her separate property for her husband or other persons; her power to do so is
still limited or denied in some states of the United States. 85
In the Swiss Civil Code (art. 17 7 par. 3), the authorization
of the court of the domicil is required for any obligation to
third persons undertaken by a wife for her husband. This
restriction would be applied in a German court, 86 and it has
been urged that a German court should grant such authorization if the wife has her domicil in Germany. 87
Another prohibition established in Portugal and Brazil 88
provides that a husband may not without the consent of his
wife ( outorga ux6ria) alienate immovables, sue or be sued
(sic) in regard to immovables, make gifts, or (by Brazilian
law) become a surety. This prohibition is expressly stated to
apply irrespective of the property regime and thus comes
8 '1

Law of Feb. 18, 1938. See supra p. 336, n. 63.
Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania.
The New Hampshire statute was construed as protecting only married women
domiciled in New Hampshire; see Proctor v. Frost (1938) 89 N.H. 304, 197
At!. 813, and Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 1444. On Nebraska see 3
VERNIER 315 n. 9· The Roman-Dutch law imposing restrictions on a married
woman binding herself or her property, was considered a rule of capacity,
governed with respect to immovables by the lex situs, in Bank of Africa Ltd.
v. Cohen [1909] 2 Ch. 129, cf. CHESHIRE 562; also UNGER, "The Place of
Classification in Private International Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3, 14.
86 For France see WEISS, 3 Traite 590, 591, but he admits two decisions of
1831 and 1833 applying the lex fori, ibid. n. 5·
87 RAAPE 287 ff.
88 Portugal: C. C. arts. 1II9, II91, 1471. Brazil: C. C. art. 235; cf. BEVILAQUA, 2 Codigo Civil (ed. 5, 1937) II5. The husband's acting without the
wife's consent is prevailingly held to be annuli able rather than void; see on
the controversy in Brazil GUIMARAES, Accordaos, 3 supplemento (1939) 476.
85
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under the heading of personal relations in all courts applying
the personal law. The Brazilian courts, however, by their
broad extension of public policy, have applied the prohibition
also in the case of a foreigner married to a Brazilian wife 89
and will probably continue to do so under their new law, in
the case of Brazilian domicil of either party.
Protection of third persons. Restrictions of the kind described above are usually meant to apply also to relations
between the spouses and third parties. If, however, foreign
restrictions are to be upheld, the conflicts rule may well make
an exception in the case of a third person dealing in good
faith with one of the spouses. The German Code, although
containing two clauses for the protection of domestic commerce ( EG. arts. 7, par. 3 and 16, par. 2), does not cover
the prohibitions discussed here, but analogous application of
these clauses has been advocated. 90 In France, Brazil, and
other countries, the vague and omnipresent force of public
policy is invoked whenever domestic creditors are endangered by the application of a foreign law.
3· Implied Authority: Legal Transactions Between Husband and Wife

Power to obligate the other spouse. By virtue of her
"power of the keys," so denominated in the German doctrine
as a power granted ex lege, the wife is authorized to bind
her husband by contracting within the sphere of household
activities (BGB. § 1357). The French courts have gradually
89 See Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 30, 1932), not published, see VALLADAO 124,
reported by RODRIGO OcTAVIO, Dicionario no. 986; Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 24,
1929) 10 Rev, Jur. Bras. (1931) 353; for decisions of Sao Paulo, see VALLADAO 132.
In the parallel case of a Brazilian woman married in Brazil to a Portuguese, a Portuguese court did not apply the prohibition because the marriage
had not been transcribed in a Portuguese register (supra p. 246 n. u6),
Juizo de Direito de Villa Real (Dec. 18, 1933) 64 Revista For. (1935) 578.
90 See RAAPE, IPR. 313·
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been reaching similar results on the basis of an alleged implied authorization ( mandat tacite) by the husband, the
presumed contractual basis thereof becoming more and more
fictitious. 91 Most countries have rules of either the German
or the French type, which are sufficiently different from each
other, ho1vever,. to cause problems in conflicts of laws. The
prevailing view holds that all these regulations are concerned
with the personal relations between husband and wife, rather
than their property relations. 92
Of the same character are the various rules concerning
liability for household expenses, such as the American family
expense statutes, 03 the corresponding provisions in Switzerland,94 Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Scandinavia, Guatemala,
and other countries, 95 which declare both husband and wife
liable for certain acts of the wife, and finally those occasional rules which impose upon the wife liability for certain
deeds of her husband.
Not only in Germany is the personal law applied with
respect to all these rules, 96 but also in America the courts are
in agreement on this point. In Paquin, Ltd. v. Westerfelt,0 7
the family expense statute of Connecticut was applied by the
Connecticut court to spouses domiciled in that state, while
91 KARL TH. KIPP, Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Lehre von der Schhisselgewalt in den romanischen Rechten (Berlin, 1928). Nothing was changed
by the reforms of 1938; cf. Note by VIALLETON in Sirey 1938.1.176, 179 and
the new arts. 220, 221 C. C.
92 See NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 144 and the authors cited by RABEL,
5 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1931) 283; }. STRELITZ, Die Schliisselgewalt in internationalen
Privatrecht, Thesis (Giittingen, 1936). To the same effect in Switzerland,
STAUFFER, NAG. 79 no. 9·
93 3 VERNIER 102 § 160.
94 Swiss C. C. arts. 207 par. 2, 220 par. z, 243 par. 3; cf. ibid. arts. 163, zo6.
95 See KIPP, op. cit. supra n. 91, at 17; KADEN, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb.
205 2 b (a).
06
Unanimous opinion. The application of the Hague Convention of 1905
is controversial; cf. WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 63 n. 365 and
contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 240.
97 Paquin, Ltd. v. Westerfelt (1919) 93 Conn. 513, 106 Atl. 766.
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in Mandell Brothers v. Fogg, 98 the Massachusetts court did
not apply the statute of Illinois, making the property of both
spouses jointly and severally liable for expenses of the
family, as against a wife whose husband had bought goods
in Chicago, both being citizens of Massachusetts. This latter
case illustrates a disregard for the seller of the goods, typical of any consistent resort to the principle of personalla w.
German law is less rigorous. The German code has established an exception to the rule that the law of the husband
governs the relations between husband and wife; German
law applies if the spouses are domiciled in Germany and the
German law is "more favorable" to the third party with
whom a transaction has been made (EG., art. 16 par. 2).
The awkward form of this sound exception has been properly criticized. 99
French courts, on the contrary, have been said simply to
apply the law of the forum. 100 What they actually did in a
series of cases was to allow fashionable Paris dressmakers
to sue the husbands of lady customers on the theory that the
debt was within the rather modest scope of those household
expenses usually allowed on the ground of mandat tacite. 101
In no case would the national law of the husband have been
more advantageous to the plaintiff; ordinarily the spouses
were found to have been domiciled in France at the time of
both the order and the delivery of the goods. Since the allo98

Mandell Brothers v. Fogg ( 1903) 182 Mass. 582, 66 N. E. 198.

99 See comment by RAAPE 3 59·
100 PILLET, 1 Traite 588 no. 276;

BARTIN, 2 Principes 242 § 300, and others
with regret, as they advocated the national law; NIBOYET 739 no. 628 (2).
101 Worth c. Rimsky-Korsakoff, Trib. civ. Seine (March 30, 1893) Clunet
1893, 868; Cour Paris (June 17, 1899) Clunet 1900, 138; Trib. civ. Seine
(June 9, 1905) Clunet 1905, 1040; Beer c. Prince Kotschoubey, Trib. civ.
Seine (April ro, 1907) conf'd Cour Paris (Nov. 5, 1907) Clunet 1908, 478;
Beer c. Prince Y ourewsky, Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, 1908) Clunet 1909, 476
(denying liability of husband) ; Redfern c. the same defendant, Trib. civ.
Seine (July 13, 1911) Revue 1912, 385; Cour Paris (April 18, 1929) Revue
Crit. 1935, 149 (English spouses living in France; the husband is not allowed
to entrench himself behind the English system of property separation).
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cation of the debt as between husband and wife was not in
question, the result seems not very different from the German rule.
The failure of the American conflicts rule to accept the
creditor's claim as defined under his own law, compels him,
before contracting, either to investigate where the spouses
are domiciled and what law is m effect there or to ask both
spouses expressly to consent. The elimination of that necessity is the precise purpose of the family expense laws.
The best solution, so far not in force anywhere, would be
to hold either spouse liable or free from liability, according
to the personal law governing the non-patrimonial relations
between the spouses and, further, to grant the plaintiff the
possibility of availing himself of any more advantageous
position that he may have under the "proper law of the
contract."
Prohibited transactions between husband and wife. A few
vestiges of the ancient notion that marriage effects a merger
of the wife's personality with that of her husband and that
husband and wife represent a single unity of body and soul,
have survived to the present day. In several states of the
United States/ 02 husband and wife either cannot contract
with each other at all or are unable to make certain transactions with each other, for instance, to form a partnership,
to transfer immovables, or to make a sale to each other. 103
The French courts, though they cannot carry the principle
through, regard partnerships between spouses as nulU 04 In
102

3 VERNIER §§ I 56, I 73 .
For sales, see also France: C. C. art. I595·
The Netherlands: BW. art. I503, and others.
104
See LAGARDE, I Revue generale de droit commercial (I938) I75; since
the alleged prohibition is based on the matrimonial law, Cass. (civ.) (July 3,
I9I7) S.I92I.I.20I, it is applied to French spouses trading in Italy, App. Lyon
(April 24, I929) S.I931.2.25 (refusing in consequence enforcement to an
Italian decree treating the wife as a merchant and, hence, declaring her bankrupt).
103
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European conflict of laws, the personal law clearly seems to
govern the application of such provisions. 105
Widely discussed, however, are the choice of law problems
arising from the prohibition of gifts between husband and
wife. The controversy originated in the days of the postglossators, when Baldus and Bartolus disagreed on whether the

donationes inter virum et uxurem was
statutum personale. 106 Most codes have

Roman prohibition of
a

statutum reale

or a

abandoned such prohibitions, but, under some legislations,
gifts made during coverture are still invalid 107 or revocable.108 According to prevailing opinion, these rules are
within the scope of the personal effects of marriage. 109 Hence
the personal law applied is that of the lucrative transaction,
irrespective of the time element considered determinative in
marital property relations. 110 To resolve the uncertainties in
105 France: Cass. (req.) (Jan. 25, I938) D.H. I938. I64 ff. (sale between
the spouses valid under Mohammedan law, despite French C. C. art. I595).
In an exceptional case, a penalty for marital infidelity contracted between
Bolivian spouses then domiciled in New York, void under Bolivian, but
valid under New York law and there paid, was characterized as a delictual
obligation; an action for repayment of the penalty, therefore, failed, Cour
Paris (July 7, I954) Revue Crit. I954, 552, 556.
The Netherlands: H. R. (May I7, I929) W.uoo6, N. ]. I929, 1279 (sale
between German spouses of Dutch immovables, subject to German marital
law rather than to Dutch BW. art I503). Similarly Louisiana: Rush et al.
v. Landers (I902) 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95; Note, 57 L.R.A. 353 applies art.
2446 La. C. C., to an immovable, the spouses being domiciled in Indiana.
1oa Cf. WEISs, 3 Traite 592 n. I; AumNET, s Repert, 668 nos. 226 ff.
1° 7 Italy: C. C. ( 186 5) art. 1054, C. C. ( 1942) art. 78I; the Netherlands:
BW. art. I7I5; Spain: C. C. art. I334·
1°BFrance: C. C. art. 1096; Portugal: C. C. arts. n78, n81.
109 Belgium: POULLET 549 no. 468 n. 2.
France: WEISS, 3 Traite 592; BARTIN, 2 Principes 2I3 § 292; App. Caen
(Jan. 15, 19I2) Revue 1914, 147; Cass. (req.) (March IS, 1933) S.I934·I.393·
Germany: R.G. (March 2, I894) 4 Z.int.R. (1894) 351; RG. (Oct. II,
I907) 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 222, and the general opinion of writers.
Greece: STREIT-VALLINDAS 350 n. 36.
Spain: See DE CASTRO, "La cuesti6n de las calificaciones en el Derecho internacional privado," 20 Revista Der. Priv. ( 1933) 265 at 278 n. I67, refuting
the argumentation by RAAPE 341 II 3 as to Spanish law.
Contra Italy: Cass. (Sept. 30, 1955) 79 Foro Ita!. (I956) I 552, 555, applying the law governing donations.
11 ° KG. (March 20, I939) Dt. Recht 1939, 938 (supposing that the husband
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the case where the spouses have different nationalities, the
Polish statute expressly invokes the national law of the husband at the time of the contract. 112
The French courts exclude immovables, at least immovables situated in France, from the rule and apply French law
as the law of the situs. 118
Other classifications have been occasionally preferred.
The Dutch Supreme Court, 114 for instance, once held that the
Dutch prohibition, although affecting Dutch public policy,
did not apply to German spouses because the prohibition was
said to be inseparably connected with the prohibition of postnuptial marriage settlements, established in the Dutch legislation and Latin Codes, but unknown to the German Code.
As respects provisions excluding lawsuits between husband
and wife, the American rule that the law of the forum 115 or,
in the case of an action in tort, the law of the place of the
wrong 116 should be applied, is not shared by other countries;
such prohibitions are regarded merely as means of regulating
the marriage relation and preserving domestic harmony.
was of Greek nationality at the time of the marriage, a certain contract made
by him, in view of the Greek matrimonial system of separate property, constituted a donation; since he certainly was a Greek at the time of the contract,
a donation, if any, was void under Greek law, applicable as governing personal relations. The court did not, as a Note by REu believes, characterize
donation under lex fori or lex causae, but simply applied the historic conceptions common to all nations concerned).
111
See, besides the general discussion, supra p. 324, AUDINET, 5 Repert. 669
nos. 236, 242 ff.
112
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 15.
Germany: Erster Gebhardscher Entwurf (1881) § 19 par. 3·
113
Cass. (civ.) (April 2, 1884) Clunet 1885, 77; Trib. civ. Seine (March
3. 1891) Clunet 1891, 508, modified by Cour Paris (May 27, 1892) Clunet
1892, 940, 8.1896.2.73, conf'd Cass. (req.) (May 8, 1894) Clunet 1894. 562,
D.1894-1.355; Cour Paris (March 5, 1901) Clunet 1901, 775; Cass. (req.)
(May 7, 1924) Revue 1924, 407. BARTIN, 2 Principes 215, 216, hopes this
singular treatment of immovables is transitory.
114
H. R. (May 17, 1929) W.12006; similarly Italian Cass. (Sept. 30, 1955),
suPra note 109, stressing that art. 781 C. C. is not part of "ordre public

international."
11 5

116

Restatement § 133 implicitly.
Critical STUMBERG 206.
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Recent American writers have urged a corresponding application of the personallaw. 117
Of the same character are laws that do not permit a husband or wife to levy execution upon the property of the other
spouse. The Swiss law contains peculiar provisions of this
kind, which the Swiss Federal Tribunal has repeatedly declared to be no part of public policy and therefore not applicable to the case of a husband domiciled abroad. 118
Finally, the personal law governing marital effects extends
to the problem whether spouses during coverture may make
agreements on such matters as alimony (without or until
judicial separation), residence, or education of children. In
modern times, more and more freedom of arrangement has
been allowed, but the laws differ considerably. The French
courts, vigorously insisting on their domestic restrictions of
such agreements, are concerned almost exclusively with examining whether these restrictions have been observed.119
Particular difficulties arise in the case of financial agreements preceding separation or divorce. 120
117 STUMBERG 206; HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflicts of Laws 235; cf. as to
vicarious liability of the husband, ibid. 255·
118 BG. (March 31, 1927) 53 BGE. III 33, 37; BG. (Oct. 10, 1930) 56
BGE. III 173; contra: BG. (Sept. 5, 1916) 42 BGE. III 342, 348.
11 9 Cour Paris (April 29, 1913) Revue 1913, 879; Trib. civ. Seine (June
18, 1934) Clunet 1935, 619, Revue Crit. 1935, 125, criticized by BATIFFOL,
Revue Crit. 1937, 429, for not having inquired into the national (German)
laws of the spouses; App. Lyon (March 26, 1934) Revue 1935, 461; Cass.
(civ.) (June 26, 1938) D.H. 1938.197, and Cour Dijon (March 28, 1939)
Clunet 1939, 634, neglect the analogous Italian marital law because the agreement was valid under French law.
12o E.g., a Swiss author, ADRIAN, (according to the review of his book in 38
SJZ. (1942), 371) admonishes Swiss lawyers to be aware in the case of
English parties, of the hostility of English law to agreements whereby a
spouse promises financial advantages to the other for obtaining divorce, while
Swiss C. C. art. 158 allows agreements as to the consequences of divorce or
separation with allowance of the divorce court. See moreover, infra, pp.
s66, 572.
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4· Support 121

Application of the matrimonial law. The husband's duty
to support his wife or, more generally, one spouse's duty to
support the other is considered in civil law countries as one
of the principal incidents of marriage, 122 rather than a quasicontractual obligation as conceived under an earlier doctrine.123
German courts and writers are in almost unanimous agreement that the national law of the husband, being the law
governing the marital relation, applies to all questions pertaining to the conditions and kind of support to be rendered,
either within the common household or during an extrajudicial separation. The only exception to this principle, according to German decisions, is that marital property rules
govern the determination of what property is liable to furnish the means of support. 124
French courts have often been said to follow the law of
the forum, but they too start with the application of the nationallaw.125 They think, however, that the French rules on
alimony present a minimum standard which must be applied
on the ground of public policy. 126 This modification has been
121 On comparative law and international enforcement see International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des obligations alimentaires (Rome, 1938); "L'abandon de famille et ses sanctions,"
in Travaux de Ia semaine internationale de droit (Paris, 1937); DE WINTER,
"Developpements recents dans le droit international en matiere d'obligations
alimentaires," 4 Ned. Tijd. Int. Recht (1957) 133-158.
122
ROGUIN, Traite de droit civil compare, Le Mariage (1904) 198 ff. nos.
147, 148; Swiss BG. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE. I 299, 313; Czechoslovakian
statute on private international law of 1948, § 13.
123
I BAR § 203.
124 RG. (Feb. 15, 1906) 62 RGZ. 400, 16 Z.int.R. (1906) 298, 20 Z.int.R.
(1910) 404, Clunet 19n, 946; Bay. ObLG. (March 3, 1913) 30 ROLG. 165;
3 FRANKENSTEIN 260 n. 135; KG. (Feb. 9, 1929) IPRspr. 1929, no. 15; KG.
1929, no. 15; KG. (March 9, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 66.
125
Cour Paris (Oct. 30, 1926) Gaz.Pal.I927.1.284; NIBOYET 739 no. 628
( 3).
126
Cass. (req.) (July 22, 1903) Clunet 1904, 355; Cass. {req.) {March
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rejected by most German authorities/ 27 although it might
well be advocated in cases where a foreign married person is
left stranded in the forum and has become a public charge,
because his personal law fails to grant him a right to support
by his spouse under the circumstances. The English and
American rules on alimony and support in particular are
usually construed so as to exclude their application by a
foreign court; the lex fori is, then, the only possible resort
to secure support for an indigent foreigner.
Switzerland applies the general rules on marital effects according to which foreigners domiciled in Switzerland are
subject to Swiss law. 128
According to section 459 of the Restatement, the duty
imposed by the state of the domicil to pay for necessaries
furnished to a husband, wife, or minor child is enforced in
every state. To this extent the personal law of the parties has
extraterritorial effect. The Restatement also recognizes an
obligation imposed by the state where the necessaries have
been furnished, but only if this state has jurisdiction over
the debtor.
Lex fori. Simple application of the lex fori to the duty of
support has been adopted in the United States 129 as well as
by the C6digo Bustamante. 130
27, 1922) S.I923.1.27, Clunet 1922, n5, Revue 1924, 401. For many other
decisions see WEISS, 3 Traite 597 n. 2. Spanish Trib. Supr. (July I, 1897) 82
Sent. x8 declares that a foreign married woman is to be protected, if in
Spain.
1 2 7RG. (Feb. I5, 1906) 62 RGZ. 400, cited supra n. I24; I BAR§ 203 n. 2:
"arbitrary." LEWALD 9I no. 126; RAAPE 284; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 26I, emphasizing the force of the Hague Convention on effects of marriage. Contra:
KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht I44 § 39B; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. I47, in the case
where both spouses reside permanently in Germany, or one spouse with the
consent of the other, in view of the administrative and criminal importance
of the duty.
128 BG. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE. I 299, 316 ff; BG. (Feb. 22, 1934) 6o
BGE. II 77 (leaving undecided the case where only the defendant lives in
Switzerland); BG. (April x8, I942) 68 BGE. II 9, 13.
129 Restatement § 458.
1 3 Codigo Bustamante art. 45· It is recognized in community property states

°

PERSONAL EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE

351

Law of the debtor. A theory presented by Pillet 131 and
adopted by several Asian countries 132 subjects duties of support to the law of the debtor, but it is doubtful whether this
rule is meant to apply to marital duties of support.
Provisional decrees. If the personal law governs, it does
so until the marriage is dissolved or some special rule applies.
The personal law is not supplanted even on the commencement of an action for annulment, for limited or full divorce,
or for judicial separation; however, the procedural situation
may give rise to particular needs. 133
A few German decisions have assumed that a court, taking
cognizance of an action for divorce or some similar action,
could by interlocutory decree grant the wife alimony pendente lite, irrespective of the foreign personal law governing
the marital status of the parties. 134 More recent decisions,
however, no longer resort to the German law of the forum
even in an interlocutory decree unless the personal law cannot be readily ascertained; 35 sometimes it is presumed that
the foreign rule is identical with that of the forum. 136
that the obligation to pay for necessaries arises out of the marriage and not
out of the wife's partnership in the community fund. See DAGGE'IT, Legal
E"ays on Family Law (1935) 116 for California, 123 for Louisiana, 134 for
Texas, 144 for Washington.
131
PILLET, 1 Traite 599 and Droit international prive, resume du cours
(Paris 1904-1905).
2
13 Japan: Law of 1898, art. 21.
China: Decree of Aug. 5, 1918, art. 16.
Siam: Law on private international law of 1939, § 36.
133
See also infra pp. 566-570.
184
OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 7, 1911) Hans. G. Z. 1912 Beibl. 56 no. 28 II;
OLG. Hamburg (April 28, 1921) 76 Seuff. Arch. 242 no. 149; OLG. Miinchen
(Nov. 4, 1921) JW. 1921, 1465; OLG. Koln (Dec. 14, 1928) JW. 1929, 449;
OLG. Hamm (Sept. 22, 1932) JW. 1932, 3824, IPRspr. 1932, no. 87. This
practice was approved by LEWALD 91 no. 126 (b) ; NussBAUM, D. IPR 147 n.
3; JoNAS, JW. 1936, 3578. It does not refer to alimony between spouses in
general, as an American writer understood.
135
The constant practice of the 13th Senate of the Kammergericht (March
9, 1931 and Oct. 22, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, nos. 66, 67; (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr.
1932, no. 88; (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 33;
RAAPE 284; cf. also WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske--Loewenfeld I 62 n. 359·
136
LG. Mainz (Sept. 2, 1925) JW. 1925, 2163; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 262.
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5. Wife's Lien

137

Article 2 I 2 I of the French Civil Code grants any married
woman, irrespective of her property regime, a general lien
on all her husband's land for the protection of claims which
she may have against her husband, particularly claims arising from his management of her property. Prevailing opinion in France categorizes provisions of this sort despite their
pecuniary character among personal effects of marriage. 138
In recent years, however, French courts have refused to
recognize a wife's lien on French immovables when the wife
is neither a French national nor enjoys treaty rights, even
though her national law imposes a lien on her husband's
immovables. 139
The theory that the wife's lien is the counterpart of the
disabilities of a married woman has been invoked to justify
the first theory. 140 This argument cannot be correct, as the
wife's lien was not abolished in France 141 when full legal
capacity was granted to married women by the law of February I 8, I 9 3 8. On the other hand, the courts transplant the
problem into the field of the rights of aliens where it does
not belong. The personal law should govern the problem
simply as an incident of the marriage relationship. 142
137 CHARRON, "L'Hypotheque legale de Ia femme etrangere," Nouv. Revue
I937, 29; Note, ibid. 1938, I24. BATIFFOL, "L'Hypotheque legale de Ia femme
mariee en France et le droit international prive," I Festschrift Rabel S9I6oi.
1 38 Trib. Havre (Dec. 29, 1928) Clunet I929, 1048. WEISS, 3 Traite 649;
PILLET, I Traite 593 ff. no. 278; NIBOYET 74I no. 630; LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 390 no. 3s4; on an earlier practice see infra p. 362, n. 15.
1 39 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 27, I903) S.1904.1.81; Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 31,
I9IO) Revue I9II, 369, Clunet I9II, 901; App. Aix. (Jan. 20, 1938) Clunet
1938, 488, Nouv. Revue I938, I22. Critical NIBOYET, 2 Traite 26o; BATIFFOL,
1 Festschrift Rabel (supra n. 137) 593·
140 See PILLET and NIBOYET, /oc. cit. supra n. I38, CALEB, 4 Repert. 196 no.
I76 and authors cited.
141 C. C. art. 2135, modified by Decret of June I4, 1938, allowing the wife,
however, to waive her hypotheque Ugale.
142 French writers cumulate the personal law of the wife with the law of
the situs, LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 390 no. 354, BATIFFOL, Traite no. 4S6, SIS;
PoNSARD, in: Le droit international prive de Ia famille 47; cf. infra p. 362.
In accord Luxemburg: Cour d'appel (Jan. 30, 1952) IS Pasicrisie Lux. 272.

CHAPTER 10

Eticcts of Marriage on Property 1
I.

BASIC CONCEPTIONS

ORRESPONDING to far-reaching differences in
the main conceptions of marital property systems,
the conflicts rules on this subject are split into three
groups, two of which are illustrated by the American conflicts rules on marital property rights in ( 1) immovables
and ( 2) movables, and the third by the European rules on
marital property rights.

C

I.

American Rules on Immovables

The old rule on immovables, 2 which is preserved in this
country, applies the lex situs. The underlying idea is that an
immovable is considered an isolated object of rights. This
1
On the American conflicts law see STUMBERG, "Marital Property and the
Conflict of Laws," I I Tex. L. Rev. (1932) 53; LEFLAR, "Community Property
and Conflict of Laws," 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 221; HoROWITZ, "Conflict of
Law Problems in Community Property," I I Wash. L. Rev. (1936) 121, 212;
:-iEUNER, "Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws," 5 La. L. Rev. ( 1943)
r67; MARSH, Marital Property in the Conflict of Laws (1952). For comparative conflicts law: JuLIA }OELSON, Giiterrechtliche Wirkungen der Ehe bei
verschiedener Staatsangehorigkeit der Ehegatten im internationalen Privatrecht (Heidelberg, 1933); DELAUME, "Marital Property and AmericanFrench Conflict of Laws," 4 Am. J. Comp. Law ( 1955) 35-59.
2 1m mobilia reguntur lege loci. STORY §§ 158, 186, I88; 4 PHILLIMORE no.
476; WHARTON 405 § I9I. D'ARGENTRE originated this doctrine in polemics
(Commentarii in Patrias Britonum Leges, art. 2I8, gl. 6, § 34) opposing
DuMOULIN's theory of domicil ( consilium 53) in case no matrimonial convention was made. The doctrine was advocated in the Netherlands and in
France by Paul Voet and Froland, from whom Story took inspiration. The
problem was called the "most famous question" in a decision of the Court of
Dutch Brabant of November 3, I693, "Decisio brabantina super famosissima
questione." See FROLAND, I Memoires concernans Ia nature et Ia qualite des
status ( I729) 272, 309, 3I6; I LAINE 234, 334·
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idea can be traced back to ancient Germanic laws and was
characteristic of the feudal system of landholding. If a
woman owned land at the time of marriage, the interest
acquired by her husband through the marriage was determined by the law of the place where the land was situated.
Therefore, under the common law, if the spouses own real
estate in ten different countries, ten different matrimonial
laws must be consulted, each applying to its respective immovables only. The point of contact is the immovable itself;
the place where the spouses are or where the assets are
managed is irrelevant. This conception implies that no problem arises other than that of determining the interests of
one spouse in the lands of the other. In fact, section 23 7 of
the Restatement contents itself with declaring:
"The effect of marriage upon interests in land owned by a
spouse at the time of marriage is determined by the law of
the state where the land is."
2.

American Rules on Movables

Movables, according to the old rule, follow the person,
mobilia ossibus inhaerent; rights in movables, created under
the law of the domicil, have extraterritorial effect. With respect to marital property, this rule is well settled in the
United States despite occasional inroads made by the law
of the situs. 3 Accordingly, the mutual interests of husband
and wife in each other's movables are localized at the place
of the interested parties.
So far the rule is unassailable. Doubt is cast on the rule,
however, so soon as we ask whether all the movables belonging to a married person are together thought to form a unit,
an entity, or whether each asset is a separate unit. The cona It is remarkable, however, as a token of the strength of the territorial
theory that the cases that actually or apparently preferred the lex situs are
continually emphasized by the writers; and this theory was adopted in the
proposed Final Draft of the Restatement § 3II.
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ception of all the movables constituting one unit seems to
obtain when the prevailing rule is justified by the "desirability of applying a single uniform regime to the entire estate
of the parties," 4 or when it is stated more precisely in the
words of Beale 5 to be motivated by the consideration that
"These (movables) are brought together into an aggregate
unit, and from the time of acquisition become part of that
unit, and . . . the entire unit is treated by third parties as
well as the spouses as a unit."
\Ve should like to think that this idea means that the law of
the marital domicil thus governs more problems than the
single problem mentioned above concerning the existence and
nature of the interests of husband and wife in each other's
property. But we are warned against any such supposition by
the language of the Restatement, which again speaks exclusively of "rights or other interests in movables" ( §§ 289 ff.)
and when we find similar expressions used by the writers. We
shall see, indeed, that many, although certainly not all, other
problems regarding the relationships between the spouses, as
well as between them and third persons, are treated in American common law as belonging to the fields of contract, tort,
or quasi-contract rather than to that of marital law. Apparently, the formulation of conflicts rules in this country has
been unduly influenced by the narrow scope of the matrimonial law believed to remain after the passage of the Married
Women's Acts. Furthermore, insufficient attention has been
paid to the problems arising under the community property
systems and to the regulations of the rest of the world.
3· Continental Rules on Marital Property Relations
Quite a different picture is presented by the traditional
European marital laws, for which Central Europe has most
4 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 1287; STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (193z)
63, supra n. I; LEFLAR, ZI Cal. L. Rev. (1933) Z33, supra n. 1.
5 Z BEALE

§ Z90.1.
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fully elaborated the general theories. The tangible and intangible assets of the parties ( activa) are conceived as forming one part of a major whole, viz., the estate, while the
debts of the spouses form the other part. Therefore, inquiry
is not limited to the determination of those interests which
one spouse may have in the assets of the other, but it is
also directed to the obligations that may arise between the
spouses, the liability of either to creditors, the enforcement
and execution of claims during coverture and after its termination, management of the wife's goods other than those
pertaining to her separate estate, presumptions as to ownership, and like questions. All these problems are regarded as
forming one complex unit, similar to an inheritance treated
as an aggregate, to which one conflicts rule applies.
Generally, such a system extends to every asset, but in
England and Argentina immovables are excepted and assigned to the lex situs, just as they are in this country. But
even in these countries the system is not confined to the
mutual interests of the spouses in each other's property.
The Continental systems, of course, are recognized in any
common law court in accordance with its conflicts rule; nobody would think of refusing recognition because such a property regime is "unknown in the lex fori." 6
4· Scope of the Marital Property Law
It is important to emphasize the comparatively broad
scope of marital property law in civil law countries.
In the American system also, the "effect of marriage upon
the interests of one spouse," to use the expression of section
237 of the Restatement, refers to all rules of the applicable
municipal law under which, by virtue of the marriage, property rights or interests are created, modified, or terminated.
6 See BECKEIT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private
International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46 at 57·
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In particular, both in the United States and in civil law
countries, these rules determine what powers of management
one spouse may exercise and what control the other may
have; to what extent freedom of alienation is affected; who
is the proper party to sue and be sued with respect to the
property of either spouse; 7 and similar questions.
In civil law countries, marital property law also includes
the effects of such events as voluntary or judicial separation,
divorce, postnuptial agreements, bankruptcy, and abuse by
the husband of his rights of management. In principle, this
is true in the United States too, but there are many variations
and exceptions.
Although article I 9 I of the C6digo Bustamante subjects
the wife's right to recover her dowry to her personal law, a
rational solution requires that either the matrimonial law of
the spouses or the general contracts law governs. 8 The former is the right solution where the applicable matrimonial
law includes special rules on dowry, e.g., in Austria and
Italy; in France the matrimonial law has been applied to a
dowry constituted under the law of Maryland. 9
In community property states everywhere, marital property law determines what constitutes the community fund and
what the separate property of either spouse, and in addition
the questions of management, possession, and control by the
wife and the husband, respectively, the actions permissible
during the community, the termination and partition of the
common fund, etcetera.
An integral part of these systems is also the regulation of
7 See Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (1900) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27
So. 851 {married woman, domiciled in Mississippi, allowed according to the
(matrimonial) law of Mississippi to sue in tort in Louisiana, as the tort had
been suffered there). See also Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Humble ( 1901)
181 U.S. 57i Traglio v. Harris (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 439·
8
Cf. RAAPE 342.
9 App. Nimes {Dec. 10, 1912) D.1914.2.169.
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liability of the different estates of the parties for debts either
of the community or of the husband or wife. Liability of the
community property for community debts only, as in Washington, or also for the debts of the husband as in Louisiana,
or for all debts of the husband and the prenuptial debts of
the wife, as in California, is naturally considered by the lawyers of those states as growing out of the marriage. The
same approach is used in Europe, not only with respect to a
system of community but to any marital system, in classifying
the problem of the husband's liability for prenuptial or postnuptial debts of his wife and vice versa. This does not seem
to be the usual way of thinking in this country but should be
recognized as the actually governing principle.
As a matter of fact, if marriage property law is defined in
the conflict of laws as dealing with problems of title to property only, its scope is much narrower than in European countries. To visualize the difference and the attendant difficulties,
let us assume that German spouses are domiciled in Germany
and that the wife has been charged with a criminal offense but
acquitted. Under the German Civil Code (§ 1387, No.2),
the husband was obliged to pay or to reimburse his wife for
the expense of her defense, and as a co-debtor he was personally liable to his wife's creditors, e.g., to her attorney. If her
husband can be sued in an American common law court, what
attitude should that court take? Should it classify the problem according to the lex fori? It might find that no such claim
is granted to the wife or her attorney by the matrimonial law
of the forum although some claim under another theory may
be prosecuted. Obviously, the desirable solution is that German matrimonial law as the law of the domicil should be
applied in its full bearing.
If we change the facts of the case slightly, there would
probably be no doubt at all about an American court's reaching an analogous solution where the husband, under the Ger-
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man Civil Code ( § I 3 8 5), has to pay the taxes, interest on
mortgages, and insurance premiums for those assets of his
wife of which he is possessed ex iure mariti during coverture.
These debts may be compared with the liabilities which are
often indicated as incidents of community property.
Conversely, a German court, applying the essentially
narrower matrimonial law of a common law state, faces the
question of what to do about matters considered part of the
matrimonial law in Germany but not so considered by the
governing foreign law. If, for instance, American parties are
domiciled in a common law jurisdiction and the wife borrows
money with the consent of her husband, the latter would be
liable to the creditor only upon his assumption of a guaranty.
Under the German Code (§ I386 par. I), however, the husband was liable for the interest on the loan, both wife and
creditor being able to enforce the liability ( § I3 8 8), which
extends to the reserved property of the wife as well as to the
husband's own property. If the German court follows the
characterization appropriate to the civil law doctrine, it has
to consider the problem as one of matrimonial law and therefore governed by the law of the American domicil. The most
sensible consequence seems to be to adopt the conflicts rule
applied in this country to surety contracts. Or, instead of the
law of the place of contracting thereby indicated, should the
German judges, as in other contracts cases, apply the law of
the place of performance, as required by the German conflicts rule? The result would be that reached neither in Germany nor in the United States.
An analogous question concerning torts was raised before
a French court. Article I477 of the French Civil Code provides as part of the matrimonial law that a spouse diverting
or concealing any effects of the community property shall be
deprived of his share of such effects. The judge considered
this provision inapplicable to an Italian couple and granted
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the ordinary remedies common to both French and Italian
private laws/ 0
In conclusion, it would seem that the broad concept of
marital property law, as developed in Europe, can conveniently be employed in the United States whenever reference
to the civil law in this field is to be made, and that, moreover,
the scope usually allocated to marital property law needs enlargement.
5. Relation Between the Marital Property Law and the Lex
Situs

As is well known, the law of the domcil or the national law
governing either movables or all property may clash with a
divergent law established at the situs. On the one hand, German writers have attempted to develop a theory of the relation between general conflicts rules (such as the rules on
marital property or inheritance) and special rules (such as
those of property referring to the lex situs or of obligations
referring to the lex loci solutionis) .11 On the other hand, fear
of friction has fostered the broad scope of the lex situs in the
United States.
Necessary role of the lex situs. What problems must be
governed in all systems by the law of the situs? The lex situs
determines quite naturally the kinds of property interests and
the modes of their creation, transfer, modification, and termination, and it decides to what extent, if at all, bona fide purchasers and attaching creditors are protected in their expectations.12 In its application to problems of marital property
rights, the law of the situs may come into conflict with the
personal law. The personal law may grant one spouse some
10 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 6, 1897) Clunet 1899, 771, criticized by CLUNET
in Clunet 1899, 740; see also BARTIN, 2 Principes 284.
11 Cf. MELCHIOR 398; M. WoLFF, IPR. 81 if.
12 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 1286; cf. LEFLAR, 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933)
221, 235, supra n. I.
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property interest in an immovable of the other, for instance,
a lien, which is unknown at the situs of the immovable, or the
personal law may provide that, immediately upon the marriage and without any conveyance, certain assets of the
spouses are transformed into a community fund, while no
such transformation by immediate operation of law is known
under the law of the situs. In all such cases, the law of the
situs prevails over the personal law insofar and only insofar
as such immediate property questions are concerned.
Thus, the Montevideo Treaty 13 limits the matrimonial
law of the domicil insofar as its application is prohibited by
the law of the place where the property is situated, with the
significant restriction in the 1940 draft to matters de estricto
cardcter real, i.e., which pertain strictly to real rights.
Illustration: Before the unification of the German civil
law, a couple domiciled in Westphalia lived under the system
of community property, whereby the land owned by one
spouse, immediately upon marriage, fell into joint tenancy by
both parties. The wife owned land in Saxony, where, however, no transfer of land ownership could take place without
a conveyance. The Court of Appeals of Saxony held that the
wife continued to be the sole owner but that she was bound
by reasonable application of the personal law to execute an
appropriate conveyance. 14

In the same sense, it has been held in France that restraints
upon the husband's alienation of his wife's dowry or liens to
secure claims of the wife against her husband, provided by
the personal law, are recognized as an interest in French immovables only to the extent and subject to the conditions
13
Treaty on international civil law, text of 1889, arts. 40, 41; text of 1940,
art. 16.
14
OLG. Dresden {Dec. 1, 1896) 18 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 513; cf. LEWALD
178, 179 no. 239; analogous decision of RG. (April 20, 1903) JW. 1903,
250. An interest created under Maltese matrimonial law was dependent on
publication in Tunis for absolute effect against third persons. Trib. Tunis
(March 15, 1905) Clunet 1906, 444·
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under which the analogous rights of French law are established.15 An express provision of the former Italian Code
was understood in the same way. 16 The maxim underlying all
these cases has been formulated by Zitelmann in the following sentence: uDas Vermogensstatut lebt nur durch die Anerkennung der Einzelstatuten." 17 It has been decided in Canada that marriage settlements concerning property situated
in another country are enforceable "so far as the lex situs
does not prevent their being carried into execution." 18
American conception of the lex situs. In comparison with
the American law of situs, the European property law has a
very modest function. It does not determine the regime under which the spouses shall live, with its innumerable ramifications, and of course not the requisites and construction of
a marriage settlement. It merely decides the technical execution of the commands of the personal law.
Under the American system as in feudal times, however,
the law of the place where the immovable is located determines every question relating to the extent and content of the
effects of marriage on property. Normally, foreign law is applied at the situs, neither to determine the property interests
which one spouse may have in the assets of the other nor, if
our assumption concerning the actual scope of American
marital law is right, to determine what liabilities, if any,
exist with respect to real property and whether the real property of one spouse is liable to the creditors of the other
spouse. In contrast to movables, the law of the situs, and not
the domiciliary law, is considered competent to fix the eco15 Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 20, x884) Clunet x885, 76; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan.
12, 1889) Clunet 1899, 346; cf. NIBOYET 635 no. 507, but also 3 ARMINJON
109 n. 2. On a different recent practice see above, p. 352.
1 6 LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 532 n. I, approved by FEDOZZI 642, disagreeing with other writers.
17 ZITELMANN in Festschrift fiir Otto Gierke (19II) 255 at 261; LEWALD
178 no. 239·
18 In re Jutras Estate (Saskatchewan) [1932] 2 W.W.R. 533, at 537·
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nomic purposes of the marriage institution and to formulate
public policy concerning administration by the husband, control by the wife, and protection of the creditors. This means,
furthermore, that there are as many matrimonial laws as
there are states where either of the spouses has immovable
property.
Even the capacity of married women with respect to all
transactions connected with an immovable is governed by the
law of the state where the immovable is located and not, in
accordance with the ordinary rule of this country, by the law
of the place of contracting.
An explanation sometimes offered for the broad rule on
immovables in the United States is that it is an essential function of a state to determine the title to interests in land. But
does it not suffice that the property interest as such be governed by local law? Why should the local law also try to determine the effects of marriage? Moreover, if this proposition were correct, the law of the situs would also have to be
applied to movables. Some American writers have indeed
claimed for the situs "a sort of primary control over property within . . . its border," 19 a claim quite unknown outside the United States. The law of the situs is said to have
the power to decide what effect, if any, should be given to the
law of the domicil, and the latter is said to be applicable not
on the basis of an independent rule of conflict of laws but only
indirectly by way of reference by the law of the situs. Attempts have been made to explain a few decisions 20 in this
way, but these appear to be inspired rather by considerations
of public policy. 21 It would be absurd to assume that the
19
LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 22I, 225, 230, supra n. I. The Restatement § 8 (I) seems to share this view.
20
Locke v. McPherson ( I90I) I63 Mo. 493, 63 S. W. 726; Smith v. McAtee
(I867) 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 64I; cf. Graham v. First National Bank
(I88I) 84 N.Y. 393,38 Am. Rep. 528.
21
Cf. STUMBERG, 11 Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 6I, supra n. I.
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courts of the domicil itself or the courts of a third state could
not apply the law of the domicil without the permission of
the law of the situs. True territorialism, furthermore, would
require that the municipal law of the situs be applied, not
merely its conflicts rule. 22
There exists, however, an important restriction upon the
application of the lex situs. In almost all American jurisdictions, 23 immovables acquired by assets pertaining to the separate property of one spouse, are his separate property, and
when acquired with community property are community
property-the so-called replacement or source doctrine. 24 As
a result, the impact of the lex situs to a considerable extent
is qualified by the operation of the lex domicilii influencing
the ownership of assets used for acquiring immovables in
another state. 25 This may be the law of the actual or of the
former domicil of the spouses. The lex situs, of course, retains its power over acquisitions of immovables through
earnings, gifts, and succession or distribution on death. 26
The courts ordinarily also apply the lex situs without hesitation in determining the validity and construction of such
contracts by the husband or the wife as dispose of land, in
adjudging the ownership of profits and fruits, and in ascertaining the internal relations between the spouses with respect to their interest in immovables. 27

Illustration. The husband bought land in Idaho with
money earned in Michigan, and acquires separate property
despite the community property system of the former state.
But, if he deeds the land to his married daughter domiciled
22
23

W!GNY and BROCKELBANK, Expose 33I n. I to art. 289.
}Acos, "The Law of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J.
(I93I) I, 36.
24 So named by JACOB (precedent note). See also In re Gulstine's Estate
(I932) I66 Wash. 325, 6 P. (2d) 628.
25 See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( I943) I67, 169, supra n. I.
26 See for example the distinctions made in Newcomer v. Orem (I852) 2
Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717.
27 See cases collected by NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( I943) 172, 173, supra n. I.
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in New York, there is a presumption, under Idaho law, that
the property is held in community by her and her husband.
The converse case has been singularly treated. If land is
sold in the state where it is situated and thus be converted
into money or a chose in action, the movables so acquired
should also, under the doctrine of replacement, to be consistent, be substituted for the land and remain subject to the
law of the situs. But in a series of early cases, it was thought
in the court of the matrimonial domicil that, thanks to the
conversion effected at the situs, the time had come to apply
the lex fori of the domicil to the movables acquired. 28 In two
other old cases, temporary differences of policy with respect
to the emancipation of married women caused one court at
the domicil 29 and the other at the situs 30 each to apply its
own domestic law to the proceeds, in order to enforce in the
interest of the wife the progressive view of the forum
against the old common law principle. Inferences as to the
present rules can scarcely be drawn from these decisions.
The lex situs in other countries. The system founded by the
postglossators, which places the effects of marriage on immovables under the law of the situs, has been adopted by
Great Britain, the United States, and Argentina, and the
Austrian courts. 31 A similar situation exists with respect to
Swiss immovables belonging to Swiss nationals. 32
28 Courts applying their own common law on marital property rather than
the community property rule of the lex situs: Kneeland v. Ensley {1838} 19
Tenn. 620; Newcomer v. Orem ( 1852) 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717; Castleman v. Jeffries {1877) 6o Ala. 380. Court of community property system not
applying the lex situs of Georgia: Henderson v. Trousdale {Sup. Ct. 1855) 10
La. Ann. 548.
29 Glenn v. Glenn {1872) 47 Ala. 204, refusing application of the old common law principle of South Carolina.
30
Smith v. McAtee ( 1867) 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 641, rejecting pathetically the old common law principle of Illinois.
31 Argentine Civil Marriage Law (1888} art. 6. Austria: OGH. (Oct. 22,
1924) 6 SZ. 778 no. 337· Ontario: Landreau v. Lachapelle {March 22, 1937)
[1937] O.R. 444, 11 Giur. Camp. (1954) 370.
32 NAG. art, 28 no, J. This r~servation of the local law is uQdersto(ld t9
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In France, Italy, and other Latin countries, this system
has been applied in a few decisions, 33 though by prevailing
opinion it has long been abandoned. 34 French public policy
even goes so far as to make equal treatment of movables and
immovables imperative, the nature of the conjugal association being said to require that all its effects be regulated by
one single, immutable law. Hence, it has been repeatedly decided in France that the American regime of separation of
assets applies to French immovables owned by Americans,
the American rule to the contrary notwithstanding. 35
In Austria, there was a split of authority on this point. 36
In the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. 3,
par. 2), only the right to dispose of immovables is reserved
to the local law.
Louisiana rule. In Louisiana, statutes have expressly provided since 18 52 that the community property system there
cover capacity to contract and acquire by will, STAUFFER, NAG. art. 28 no. 14.
SCHNITZER 532 observes that before the Swiss Civil Code the law of the
canton of origin and not that of the situs was meant; thus the system was
not exactly that of the lex situs.
33 Cass. (civ.) (April 4, r88r) Clunet r88r, 426; see also OLG. Colmar
(Dec. zr, 19rr), as a German court, DJZ. 1913, 174; CLUNET in Clunet 1907,
676. Outside of France, it is often not understood that this opinion is obsolete. Likewise, in German interzonal law, LG. Gottingen (May 3, 1952)
IZRspr. no. 39, superseded now by LG. Kassel (May 17, 1952) IZRspr. no.
40, and LG. Braunschweig (Oct. 9, 1952) IZRspr. no. 41.
84 France: Principle of indivisibility, NIBOYET 6o1 no. 478; WEISS, 3
Traite 171, 4 ibid. 195; z ARMIN JON 465; AuDINET, 40 Recueil 1932 II 289 ff;
BATIFFOL, Traite 682.
Belgium: POULLET no. 443 ff.
Italy: DIENA, 2 Prine. 148; MONACO, L'efficacia 148.
Portugal: CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, r Dire ito Civil 689 (exempting only special
laws on immovables).
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. 28, 1896) 79 Sent. 125 at 133; Cf. TRfAs DE BEs
no. 138.
35 Cass. (req.) (July 18, 1905) Clunet 1906, 446, Revue 1906, zoo; Trib.
civ. Versailles (May 15, 1924) Revue 1925, 240, 252; Trib. Meaux (May 4,
1928) Clunet 1928, 1223, 1228. See, however, recently Trib. Orleans (Feb. 27,
1951) Revue Crit. 1954, 358. Cf. also DELAUME, supra n. 1, 4 Am. J. Comp.
Law ( 1955) 46 f.
36 The courts were traditionally for the lex situs,· cf. r EHRENZWEIGKRAINZ 106.
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in force applies to all property, including movables, acquired
in Louisiana "by non-resident married persons." 37 The
courts have given effect to this provision in order to grant the
outstanding benefits of the Louisiana community system to
the wife with respect to real property acquired in the state, 38
but have declined to apply this provision to choses in action, 39
while their position as regards tangible personal property
does not seem entirely settled. 40 How this strange rule can be
fitted into a well coordinated law of conflicts seems not to
have been discussed so far.
The Civil Code of Latvia also subjects to the lex fori all
property of spouses not domiciled in the country. 41
Deference of Continental countries to the Anglo-American
rule of lex situs. The application of the law of the situs to
marital property interests in immovables in some countries,
particularly those following the Anglo-American system, has
been taken into consideration by several other countries,
which in such cases allow their own personal law to yield to
the lex situs to a greater extent than usual (see page 3 6o).
The outstanding provision of this kind, article 28 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, leaves the determination of interests in or respecting foreign immovables or
movables to such particular local provisions as claim to govern at the situs. Thus, all rules applied in Maine or California with respect to immovables of a married person-at
least insofar as these rules are classified in America as rules
37

La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (1932) art. 2400.
It is doubtful whether art. 164 of the Cal. Civ. C. of 1872, as amended in
1917 and 1923, is to be understood in a similar sense. Cal. Civ. C. (Deering,
1941) 6o ff., § 164; cf. 10 Cal. L. Rev. (1921) 154; STUMBERG, I I Tex. L.
Rev. ( 1932) s6, s8, supra n. I.
In Texas no such case has been found, STUMBERG, ibid. 65.
38
Succession of Dill (1923) 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752.
39 Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. ( 1900) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So.
851.
40 DAGGETT, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1931) 109-1II.
41 C. C. (1937) art. 13 sentence 2.
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of matrimonial character 42-are respected and applied in
Germany as well. Article 28 of the German law has been followed with respect to immovables by the Hague Convention
of 190 5 on Effects of Marriage (art. 7) and other codifications.43 The reservation is applied, for instance, to homestead provisions. 44 French courts, however, profess a radically contrary policy; in their eyes unity of the matrimonial
regime has the dignity of an inevitable dogma. 45
Rationale. The American system of isolating interests in
immovables, although it has hardly ever been justified on
rational grounds, 46 is based on firm traditions and is undisputed in its reign. Its principal advantage lies in the simplicity with which it enables a court to determine the interests of
the parties. This simplicity exists, however, only so long as
the court has to deal with isolated legal relationships regarding a specific piece of land. Complications similar to those
arising in cases of succession or bankruptcy arise when assets
are located in different states and are to be treated as belonging to a single estate, either in the relation of the spouses to
each other or in their relations with third parties.
The European system of treating all problems of property
relations as one single complex, subject to one single law,
avoids the difficulties that arise when different assets belonging to the same persons are subjected to different laws. It
creates so many complications of its own, however, that it is
42 One of the many questions not hitherto discussed, because the fundamental difference in scope between the matrimonial laws of this country and
Europe has been neglected.
43 Hague Convention on Marriage Effects, art. 7·
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I6.
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of I948, s. I7.
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 22 par. 3·
Contra Denmark: see BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I9 no. 44·
44 CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 689 with reference to the Portuguese
Decree no. 7033 of October I6, I92o.
45 See supra p. 366 and infra p. 386.
46 On the specious justifications by the ancient scholars, see I BAR § I8I.
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problematical which of the two systems should be preferred.
The greatest practical difficulties are caused by the coexistence of two such fundamentally different approaches. International cooperation of the type suggested by the Hague
Convention and generous concessions such as those made to
the Anglo-American system by the Introductory Law of the
German Civil Code, might smooth over some of the friction
between the two systems.
II.

THEORY OF IMPLIED CONTRACT

Another basic difference in views concerns the relationship
between the matrimonial law and the marriage settlement.
I.

French Practice

The French courts still follow the theory of Dumoulin,
who advocated in 1525 that the effects of marriage upon
property should be determined primarily by the intention of
the parties. This theory is well known in this country too; in
the famous opinion in Saul v. His Creditors/ 1 Porter, J., although rejecting certain elaborations of Dumoulin's theory
as developed in later French and Spanish practice, adopted
the principal ideas of the theory. In the opposite doctrine,
marriage effects belonged to the domain of the various territorial ("real") statutes, which were in fact multiple and inconsistent customs. To free the relations between husband
and wife from this entanglement, the parties were declared
free to regulate their rights and duties by marriage settlement once and for all, the extraterritorial effect pertaining
to the personal "statute." Even in cases where the parties
had made no settlement, they were said simply to have tacitly
agreed to subject themselves to a certain local custom, pref47 (1827) 5 Mart. N. S. (La.) 569. A mistake by Judge Porter in interpreting the Spanish law has been noted by DEFUNIAK, I Principles of Community
Property (1943) 249·
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erably to the custom in force at the marital domicil, identical
for practical purposes with the domicil of the husband at the
time of the marriage. 48
(a) Method and result of French cases. The full liberty
of the parties to make any settlement they choose is still recognized by the French courts, which continue to imply a tacit
contract in the absence of a settlement. 49
While once this method resulted in the general application
of the matrimonial law of the first domicil, it is now employed more consistently with the original idea; in order to
determine the presumed intention of the parties, all facts
of the individual case are taken into consideration, including
the conduct and statements of the parties after the marriage.50 Criticism of this method of practical interpretation "1
has been answered by the Tribunal de la Seine with the argument that manifestations of the parties during marriage,
though they cannot modify the regime adopted at the time
of the marriage, nevertheless give significant support to the
assumptions of the court. 52 By these methods, it has been
presumed that the parties have tacitly agreed to adopt the
law of the domicil of the husband or that of their common
nationality or that of an intended future domicil. 53 But as an
after-effect of the old domiciliary tradition, the presumption
of a tacit agreement to the law of the real or intended marital
4B Cf. CALEB, Essai sur le principe de l'autonomie de Ia volonte en droit
international prive (I927) I35; NIBOYET 792 no. 684; 3 ARMINJON nos. 88 ff.
49 Cass (civ.) (July 11, I855) S.I855.I.699; Cass. {req.) (July I5, I885)
Clunet I886, 93; Cass. {req.) (May IS, I886) Clunet I886, 456. See other
decisions cited by WEiss, 3 Traite 639 ff.
5o Constant practice, as the Repertoires attest; cf. particularly Cour Paris
(Dec. 7, I887) D.I888.2.265; Cass. {req.) (June 4, 1935) Clunet I936, 898;
Cass. (req.) (April 6, I938) S.I938.1.I5I, Clunet I938, 788; Cass (civ.)
(May 5, I953) Revue Crit. I953, 799, Clunet I953, 658, excluding expressly
a preponderance of a presumption for the matrimonial domicil.
51 NIBOYET 833 no. 7I6; PILLET, 2 Traite 225.
52 Trib. civ. Seine (May n, I933) Revue Crit. I934, I29.
53 See the report of Brachet in Trib. civ. Versailles {May I5, I924) Revue
I925, 24I, 245· See also }OELSON, op. cit. supra n. I, at 9I.
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54

domicil seems to be preferred, the latter especially when it
happens to result in the application of French law. Some decisions have aroused amazement. Thus, a Swiss married a
French woman in New York, went with her to Switzerland
and many years after to France, but French law was presumed intended. 55 The same result was reached in cases
where sixty years after the marriage the bodies of the
spouses were brought to France 56 and where Swiss spouses
had stayed in France no longer than three weeks. 5 7
(b) Influence of the French doctrine on other countries.
The French system has been followed by some courts in other
countries 58 and hinted at in the statutes of Spain, Portugal,
and in the original text of the Treaty of Montevideo. 5 9 The
54 CALEB, 4 Repert, I8o no. 69 ff.; cf. Cour Paris (Nov. I8, I937) Clunet
1938, 3ro; Cour Paris {March 2, I938) Clunet 1938, 544· In Switzerland this
was erroneously believed to be the French law; cf. ScHNITZER {ed. I.) I97·
55 Trib. civ. Belfort (June I3, I911) and Cour Besan<;on {March 18, 1912)
Clunet 1913, 171.
5 ' 1 Trib. civ. Versailles (July 19, 1927) Clunet 1928, 429; 3 FRANKENSTEIN
296.
57 Cour Paris (June 28, 1937) Schardon c. Chavon, Clunet I938, 537; the
commentator, ibid. 540 is surprised, but the Court of Cassation affirmed (May
5. 1938) Gaz.Pal.I938.2.232, cf. 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 128.
58 To this effect Belgium: Trib. civ. Anvers (Dec. 26, I925) Pasicrisie
1926.3.24; Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Dec. 2, I925) Pasicrisie 1926.3.117; App.
Bruxelles (June I3, I931) 18 Bull. lnst. Beige {1932-1933) 53; Trib. civ.
Bruxelles {March 29, I933) Pasicrisie I934·3·I9. Cf. POULLET 513 ff. nos.
442 ff. Other decisions, however, followed the national law. See infra p. 375,
n. 82.
Luxemburg: Cour d'appel {Feb. 4. 1948) 14 Pasicrisie Lux. 359·
Brazil: with respect to marriages anterior to the Civil Code see VALLADAO
153 and more recently Sup. Trib. Fed. (June I2, I940) In re Wolner, I40
Revista dir. civ. (I942) 281 {submission to the Brazilian general community
property system, assumed to have been effectuated by declaration in the
marriage record, without marriage settlement; per abundantiam the Austrian law, possibly national law of the parties is understood, with KRASNOPOLSKI, Oesterreichisches Familienrecht (Wien, 1911) § 17, as permitting
autonomy of the parties (at 287)); Trib. de Apela<;iio de Sao Paulo (Aug.
21, I945) I05 Revista For. (I946) 315.
The Netherlands: A few older decisions overruled by H. R. (May 17, I929)
W. 12006; on a later decision of Hof den Haag (Feb. 6, I93 I) W. 12373 see
VAN DER FLIER, Clunet 1933, 1110. For an implied choice of law by the parties
again Rb. Roermond (Feb. 8, 1934) N. ]. I934, 824.
59 Spain: C. C. art. 1325; Portugal: C. C. art. 1107; Belgian Congo: C. C.
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Civil Code of Louisiana varies the French doctrine by declaring that "every marriage contracted in this State, superinduces of right partnership or community of acquest or gains,
if there be no stipulation to the contrary"; 60 of course, this
is not an interpretation of the parties' intention but a statement of the legal regime.
In England, the contractual theory has exercised some influence. An express marriage settlement is construed according to the law presumed to be intended by the parties; ordinarily, the effect is that, by a rebuttable presumption, it is
governed by the law of the marital domicil. 61 Moreover, although no longer popular, the doctrine of intended marital
domicil has not been forgotten. 62 Finally, the inference from
a tacit marriage covenant to an immutable law of the first
domicil, which was rejected in Saul v. His Creditors, was proclaimed in De Nicols v. Curlier as late as 1898. 63 The case,
however, referred to a marriage celebrated in France by
parties domiciled in France; a tacit marriage agreement was
assumed, because the French courts administering the law of
the domicil would have proceeded by this method. Neither in
England, according to the better view, 64 nor in Canada, according to the distinctly adopted opinion, is such construction
imitated. In the absence of an express settlement and a will,
marital property is governed by the law of the husband's
domicil. Hence, the community system of Quebec was applied in Ontario to spouses who had their first domicil in Queart. I2; but all these are rather harmless reminiscences, M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 410; Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law,
text of 1889, art. 4I (the marital domicil expressly agreed upon by the parties before the marriage).
60 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) art. 2399.
61 In re Fitzgerald, Surman v. Fitzgerald [1904] I Ch. 573; In re Bankes,
Reynolds v. Ellis [I902] 2 Ch. 333, etc. CHESHIRE 50I.
6 2 In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900] P. 2u, 239; See WEsTLAKE
72 § 36 ; DICEY 789, CHESHIRE 502.
63 [1898] I Ch. 403; [1900] A. c. 2I.
64 Doubtful: CHESHIRE 505 ff.; DICEY 788.
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bee, because the law of Quebec like the French referred to
the presumable intention of the parties to choose the local
regime rather than because the Ontario court shared the
theory of implied contract. 65
(c) Influence on America. In the United States, the old
French doctrine had some influence on Story. 66
The "intended domicil" appeared in a few decisions 67 but
has been rejected by prevailing opinion as well as by the Restatement.68 A contemplated domicil which, because of a
change of mind, does not become a home in fact, may figure
as an important element in ascertaining the law tacitly chosen
by the parties in setting up a marriage contract, but it is no
veritable domicil at all and is therefore neglected in this country; domicil is the test for the determination of marital property rights in movables, independent of any intention of the
parties. 68 a
In Latin America, while the Montevideo Treaty of 1889
testifies to the widespread adoption of the theory of intended
marital domicil, the new text of 1940 evidences a disposition
to abandon the theory. 69
(d) Opposition to French practice. The literature, including the modern French writers, 70 unanimously rejects the old
65 See Beaudoin v. Trudel (Ont. Ct. App. I936) [I937] I D.L.R. 216; In
re Parsons (Ont.) [I926] I D.L.R. n6o.
66 STORY §§ I98, I99·
67 Ford's Curator v. Ford (I824) 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 574, 578, I4 Am. Dec.
20I; I WHARTON 402 § I90.
68 Restatement § 289; 2 BEALE § 289.I n. 3; GooDRICH, "Matrimonial Domicile," 27 Yale L. J. (I9I7) 49 at 50 (against STORY), STUMBERG, I I Tex.
L. Rev. (I932) 53, 55, supra n. I and in his Principles of Conflict of Laws
3 I 2, but see 3 I7; cf. CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 492.
as a See infra p. 397.
69
Art. I6. Supra n. 59; see also I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ no. 224.
70
BARTIN, D.r898.2-457, BARTIN, 2 Principes 247 no. 302; PILLET, 2 Melanges 95; VALERY n28 no. 794; 3 ARMIN JON IOI no. 95 bis; NIBOYET 833
no. 7I6 and 5 Traite 398; AuDINET, 40 Recueil I932 II 257-259, 265. As is
known, DuMOUI.IN's contemporary, D'ARGENTRE, fought against extraterritorial effect of a tacit agreement, see WEiss, 3 Traite 29. In Italy, ANZII.OTTI
particularly attacked the doctrine of presumed intention.
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French practice. The presumed intention is called an excessively fictitious assumption, and the unpredictability of a
future court decision on this intention is considered intolerable.71 Of this system, it was recently said that the matrimonial law, whose main reason to exist must be found in the
security of the spouses and of third persons, fails completely
to serve its purpose. 72
It is interesting that French writers advocating reform
have expressed a preference in certain cases for the domiciliary test rather than the nationality principle. 73 The French
private draft of 1930 favors the first marital domicil. 74

III.
I.

CONTACTS

Domicil

Domicil is the test of the effects of marriage on property
in the Anglo-American countries, Denmark, Norway, Argentina, Paraguay, and Peru, 75 recently joined by Brazil 76 in
accordance with the general principles of these countries in
matters of status. Furthermore, domicil, rather than nationality, has been recognized by the courts in Austria, 77 whose
71 LEREBOUR~PIGEONN!llRE 417 no. 344, justifies the regard for manifestations of the parties subsequent to the marriage as a means of avoiding surprises which the courts would otherwise inflict on the parties.
72 SAVATIER, D.1936.I.7,
73 3 ARMIN JON 104 no. 97; COSTE-FLORET, Note, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 224
no. 126.
74 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 82; cf. NIBOYET, ibid. 1928, 336. The official draft of 1949 takes the personal law of both spouses into account, in
case of difference the law of the place of the marriage ceremony (art. 37).
75 Denmark: MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746; BORUM, Personalstatutet 455·
Latvia: C. C. (1937) § 13, extending however lex fori to all property situated in the country.
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II6.
Argentina: Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 5 par. I.
Paraguay: Civil Marriage Law of Dec. 2, 1898, art. 5 par. I.
Peru: C. C. (1936) Tit. Pre!. art. V (for foreigners).
76 Brazil: Introductory Law of Sept. 4, 1942, art. 7 § 4·
77 Austria: OGH. (Jan. 5, 1864) 5 GIU. no. 2701; OGH. (Feb. 27, x89o)
28 GIU. no. 13176; dictum in OGH. (Oct. 22, 1924) 6 SZ. no. 337; contra:
most writers, see WALKER 748.
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marital property law has not been changed since 1938. The
particular system of the Swiss conflicts law extends to the
property effects of marriage. 78
The domicil in question has been generally and still is the
domicil of the husband at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. This principle, derived from the old ideas of coverture and merger, as in England, is preferred in the United
States as a simple and unequivocal test to indicate the matrimonial center, more reliable than the concept of first conjugal domicil. Yet another view has been taken in Switzerland
and increasingly in Latin America, where the law of the first
domicil actually established by the husband and wife in common is declared applicable. 79 But as this doctrine needs to be
supplemented when the parties, because of premature death
or separation or continued migration, never establish a
common domicil, the husband's domicil at the marriage has
to be utilized as an inevitable emergency test. 80 The C6digo
Bustamante (art. I 87) adopts this method also in case the
parties have no common nationality. 81
These divergent concepts are obviously part of the marital
property laws, so as to make characterization of the domicil
dependent on the applicable law.
2.

Nationality

In other countries, 82 the nationality of the husband is the
test adopted and is preferred to the possibly different naSwitzerland: NAG. arts. 19, 20, 32; cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 472.
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 19, 1929) 55 BGE. II 231. Treaty of Montevideo
on international civil law, text of 1940, art. 16.
Brazil: Introductory Law of 1942, art. 7·
80
Opinion adopted in Switzerland following TEICHMANN; see STAUFFER,
NAG. 87 f no. 13; BG. (Sept. 19, 1929) 55 BGE. II 230.
81
Similarly, e.g., Guatemala C. C. (1926) art. 174; Law on Foreigners
( 1936) art. 40; C. C. (1933) art. 116, if both parties are foreigners.
82
Germany: EG. art. 15, followed by Hague Convention on Marriage
Effects, art. 2.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June r6, 1926) Pasicrisie 1927.2.77, Clunet 1928,
78
79
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tionality of the wife. In this field, unity and clarity of the
regime to govern the effects of marriage on property are considered more important than attempts to satisfy both nationallaws.82a This contrasts markedly with the controversial
literature respecting the effect of divided nationality on personal marital relations. 83
1102; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (]an. 15, 1934) Clunet 1935, 682; App. Bruxelles
(July 7, 1943) J.d. Tr. 1944, 41, Clunet 1946-49, 106; App. Bruxelles (May
24, 1954) Revue des Faillites 1953-54, 312, Revue Crit. 1955, 701. See also
supra p. 371 n. 58.
Bulgaria: GHi1NOV, 6 Repert. 192 no. 68; GANEFF, 4 Leske--Loewenfeld I
818.
China: Law of 1918, art. 10 par. 2.
Finland: Law of 1929, art. 14 par. 2.
Egypt: C. C. (1948) art. 13 par. 1 (for foreigners).
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (1936) art. 40; C. C. (1933) art. u6 (in
cases of common nationality of the parties).
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. I5.
Hungary: 6 Repert. 463 nos. 83, 83 his, 88.
Iran: C. C. art. 963.
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. I9; as to the former law: Cass. (April
I6, I932) Foro Ita!., II Massimario I932, 282 no. I376.
Japan: Law of I898, art. I5.
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I9I9) W. I0444; VAN HASSELT
6 Repert. 630 no. I7o.
Philippines: C. C. ( I949) art. I24·
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I4 par. 3·
Portugal: C. C. art. 1107, cf. art. I6; CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil
689.
Rumania: Cass. (Feb. 23, I937) affaire Grigoriou, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP.
no. I89.
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 22.
Spain: C. C. arts. 9 and I325 as currently interpreted: see MANRESA, 9
Comentarios al C6digo Civil Espafiol ( I908) I 99; J. LASSALA SAM PER, El
Regimen Matrimonial de Bienes. Derecho Internacional y Interregional
(I954) I64; Trib. Supr. (July I, I955) Revista Priv. I956, I43 1 Rev. Esp. Der.
Int. I955, 6o8.
Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, §I no. 2.
Syria: C. C. (I 949) art. I4 par. I (for foreigners).
8 2 a A proposal of MAKAROV, "Die Gleichberechtigung der Frau und das
Internationale Privatrecht," I7 Z.ausl.PR. (I952) 382-396, to adapt the German statutory Conflict rules to the constitutional postulate of equality of the
sexes has been generally rejected, cf. DOLLE, in: Le droit international prive
de Ia famiile 564.
83 In this field only isolated voices have protested the dominant doctrines
such as 2 ZrTELMANN 749 who advocated a compulsory system of separate
property in nationally mixed marriages,
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Following the general trend from nationality to territoriality,84 however, the courts of some countries are inclined to
apply their own municipal law, if the wife was a national of
the forum before the marriage or at the time of suit or if the
first marital domicil was established at the forum. 85 Recent
statutes have confirmed this tendency. 85 a In France, this trend
has inspired a draft proposal of the Societe d' etudes tegislatives, basing the property regime on the law of the place
where the parties "fix" their domicil immediately after marriage, of which the last version significantly limits itself to
provide for the application of French law in the case of a
first French matrimonial domicil. 86
On the other hand, the far-reaching arm of the national
law is exhibited by the declaration of the Italian Supreme
Court that a regime of general community of property, under
which the spouses in Argentina believed they were living,
was inapplicable, because this regime was forbidden to them
84

See Jupra pp. 163 ff., 374•
law has been applied where the marriage is celebrated
in Spain and the wife is a national; see TRIAs DE BEs, 31 Recueil I930 I 6s8,
68o.
Regarding the Brazilian law previous to 1942 (C. C. of 1916, Introduction
art. 8), decisions of the Sup. Trib. Fed., Recurso Extraord. no. 919, Weinberger {Dec. 20, 1916) 12 Revista Jur. (1918) 479, (Dec. 30, I918) and
(Dec. 20, 1919) 19 Revista Sup. Trib. (1919) 48 (cf. VALLADAO 128, I29)
modified the principles essentially for the benefit of the Brazilian party. They
deal with an American from New York who married a Brazilian woman and
established domicil in Brazil. He went bankrupt under the law of New York,
and the wife claimed her Brazilian immovables under the common law system. The Supreme Court actually applied the law of New York and not the
Brazilian general community system. But the New York regime could not
govern immovables in Brazil. Moreover, under the principle of renvoi,
Brazilian law was competent in every respect. In the cases of Sao Paulo
(VALLADAO 133) the law of the forum was undisputed.
85
a The C. C. of Egypt, I948 {art. I4) and of Syria, I949 {art. IS) apply
the lex fori if one of the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage is a national of the lex fori. In Czechoslovakia, in case of diversity
of the national laws of the spouses, the lex fori governs subsidiarily (Law
on private international law of I948, §IS).
86
Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1928, 339 ff., art. 20; definitive text, ibid. I930,
I7S ff., art. 20. Cf. NIBOYET, ibid. I928, 3I9 ff., 334, Revue I929, I93, 2I2. As
to the official draft of I949, see supra n. 76.

85 In Spain, Spanish
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as Italian nationals by article 1433 of the Civil Code (of
I86s). 87 The disharmony between the Italian nationality
principle and the Argentine domiciliary principle has attracted attention, in view of the millions of Italian immigrants living in Argentina, and has resulted, if not in concessions to the domiciliary law, at least in the suggestion that
the parties should be induced to declare a choice of law on
their marriage. 88

/llustration. 89 A German married woman domiciled in
Zurich, Switzerland, contracted a loan with a Swiss bank.
The contract was, without doubt, governed by Swiss law. The
question, however, whether she could, without her husband's
consent, make her nonreserved property liable, was answered
in Germany under the German law of nationality, while a
Swiss court would have applied the Swiss law of domicil.
3· Law of the Place of Celebration
The law of the place of celebration has been invoked but
rarely. 90 Except within the strict confines of title questions,
the situs of movables is attributed no importance in any law.
4· Renvoi
Divergences between the law of the situs and the personal
law (for instance, in the case of immovables in the United
States), or between the proper law (French practice) and
other principles, make place for renvoi. If two French na. tionals domiciled in the United States are married, under
American law their movables are governed by the law of the
87 Cass. Roma (April 16, 1932) Foro Ita!., II Massimario 1932, 282 no.
1376 j cf. UDINA, Elementi 184 no. 135 j FEDOZZI 446.
88 FEDOZZI 451; AuniNET, 40 Recueil 1932 II 241 at 265. Cf. WEISS, 3
Traite 643, in view of the uncertain French practice.
89 Bay. ObLG. (May u, 1929) IPRspr. 1929, no. 75·
90 Argentine Civil Marriage Law ( 1888) art. 5 par. I, probably presuming
that the marital domicil is at the place of celebration. Texas Ann. Rev. Civ.
Stat. (Vernon, 1940) art. 4627 declares expressly that removal to Texas subjects the marital rights of persons "married in other countries" to Texas law.
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state of their domicil; French courts would probably arrive
at the same result by construction of the parties' intention. 91
German courts would follow the presumed French decision
under the statutory command of renvoi (EG. art. 27).
It is likewise by renvoi that, in Germany, the lex situs
governs the effects of marriage on immovables owned by
Americans. 92 German courts have interpreted this renvoi so
broadly that all questions determined in the United States
according to the lex situs of immovables are by them decided
in conformance with the German law applicable to immovables located in Germany.

Illustration: An American wife in New York owned German immovables. The law of the matrimonial domicil, New
York, did not require the husband's joinder for conveying
the land. Under German matrimonial law, however, the land
was a part of those assets of the wife of which she could not
dispose without her husband's consent. The German court
held that the American renvoi to the lex situs resulted in the
application of all the rules of German law on matrimonial
property and that, therefore, the husband's consent was necessary.na Thus, the ordinary German conflicts rule on capacity
to contract was not applied. Similar arguments have been
made in Switzerland. 94
The French courts are in a different position, as their doctrine of renvoi yields to their doctrine that the matrimonial
property law must be supreme and unqualified. 95
01

See the decisions above, n. 54, and LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 567. When
renvoi was followed by OLG. Colmar (Feb. 12, 1901) Clunet 1903, 666, II
Z.int.R. (1902) 282, it was done under French law, but the court was German
at the time.
Spain: see MANRESA, op. cit. supra n. 82, at 205.
92
OLG. Colmar (Aug. 24, 19II) 4 Rhein. Z.f.Zivil- und Prozessrecht 295;
cf. OLG. Miinchen (March 15, 1913) 30 ROLG. 45 (renvoi by Hungarian
law); OLG, Breslau (Oct. 31, 1929) JW, 1930, IOII.
93
OLG. Colmar (Aug. 24, 19II) 4 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht 295;
3 FRANKENSTEIN 401 n. 57 approving.
94
HuBER-MuTZNER 476 n. 417.
95
See supra n. 35 and infra n. 122.
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The problem arising from the different scope of European
and American marital property laws in the application of
renvoi has not yet been properly explored. It seems obvious,
however, that renvoi must be applied when the two foreign
laws involved agree with each other in a certain result. Suppose that Italian spouses are domiciled first in Italy and then
in Switzerland; a Swiss court would apply the Italian system
of separate property so far as the mutual relations of the
spouses are concerned, and Swiss law of "property union"
with respect to their relations to third persons. In like case,
an English court would strictly follow the Swiss court, provided the parties retain their Swiss domicil. Would an American court, disregarding the Swiss partial recognition of Italian law, also apply the Swiss principles of "property union"
between the parties? Another question is still more delicate:
Would an American court introduce its own distinction between movables acquired before and after marriage?

IV.

TnE

PROBLEM OF MuTABILITY: CHANGE OF

PERSONAL LAw DuRING CovERTURE
1.

Change in Legislation

If altered during the marriage, the governing municipal
law, according to principles generally recognized in Europe,
rules in its changed form. 96 The same law also determines
what retroactive effect changes have on the matrimonial relationship. 97
96 E.g., Cour d'Aix (April 28, 1910) Clunet 1911, 199 (change from Italian
to French law by the annexation of Nizza in 186o).
07 Cass. (req.) (June 4, 1935) Revue Crit. 1936, 755; Trib. Colmar (June
12, 1951) Revue Crit. 1952, 313. HABICHT 128 and the general opinion in
Germany.
After the introduction of new marital property regimes in Poland in 1946
and 1950, effective also for existing marriages, the courts did not find that
this retroactive change infringes public policy: Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. II,
1950) N. ]. 1951 no. 391; Cour Paris, (July 2, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 810,
Clunet 1955, 142.
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In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment in some
measure limits retroactive state legislation. 98
2.

Change in Status

It is an old question whether alteration of the initial domicil alters marital relations. The question now comprehends
any change in the personal law 99 and is of extraordinary importance in view of the enormous differences of matrimonial
property systems and the multiplied migrations of our time.
The former conception in Germanic countries seems to
have been that the legal incidents of property are only an
outgrowth of the personal relations between the spouses. The
personal regime being mutable, the property system was held
mutable too. This concept was followed in Switzerland, England, and, before the German Civil Code, in the northwestern
parts of Germany and in Baden.
Nevertheless, as early as 1265 A.D., the Spanish Partidas,
which have been so influential in the Americas, declared the
matrimonial regime immutable in the face of a change in personal status/ 00
In France from the times of the postglossators, the problem was controversial; the victory of the theory construing
marital property law as a tacit contractual system naturally
brought with it the assumption of permanence. Moreover, in
French municipal law itself, the immutability of marital regulation of property was proclaimed so as to prohibit postnuptial settlements of any kind, and finally also in the Civil Code
(arts. I 3 94, I 3 9 5) , even in the case of divorce and remarriage of the spouses (art. 29 5 par. 2) , in the belief that, to
secure conjugal peace and to protect husband and wife
98

See the interesting Note, 16 Cal. L. Rev. (1927) 399·
Uber die Wandelbarkeit oder Unwandelbarkeit des gesetzlichen ehelichen Giiterrechts, bei Wohnsitzwechsel (Basel, 1879); 2 ZITELMANN 725.
100 Partida IV, ley 24, tit. XI, a very clear and neat statement.
99 TEICHMANN,
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against their respective maneuvers as well as those of their
creditors, the system of marital property must be stable.
Therefore, the principle of immutability was considered imperative. 101
On the contrary, it is characteristic of modern codifications
to permit marriage settlements during marriage. 102
3· The Principles
(a) Full mutability. In England, the House of Lords
decided in the Hog case ( 1804) 103 that parties, acquiring a
domicil in Scotland after fifteen years of marriage, thereby
became subject to the Scotch rule of community, and Lord
Eldon held that the rule applied to all movables which Hog
possessed. However, the communio bonorum of Scotch law
was not a true marital regime but only a mode of distribution,
and hence adequately governed by the law of the Scotch
domicil of the deceased at the time of his death rather than
at the time when he acquired such domiciU 04
Full mutability decrees also the new Brazilian law. 104a In
Switzerland, the principle of mutability, limited to the relations of the spouses to third persons, applies to a married
couple transferring their domicil to Swi tzerland. 105
1o1 The entire Latin group followed this model.
1o2 The United States: see 3 VERNIER §I 56.
Denmark: Law on Effects of Marriage of I925, c. 4 § 28.
Germany: BGB. § I408 (as amended by Law of June IS, I957)·
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. I405 {for modification of settlements only).
Guatemala: C. C. (I933) art. I03.
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. I62 par. 3·
Sweden: Marriage Law of I920, c. 8 §I.
Switzerland: C. C. art. 179 par. I.
103 Lashley v. Hog (I804) 4 Paton {Scotch Appeals Case) 58 I. DICEY 796
Rule I82; CHESHIRE {ed. 2) 493, but doubtful in ed. 5, 509.
104 WESTLAKE 73 ff.; FoOTE 354 {both concluding for the system of full
immutability).
104a C. C. Introductory Law of I942, art. 7 par. 4, as amended 1943;
TENORIO, Lei de Introduc;ao ao C6digo Civil Brasileiro ( ed. 2, I955) 276.
105 NAG. arts. I9, 20, 3I. However, the spouses can submit, by formal
declaration, also their mutual property relations to Swiss law, art. 31 par.
3, 20 NAG.
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(b) Mutability of new acquisitions. In the United
States 106 and Argentina/ 07 the principle of mutability is established in the sense that only movables acquired after the
change of domicil are governed by the law of the new domicil. The same principle was adopted by the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. 3) and is sometimes assumed to
be English law. 108 In the United States, the continuing effect
of law on property once acquired 109 is the more important
principle, since the interests in movables acquired under the
former domiciliary law continue in any objects that may replace these movables, 110 so long as the proceeds of the original goods can be traced. 111 (In the language of the civil law,
a subrogation; pretium succedit in locum rei, and res succedit
in locum pretii.) Moreover, the authorities emphasize that
transfer of movables from the state where they have been
acquired or from one domicil to another does not· alter their
condition, either as separate or community property. 112 This
doctrine is generally thought to be protected by the constitu106 Matter of Majot (1910) 199 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402 rejected the doctrine of the De Nicols case. The great majority of American courts have
adopted the law of the domicil at the time of acquisition. Cf. Succession of
Packwood (1845) 9 Rob. (La.) 438,41 Am. Dec. 341; Pearl v. Hansborough
(1848) 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 426; Castro v. Illies {1858) 22 Tex. 479, 73
Am. Dec. 277; Snyder v. Stringer (1921) n6 Wash. 131, 198 Pac. 733. To
the same effect the statute of Louisiana Civ. Code {1932) art. 2401; Arizona Code Ann. (1939) §§ 63-306; and Texas Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. {Vernon,
1947) art. 4627. Restatement §290; 2 BEALE §290.1; DEFUNIAK, I Principles
of Community Property (1943) 250; MARSH (supra n. I) 213.
107
Argentine Civil Marriage Law {I888) art. 5 par. 2, followed by
Paraguay: Civil Marriage Law {I898) art. 5 par. 2.
108
FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization," IS
Can. B. Rev. {1927) 226, now Essays 105, arguments on De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] A. C. 21.
109
Brookman v. Durkee {I907) 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914; Restatement
§§ 291, 292.
110
ScHOULER, I Domestic Relations § 592; I WHARTON 415 ff. § 193a;
MARSH (supra n. I) 206.
111
McAnally v. O'Neal {1876) 56 Ala. 299, 302.
112
Restatement §§ 291-293. Brookman v. Durkee (I907) 46 Wash. 578, 90
Pac. 914 and many other decisions; see I2 L.R.A. (N. S.) 921; 57 L.R.A. 353·
In Europe it goes without saying that these rules apply.
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tiona! guarantees against deprivation of property without
due process of law. 113 Only the technical nature of community
property may have to be construed, after a transfer, so as to
agree with the new lex situs. The debts contracted by the husband or wife likewise retain their nature as enforceable on
separate or community property respectively. 114
Under section 291 of the Restatement, however, control
by the former domiciliary law ends when "the interests are
affected by some new dealings with the movables in the
second state." The exact meaning of this proposition is in
doubt. 115 Beale, in another place in his treatise, 116 referring
to Drake v. Glover, where it was said that "The lex loci contractus governs, 'as to the nature, the obligation, and the interpretation of a contract,' " 117 remarks only that dealings
with movables must be carried out in accordance with the law
of the new' domicil.
How these rules work in practice has been illustrated during a century in a few cases only, covering only a part of the
situations imaginable and leaving incertitude in many respects.118
(c) Immutability. In the field of the law of conflicts, immutability is proclaimed ordinarily by all systems following
the nationality principle 119 and in addition by some others:~o
11 3 In re Drishaus' Estate (I926) I99 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. SIS; In re Thornton's Estate (I934) I Cal. (2d) I, 33 P. (2d) I.
114 As to moving domicil from a separate property state to a community
property state: Hyman Lichtenstein & Co. v. Schlenker ( I892) 44 La. Ann.
ro8, IO So. 623; Clark v. Eltinge ( I902) 29 Wash. ZIS; 69 Pac. 736; Huyvaerts v. Roedtz (I9I9) IOS Wash. 6s7, I78 Pac. 8oi. For the inverse situation no case is illustrative; see also DE FUNIAK, I Principles of Community
Property ( I943) S32, S33·
115 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (I930) 1286, I289; MARSH (supra n. I) 203.
116 2 BEALE § 292.I; cf. Restatement § 29I.
117 (I8S7) 30 Ala. 382 at 389 quoting STORY 2I9 § 263. This distinction is
universally recognized.
11 8 NEUNER, s La. L. Rev. (1943) 176, I78-I82, supra n. I, makes an interesting attempt to coordinate the cases.
11 9 Germany: EG. art. IS. Following this model: Hague Convention on
Marriage Effects, arts. 2 and 9·
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Under this principle, the spouses continue under their former
matrimonial law.
Switzerland has adopted this conception, so far as the
rights of the parties between themselves are concerned. The
Federal Tribunal has observed that rights created under the
China: Law of 1918, art. 10 par. 2.
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 15.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 15 par. 1.
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 14 par. 3·
Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, §I No.2.
See moreover:
Egypt: C. C. ( 1948) art. 13 par. I (for foreigners).
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. 15; formerly by interpretation of C. C. (I856)
art. 4 § 3; 2 STREIT-VALL!NDAS 346 n. 22.
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (I936) art. 40 last sentence.
French Morocco: Dahir of Aug. I3, I913 sur Ia condition civile des Fran<;ais et des etrangers dans le protectorat Fran<;ais du Maroc, arts. 14, I5.
Spanish Morocco: Dahir de Ia condicion civil de los espaiioles y extranjeros, art. 13.
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. I9 par. 2.
Syria: C. C. (1949) art. 14 par. 1 (for foreigners).
Decisions in the following countries:
Austria: 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ ( ed. I) I I05.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June 16, 1926) Pasicrisie 1927.2.77, Clunet 1928,
1102.
France: App. Alger (Dec. 13, 1897) Clunet 1898, 723; Trib civ. Seine
(Dec. z8, 1900) Clunet I9o1, 568; Trib. civ. Marseilles (July I2, I907)
Clunet 1908, 831; Trib. civ. Marseilles (May 8, 1913) Clunet 1914, I27I;
Trib. civil Colmar (June I2, I951) Revue Crit. I952, 3I3·
Hungary: SCHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R. (I929) 170, I74·
The Netherlands: applied in the case of a Dutch husband by KG. (Feb. z6,
I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins 1927, 58.
Spain: TRIAS DE BES, 6 Repert. 253 nos. I03, I09; LASALA SAM PER (supra n.
82) 209; Trib. Supr. (Oct. 29, I955) Revista Der. Priv. I956, 258, Rev. Esp.
Der. Int. 1955, 624.
Sweden: Sup. C. (July 31, 193I) Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, I93I, 403, 7
Z.ausl. PR. (1933) 934 (Swedish spouses domiciled in the United States);
Sup. C. (Sept. 23, 1937) ibid. 1937, 438, I3 Z.ausi.PR. (1940/41) 841.
120
Quebec: Astill v. Hallee (1877) 4 Q.L.R. 120.
Denmark: Ostre Landsret (Sept. 24, I935) U.f. R. I935, 1143, 10
Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 6zo; BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I9 no. 44; BORUM
116, hut see for another view MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746
no. 4·
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. 116; SYNNESTVEDT, DIP. Scandina vie 262. This rule was overlooked in Muus v. Muus ( I88z) 29 Minn.
115, 12 N. W. 343, but probably would not have changed the decision.
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 43·
Rumania: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 22, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 3I8 no. 267
(interprovincial law).
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first law survive m such form as Is consonant with a new
statute. 121
Under the rigid French notions, this approach leads to
strange results. In the case of a married couple, first domiciled in New York and then in France, the separate property
system of New York was applied in every respect, even to
French immovables of the husband acquired after the change
of domicil. This was done, although the New York matrimonial law does not extend to foreign immovables and, besides, would not be applied by a New York court to objects
acquired at a new domicil. This result was based on the
principles of unity (assets regarded as an aggregate unit)
and of immutability, both of which go together: "L'immutabilite et !'unite vont de pair; l'une ne peut se concevoir sans
l' autre." 122
4· Exception: New Marriage Settlements
Assuming immutability as a principle of conflicts law, the
matrimonial law of the first domicil or first nationality decides whether there is mutability in the field of private law,
i.e., the first personal law decides whether or not the parties
may make a settlement under a changed personal law.
General Continental customary law has admitted an important exception, however, 123 which is formulated by the
121 See NAG. art. I9 par. I, as contrasted to par. 2 and art. 31 pars. 2 and
3; BG. (Dec. Io, I9IO) 36 BGE. II 6I9; BG. {Dec. 5, I940) 66 BGE. II 234
no. 48. (Swiss spouses having transferred their domicil to a foreign country
retain their regime established in Switzerland, except when the foreign law
opposes it.) But see also supra n. IOS.
122 Trib. civ. Versailles (May IS, I924) with the conclusions of Counsellor
Brachet, affirmed by Cour Paris {Oct. I7, I924) Revue I925, 240, 254· Easier
to decide to the same effect was the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I7, I924)
Revue I925, 226 (incommutability and indivisibility of the property separation of a naturalized American, former Frenchman, domiciled with his wife
first in New York and then in France). However, a recent decision has accepted the renvoi of the law of New York to the French lex sitae, Trib. civil
Orleans (Feb. 27, I95I) Revue Crit. I954, 358.
123
RG. {March 9, I9oo) IO Z.int.R. (I900) 28I; RG. (Sept. 25, I903)
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German Civil Code (Introductory Law art. 15, par. 2),
namely that if a foreign husband acquires German nationality after the marriage or if foreign spouses establish their
domicil in Germany, they are allowed to contract a marriage
settlement, even if no such agreement would be permitted by
their former personallaw. 124
The Hague Convention on Marriage Effects accepts this
result in the case where both spouses acquire a new common
nationality, 125 but not where there is only a change of domicil126 nor where the husband alone changes his nationality.
The more sweeping German statute has aroused much criticism/27 which is justified in the case where the husband alone
becomes a German national after marriage.
In the case where both parties change their status, it has
been argued that a former personal law that allows them to
modify their regime during coverture, invests them with a
right effective after the parties leave its orbit, whereas, if it
prohibits such modification, the prior law ceases to have a
I 3 Z.int.R. ( I903) 587. ANZILOTII, Sui mutamenti dei rapporti patrimoniali
fra coniugi nel diritto internazionale privato (Firenze, I899) I2I.
124 Followed by Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 14
par. 2.
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 19 par. 2.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. I05·
Swiss writers have inferred from NAG. art. 20 a similar right of French
parties to conclude a postnuptial settlement in Switzerland against the national law. See STAUFFER, NAG. I02 n. 49·
25
1
Art. 9 par. I with art. 4 par. r.
Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, § I no. 9·
126 KG. {Feb. 26, I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins 1927, 58 {settlement
concluded by Dutchmen after having established themselves in Germany
void). This restriction by the Convention of the rule of EG. art. I5 par. 2 is
approved by LEWALD, 103 no. I44, and others. Contra: under EG. art. 15
par. 2, the KG. (June 23, I932) HRR. I933, no. 205, recognized a settlement by Swiss nationals who had established their second domicil in Germany, whereby they agreed to a system of separate property in accordance
with the German Code but not in accordance with Swiss C. C. art. I79 par. 2.
127 2 ZITELMANN 741 n. 40I; NEUMEYER, IPR. ( ed. I) 20; KOSTERS 468;
LEWALD I03 no. 144; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 3 IO ff. who overrates the nationality
principle.
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legitimate role. This last argument suffices to prove that
the solution of the question should be reserved to the new
personal law. Various writers have suggested that, in the
event of a change of personal law, the parties should be
allowed to adapt their property relations to their new legal
surroundings, irrespective of the municipal law of the first
state and the general conflicts rule of the second state. 129
Louisiana has instituted such an exception to its otherwise
rigid rule of immutability. 130
The draft proposed by the French Societe d' etudes tegislatives provides that if the marital property was not governed by French law and if both parties are of French nationality, either by naturalization or reintegration-viz., of
both, or of the party not a French national-they may adopt
a settlement accepting a regime within a year. 131 Under the
recent Brazilian law, a party who is naturalized may require.
with the consent of the other, that the judicial decree of his
naturalization should state the acceptance of the Brazilian
regime of general community property saving (acquired?)
rights of third persons.132

5. Classification
The classification of the problem of mutability is theoretically easy; there can be no doubt that it belongs to the field
128

KosTERS 454·
Switzerland: NAG. arts. 20, 32, 36b.
Italy: ANZILOTTI, op. cit. supra n. 123, at 65; DrENA, 2 Prine. 153 ff.;
FEDOZZI 453·
130 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. ( 1932) art. 2329, as amended by Act No. 236 of
1910.
131 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 175 ff., art. 21; cf. ibid. 1928, 319 ff. at
339 ff. According to art. 26 as proposed the French regime replacing a foreign
system, has an effect retroactive to the day of marriage, this, however, without prejudice to the rights acquired by third persons and the validity of
regularly performed acts of the spouses. Similarly the official Draft of
1949 (art. 40), adding that a previous legal property regime will be substituted by the French legal regime of marital property if the parties omit
an express settlement.
13 2 Brazil: Introductory Law ( 1942) art. 7 § 5·
12 9
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of effects of marriage on property. 183 Most French writers,
however, thought that immutability in French law implies a
certain incapacity, characteristic of the French regime, which
therefore concerns status and as such is dependent on the national law. 134 Nevertheless, the French courts 135 place the
problem in the category of the regime matrimonial in a peculiar way. The Court of Cassation, in adopting the classification, emphasized as decisive the unity of the marital property law (regime Ugal) ,136 meaning thereby that parties who
have once come to live under the French system of communaute Ugale are bound by it irrevocably, regardless of
whether they are of French nationality. Parties, however,
who have chosen or who are subjected to a foreign regime,
may change to the French community system whenever such
change is permitted by their first personallaw. 137
Fortunately, no such queer controversy exists in any other
country.
6. Renvoi
The renvoi problem is resolved by including in the governing law the conflicts rule respecting variability. For instance,
two Americans, who have not made a marriage settlement,
establish their domicil first in the United States and then in
Germany. According to the American rule (Restatement
§ 290), on the one hand, newly acquired movables would be
133
To this effect in France, BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1934, 641 and Traite
700; LEREBOURs-PrGEONNIERE 368 no. 341.
134
2 ARM!NJON {ed. 2) 585; HARTIN, 2 Principes 143 § 271; NIBOYET,
no. 710, but contra 5 Traite no. 1507; VALERY 1096 no. 768; AUDINET 474
no. 589; CALEB in Repert. 199 no. 192 If., SAVATIER, D. 1936.1.7, 10.
135
Cour Montpellier {April 25, 1884) D.r845.2.36; Cass. {req.) (June 4,
1935) D.r936.1.7, Clunet 1936, 898, Revue Crit. 1936, 755, annotated by
BASDEVANT, ibid. 761; Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1939,
105; Trib. civil Colmar (June 12, 1951) Revue Crit. 1952, 313. Contra:
Trib. civ. Strassburg (July 24, 1935) Clunet 1937, 320.
136
Report of Counsellor Pilon, Cass. {req.) (June 4, 1935) D.1936.1.7,
cited supra, n. 135.
137
This was hailed by LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE {ed. 2) 402 no. 340.
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considered subject to the German system of separate property, subject to participation in gains upon its termination.
Under the German conflicts rule, on the other hand, the
common law system of the first domicil would continue to
apply to all property. The German matrimonial law will
be applied, however, because its application is induced by the
American rule of conflict of laws.
7. Rationale
Apart from the antiquated historical reasons that have influenced French developments, the invariability of the governing law has been explained as being required by the theory
of vested rights/ 38 by the alleged function of the law first
applying to give a definitive solution, 139 by the need of the
wife to be protected against arbitrary changes, 140 and by
other arguments equally weak. From a rational standpoint,
there is only one reason for a voiding a radical change in the
regime, the danger of confusion and unworkability in maintaining two heterogeneous systems at the same time, a danger illustrated under the American rules pursuant to which a
former regime partially survives with respect to movables
acquired before the change of domicil or replaced at any
time, and makes itself felt in other ways.
These difficulties, it is true, seem not to have attracted
much attention in this country. For some unknown reason,
cases dealing with the topic are relatively few.
On the other hand, the permanence of property relations,
188 In connection with an assumed implied contract, a vested right (jus
adquisitum) was at the base of the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht; see
Prussian Obertribunal (March u, I873) 69 Entsch. kgl. Ob. Trib. IOI. Among

the modern writers see PILLET, Principes 52 I no. 289; DIENA "La conception
du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et Ia pratique en Italie," I7
Recueil I927 II 343, at 4I6; RAAPE 304; WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld
I 64 n. 373·
139 I BAR § I84; KosTERS 453·
14o I BAR, loc. cit.; WEISS, 3 Traite 647.
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more completely adopted in Europe than in this country,
raises problems in connection with other conflicts rules. While
the law governing marital property is fixed on the day of the
marriage or of acquisition, the law controlling succession to
the estate of a predeceasing spouse depends on his nationality
or domicil as of the day of his death, and the law governing
the personal relations between the spouses admittedly
changes with every change of domicil or nationality. In every
municipal legislation, these three matters are to a certain degree coordinated. Their harmony may be greatly disturbed
by combining in the applicable laws two or more divergent
principles, one for marital property, a second for personal
relations, and a third for succession upon death. Difficult
problems of characterization, much discussed in recent literature, result. 141 Those regarding the relation between marital
property and inheritance law will be illustrated hereafter.
The position of third states is particularly delicate. In this
country, an acquisition by an Italian married couple, after
emigration to the United States, will be treated according to
the law of the state where the parties establish themselves.
Italian courts, however, hold that Italian matrimonial law
continues to govern in every respect. What should be done
by a court in Cuba or France? Under the nationality principle there in force, these two countries generally agree with
the I tali an conception, although such a decision seems illadvised.142
The circumstance, finally, that the German doctrine has
adopted the principle of mutability in the related field of
paternal rights in the property of a minor child, 143 further
suggests that all existing rules are unsatisfactory and that
entirely new methods should be devised.
141 Doubt of the advisability of the principle on this ground has been con·
sidered by NEUNER, Der Sinn 67, 68.
142 Cj. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 307.
143
See infra, pp. 6oo, 6scr-6sr.
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V.
I.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS

Characterization

What agreements are covered by the rules dealing with
marriage settlements, is in practice only to be ascertained by
comparative law. 144
2.

Permissibility

In the United States, the ordinary rule respecting contracts
is applied to antenuptial agreements. Hence, the Restatement
declares applicable the law of the place of contracting. 145 The
Argentine Civil Code states the same rule. 146 This place, however, may easily coincide with that of the first marital domicil.147
Generally, the conditions under which a marriage settlement is permitted are determined, in the absence of an antenuptial agreement, by the law governing the marital property.147a This law decides questions such as are incident to the
English doctrine of freedom of contract, to the Italian
provisions that the parties may choose only between narrowly
144

RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 261 and 283; JoELSON, op. cit. supra n. 1.
Restatement § 238 comment b, § 289 comment c, should be read with a
view to the criticism by STUMBERG 317, 318 referring to Hutchison v. Ross
(1933) 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65.
146 Argentine C. C. arts. 1220 (new 1254), 1205 (new 1239); cf. 2 VICO
48 no. 69, ibid. 50 no. 72; Cam. civ. 1 Cap. (June 27, 1941) J. A. 1942. I
926, 937 (explains in a learned comment that the restrictions on community
property settlements do not apply to foreign-concluded contracts).
The Brazilian C. C. of 1916, Introduction art. 8 provided that the spouses
may choose the Brazilian law. On this unfortunate addition proposed by the
Senate and approved by the House of Representatives, which has been called
mysterious, see BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 168 ff. no. 50.
147 See, for instance, LeBreton v. Miles (N.Y. 1840) 8 Paige 261 (intended
domicil in France); Spears v. Shropshire (1856) I I La. Ann. 559, 66 Am.
Dec. 206; Davenport v. Karnes (1873) 70 Ill. 465; Mueller v. Mueller ( 1899)
127 Ala. 356, 28 So. 465.
147a Expressly the Czechoslovakian Statute on private international law of
1948, § 16; Benelux-Draft art. 5 par. 3; King v. Bruce ( 1947) 145 Tex. 647,
201 S. W. (2d) 803.
145
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defined regimes 148 (viz., the dowry system or the community
of gains), or to the German provision that the parties, unless
one of them is domiciled abroad, may not, merely by referring to the foreign law and without expressly stating its rules,
incorporate a foreign regime in their contract. 149 The same
law also controls the question whether the parties may insert
clauses in favor of third persons or provisions looking to
the death of one of them.
The law meant here is, of course, the law of the husband's
or of the matrimonial domicil in certain countries and the national law of the parties in the great majority of civil law
countries.
In both systems, the validity of the settlement is suspended
until the celebration of the marriage. In England, the applicable law is considered to be that intended by the parties,
which, only by rebuttable presumption, is identified as that of
the matrimonial domicil.
The French courts again have developed a contrary view.
Where two Italians marrying in France stipulate universal
community of assets, the contract is prohibited and void in
Italy but has been held valid in France, either by application
148 Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. I381; C. C. (I942) art. 161.
Spain: C. C. art. I3I7, contrary to French law, see PLANIOL, RIPERT, et NAsT,
1 Reg. Matr. 47 no. 36.
149
BGB. § I433, now§ 1409 (as amended by Law of June IS, I957), followed by Italian C. C. (I942) art. I6I. Germans in Belgium may by virtue of
§ 1433 choose the Belgian community of gains, RG. (March I6, I938) 92 Seuff.
Arch. no. 96, ]W. I938, I7IS. The Reichsgericht even extended this benefit to
Germans simultaneously citizens of another state, beyond the limits of § I433
par. 2, RG. (March I3, I924) Leipz. Z. 1924, 74I.
Contra: the Hooge Raad (June 24, I898} W. 7I41; H. R. (Jan. I4, I926}
W. II459, and KoSTERS 447, have seen in a similar Dutch provision, BW. art.
198, a rule on formalities not binding Dutch subjects abroad; but see the criticism by HI] MANS 108; OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek I838-I938, 707.
An old decision of Louisiana, Bourcier v. Lanusse (ISIS) 3 Mart. 0. S. 58I
held that the submission of the parties to the coutume of Paris was invalid,
the C. C. of Louisiana not permitting parties to choose a law other than of
a state of the union.
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of the law of the situs or nowadays generally under the doctrine of implied contract. 150
On principle, an antenuptial agreement made by foreign
immigrants before coming to this country will be recognized
in the United States. 151 But they cannot be sure that a settlement validly made here will be recognized in their homeland.
3· Formalities
The rule locus regit actum governs the formalities of marriage settlements. For this particular subject matter, it is recognized also in England that this rule as generally understood is optional, that is, it applies in case of noncompliance
with the formalities of the proper law. 152
The Hague Convention on the Effects of Marriage, article
6, has adopted some peculiar provisions; either the lex loci
actus or both national laws of the parties must be observed.152a
4· Capacity

It is generally held outside the United States that capacity
to contract an antenuptial agreement is entirely distinguishable from capacity as envisaged under the personal or the
property law relations of husband and wife. In the common
assumption, it is not affected by the marriage but flows from
the general status rights of the party. Therefore, capacity
150 See Cass. (req.) (May 7, I924) Revue I924, 406 and 2 ARMINJON, ed. I,
463, ed. 2, n. 2.
Cf. Italian C. C. (I86s) art. I433·
151 See, however, infra n. I 56.
152 Sir John Romilly in Van Grutten v. Digby (I862) 3I Beav. 56I; In re
Bankes, Reynolds v. Ellis [I9o2] 2 Ch. 333 per Buckley, J.; In re Barnard,
Barnard v. White ( I887) 56 L.T.R. 9 per Kay, J.; In re Fitzgerald, Surman
v. Fitzgerald [1904] I Ch. 573; cf. WRIGHT, "A Problem of Conflicting Marriage Settlements," 44 Law Q. Rev. (1928) 85, 93; CHESHIRE SI4·
152a Followed by Finland: Law on international family law of Dec. 5, I929,
§ 15 par. 2; French-Morocco, Dahir of Aug. 12, I913, art. I2; Portugal:
C. C. art. no6; Sweden: Law of June I, I9I2, § I no. 6.
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to enter into a marriage settlement before marriage is governed by the law of the domicil or nationality of the party
at the time when the agreement is made, 152b the same as the
capacity of an unmarried person to make any other kind of
contract.
However, in disagreement with this view, the Hague Convention on the Effects of Marriage (art. 3) has referred to
the national law at the time of the marriage rather than that
of the contract. 152c By a remarkable coincidence, the English
writer Cheshire suggests that on principle the law of the
matrimonial domicil should prevail. 153 Although his main impulse derives from his peculiar proposal to extend the marital
law to capacity to marry, it may be argued on another ground
that the marital law governing the objective permissibility
of settlements should likewise cover their subjective requirements.
Nevertheless, in recent times, the dominant opinion has
been well supported by the emphasis laid on the independence
of married women. If the wife retains her own personal law
during the marriage, her status deserves to be respected in
the case of postnuptial settlements-in accordance with their
basic significance-and the more so in the case of contracts
preceding the marriage.

5. Mutability
The right to alter the property regime during coverture is
determined in the same way as in the absence of a settlement.
152b Denmark: Law on Marriage Effects of March I8, I925 1 § 53 par. I;
Finland: Law on international family law of Dec. 51 I929, § I5 par. I; Siam:
Law on private international law of I939, § 24.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July I 1 I955) Revista Der. Priv. I956, I43 1 Rev. Esp.
Der. Int. 1955, 6o8.
152c Also the Swedish law of June r, I9I2 1 §I no. 3·
153 CHESHIRE sxo. Other suggestions are made by MoRRIS, "Capacity to Make
a Marriage Settlement Contract in English Private International Law," 54
Law Q. Rev. (I938) 78, 86.
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The very origins of the doctrine of immutability in France
were connected with antenuptial agreements. Because the
property of spouses was supposed to be governed by such an
agreement for the whole duration of their union in all jurisdictions, tacit agreements were implied. The doctrine was applied in England in the case of a French marriage 154 and is
used in Canada in the analogous case of a contract made or a
marriage celebrated without express settlement in Quebec. 155
Also, the American courts basically consider express marriage settlements to be valid and unaffected by any change of
status. But they have construed some agreements as intended
solely to cover property owned at the time of the marriage or
acquired while the parties resided at their first conjugal
domicil. 156 This was done particularly in the case of immigrants who had settled their matrimonial property in the old
country without contemplating emigration. A certain tendency in favor of such a presumption may still be observed, 107
sometimes subject to question. According to the English and
Continental point of view, a settlement applies to all assets
of the parties wherever and whenever acquired. This interpretation is certainly convincing, where change by postnuptial
agreement after change of status is permitted and there is
actually no new settlement.
This contrast and the conflict of policy behind it are
154 De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] A. C. 21 regarding movables; In re De
Nicols, De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] 2 Ch. 410 with regard to immovables
(implied French contract was held enforceable against property in England).
155 See supra n. 65.
156 Long v. Hess (1895) 154 Ill. 482, 40 N. E. 335 (the parties having immigrated many years ago; their settlement made in the grand duchy of Hesse
was declared not binding); Castro v. Illies (1858) 22 Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dec.
277; Fuss v. Fuss (1869) 24 Wis. 256. More recently: Hoefer v. Probasco
(1921) 8o Okla. 261, 196 Pac. 138 (avoiding by mere construction of the
intention of the parties for clear equitable reasons the interference of the
agreement to a homestead acquired in a new domicil).
157 See the statement of the writers: 2 BEALE 1015; LEFLAR, "Community
Property and Conflict of Laws," 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 221, 224; GooDRICH
391 n. 52. Cf. NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 167, 185, supra n. I.
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sharply illustrated by the well-known case of Hutchison v.
Ross/ 58 where the higher New York courts applied the lex
situs to give effect to transactions between spouses who were
continuously domiciled in Quebec and lived under a marriage
covenant of property separation, immutable under the law of
Quebec. This leading case in conflict of laws on trusts has
been considered a violation of the marital law of the domicil,
and the lawyers of Quebec resented the Appellate Division's 159 interpreting the covenant as not intended to bind
the spouses during their whole marriage or to subject them
definitely to the law of Quebec, a construction which has
been called fantastic/ 60
6. Settlements Concerning Immovables
The Restatement declares that settlements concerning immovables are to be construed in accordance with the law of
the situs, excepting the validity of the contract. 161 This statement has been criticized as too broad/ 62 but it is misleading
as a whole unless it is remembered that the Restatement recognizes renvoi from the lex situs ( § 8, ( 1)). The ulex situs"
in this case simply consists of a conflicts rule common to all
jurisdictions of this country. First, the validity of the contract is ascertained according to the law of the place of contracting or whatever law is deemed to be applicable thereto.
Second, under another conflicts rule which is not more ulex
situs" than the first, the agreement is recognized as having
full effect in the state of the immovable, unless a particular
public policy is offended, and likewise is to be recognized in
158
Hutchison v. Ross (I933) 262 N. Y. 38I, I87 N. E. 65, Annotation, 89
A.L.R. I023.
159
Ross v. Ross ( I93I) 233 App. Div. 626, 253 N. Y. Supp. 87I. The argument was not adopted by the Court of Appeals (see note I58, supra).
160
I ]OHNSON 449, Appendix (devoted to the case).
161
Restatement §§ 237, 238 comment b; 2 BEALE § 238.2.
162
NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I84, supra n. I, explains that the first part
of the rule is too broad.
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all third states. An antenuptial contract concluded between
residents of Nebraska in that state is applicable, beyond any
doubt, "to real property situated in Kansas owned by the
husband at the time of his death," in accordance with "the
general rule that antenuptial agreements, equably and fairly
made are valid and enforceable." 163
In the great majority of countries, this result is unchallenged, on the premise that immovables and movables are
parts of a unit.
7· Obligatory Settlements
An interesting experiment has been made in Guatemala,
where a marriage settlement in the form of a public instrument must be executed when an alien or naturalized bridegroom intends to marry a Guatemalan woman. 1"' European
authors have suggested similar measures for aliens marrying
in the country or foreign married couples acquiring citizenship.165 Many uncertainties would be avoided by some cautious pressure in this direction.

VI.

PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES

Opinion is strongly divided concerning the advisability and
means of protecting third parties. While, according to the
older conception, the personal law could be invoked against
everyone, in recent times protection of third parties within
the jurisdiction results from the system of territoriality or
from exceptions to the rule of the personal law.
163 Sanger v. Sanger (1931) 132 Kan. 596, 296 Pac.
16 4 Guatemala: Law of Foreigners (1936) art. 41; C.

355, 356.
C. (1933) art. 100 no.

4; cf. MATOS 356 no. 241.
165 See authors cited supra n. 88. See, in particular, the detailed requests
that marriage officers should address to the parties, as proposed by ROGUIN
at the Hague Conference of 1900, Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia
Haye (1900) 231.
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No Exception to the Personal Law

No exception to the application of the personal law is
granted to third parties in France, Poland, and a few other
countries. French courts, when they actually recognize that
foreign law governs the property regime, consider it the
duty of anyone dealing with the husband or wife to inform
himself about the legal background. 166
2.

Exception with Respect to Third Persons

Conversely, in a system historically rooted, 167 Swiss law
distinguishes sharply between the relations of husband and
wife to each other and their relations with third persons. Irrespective of the law applying to the former, the latter are
governed by the matrimonial law of the conjugal domicil,
which determines especially the legal position of the wife in
relation to the husband's creditors in the case of his bankruptcy or of an execution levied upon his property. 168 This
proposition sounds attractive, but its application is complicated 169 and, as the Swiss Federal Tribunal itself was compelled to admit, results in certain curious consequences. 170 It
was criticized by Meili as early as 1902. 171
166
Trib. civ. Seine (May 29, I90I) Clunet I902, 36I; see, however, DELAUME (supra n. I) 4 Am. J. Comp. Law (I955) 38. For Greece see
MARIDAKIS, II Z.ausJ.PR. ( I937) I22.
167
See in particular Prussian AJlg. Landrecht, II Tit. I §§ 35I, 352 declaring the law of the first domicil immutable except in relation to third persons.
The code referred only to the case where married persons, without a marriage settlement, move from a country of separate property to another of
community property, but the courts extended the rule to the converse case;
see Obertribunal (March 28, I846) I3 Entsch. kg!. Ob. Trib. 297 no. 24 where
it is stated that the continuance of the original regime should not harm third
parties acting in good faith.
168
NAG. art. 19 par. 2.
169
SCHNITZER 392 ff.; H UBER-MUTZNER 469 ff.; BG. (July IO, I 907) 33
BGE. I 6I7, 622; BG. (July 14, I909) 35 BGE. II 463, 470; BG. {Dec. IO,
I9IO) 36 BGE. II 6I6, 6I8; BG. (Oct. I7, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 333·
170
BG. (July II, I929) 55 BGE. III 732; cf. also BG. {Dec. I7, I908) 34
BGE. I 734, 737·
171
I MElLI § 75; see }OELSON, op. cit. supra n. I, at Io8-II6.
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The C6digo Bustamante declares in article 189 that the
forum's provisions on the effects of marriage as respects
third persons belong to the sphere of public policy of the
forum, i.e., that they apply even where a foreign personal
matrimonial law otherwise governs.
3· Exception in Favor of Third Persons in Good Faith
Under the German provisions, a person may rely on the
results of German matrimonial law when he contracts with a
married foreigner domiciled in Germany, if he is ignorant of
the fact that the spouses are governed by some foreign regime and this fact is not recorded in Germany in the proper
public register; likewise a married woman who carries on an
independent business enterprise in Germany with the consent
of her husband is purported to have capacity as under German law, 172 although she may otherwise be governed by a
foreign regime.

Illustration: Suppose an American married couple domiciled in Germany. Nothing has been entered in the public
record respecting matrimonial property rights. The husband
sold a crop of grain owned by his wife to a buyer who was
ignorant of the fact that the husband and wife were living
under the American system of separation of assets, under
which, contrary to the German law, the husband had no
power to sell and transfer his wife's crop. The German rule
granting the husband such power is to be applied.
Other countries also prescribe that a foreign regime must
be publicly recorded 173 and establish consequences for the
parties' failure to do so.
1 72 EG. art. 16, art. 36 par. I. Also the German presumptions of ownership
of the husband (praesumptio Muciana) and of the wife (§ 1362 BGB.) are
declared applicable if they are more favorable to the third party, EG. art. 16
par. 2.
173 Switzerland: Justice Dept. Oct. 25, 1933; see II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 658.
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, § 2.
Denmark: Law on Marriage Effects of March 18, 1925, §53 par. 2.
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In effect, the German system is not much different from
the Swiss, because parties living under a foreign system of
matrimonial property law very rarely take the trouble to
have this fact recorded.
The international relation between these two systems has
been described by the Swiss Department of Justice, 174 to the
effect that a Swiss married couple living in Germany have to
observe the German prescriptions of registration to make
their marriage settlement effective, even in cases where otherwise Swiss law would be applicable under the conflicts rule of
the court. Thus, a Swiss national domiciled in Switzerland,
who contracts with a Swiss husband or wife domiciled in Germany, must inform himself concerning the property system
valid in Germany. In addition, Swiss legislation has given
such spouses opportunity to publish their property regime
with the registrar of their home canton, effective for transactions in Switzerland.
In the United States, no particular provisions exist for
such protection. Sometimes it has been assumed that the application of the lex situs to the marital property in immovables has the purpose of giving third parties the legal position
they are likely to suppose, 175 or that, for the benefit of a
bona fide purchaser or a creditor, movables are occasionally
treated as if they were not brought from a former domicil.176
But the cases do not seem to give such assumptions any considerable support.
Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, § I6.
Japan: C. C. art. 757·
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 75 par. 2, and Nicaragua: C. C. art. I 54, which prescribe that charges of regime must be recorded in the appropriate registers
to be effective against third parties, may be applicable by analogy.
174
See 29 SJZ. (I932-33) 25 no. IS.
175
See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) 172, suPra n. I.
176
HARDING, "Matrimonial Domicil and Marital Rights in Movables," 30
Mich. L. Rev. (I932) S59; LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 235, supra n. I;
NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( I943) I So and n. 49, supra n. I.
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VII.

QUESTIONS OF CLASSIFICATION

r. Composition of Community Property

Two cases of the German Reichsgericht undertake to determine whether the community fund includes certain rights
which taken by themselves are governed by a law other than
that of the community property. In the first case, German
parties were married under a German contract of community
of acquests. The wife having acquired a tort claim under Belgian law, the court properly applied German matrimonial
law to the problem whether the claim belonged to the community. But the preliminary problem whether the claim was
alienable, so that it could fall into the community fund,
should have been decided under Belgian law. 177
In the second case, German spouses, living abroad, had
validly settled their community regime under Belgian law. In
the proceedings for partition of the community fund, the
question arose whether the rights of the husband in a German partnership were a part of the community fund. The
court correctly inquired into the alienability of the right, applying the German law governing the partnership and deciding that the right was not alienable iH the precise sense in
which alienability is required in the Belgian and French law
of community property. 178
A comparable case in this country is where the husband
buys a chattel outside the domiciliary state. Thus, in Snyder
v. Stringer, 179 the husband, domiciled in Washington, acquired an automobile in Iowa with earnings made in Montana and Iowa. Under the laws of these two states, the earn177

RG. (May 30, 1919) 96 RGZ. 96. Comments in various sense by MELI 87; RAAPE 309; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 400 n. 52.
1 78 RG. (March 16, 1938) JW. 1938, 1718. For another interpretation
RoBERTSON, Characterization 152 n. 6o.
17 9 (1921) n6 Wash. 131, 198 Pac. 733; cf. LEFLAR, 21 Cal. L. Rev. (1933)
232, supra n. I.
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ings and the automobile purchased therewith would have
been acquired as the husband's separate property, but they
were deemed to be community property by the law of the
domiciliary state, Washington.
2.

Marital Property and Inheritance

(a) Importance of defining limits of each field. To draw
the proper line of demarcation between marital property law
and the law of succession upon death is important in defining
the scope of conflicts rules. 180 In the United States, Great
Britain, and Argentina, the law governing movable marital
property is determined differently from that governing inheritance of movables; in most countries, the difference also
includes the rules on immovables.
It has been asked, for instance, in England whether the
English rule that a will is revoked by marriage is to be classified as a rule of matrimonial or testamentary law. As the rule
has been held to be essentially connected with the marriage
relationship, 181 its effect is measured by the law of the matrimonial domicil, "i.e. in most cases by the lex domicilii of the
husband at the time of marriage," 182 rather than by the lex
domicilii of the testator aUhe time of his death. This reasoning is unsound, and the decision ought to be overruled. 183
Many international treaties contain special clauses providing rules for the distribution of estates upon death. For instance, one of the oldest bilateral treaties on jurisdiction,
1 8° C/. particularly, BARTIN, Etudes 5, 68; SILBERSCHMIDT, 3 Z.int.R. (1893}
132 at 143, 8 Z.int.R. (1898} 97 at 109, 48 Z.int.R. (1933) 313; RABEL, 5
Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 283; NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932) 6off. and in 5 La. L. Rev.
( 1943) 167 at x86, supra n. x; M. WoLFF, IPR. s6; BECKETT, "The Question
of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," zs Brit. Year
Book Int. Law ( 1934) 46; cf. also ROBERTSON, Characterization I58-x68.
181 Vaughan Williams, L. J., in the case of In re Martin, Loustalan v.
Loustalan [1900] P. 2II, 240. Cf. CHESHIRE 550.
1 8 2 CHESHIRE SSO.
188
FALCONBRIDGE, IS Can. B. Rev. (1937) 227-230, supra n. zo8, now Essays II2-II7; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 595·
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that between France and Switzerland of I 869/ 84 provides
that the assets of a Frenchman or a Swiss dying within the
territory of the other country should be distributed by the
court and under the law of his last domicil in his home country. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held in a recent case that
the question whether certain assets belonged to the wife's
separate property or to the acquisitions of marriage is a matter of marital law and does not come within the treaty. 185
The two fields of marital property and inheritance are not
separated in the systems of municipal law by a uniform or invariably clear line. This fact has given rise to various useless
theories that have greatly overburdened the so-called problem of characterization. The only acceptable method of
treatment has proved to be that based on general principles.
Repeated comparative research has revealed a basic criterion
that more or less obviously underlies all legislations, namely,
that matrimonial law determines the interests of husband
and wife during the marriage, including the specification of
the assets of either spouse on the dissolution of their conjugal
life. In the event of one spouse's predeceasing the other, the
law of inheritance regulates the distribution of those assets
which belonged to the deceased in accordance with the matrimonial law. This distribution is particularly significant where
the matrimonial regime is a community property system. On
the death of one spouse, two partitions take place, either
actually or at least for the purposes of an accounting or a
fictitious liquidation. First, all property of husband and wife
is examined to ascertain what constitutes the community fund
and which part of it continues to be owned by the surviving
spouse, while the other part, together with the predeceased
spouse's separate estate, forms the inheritance. Second, ad184 Treaty on the jurisdiction and execution of judgments in matters of private law of June IS, I869, art. 5 par. I.
185 BG. (Dec. 4, I936) 62 BGE. I 235, Praxis 1937, 6I.
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ministration and distribution of the assets designated by the
matrimonial law as the separate property and the part of the
community fund belonging to the deceased, are governed by
the law of inheritance according to the will or the rules of
intestacy, as the case may be. 186
This distinction is adequate to satisfy the theoretical needs
of all legislations and therefore to serve the needs of international application as required by the law of conflicts. Of
course, the distinction is so general that it leaves occasional
doubts as to classification. In fact, in determining which rule
of conflicts is applicable, uncertainty may arise from two
sources. On the one hand, some municipal systems have institutions of mixed or obscure character. On the other hand,
marital and inheritance regulations, forming integral parts
of municipal legal systems, should logically be applied concurrently, and not separately as necessitated by the dictates
of two different conflicts rules. We must explain these two
difficulties.
(b) Rights and expectancies distinguished. Ordinarily, interests in assets of one spouse, which by marital law or marriage settlement have been conferred upon the other, come
into being or, in the usual language, acquire the quality of
vested rights before the dissolution of the marriage. At common law, for instance, a wife by virtue of the marriage has a
dower interest in every parcel of real estate of which her husband has been seised at any time during coverture. This interest can be defeated neither by a conveyance of the husband
nor by his will. On the other hand, where testamentary or interstate succession entitles a surviving spouse to participate
in the distribution of the predeceased spouse's estate, the surviving spouse receives no more than a mere expectation,
186
See ROGUIN, Droit civil compare, Regime matrimonial ( 1905) 9; KADEN,
"Eheliches Giiterrecht," 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 705. Cf. also FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. {1937)
537, 540, now Essays 105, uo.

MARRIAGE
strengthened at the most by provisions for forced shares;

viventis hereditas non datur.
It follows that where a legal system grants to a spouse a
genuine right to be acquired upon and during the marriage,
this right is always to be classified as matrimonial. Such a
right will therefore be acquired under the applicable matrimonial law, irrespective of the inheritance law of the last
domicil or the last nationality. By a marriage settlement, in
England, "the law of the testator's domicil may be ousted
from its regulation of a will." 187 In this country, much discussion has centered around the question whether, in all ten
of the community property states, the wife has a present interest in the community fund during the marriage, sufficient
for a separate income tax return. 188 There seems to be a
growing tendency to affirm the existence of an actual right
for all purposes. 189 In France, Germany, Switzerland, as well
as in the Latin American countries, all regimes, except that
of complete property separation, undoubtedly give actual
rights during marriage. Antenuptial or valid postnuptial settlements have a clear precedence over intestate distribution
also in this country. 190
Where, conversely, a right of a spouse is recognized as existent only at the time of the dissolution of marriage, the
right by no means necessarily originates in the law of inheritance. Death of one spouse is ordinarily only one of several possible causes of dissolution and the regimes that are
usually called systems of community upon death are in reality
187 BENTWICH, The Law of Domicil in its Relation to Succession (London,
191I) 133 ff.
188 See DAGGETT, "Wife's Interest in Community Property," Legal Essays
(1935) 101 ff. For the construction of the law of Idaho see JACOB, "The Law
of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J. (I93I) I, 25.
189 See STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 65 n. 50, supra n. I; DAGGETT, "Division of Property upon Dissolution of Marriage," 6 Law and Cont.
Probl. ( I939) 225, 233.
190 Ford's Curator v. Ford (I824) 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 574; Estate of J. B.
Aubichon (I874) 49 Cal. I8.
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meant to confer some interest also in cases other than
death. 191 For this reason alone, such systems cannot be characterized as constituting successions on death. Moreover, although the nature of the benefits granted to a surviving wife
is uncertain in such systems, analyses undertaken in recent
years for the purpose of applying conflicts rules has shown
that in almost all such institutions the widow is entitled to
an interest upon marriage rather than upon inheritance. 192
Still, some legislations contain veritable mixtures of elements which resist satisfactory classification. Thus, certain
American institutions of mixed character, such as the widow's right of election between dower rights and testamentary
bequests under the law of Pennsylvania, 193 or between dower
and intestate share in Florida. 194 or between statutory portion and legacy under New York law, 195 have been objects of
discussion in the European conflict of laws.
191

KADEN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. I.
The Austrian community on death is to be classified with matrimonial
law; see RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 261; likewise the Danish community of
goods, see PAPPENHEIM, 6 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1932) 120; and the Hungarian community of gains, see ALMAS!, I Ungarisches Privatrecht (Berlin, I922) I97 ff.,
RAAPE 344·
An interesting example of a matrimonial institution clearly preserved from
ancient ideas is the continued community property of the German Code
(§§ 1483-1518), by which the community which existed between the spouses
is continued after the death of one spouse between the survivor and the children of the marriage. The children step into the place of the predeceasing
parent through the operation of marital law rather than the rules of inheritance. See RG. (Oct. 25, I895) 36 RGZ. 331, 334· Hence, German courts
and other courts having a similar set of conflicts rules apply the said provisions whenever the husband was a German national at the time of the marriage. 2 ZITELMANN 694; RAAPE 343; KADEN, 3 RechtsvergJ. Handworterb.
500; contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 391.
In Switzerland, an exactly analogous characterization of the existing continued community property system of the canton of Bern was made on the
basis of federal law, viz., general notions and the nature of things, by the
BG. (June 30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 287, 294; cf. ScHOCH, "Conflict of Laws in a
Federal State: the Experience of Switzerland," 55 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) 738,
767 ff.
193
Classified as part of the matrimonial law by Cour Paris (Jan. 6, 1862)
S.1862.2.337, discussed by BARTIN, Etudes 70; NEUNER, Der Sinn 6o.
94
1
Cf. NEUNER, Der Sinn 64-66.
195
Classified as part of succession law by French Cass. (civ.) (Aug. 16,
x869) S.1869.I-417.
192
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The name that an institution bears in its legislative home
country cannot be decisive. Nor should the law of the forum
influence the analysis of foreign institutions. 196
(c) Coordination of the two fields in municipal legislation. In some municipal laws, the connection between the
matrimonial property law and the law of inheritance is particularly strong. Recent authors have drawn attention to the
purposeful balancing of provisions in the two fields, disregard of which has caused unfortunate results.
Thus, for instance, under the Massachusetts statute, a
widow has a dower interest in the property of her late husband, while no community property is recognized. A husband, who shortly before his death had transferred his domicil to California, would not leave any community property.
nor would the widow have any dower right. "That result
would defeat the spirit of both of the dower laws of Massachusetts and of the community property laws of the distributary estate; yet it would be reached none the less." 197 If the
husband had gone to Louisiana, the widow would receive
nothing if there are "heirs." 198 Conversely, where the husband removes his domicil from California to Massachusetts,
the widow enjoys simultaneously her community share acquired under California law and the dower interest under
Massachusetts law.
Similarly, in Sweden the wife is granted a share in the comOn the question whether or to what extent provisions of a marriage settlement are offset by the provisions of distributing statutes establishing forced
shares, see BRESLAUER, "Conflict of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of Testation," 27 Iowa L. Rev. (I942) 425, 44I; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I87,
supra n. I.
1 &6 This method has in fact been observed by the Reichsgericht since early
times; see its decision RG. {Dec. I9, I887) 43 Senff. Arch. 288 and {Nov. 25,
I895) 36 RGZ. 33I, 334· The French courts have also followed it, as NEUNER,
Der Sinn 6o has demonstrated in opposition to BARTIN's thesis of classification
according to the lex fori.
197 LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L, Rev. ( I933) 22I at 226, 227, supra n. I.
198 La. C. C. {Dart, I932) art. 924; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) at I76,
supra n. I.
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munity fund and for this reason is excluded from participation in the inheritance, if there are descendants of the husband. Where a German married couple, not having concluded a marriage settlement, acquire Swedish nationality
and the husband dies, the widow has no claim under German
matrimonial law, which provides no benefits for the wife, nor
under Swedish inheritance law.
Where, conversely, a wife is not given any matrimonial
right (except, of course, through an express marriage settlement), she may be granted under modern legislation a generous and indefeasible portion in her deceased husband's
estate. If, for instance, the spouses were of Swedish nationality at the time of their marriage and later became German
nationals, in the courts of both countries the widow would
receive, under the Swedish matrimonial law, half the husband's property as community part and, in addition, under
the German law of succession on death, half or a quarter of
the rest as heir.
Thus, coordinations carefully worked out within a domestic statute are badly disturbed when different systems of law
are called into play by the choice of law rules on matrimonial
property and inheritance. Ingenious remedies have been suggested,199 but so far with little success. The problem is aggravated by the double fact that in most systems of private law
the relation between the two groups of provisions is hidden,
and that the factual situations are far from suggesting that
radical change of the conflicts rules, or enlargement of the
scope of the law at the last domicil, is in equity required. We
may take for illustration the American cases in which the
husband transfers his domicil from a separate property state
to a state where community property obtains. Apart from
the hardship imposed by the former common law doctrine
1 99 See RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 283; NEUNER, Der Sinn 66 and 5 La.
L. Rev. ( 1943) 190, supra n. I; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 326; RAAPE, IPR. 320.
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upon the wife, which it was not the task of conflicts rules to
remedy, it seems not inequitable to apply the law of the first
domicil. Bruggemeyer, 200 a lawyer, earned almost all his
money in Illinois as his separate property and then stayed for
years with his wife in California where she died. There was
no reason why this change of domicil should have shifted
half of his earnings to the heirs of his wife. The spouses La tterner 201 lived three years in Boston, Massachusetts, and
fifteen in Los Angeles, until they separated. No equitable
argument challenged the character as separate property of
the husband's earnings as a physician in Boston. O'Connor 202
married in 1925 in Indiana, but the spouses separated within
"a few days"; there was no ground why the husband's later
moving to California should give the widow half of the husband's premarital land in Indiana.
The easiest practical way to assure that matrimonial and
inheritance statutes in the same legal system preserve their
natural balance, is simply more circumspect drafting of these
statutes. In this country, a federal Union where a part of the
population is inclined to change domicil, statutes of descent
and distribution should not blindly envisage only cases where
both the first and the last domicil happen to be in the state
and, moreover, no marriage settlement was established. In a
community property state, the possibility that the surviving
spouse may fail, for any cause without his fault, to enjoy the
regular matrimonial share, should be considered. Vice versa,
in a separate property state, there should be an appropriate
provision to adjust the ordinary distribution in the case
where the surviving spouse is amply provided with a matrimonial property interest. True, theoretically the matter belongs to conflicts law, but conflicts rules suitable to all situations are scarcely available at this time.
200
In re Bruggemeyer's Estate (1931) II5 Cal. App. 525, 2 P. (2d) 534·
2° 1 Latterner v. Latterner (1932) 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P. (2d) 870.
2° 2 In re O'Connor's Estate (1933) 218 Cal. 518, 23 P. (2d) 1031.

PART FOUR
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

CHAPTER

11

Divorce
I.

THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

T

HE conflicts rules concerning divorce are generally
applicable not only to absolute divorce, i.e., dissolution of the bonds of marriage, but also to limited divorce, such as separation from bed and board and similar
types of judicial separation, not merely temporary. Nevertheless, we shall confine our discussion in general to absolute
divorce. Judicial separation has some particular features; for
example, there are special rules in the United States respecting the recognition of foreign separation decrees. 1
I.

Aspects of the Problem

Divorce is to be studied here in three aspects. We have to
consider first the connection that the parties to a divorce suit
(or corresponding proceedings of a non-contentious nature)
are required to have with the forum and, in the case where
persons, not subjects of the forum, are permitted to be parties, the law applicable to the suit. In the second place, it
will be presupposed that a divorce decreed in one jurisdiction
is being examined for the purpose of recognition in another.
Third, the extraterritorial effects of non-recognized and of
recognized divorce decrees will be analyzed more precisely.
The subject to be discussed in this chapter has been somewhat neglecte,d in comparative surveys and international discussions. Particularly in this country, endeavor to improve
1

Restatement § 114 and comment.
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the actual situation in case a marriage may be regarded as
existent in one state and dissolved in another, with all its tremendous consequences for the parties and their issue and
third persons, has chiefly centered around the recognition of
foreign decrees. In the highly spirited debate under the headline of Haddock v. Haddock/ or now of Williams and Hendrix v. North Carolina/ it has been asked what position
should be taken by a state whose court is requested to recognize another state's divorce decree, rather than what attitude
might be suitable to that state whose court is to take cognizance of the original application for divorce.
Every state of the Union has the unquestionable power to
determine by itself all of its divorce policy; on the other
hand, by the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as
developed by the Supreme Court of the United States, recognition of divorce decrees is compulsory under certain conditions. Hence, not unnaturally, scrutiny of the more or less
anomalous decrees rendered by the courts of about fifty jurisdictions and selection of those decrees that deserve recognition, has appeared the chief problem. The complement of the
problem is, what limits every state ought to observe in opening its courts to divorce, so as to facilitate reciprocal recognition. Perfect mutuality has been reached by this method in
such treaties as those of Montevideo and the Scandinavian
states. The drafters of the successive uniform acts in this
country 4 also distinctly perceived the problem and found, in

u. s.

2 (1906) 201
562.
(1942) 317 U. S. 287, and Williams et al. v. North Carolina (no. 2, 1945)
325
226.
4 Draft of a Uniform Divorce Law, 14 Harv. L. Rev. (1901) 525; Resolutions, adopted by the National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws in Washington, D. C., Feb. 19-22, 1906; Proposed Uniform Statute relating to Annulment of Marriage and Divorce submitted by the Subcommittee on Resolutions
to the Divorce Congress of Philadelphia, Nov. 13, 1906. This statute was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1907 and adopted in Delaware, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, but was
replaced by the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 1930, 9 Uniform Laws
8

u. s.
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the writer's opmton, an adequate solution; yet these acts
have encountered an amazingly unfriendly reception. 5 The
restaters of the law of conflicts, too, saw the goal when they
started to define "jurisdiction for divorce," 6 apparently as
an absolute notion, good for the use of all courts concerned.
But what they have stated can hardly be meant to bind the
courts granting divorce; it has useful reference only to the
problem of deciding in which cases the jurisdiction exercised
by a divorce court should be recognized by a court of another
state, i.e., the problem of jurisdiction in the international
sense.
2.

Diversity of Divorce Legislation

Comparative research in divorce legislation has revealed
staggering diversity. However, for writers to claim for this
reason alone that in cases of conflict of laws every state must
stick to its own policy without regarding the outside world,
is an overstatement. Certain contrasts are fundamental indeed; others are not.
The doctrine of the Catholic Church that marriage cannot be dissolved except by death, although having lost its
force in many countries, actually prevails in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Paraguay, and Spain, and with respect to Catholics in some parts of Eastern Europe and the
Middle East. 7 Absolute divorce was until recently excluded
also in South Carolina. 8 Next to this group, we must place
Annotated (1932) 133. Uniform Divorce Recognition Act (1948}, approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
adopted in California, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 3akota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin.
6
See especially VREELAND so. His own propositions were called politically
impossible by STUMBERG, Book Review, 2 La. L. Rev. (1939) 207.
6
Restatement §§ uo-113; cf. ibid. at §§ 43, 77·
7 See infra p. 462.
8
S. C. Constitution, Art. 17 § 3, amended 1949, Stats. 1949 no. 137, Code of
Laws of S. Car. ( 1952) §§ 2D-101-2o-148.
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the laws of New York and formerly of the District of Columbia, admitting divorce only on the ground of adultery. 9
Looking to the opposite end of the line, we notice several
institutions of a very diverse nature. There are remainders
of the old patriarchial repudiation by which, for instance, an
Egyptian Moslem may divorce his wife without any alleged
cause. There was up to 1944 the ultramodern view of the
Russian Soviet Republics allowing each spouse to terminate the marriage by unilateral declaration. Neither state
nor church influenced this act. 9 a Again, we may add a few
American and Mexican jurisdictions where the dissolution of
marriages is offered, as the current expression goes, 10 on a
commercial basis; also, in addition to these open divorce
markets, some states are disgraced by abusive practices. The
Old Testament right of a sovereign head of a household, the
Soviet emphasis on freedom of marriage, and the readiness
of American courts to provide divorce, are certainly heterogeneous phenomena, but in common they result in permitting
indiscriminately what the legislations of the first group refuse indiscriminately.
We may well call both groups of legislations radical and
set them apart for the major purposes of conflicts law. In the
rest of the world, divorce regulations form a block of kindred systems. To be sure, they are very far from being homogeneous. The old conception that divorce is a remedy given
9 D. C. Code (1929) tit. 14 § 64, was repealed by the Act of August 7, 1935,
49 Stat. 539, c. 453, §I.
Laws of New York (Cahill, 1937), C.P.A.§ II47·
9 R On July 8, 1944, an Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR decreed a judicial divorce proceeding, without setting forth grounds
for dissolution of marriage (arts. 23-27; German translation in BERGMANN,
s. verbo U dSSR p. 5). The several Soviet Republics changed their Family
Codes accordingly, e.g., RSFSR Code on Marriage, Family and Guardianship,
arts. 18-22, GsovsKI, 2 Soviet Civil Law (1949) 246.
10 Hatton, J., of Tonopah, sitting during the vacation of a judge in Carson
City, Nevada, "asserted that the State Legislature, with commercial intent and
under pressure, had legislated the present divorce law," in the cause of Mrs.
de Forest Payne, N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1942, p. 12.
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to an innocent against a guilty party vanishes more or less
slowly; modern social aims are gaining acknowledgment here
and there; private interest and public welfare are differently
evaluated; many historical remainders and arbitrary predilections of local lawmakers increase the number of varieties.
Vernier lists eight major and thirty-one minor causes for divorce in this country alone, irregularly distributed over fifty
jurisdictions.11 Defenses, principles of procedure, authorities
empowered with granting divorce, are diverse. Nevertheless,
the basis is a common one: marriage can be dissolved, if dissolution appears to be the minor evil, and whether it is must
be controlled by an agency of the state in appropriate proceedings. A really basic difference occurs respecting the question whether a mutual agreement of the parties should be accepted as a self-sufficient ground for divorce decrees, but,
strangely enough, this point has not been much emphasized
as a consideration of public policy in conflicts law. On the
whole, soberly examined, a modern statute on divorce is usually on the middle road, a product of compromise with an increasing admittance of social-hygienic ideas. There is little
need for conjuring up the vision of bridgeless gulfs between
conceptual antitheses.
There is something more to tone down the contrasts. A
statute such as that of Nevada or of a Mexican state embodies the normal terms and provisions, at the most indulging in some clauses that promise secrecy or allow unnamed
grounds for divorce at the discretion of the judge, whil~ the
experiences of other countries, we may discover, again and
again reveal an average practice laxer than the official language indicates. Lawyers know this well, each with respect to
his own state; probably it is a universal tendency. A few illustrations: When before the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937,
11 Z VERNIER

§ 62.
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adultery was the only divorce ground in England, scandalous
maneuvers were in semi-official use to simulate evidence of
adultery. The same revolting practice is said to be frequent
in New York. Courts where desertion is not recognized as a
cause, find a cause in cruelty and vice versa; in the numerous
countries following the Code N apoUon, ({injures graves" is
an elastic notion. German courts were never seriously embarrassed by the provision that the defendant spouse must have
caused the breaking up of the marriage by his reprehensible
conduct. A reform of the law was demanded and finally accomplished, with the effect of legalizing the liberal practice
and obviating the conventional lies of the parties, rather than
of introducing a new rule.
Why are these practices admitted? In large centers of
population, courts are unable to examine the individual circumstances as they might wish to do. As has well been observed in this country/ 2 collusion between the parties or
abandonment of the cause by the weaker party characterize
the overwhelming majority of cases. A divorce judge in any
such country has the feeling of gliding down an inclined
plane; no stop anywhere is firmly assured, once divorce has
been permitted. Of course, there will always be judges more
conscientious, or conservative, or formalistic than the average. But it is the general trend that counts. And even the general prohibition of divorce does not work without exceptions.
Courts without absolute divorce at their disposal are inclined
to grant annulment of marriage where in other systems divorce would be expected.
In addition, there are geographical limitations on legislative control. Italian couples went to Fiume for divorce, Ar12 HARPER, "The Myth of the Void Divorce," 2 Law and Cont. Probl.
(1935) 335; JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936)
749, 959; SAYRE, "Divorce by Judicial Process," 18 Iowa L. Rev. (1933) 493,
508; Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. ( 1936) 1121; cf. JACOBS, "The Enforcement of
Foreign Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl. (1939) 250, 251.
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gentines used to go to Montevideo, citizens of South Carolina to Georgia and North Carolina, and the answer to New
York is given in Reno. That only wealthy people are able to
escape their home laws aggravates the moral aspects of the
situation.
Paradoxes reach a climax in the field of recognition. Foreign decrees are irregularly recognized in this country and encounter prohibitive defenses in Continental Europe, especially in the country to which a party belongs as a national.
However, if "invalid" divorces are not a simple "myth"
within the United States/ 3 the contention that they are to a
large extent in fact recognized is true with respect to all
countries.
3· Divergence in Method
In approaching the problem of the interstate and international treatment of divorce, we must be aware of a fundamental difference between the American method and that followed in the principal civil law countries.
In this country, it is a matter of course that every state
grants jurisdiction for divorce without asking what extraterritorial effect the forthcoming decree will enjoy in other
states. Moreover, so soon as jurisdiction is assumed by a
court, there is no doubt that the case will be decided in exclusive accordance with the municipal statute of the forum (lex
fori), irrespective of any qualifications of the parties; no
choice of law therefore is involved.
The most representative legislations of the civil law, bowever, take into consideration the position of the law of the
state whose nationals the parties are, with regard to one or
both of the following points:
( i) Jurisdiction in the case of foreign nationals is not as13 GOODRICH

§ 128 n. 46.
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sumed unless the national law of the parties is willing to
recognize this jurisdiction.
( ii) Divorce is not granted, unless it is agreeable to the
internal law of the national state of the parties.
In the heyday of the principle underlying these ideas (the
so-called principle of nationality), many writers went further, applying the pure national law of the parties. 14 But with
the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code (I 896) and
the Hague Convention on Divorce and Separation (I 902) as
models, it is now generally required that both the foreign and
the domestic laws must concur in permitting divorce in the
particular case. Hence, the law of the forum, although not
exclusively governing, as in the common law countries and
others, has more to say than in almost any other field of conflicts law. Its importance is further increased where one party
is a subject of the forum and the other a foreign national.
4· Predominance of Lex Fori
Why in divorce involving foreign aspects, the law that a
court must apply in purely domestic matters should have such
an abnormal influence is usually explained by a general reference to the nature of the institution. It is said that divorce
is permitted or refused in every state according to its tradition, religion, ethics, logic (or what is believed to be logic) ,
and in conformity with hygienic and other considerations of
population policy. This general reasoning is not adequate to
the subject. Consideration of the three groups of divorce legislations set out under ( ii) above, taken as a basis to measure
affinity of divorce policies, suggests the following.
The standards of each of the three groups are basic. We
may be astonished indeed by the grouping of states in which
the Hague Convention of I902 undertook to unify the rules
14 GIERKE, I

5

Deutsches Privatrecht,
and others.

LAURENT 244, 276, 285,

236; REGELSBERGER, I

Pandekten

178;
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for granting divorce and for recognizing foreign divorce.
There were, on the one hand, the states which had normal
modern legislations and, on the other hand, Austria, Italy,
Portugal, and the Czarist Russian Empire, where at that
time divorce was either left to the ecclesiastical authorities
of the various denominations, or forbidden at least to Catholics. Italy has remained a member and retained its ban on divorce; the Convention has prevented Italian nationals from
being divorced in any participating state. This has been
praised as a great progress in international cooperation/ 5
but it has resulted in the final withdrawal from the Convention of France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden
successively. It is quite as prejudicial to combine legislations
of contradictory character for the purpose of reciprocal respect, as it is to exaggerate minor varieties of policy. In federations that guarantee mutual recognition of state acts between the single states, it should be presupposed that the
aims of the several legislations, varied as they may be, are
not fundamentally hostile to each other. In a Union including
legislations of New York and Nevada, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause cannot work smoothly. It is the writer's conviction that it is not so much the multitude of regulations in
the United States as the extremes to which a few of them go
that creates difficulties in the mutual recognition of divorce
decrees.
On the side of the majority group, no such prominent differences obstruct mutual understanding. All these systems
strive, through an institution controlled by the state, to assure sound domestic relations within the limits to which the
assistance that law and legal machinery provide is subject.
To apply the law of the forum among states of this group to
foreigners as well as to citizens presumes a claim to a strin15

"Haager Konventionen zum Internationalen Privatrecht," in
Wiirterbuch des Viilkerrechts und der Diplomatie 466.

LEWALD,

STRUPP, 1
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gent public policy that cannot be objectively justified by the
accustomed standards of comparative law. Whether considerations pertaining to the field of conflicts rules better
support that claim will be asked later.
5· "Migratory" Divorce
Our subject includes divorces described in the United
States as "migratory" and probably best defined as divorces
obtained in a state by persons who have just completed the
minimum time of residence required by the local statute for
granting jurisdiction over divorce. Technically, it is required
that a bona fide domicil be established and, in the prevailing
opinion, that the person must have had actual residence during this time. Hence, it is presumed by the law "of the books"
that the newcomer has intended to transfer the center of his
entire life to the state for an indefinite time. In contrast, it is
not sufficient to take residence within the jurisdiction merely
for the purpose of obtaining divorce, although the circumstance that the domicil is changed with the motive of securing a divorce is not prejudicial. The minimum requirement of
"residence" is generally understood to evince the required
mental purpose, which, to put it simply, is that of establishing a real and permanent domicil.
The actual picture looks so different from this legal structure that migratory divorces are currently identified with
those obtained in evasion of the domiciliary statute, i.e., by
a falsely pretended domicil. The rate of migratory divorces
in the first sense, i.e., upon completion of minimum residence
requirements, has been appraised for the year 1929 as constituting only 3 per cent of the total number of divorces in
this country, a much smaller percentage rate than had been
feared. 16 The absolute numbers, however, are high. 17 The
16 CAHEN, Statistical Analysis of American Divorce (1932) 78. The apparently optimistic views of this writer have influenced most sociological observers.
17 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Vital Statistics, Special Reports, U. S. Dept.
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total of divorces was over 20o,ooo in I929 and, after the
drop caused by the depression, reached 250,000 in I937
and about 264,000 in I940. In the two counties in Nevada,
Clark and Washoe, where Las Vegas and Reno are situated,
divorces totaled 1756 in I929, 4769 in I93I, and 3629 in
I935/ 8 The rate of divorce for IOo,ooo population has been
estimated with respect to the year I 940 as 200 in the United
States, 90 in the Middle Atlantic states, and 4 7 IO inN evada.
More serviceable than many arguments used to moderate
the apprehensions that must be aroused by the rapid increase
in these rates is comparison. Although in Europe, excluding
Soviet Russia, no country reaches even half of the American
percentage, the highest percentage of divorces occurs in
Switzerland, 10 despite the repugnance to divorce in the
Catholic inner cantons and the conservative character of the
population in the entire country. In I 93 I the rate of divorce
for wo,ooo population was 70 in Switzerland as against I47
in the United States. We may conjecture that the spirit of advanced democracy and industrial enterprise has some influence on the frequency of divorce. Yet, obviously, every divorce marks a regrettable failure even for a childless couple,
and lawyers cannot fail to be moved by the inadequacy of
of Commerce, Vol. 15, No. 18, p. 193 (March 20, 1942). Estimated number
of divorces by states, United States 1937-1940.
18
According to a newspaper correspondence in 1943, there were 5910 divorces in Washoe County and 2720 cases in Clark County, an "all time high"
rendering $2oo,ooo in fees in these counties. The total of seventeen ccnnty
courts in Nevada is given with u,399 divorces again 8,616 in 1942, the fees
amounting to more than $soo,ooo.
19 This fact has been observed by Swiss authors. GMUR, 2 Familienrecht
r so, with respect to the decade of 1900 to 1909. It is confirmed by the following figures regarding the year 1927: divorce rate per 1oo,ooo population:
England and Wales, 7.3; Belgium, 31; France, 45; Germany, 57.6; Denmark, 55; Switzerland, 62; Japan, 79; United States 16o; Leningrad, 983;
Moscow, 959· REUTER and RUNNER, The Family (1931) 210; HANKINS, "Divorce," 5 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences ( 1935) 177. Higher figures in
similar proportion have been indicated for 1935, omitting Switzerland, see
JACOBS, Cases on Domestic Relations ( ed. 2, 1939) 352. The relation to "married persons" or "existing marriages" would be more instructive, but this is
not available.
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their machinery. The divorce mills complete the evils of familial maladjustments; not only do they work against the intentions of sister state legislatures, in itself a sign of unsound
relations, but they also enable legislatures, courts and attorneys to destroy homes for the sake of local profits.
6. Ex Parte Proceedings
The many cases in which, under modern statutes, a spouse
can sue for divorce while the other party is resident in another state, need particular care by legislatures and courts.
Not only do almost all legislations of the world allow in
such cases subsidiary use of service by publication and the
grant of divorce despite the absence of the defendant, but
often the procedural guarantees are handled unsatisfactorily.20 Facts alleged by the plaintiff are not sufficiently verified. Even fraudulent maneuvers-for instance false indication of the defendant's address designed to prevent due notice of the trial-are not efficiently counteracted, whatever
the law of procedure may be. 21 No wonder that the international attitude is simple mistrust. Easily gained divorces may
be attacked in the courts of other states, if enforcement is
sought or, alternatively, annulment is asked. And this, despite the fact that everywhere, by customary law or statute
or express clause of international treaty, proper service and
a decent opportunity for defense are made primary conditions to the recognition of foreign divorces. Any observer
will note that all those states whose courts indulge in routine
20 Very conveniently, SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for
Judicial Separation and Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 321,
339 suggests "more effective substituted service than is required now" as part
of the process.
21
Among the endeavors to help the victims of divorce, the activities of the
International Migration Service are particularly deserving. See WAINHOUSE,
"Protecting the Absent Spouse in International Divorce," 2 Law and Cont.
Probl. (1935) 360.
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service by publication, are among the severe censurers of the
same act by foreign courts.
We have, however, to limit our survey to the two mam
questions of jurisdiction and choice of law.

II.

JURISDICTION

A divorce suit is considered to belong to a court either by
virtue of some domiciliary connection or the nationality of
both, or possibly one, of the parties.
Other grounds for assuming divorce jurisdiction have
sometimes been deemed to include the place where the marriage has been celebrated or the place where an offense
against the marriage has been committed. The first conception is derived from regarding marriage as a contract and
dissolution of marriage as a rescission thereof; the second
reflects the idea that divorce is of a penal nature and therefore governed by the law of the place of the wrong. These
conceptions no longer retain roots in the present legislations; 21 a their after-effects may be discerned in certain rules
of choice of law and, in this country, in some additional provisions relative to jurisdiction over divorce, rather than in
the main principles.
The existence of a third ground for jurisdiction is quite uncertain. Generally, it is emphatically denied that in matrimonial causes the parties may agree on a court. 22 Nevertheless,
sometimes openly, courts are induced to take jurisdiction
21
a The recently enacted Ecuadorian law of October u(25, 1956, art. 3
provides that a marriage concluded in Ecuador by an Ecuadorian national
can only be annulled or divorced by an Ecuadorian court, see Karger, 22
Z.ausl.Pr. (1957) 525, 527; cf. also infra n. 151, 152.
22
There are exceptions such as the permission by Mexican state laws to
grant jurisdiction in divorce when both parties submit to the court. The
Federal Supreme Court holds recognition due in the Federal District and
Territories in the case of express submission as contrasted with tacit agreement, on the basis of art. 602 of the Cod. Fed. de Proc. Civ. See decisions
(April 2, 1935) 44 Seman. Jud. 72 as to the state of Chihuahua, and (Dec.
7, 1934) 42 Seman. Jud. 3596 as to the state of Morelos.
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without close scrutiny, when the defendant consents to the
suit. 28 In any event, jurisdiction is quite frequently assumed
everywhere on undisputed false allegations of domicil, without any inquiry by the court, which is equivalent to making
the parties domini litis as to jurisdiction, and-more legitimately-a separate domicil of the wife is recognized when
the husband consents.
I.

Nationality as Basis

The faculty offered by most civil law countries to their nationals to bring suit for divorce even when the plaintiff is
domiciled in another country may be briefly mentioned. 24
A few countries go so far as to reserve all matrimonial
suits involving a national to their own courts exclusively,
even if the parties are domiciled abroad and in the most distant regions. Once the Czarist Russian and the Austrian Empires were in this group. Today the list includes-after
many doubts are discounted 25 and leaving Austria aside 26
2 8 Submission to divorce jurisdiction is treated as actually effective in
Greece by 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 379·
It has been considered but rejected in Argentina, see LAZCANO, 57 ].A.
( I937) 463 ff. n. 128.
The Brazilian Supreme Court, however, seems to have construed arts. 3 I 8323 of the C6digo Bustamante, allowing submission to a court, so as to include
jurisdiction in divorce; Fed. Sup. Ct. (July I7, I940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83.
In the English case of Hussein v. Hussein [I938] 54 T.L.R. 632, marriage
was celebrated in England but the husband was not even a resident. The
court took jurisdiction on the undefended suit by the wife, a decision presented as model to Scotch courts in so Jurid. Rev. I95·
24 For details see French Cass. (req.) (April 29, I931) S.I93I.I.247·
German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2, 6o6b.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7 g.
25 In Greece exclusive jurisdiction is no longer claimed by the courts except
for Greeks domiciled in Greece. See STREIT, 20 Recueil I927 V ISI; FRAGISTAS,
7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 297; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 382; cf. Trib. Athens I933,
no. I676, Clunet I934, I04I; Trib. Athens I (st inst.) I935 no. 8250, 47 Themis
582, Clunet I937, 597, TENEKIDES, Clunet I937, 598.
Portugal: I BERGMANN (Portugal p. 5).
Czechoslovakia: A Czech writer claimed that the Code of Civil Procedure
( I950) § 6I2 par. I conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Czech courts, STAJGR,
"Rapports juridiques avec l'etranger dans Ia loi sur Ia procedure en matiere
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-Hungary, 27 Poland,28 the Soviet Union, 29 and Turkey. 30
On the other hand, such exclusive jurisdiction is not claimed
by the vast majority of states, and, although at one time nationality of the husband was considered the only generally
sufficient condition for divorce jurisdiction, 81 in some countries national: ty alone, without domicil or at least residence,
of one party in the state is considered insufficient for suing or
civile," 9 Bulletin de Droit Tchecoslovaque (1951) 64, 68. Contra: I BERGMANN (Tschechoslowakei p. 8); RAAPE, lPR. 290 n. 86.
26
Austria: § 8I no. 3 of the "Jurisdiction Law" (Exekutionsordnung) was
understood as reserving divorce jurisdiction over nationals to the Austrian
courts, see \VALKER 724. This interpretation has been superseded by the
Decree of Oct. 15, 1941 (§ 24), which is still in force. Today, Austria no
longer claims an exclusive jurisdiction.
27 Even, if only one party is Hungarian: Code of Civil Procedure, Executive Decree no. 22/1952, § 15(a); I BERGMANN (Ungarn p. 10). This rigid
rule has been mitigated by bilateral treaties on judicial assistance with the
neighboring countries, e.g., Treaties with Yugoslavia of Nov. u, 1930, art.
28, with Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1951, art. 21, with Bulgaria of Aug. 8,
1953, art. 23.
28
A contrary liberal doctrine was clearly adopted by the Polish Law of
1926 on international private law, art. 17 par. 3, on which a great many
German decisions were based, see RAAPE 397· It was the declared intention of
the judicial commission of the Polish Sejm, as the Polish Ministry of Justice
recognized, to facilitate the divorce of Polish emigrants before foreign courts.
See documentation of the decision of App. Danzig (Oct. 21, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 304. Yet, the tendencies were reversed, and by a rather surprising interpretation of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure of 1932, § 528,
recognition of any foreign divorce decree was refused except for the reciprocity provided by treaty. See Zou., 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 716; Polish Supreme
Court (Feb. 5, 1931) Z.f.Ostrecht 1932, 383; Polish Supreme Court (April
23, 1936) Clunet 1937, 617; and Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Civil
Chambers (May 29, 1937) published in Dt. Justiz 1938, 251; cf. RABEL, 8
Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 718; 9 ibid. (1935) 290. MASSFELLER, "Einzelfragen aus
dem deutschen internationalen Ehescheidungsrecht," JW. 1935, 2465. Correspondingly, jurisdiction was denied by RG. (Feb. 24, 1936) 150 RGZ. 293;
RG. (July 3, 1939) 160 RGZ. 396, 399; OLG. Stettin (Sept. 23, 1938) JW.
1939, 249; OLG. Hamm (July 18, 1949) IPRspr. 1945-49 no. 66.
29 Since 1944, the Soviet Union has claimed exclusive jurisdiction in matrimonial suits in which both parties are Soviet nationals, not however, in suits
concerning mixed marriages, LUNZ 306; HoYER, Anerkennung von Entscheidungen in Ehesachen im Ausland auf Grund inneren Staatenrechts
(1951) 34i 4 Schwz. Jahrb. (1947) 263.
30 Turkey: Art. 13 no. 6 of the Law of April 22, 1924, amending § 18 of
the Code of Civ. Proc., see I BERGMANN (ed. 2) 768.
s1 See Gebhardsche Materia!ien 184.
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being sued. Even so, many conditions attach to recognition
of foreign divorce decrees by the national states, including
such powers of re-examination as approximate exclusive jurisdiction. 33
The conflicts between the claims of the national and the
domiciliary jurisdictions have attracted a great deal of attention. Generally, the only remedy envisaged has been in concessions by the states of domicil to those states to which the
parties involved belong. Not only has the Hague Convention
sanctioned this trend, but more moderately, even an English
authority has suggested that divorces rendered at the competent court of the national state should be recognized in England the same as decrees of the matrimonial domicil. 34
2.

Domicil as Basis 35

By common law, coverture effects a merger of the personalities of husband and wife. The wife necessarily shares the
domicil of the husband. This "matrimonial domicil" is, if
any, the most suitable place for the dissolution of the marriage or, in the terminology of the common law, to locate the
{(res" that constitutes the object of the action in rem, as the
action for divorce is commonly regarded. It happens that under common law the private relations of individuals are generally governed by the law of their domicil, and this, of
course, is interrelated with the domiciliary principle of jurisdiction. But the idea that the domicil of the parties, even of
az E.G., the German Law on Divorce of January 24, I935, §I; Swiss NAG.
art. 7g par. I also involves restrictions; see BG. (Oct. IO, I930) 56 BGE. II
335, at 341.
83 See infra pp. 510, 5I6-5I8.
34 GuTTERIDGE, "Les conflits de competence jurisdictionnelle en matiere de
divorce et de separation de corps," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I938) I, 7.
I6, 28.
35 Recent Anglo-American developments are noted by GRISWOLD, "Divorce
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study,"
65 Harv. L. Rev. (I95I/52) 193-233.
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one party, in a state suffices to give that state jurisdiction for
divorce, because divorce is a matter of "status"-this "generally accepted doctrine," in the words of Beale 36- may be
questioned after a glance at the rules of the civil law countries. In most of these, status and capacity of an individual
are governed not by the law of his domicil but by that of the
country whose national he is (principle of nationality). N evertheless, also in these countries, jurisdiction for granting divorce is ordinarily assumed at the matrimonial domicil or at
the domicil of one party. Certainly, divorce alters the family
status of a person, and, therefore, the states following the
nationality principle have partly opened their courts to nondomiciled nationals also. But the reasons why jurisdiction is
given at the "domicil" and the more precise determination of
domicil for this purpose are not to be found in any doctrine.
They are policy considerations that we shall subsequently
try to analyze.
(a) Cammon domicil. Where, under the conception of
the court applied to for a divorce, both spouses are domiciled, in the full sense of this word, within the forum, jurisdiction is granted in all states acknowledging the dissolution
of marriage inter vivos. There are two groups.
The matrimonial domicil is sufficient everywhere for assuming jurisdiction. However, in Great Britain since the subject was clarified in 189 5 31 until recently, in the British dominions except Australia and South Africa, 38 and under the
BEALE § I 10.1.
Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A. C. 517.
38 South Africa: Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction Act, 1939, as amended
I953, s. I ( 1) (b,c), but limited to cases in which residence and domicil
are in different jurisdictions of South Africa.
General exceptions in favor of wives living separately are made in New
Zealand: Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, 1930, s. 3; and
in Australia: Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act, 1945-1955, ss. IO {I),
12 A, in consequence of the English cases in misericordia, see below n. 128.
For particulars, see GRISWOLD (supra n. 35) 202 ff.
36 I
31
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present Treaty of Montevideo, 39 the matrimonial domicil
has remained the sole test of jurisdiction for the purpose of
divorce. The wife has her domicil with that of the husband
by operation of law. It is the most certainly recognized case
of divorce jurisdiction also in this country. 40
This simple system of conferring jurisdiction also provides
an appropriate test to determine the applicable law, since the
statutes of the state where the marriage is located work in
the double function of lex fori and lex domicilii, and moreover, among the states adopting this system, mutual recognition of divorce decrees is easy.
In countries acknowledging a separate domicil of the wife
or ignoring the institution of legal domicil, the principle has
to be modified. Jurisdiction is exercised when both spouses
have their domicil within the state, either together or separately.41 Naturally, this rule obtains in the United States. 42
The reasons supporting these rules and underlying the
"res" theory are obvious. A community in which the spouses
have centered their lives may feel competent to adjudicate
the continuation of their marriage. Insofar as the conduct of
private persons may deserve consideration in determining
jurisdiction, an element of submission to the state activity
may be implied. On the other hand, it appears a superfluous
hardship to send the parties away to their distant homelands; this would sometimes mean their ruin.
(b) Presumption of common domicil. If in the eyes of the
forum the parties have their domicils in different states, an
Treaty of Montevideo, text of I889, art. 62; text of I940, art. 59·
Haddock v. Haddock (I9o6} 20I U.S. 562; Atherton v. Atherton (I900)
I8I U. S. I 55; Restatement §§no, 114.
41 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 § I: ". . . before the
competent authority of the place where the parties have their domicil."
Under the Scandinavian Convention, art. 7 par. I, this is the main ground
for jurisdiction.
42 Restatement § uo.
39
40
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attempt has been made to maintain the original system in
one of two ways.
One way is this: The last matrimonial domicil of the parties is held competent for the purpose of divorce, even
though it has been deserted by the husband. Thus, the ancient
construction is superseded, whereby the husband would transfer the matrimonial domicil to his new place. This progress
was made in the United States as the earliest step to improve
the situation of married women as against offending husbands.43 The same step has been made in British countries 44
and, as late as 1937, in England. 45 The draftsmen of therecent revision ( 1940) of the Montevideo Treaty added a
similar clause to their text, 46 after the Argentine practices
had taken a kindred view. 47 Analogous clauses in the Hague
Convention and the Swedish law permit divorce at the former common domicil in case the defendant has deserted his
spouse or has left the country after a cause for divorce
arose, 48 and, more generally, the Scandinavian Convention
gives jurisdiction to the state where both spouses "had their
last common domicil and one of them is still domiciled." 40
Traces of this stage of the development are frequent in this
country. 50
See I BEALE § 28.2.
Canada: Divorce Jurisdiction Act (I930) 2o-2I Geo. V, c. I5 § 2. Australia and New Zealand: see the detailed statements by READ, Recognition and
Enforcement 224.
South Africa: Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction Act, I939 as amended
I953, s. I (I) (a).
45 Matrimonial Causes Act, I937, Edw. VIII & I Geo. VI, c. 57, § 13, now
Matrimonial Causes Act, I950, I4 Geo. VI, c. 25, § I8.
46 Treaty of Montevideo, text of I940, art. 59 par. 2.
47 Cam. civ. 2 Buenos Aires (March 24, I933) 4I J. A. 420; the law of the
matrimonial domicil determines also the question whether the husband has
deserted his wife, Cam. civ. 2 (Oct. 7, I935) 52 J. A. I44·
4 8 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 par. I sentence 3;
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of I904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § I par. 1
sentence 2.
49 Scandinavian Convention art. 7 par. I.
50 In particular, venue exists in the county where the parties lived as hus43
44
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The other way has been demonstrated by the German procedural code. Where both parties are of foreign nationality,
the actual domicil of the husband within the state was sufficient and necessary for suits of either party, without regard
to the domicil of the wife, 51 whether or not it be recognized
elsewhere or for other purposes.
(c) Admission of separate domicil for married women.
During the second third of the nineteenth century, the courts
in the United States successively began to acknowledge the
capacity of a married woman to acquire a separate domicil in
a steadily increasing number of situations. Ultimately, even
the most conservative courts acceded to this for the purpose
of bringing a suit or being sued, for divorce. 52 Consequently,
American courts and statutes no longer distinguish, for this
purpose, between husband and wife but treat them equally
as parties. Despite the diversity of the clauses-there are
seventeen different kinds 53-in all jurisdictions, suit for divorce can be brought by the plaintiff at his own domicil. 54
Optionally, it can be instituted in most states also at the
domicil of the defendant by a non-resident plaintiff.
The theoretical basis of all this is traditionally attributed
to the conception that every state has an eminent interest in
band and wife, if the defendant still lives there, cf. Mass. Gen. Laws ( I932)
c. 208 § 6, or if the plaintiff lives there, cf. Miss. Code Ann. (I942) § 2738,
or without such conditions, cf. Ala. Code Ann. ( I940) tit. 34 § 28; Va. Code
Ann. (Michie & Sublett, I950) § 20.98; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett,
1955) §4709·
5l Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I; cf. the Netherlands: B\V.
art. 262 par. I. However, under the principle of equality of the sexes, the
situation has been remedied in both countries; jurisdiction is now based on
the residence of either party within the country. Western Germany: Code of
Civ. Proc. {as amended by Law of June I8, I957) § 6o6 par. 2; the Netherlands: BW. art. 262 par. I {as amended by Law of June 14, I956).
52 I BEALE § 28.2.
53 2 VERNIER § 8I.
54 Haddock v. Haddock ( I9o6) zoi U. S. 562; Williams v. North Carolina
(no. I, I942) 3I7 U. S. 287, 298; Stevens v. Allen (I9I6) I39 La. 658, 71 So.
936; Perkins v. Perkins { I9I6) 225 Mass. 82, I I3 N.E. 84I; Re Ellis ( I893)
55 Minn. 40I, 56 N. W. 1056; Jones v. Jones ( I889) 67 Miss. I95, 6 So. 7I2;
Blakeslee v. Blakeslee (19I7) 4I Nev. 235, 168 Pac. 950; Hubbell v. Hubbell
( I854) 3 Wis. 662.
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the status of its domiciliaries and is thereby entitled to alter
the married status of a person domiciled in the state, even
though the other party may be domiciled in another. 55 Thus,
the marriage status of one spouse is treated in the same manner as the marriage of a married couple was under the older
doctrine. In the words of a New Jersey decision of 1934, the
husband's or the wife's domicil "carries with it the complete
(marital) res or a part of it," so as to give the state court
jurisdiction. 56 How can this be? Vreeland may well ask:
"Since the status is that of two persons, and not one, does the
wife upon acquiring a new domicil take half of the res with
her and leave half with the husband, or does it all stay where
it last was, or do they both have a sort of tenancy by entirety
in the res . . . ?" 57
On the practical side, we are made aware by Goodrich that,
merely as a matter of logic, the out-of-state spouse would not
be affected, but consistency compels the courts to assume further that the divorce destroys also the married status of the
non-domiciled party. 5 8 In counterpoise to this convincing reasoning, we may remark that the Michigan statute allows its
courts to divorce, in their discretion, any party who is a resident of the state and whose husband or wife has obtained a
divorce in another state, whether the foreign divorce is valid
or not. 59 The explanation given by the Michigan Supreme
Court is that the courts of both domicils possess jurisdiction
to grant divorces only "so far as the party resident within its
own limits is concerned; if <>ne proceeds first, there is no legal
impediment to the other's taking like steps afterwards." 60
55

See I BEALE at § 10.8, 110.1.
Webb v. Webb (1934) 13 N. ]. Misc. 439, 178 At!. 282.
5 7 VREELAND 28.
5 8 GOODRICH 412.
~ 9 Mich. Camp. Laws (1948) § 552.6(6) [Mich. Stat. Ann.§ 25.86]. Related
but perhaps not identical statutes are in force in Florida, cf. Fla. Statutes
( 1941) § 65.04 and Ohio, cf. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. ( 1953) § 3105.01 (I).
60 Wright v. Wright (1871) 24 Mich. 179; cf. Van Inwagen v. Van Inwagen (1891) 86 Mich. 333, 49 N. W. 154·
56
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The fact is that the American divorce law has outgrown
the doctrine of jurisdiction in rem. From the time that the
wife acquired the power to assume a domicil of her own,
duality of domicil as a basis for divorce jurisdiction has been
possible, and all conceptions born of the ancient idea of marital unity have lost their sense. Domicil has remained an
essential prerequisite of jurisdiction only insofar that, according to the best settled rule of this unstable field, no jurisdiction is granted when neither of the spouses is domiciled
within the state. The entire question depends upon the extent
to which a state chooses to shoulder the responsibility of entertaining divorce suits, or to leave them to other states. Individual legislatures have tried to solve the problem in such
a variety of ways as to indicate that there is no logical necessity to follow any of them.
Indeed, no exact analogy to the American doctrine exists
elsewhere, and very few foreign regulations approach it.
Even these cannot be compared with it without understanding that they deal with parties of foreign nationality, while
in this country the law has been developed with American
citizens in view and is applied to aliens with very few qualifications. The nearest parallel is afforded by the Swiss law.
In Switzerland, jurisdiction is assumed at the instance of a
plaintiff of foreign nationality if he is domiciled within the
country, irrespective of whether husband or wife is suing and
whether the defendant is a Swiss national or domiciliary. 6 '
In France and other countries, the defendant spouse must be
a domiciliary, but the husband's domicil determines that of
the wife, except where she has been judicially separated. 62
61

See BECK 404 no. 37, comment to NAG. art. 7h par. I.
Uruguay since 1946: ALFONSIN, Regimen Internacional del Divorcio ( 1953)
133 ff.
62 France: GLASSON et TISSIER, 5 Traite de Procedure Civile (ed. 3, 1936)
no. 1609.
Belgium: Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 144 no. 471.
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The Hague Convention allows an option for the domicil of
the defendant where the parties have not the same domicil. 63
The general rule of reference to the defendant's domiciliary
law is also resorted to by the Federal Supreme Court of
Mexico in interstate divorces, in case the laws of the Mexican states determine jurisdiction for divorce differently
(domicil of the husband, marital domicil, domicil of the deserted wife). 64
Hence, we find.the American law rather isolated. But the
French practice sheds some light on one motive that is of
universal validity. The French courts have proclaimed the
doctrine that they must refuse to entertain jurisdiction over
parties who are both of foreign nationality, at least if they
have not their common domicil in France. 65 However, in
practice jurisdiction is exercised when the defendant does not
prove that he has maintained a foreign domicil at which he
can be actually sued 66 or, in another version, when there is no
foreign jurisdiction in which the suit can be prosecuted without hardship. 67 The desire to avoid what would look like a
denial of justice, is a legitimate one among the many impulses for entertaining causes presented.
The reverse side of this obliging attitude was well known
in this country from the wave of divorces of Americans m
Paris until the decline of the 1920's. 68
63 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 par. I sentence 2. The
provision has prevailingly been understood so as to characterize the domicil
of a party generally under his national law. See German RG. (April 5, I92I)
102 RGZ. 82, 84; LEWALD in I Strupp's Wiirterbuch des Viilkerrechts und der
Diplomatic 469.
64
Mexico: S. Ct. (Oct. I4, I940) Seman. Jud. I94I.1.403.
65 French Cass. (req.) (June 25, I9I8) S.I918-I9.1.206; Cas. (civ.) (Nov.
Io, I920) S.I923.I.I29; Cass (civ.) (April 30, I927) S.I927.I.2o8.
66 GLASSON ET TISS!ER, supra n. 62.
67 See French Cass. (civ.) (July 29, I9I2) S.I9I3.I-425; Cass. (civ.) (Nov.
10, I920) and Trib. civ. Nice (Dec. 6, I920) Clunet I923, 72 ff.; Cass. (Dec.
30, I930) Revue I932, III; cf. KuHN, Comp. Com. I70.
68 See BATES, "The Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont.
Probl. (I935) 324; see also }Aeon, "Problems of Divorce in France Incident
to the Statutes of 194I," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) at 309.

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
The wider such "hospitality," the more conflicts are likely
to appear. Conflicts are not even confined to that diversity of
national and domiciliary divorce laws that has been receiving
paramount attention in Europe. The different views, for instance, regarding the wife's domicil have the result that a
court of Uruguay, predicating jurisdiction upon the matrimonial domicil, will divorce an American citizen domiciled in
Montevideo from his wife who lives in the United States, 69
while a New Y ark court, if the wife lived there, would
probably consider her domiciled in the state and protected
by certain special rules against the Uruguayan decree. A
series of Canadian decisions has invalidated decrees rendered
in this country because the finding of domicil was in contradiction to the Canadian doctrines. 70 Where a Swiss court, assuming jurisdiction because of her separate Swiss domicil,
had divorced a woman of Belgian nationality, a Belgian
court denied recognition to the decree; not even for the purpose of jurisdiction could a Belgian wife have a domicil
separate from her husband. 71 Well known is the number of
divorces unrecognized within the United States despite the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, and in the
second Williams case, 71 a the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly confirmed that a divorce decree obtained at the domicil (for purposes of divorce court) of one spouse need not
be recognized in another jurisdiction denying that domicil
under its own qualification.
Residence is sometimes taken as a substitute for domicil,
particularly for the purpose of jurisdiction for limited divorce; 72 as such it may suffice.
69 Trib. Ap. Montevideo (Sept. 13, 1935) 36 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (1938)
:no, Clunet 1938, 841.
70 See infra p. 532, n. 143.
71 Cass. (March 19, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925-1.179; Trib. civ. Bruges (March
4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81.
na Williams v. North Carolina (no. 2, 1945) 325 U. S. 226; Rice v. Rice
( 1949) 336 u. s. 674·
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We have now to investigate the additional rules that restrict the assumption of jurisdiction.
3. Restrictions on the Assumption of Jurisdiction
It is a comforting experience that modern legislatures have
felt the need to limit their own domiciliary jurisdiction over
divorce, partly for the express purpose of avoiding at least
certain conflicts with other jurisdictions, partly with less distinct intentions to the same effect. However, these additional
requirements are of a very different nature in this country
from those on the European Continent.
(a) Additional requirements. In the United States, the
prerequisite that one party or the plaintiff be domiciled in
the state at the time of the commencement of the action, is
usually accompanied by further qualifications. The statutes
have varied and mixed the requirements so "as to defy classification," Vernier attests. 73 The author must confess that he
has not succeeded so far in completely understanding the
meaning of several such combined versions and would most
welcome a thorough discussion of all these clauses by a more
competent writer. It seems that there are three main statutory clauses:
Sometimes it is required that the parties have, at some
time before suit, both lived in the state. This is obviously derived from the idea of the matrimonial domicil, upon return
to which either spouse is entitled to sue the other.
A considerable number of various clauses emphasize the
importance of the place and the time where the cause of action accrued. Of this group, certain are important as direct
measures to reject petitions evasive of foreign divorce law
and will be considered separately.
72

With respect to the United States see
§ 81 and p. 107.

7 3 2 VERNIER

1 BEALE

§ xo.8, § uo.s.
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In their vast majority, the statutory clauses require a definite period of "residence" of that party whose domicil is
decisive, previous to the filing of the action; almost always it
is provided or understood that this period should immediately precede the suit. The period is from six weeks to two
years in particular states and varies also in different cases.
It may make a difference what the cause for divorce is. In
linking the ideas just mentioned with the minimum residence
requirement, the length of time is declared unnecessary or
reduced, if the party, or both parties, lived in the state before, or lived there at the time when the cause of action
arose, or if the cause occurred in the state, etc. A typical formula is presented in the Uniform Annulment of Marriage
and Divorce Act of 1907, whose first provision gave jurisdiction:
"When, at the time the cause of action arose, either party
was a bona fide resident of the state, and has continued so to
be down to the time of the commencement of the action; except that no action for absolute divorce shall be commenced
for any cause other than adultery or bigamy, unless one
of the parties has been for the two years next preceding
the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this
state." 74
As this wording shows, no exception is made in the case of
both parties being domiciled in the state at the time of suit.' 5
Similarly, in the great majority of the statutes no particular
exception seems to be intended to that effect, although the requirement of residence may be released in related situations,
such as where the defendant is personally served. 76 There
74 Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Draft of an Act to Make Uniform the Law Regulating
Annulment of Marriage and Divorce (1907) § 8(a).
75 Statutes formed after this model speak expressly of both parties.
7 6 See, for instance, Iowa Code (1954) § 598.3 (defendant resident and personally served).
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) § 7334·
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are, however, a few statutes which state that actual domicil is
sufficient, if both parties are domiciled in the state. 77
Disregarding the labyrinth of the statutory details, we
may take it that the restrictions of the last type counter-balance the ruthlessness of divorce jurisdiction at the domicil of
one party by qualifying this domicil in a possibly very effective manner. The requirement of residence previous to the
suit is generally understood as meaning domicil and, in most
jurisdictions, actual presence in the state as well, although a
temporary absence is innocuous. 78 The lapse of time guarantees that the individual has become a participant in the life
of the state and serves as evidence that the change of abode
includes a serious change of domicil. If applied to the case
where both parties have come to the state, the requirement
is intended to foil evasive demands as well as to protect one
spouse against the othe;'s arbitrary choice of the forum. In
both applications, the requirement is usually held to be mandatory/9
Unfortunately, the great purpose of this restriction has
often been forgotten. It is buried under the maze of confusing details accumulated in the various statutory experiments.
Moreover, two defects are rightly much criticized. While
some states formerly demanded a residence of five years,
an unjustifiably long period, others are content with three
months, or, since the famous competition of Nevada with
Idaho and Florida, with six weeks. It has become the only
purpose of such a requirement to benefit the local hotels and
shops. The other evil is lax enforcement of the normal resi77 See especially Ala. Code Ann. (I940) tit. 34 § 29, as amended by Law
of July 6, I945·
N. H. Rev. Stats. ( I955) § 458-5In this sense, see also the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of I930, §I (a)
(ed. I932).
78 I BEALE § 10.8.
79 Hetherington v. Hetherington ( I928} 200 Ind. 56, I6o N. E. 345·
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dence period; strange stories have been told in the literature
in this respect. 80
Could these faults be corrected, this dependence of jurisdiction on a residence period would be calculated greatly to
inspire legislation in other countries where thus far a minimum period of residence has only occasionally been provided.81
(b) Conformity toN ational Law. In Europe, while as a
rule jurisdiction over foreigners is taken at the matrimonial
domicil or in some countries at the domicil of one party,
measures are taken to avoid collision with the national law.
The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention, 82 followed by the statutes of Sweden and Poland, 83 has recognized, in special clauses, the claim for exclusive jurisdiction
of divorce, which today is asserted by such countries as Soviet Russia, Hungary, and Poland. 84 If the jurisdiction of a
state over petitions for divorce or judicial separation is exclusive for its nationals, such jurisdiction is recognized by
the other states as the only one competent. The Belgian
courts observe the same restraint in the absence of an enacted rule and without being bound any longer by the Hague
Convention. 85
80 BREARLEY, "A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South Carolinans," 2
Law and Cont. Probl. (I935) 329, 332.
81 Poland: Law of I926 on interlocal private law, art. 2 (one year for
change of personal law).
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904, as amended, c. 7 § 2 par. 2 (one year in case
of Swedish spouse) ; c. 7 § 4a (two years for certain foreign fiances).
France: the now superseded decree of Nov. 12, I938, requiring a police
permit for at least a year's residence for recognizing the domicil of a foreigner (supra p. 152) evidently was applicable to divorce.
8 2 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 par. 2.
83 Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of I904 with amendments, c. 3 § I par. 2.
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, § I7 par. 4·
84 See supra p. 426.
85 Cour Bruxelles (March IS, I922) Belg. Jud. I923, col. I03; Rb. Antwerp
(Nov. I9, I937) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. (I938-1939) col. 547 no. 112 and (March
29, I939) 9 ibid. (I939-I940) col. I373 no. 28I; App. Bruxelles (May 20,
1939) 9 ibid. (I939-I940) col. 42 no. 7 (Hungarians).

DIVORCE

441

Germany. The German law goes even further. German
courts may not exercise jurisdiction in divorce cases where
the national country of the husband would not recognize the
resulting judgment because of lack of jurisdiction of the German forum. The German provision prescribes that, if both
spouses are foreigners, action for divorce may be brought at
the forum, provided that the domestic court has jurisdiction
also according to the laws of the state of which the husband
is a national. 85a According to one opinion, this text requires
that the national country should recognize also the specific
court where the suit is brought as having jurisdiction. 86 Better authorities, however, declare it sufficient that any German court, this or another, be considered endowed with jurisdiction in the eyes of the national law, that is, that
German courts have jurisdiction in the international sense. 87
The prohibition does not extend to the case where theresulting decree of divorce would not be recognized on another
ground, for instance, because of lack of reciprocity or because of service of the defendant by publication. 88
This prohibition, however, covers many more cases than
just those of exclusive jurisdiction mentioned above. It extends to all situations where one or both of the foreign
spouses are domiciled in a country that does not recognize
the effectiveness of the German decree within its borders.
5
' a Germany: Code of Civil Procedure, § 6o6 b no. 1; similarly Bulgaria:
Family Law of 1949, art. 59 par. 2.
86
RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, ]W. 1930, 1309; KG. (Oct. 25, 1937)
]W. 1937, 3249, but cf. MASSFELLER, JW. 1936, 3579·
87
SCHONDORF, 75 }herings Jahrb. 66; RUHL, }W. 1930, 1310; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 505; PAGENSTECHER, I I Z.ausi.PR. ( 1937) 480.
A via media is followed by STEIN-}ONA5-SCHONKE, 2 ZPO. (ed. 17,
1951) § 6o6 III suggesting to ask the foreign law whether it requires the
jurisdiction of a specific court or that of any German court.
88
RG. (Nov. 21, 1935) 149 RGZ. 232; cf. KG. (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr.
1932, no. 76. On the application of the provisions to religious divorce forms,
see below, p. 413. On the case of subjects of a country where divorce cannot
take place except by bill of parliament, see NIBOYET 506 no. 417; ibid. 744
no. 636; 2 BERGMANN 79; RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 262.
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Similarly, exclusive jurisdiction has been claimed by many
American cases for the courts of the domicil, and likewise by
Switzerland, which does not recognize a foreign divorce of
two Swiss citizens, one of whom is domiciled in Switzerland. 89 Before assuming jurisdiction to divorce an American
husband, a German court must therefore ascertain, among
other points: 90 ( I ) where the husband is domiciled, under
the American definition of domicil, requiring in particular the
animus manendi in the American sense; ( 2) if he thus is
found to be domiciled in Germany, whether the American
conflicts rule recognizes the jurisdiction of the domicil, and
as of what time.
This subject needs more discussion m connection with
renvoi.
Switzerland. Still broader is the scope of the former
Swiss 91 and Hungarian 92 and the Czechoslovakian 92 " provisions that require not only the jurisdiction but also the decree to be recognized by the national law, insofar as the acting court is able to predict. 93 Also, the Court of Appeals in
Zurich was denied jurisdiction, because personal service on
89

BG. (Oct. 10, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335; BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 7·h
more difficult situations, BEcK, NAG. 363 nos. nz-115.
particular RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, IPRspr. 1930, no.

cf. for
9 °Cf. in

78;

136.
91 Law on Civil Status of Dec. 24, 1874, art. 56, now superseded by NAG.
art. 7h par. I.
92 Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § 116: . . . if the judgment has force
in the state whose citizens the spouses are; though the new Marriage Law of
1952 lacks a comparable provision, the requirement of enforceability has
been maintained as a principle of public policy, TORZSAY-BIBER, "Problems
of Private International Law in Matrimonial Actions in Hungarian Courts,"
3 Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe (1955) 15.
92 a Czechoslovakian Code of Civil Procedure § 612 par. z sentence 2, requiring recognition by the national law of both spouses.
93 App. Zurich (Jan. n, 1936) Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1936) 359; the treaty
is that of Nov. 2, 1929. App. Zurich (1937) 38 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1939) 78
no. 36 denies jurisdiction to the wife, because, under the applicable Polish
law, she shared the domicil of her husband who lived in Antwerp, Belgium.
Similarly, in the case of a wife suing her British husband domiciled in Canada, 37 SJZ. (194o--I941) 31 no. S·
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the defendant was impossible and German courts, under the
German-Swiss treaty on mutual recognition and execution of
judgments, 94 therefore, would not have recognized the
decree.
There is some uncertainty in applying either of these selfimposed restrictions, due to the difficulties of knowing exactly the position of the foreign law. The possibility that the
national court in reviewing the decree will even re-examine
the jurisdictional facts further aggravates the problem. The
Swiss law was therefore significantly changed in the wording
of its provision. Former article 56 of the Swiss Law on Civil
Status required proof that the future judgment would be recognized in the homeland. As this was found to be an impossible task, the actual text (NAG. art. 7h par. I) demands
proof only that the Swiss jurisdiction would be recognized.
But it is not clear whether by this change the evidence has
been made easier to produce. Once, a Swiss court tried to
consult the Supreme Court of the United States on the
"American" divorce law but was informed that neither
courts nor administrative agencies in this country are prepared to give advice. 95 At any rate, the court can only guess
at the chances of recognition, if it does not want to refuse to
assume jurisdiction in virtually every case, and experience
shows that no court wants that.
In some cases, it may be suspected that Continental courts
94
Examples regarding American citizens: Bez. Ger. Ziirich (June 18, 1930)
27 SJZ. (x93o--1931) 87, no. 14 (wife under medical treatment in Ziirich, intending to stay "permanently" in order to study there. Jurisdiction was
granted in view of the husband's submission to the court and the certainty
that the decree would be recognized in Minnesota). Same court (Nov. 3,
1931) z8 SJZ. (1931-1932) 250 no. 217 (the wife paid taxes and attended
classes at the University. The husband in Boston consented to the separate
domicil. The divorce ground would also be recognized in Massachusetts).
In both cases the assumption of domicil was questionable, but the husband's
consent to its establishment would be termed decisive. The same observations
are true for a case of British subjects, Bez. Ger. Ziirich (Oct. 25, 1935) 32
S]Z. ( 1936) 202, no. 41.
95 BuRCKHARDT, 4 Schweizerisches Bundesrecht 142 no. 1674 II.

444

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

have too lightly presumed American and especially English
willingness to recognize a domicil at and, therefore, jurisdiction of, the forum.
4· Religious Divorce
When a court applying the rule of nationality finds that
under the national law of a party divorce can be pronounced
only by an ecclesiastical authority (as in the countries influenced by the Greek Orthodox Church and by Islam), the
court faces the problem whether it may exercise jurisdiction
or must refrain from it. The German courts feel prohibited
from assuming jurisdiction by the provision that jurisdiction
must be in accordance with the national law of the husband,
for a national law giving exclusive powers to the churches is
deemed to exclude any judicial activity of temporal tribunals, 96 even abroad.
In France, jurisdiction was likewise denied, especially by
the Supreme Court in the famous case of Levinfon/ 7 a Russian Jew. Since the Russian law at the time left divorce proceedings to the religious authorities, a French court was held
unable to apply the national law of the party in its true form
without injury to the religious feelings of the parties. This
example was followed by many other French decisions, most
of which had to deal with subjects of the former Russian
parts of Poland and Lithuania.98
96 KG. (Dec. 19, 1905) 14 ROLG. 241, aff'd RG. (Oct. 4, 1906) 19 Z.int.R.
(1909) 263; RG. (Feb. 21, 1925) Clunet 1925, 1055. This is also the meaning
of the Hague Convention on Divorce, Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference
de Ia Haye (1900) 211. An analogous position was taken in Switzerland by
the Trib. Zurich (Sept. 22, 1936) 34 SJZ. (1937-1938) 313 no. 591, although
in the instant case jurisdiction was assumed because the marriage was void
under the national (Palestine) law.
97 Cass. (civ.) (May 29, 1905) D.1905.1·353, S.1906.1.161, Clunet 1905, 1006,
Revue 1905, 518.
98 Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) S.1911.1.581; Cass. (req.) (July 20, 1911)
S.1912.1.132; about ten decisions from 1920 to 1927 cited by J. DONNEDIEU DE
VABRES 485; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 15, 1936) Nouv. Revue 1936, 541. Similarly
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In France, however, some courts and writers have expressed contrary opinions, mainly because of the hardship
imposed on the parties but also because of two legal arguments. First, public policy is invoked on the ground of the
declared neutrality of the French state toward the churches
and the impropriety of granting more prerogatives to foreign churches than to its own. 99 Second, religious divorce
rules are analyzed as composed of substantive rules, concerned with the permissibility and the causes of divorce, and
procedural rules giving way in a French tribunal to the
French rules of procedure. 100 A recent Belgian critic of the
dominant doctrine remarks that neither the consistories of
the Orthodox Church nor the rabbinate tribunals use any formule sacrec, prayers or deprecations; they exercise purely
judicial functions. 101 Courts of other countries, too, are di,-ided on the question. 102
in Belgium: Trih. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie 1931·3·36; see
also PoULLET 443 no. 378; Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940,
col. 120 (Spanish Catholics).
9
" Trib. civ. Seine (June 11, 1921) Clunet 1921, 525 (Greek Orthodox Rus,ians); Trib. civ. Seine {Dec. 24, 1921) Clunet 1922, 117 (Russian Jews).
100
See in this sense HARTIN's note to the decision of Cour Paris {March
17, 1902) D.1903.2-49 and (implicitly) Trib. civ. Seine {Feb. 25, 1937)
Clunet 1937, 523 (Lithuanian Jews); PILLET, 2 Melanges 359.,373, NIBOYET
S67 no. 752 and 5 Traite 630. App. Alger (March 7, 1898) Clunet 1898, 1102
1
separation of Spanish Catholics); Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue
Crit. 1939, 105 (Russian-Polish Jews); Cour Paris (Jan. 9, 1943) S.1943.2.29
with affirmative note of NIBOYET (separation of Spanish Catholics).
101 ]oFf, 22 Revue Inst. Beige (1936) 140.
H•" Belgium: for exercising jurisdiction under application of substantive
Belgian law: Trib. civ. d'Anvers (May 30, 1936); cf. 65 Revue Dr. Int.
(Bruxelles) (1938) 295, and Cour Bruxelles (June 22, 1938) J.d. Tr. 1938,
no. 3550 col. 646 (Polish Jews); ]OFE, "Divorce de Polonais en Belgique,"
4-5 Pand. Fer. (Jan. 1938) 5·
For denying jurisdiction: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie
1931·3·36 (Spanish Canon marriage-no divorce possible); App. Bruxelles
(July 9, 1932) Revue 1933, 511; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Clunet
1932, 487, 489; Trib. civ. d'Anvers {March 1, 1939) Pasicrisie 1939·3·76;
also PouLLET 443 no. 378; VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938)
295; DE Vos, 1 Probleme 165.
Italy: for exercising jurisdiction: Trib. Roma (June 22, 1898) Giur. Ita).
1898, I, 2, 647 (separation of Spanish Catholics married according to canonic
formalities); for denying jurisdiction: App. Roma (June 6, 1899) La Legge
1899·2·45·
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The role of the religious element under the national law,
however, may be less important. The Austrian Civil Code
prescribed that Jews are to be divorced in court but that in
the case of a mutual divorce agreement a preliminary attempt at conciliation must be made by the priest or teacher .103
The Marriage Law of I 836 of the Warsaw District required
as a preliminary to court proceedings a certificate of a rabbi
on the ecclesiastical aspect of the case. 104 French and German
courts have considered such regulations no obstacle to litigation at the forum. 105 They find it more difficult to adjust their
own procedure to the singular presuppositions of the foreign
laws. But some courts have even agreed to recognize the activities of local religious authorities corresponding to the foreign customs. 106
103

AUg. BGB. §§ 133, 134.
Marriage Law, Kingdom of Poland, art. 189, as generally interpreted.
Although art. 196 of the Code required ecclesiastical jurisdiction also for
Catholics and Protestants, the German LG. Bremen (May 8, 193-1-) JW. 1934,
2353, IPRspr. 1934, no. 55, concluded from the Polish international private
law of 1926 that jurisdiction should be assumed, and tried to apply the rules
of both these churches to a mixed Catholic-Protestant marriage.
105 France: Trib. civ. Strasbourg (Oct. 22, 1930) Clunet 1931, 166, Revue
Crit. 1935, 753; Trib. civ. Metz (May 20, 1931) Clunet 1932, 165, 644, Revue
Crit. 1935, 754 (Russian-Polish Jews).
Germany: RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) II3 RGZ. 38; RG. (May 20, 1935) I.J-7
RGZ. 399; KG. (Dec. u, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 1934, no. so
(Russian-Polish Jews}, overruled see infra n. 106.
Of Greek Jews, the Greek laws do not speak; cf. CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 430
nos. 95, 96; but in view of the entirely judicial and temporal procedure in
Greek legislation following Law no. 3222 of August 28-30, 1924, the Cour
Paris (Dec. 29, 1925) Revue 1929, 258 has granted jurisdiction.
106 France: Cour Paris (Jan. 15, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Trib. civ. Metz
(May 20, 1931) Clunet 1932, 165, 644, Revue Crit. 1935, 754· Contra: Cass.
(req.) (July 20, 19II) S.1912.I.132; App. Rabat (May 9, 1933) Revue Crit.
1934, 125 (whether a French Algerian Jew has to give a religious bill of
divorce); AuDINET, Revue Crit. 1935, 756.
Belgium: App. Liege (June 26, 1934) Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ., Divorce
371 no. 1715 (certificate of the Grand Rabbi of Belgium accepted}.
Germany: OLG. Kiiln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932, 2304, IPRspr. 1932, no.
78; KG. (Dec. II, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 1934, no. so. Contra, overruling this practice, RG. (May 20, 1935) 147 RGZ. 399·
England: Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] 2 All E.R. 373; also Victoria:
Mandel v. Mandel [1955] V.L.R. 51.
104
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The sacrifices involved in such concessions to foreign
claims are admirable instances in the development of international cooperation. But they originated from such a superstitious belief in the legitimacy of the nationality principle,
that the most unreasonable of all its claims, that for exclusive jurisdiction over emigrated married couples, was not
questioned. Foreign law must not be recognized, unless it is
fit for international use.

III.

COMMON ScoPE OF THE

Lex Fori

To evaluate the domain of choice of law in the countries
observing the personal law, it is necessary to go beyond the
question of jurisdiction and to realize that important questions are everywhere governed exclusively by the law of the
forum.
I .

Procedure

Procedure, of course, is the concern exclusively of local
rules. The law of the forum determines the necessity of contested and the permissibility of uncontested proceedings, as
well as the acts constituting procedure. 107 Provisional decrees
for separate residence or maintenance rendered during a divorce suit also follow the procedural rules. 108
107 Deviating from this principle, the Appeal Court of Paris in Affaire
Chiger, Cour Paris (April 30, 1926) Clunet 1926, 943, Revue 1927, 243 declared that a French court could appropriate the power to determine causes
for divorce in its discretion, a power provided for by the Soviet Russian law
of the time, with respect to a controversial divorce between Soviet Russian nationals. This decision was much criticized; cf. BARTIN, 2 Principes

302, 303.

In Greece, the requirement of a previous conciliation is recognized as a
procedural question, 20 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1955) 151.
108
Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 6; Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 17 par. 4 sentence 2; for comment, see KAHN, 2
Abhandl. 360 ff.

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
2.

Decrees

The law of the forum controls the form in which a divorce
is granted, if at all, including the choice of the persons or
authorities entrusted with granting divorces.
In certain countries, divorce is granted by the king or an
administrative authority/ 09 in others by the parliament, 110
often by ecclesiastical tribunals, 111 or it is a private agreement between the parties either with or without some religious 112 or public control. 113 Whatever form divorce has in
a country for its own subjects, is also permitted between
foreigners. Divorce, conversely, if allowed at all, must not be
granted to foreigners according to formalities nor by persons, other than those prescribed for subjects of the forum.
Hence, religious and private divorces are out of the question
in the United States, 114 as well as in Western and Central
Europe. French and German courts annulled scores of divorce decrees rendered in their territories by religious authorities, especially in cases of Czarist Russians of various
denominations, Polish Jews, members of the Orthodox
Denmark, Norway.
Domiciliaries of Newfoundland and Quebec may obtain relief only
by special acts of the Dominion Parliament of Canada. Judicial decrees replaced Parliament bills in Ontario by the Divorce Act (Ontario) 1930, 2o-21
Geo. V, c. 14 of the Statutes of Canada, 1930; Northern Ireland by Matrimonial Causes Act (Northern Ireland), 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. VI, Pub!. Gen. Acts
of 1939, c. 13; and in the Isle of Man by Act of 1938.
1 11 Greece (since Law no. 3222 of 1924 for Mohammedans only and perhaps Jews). With respect to limited divorce: Italy, Spain, and Colombia.
11 2 Jewish law as chiefly in use in Israel and formerly in some eastern
European countries. The rabbis assist in varying degrees, but constitutive is
the offer and acceptance of the "Gueth"; see the observations of HAIM H.
COHN, Advocate General of Israel, Revue Crit. 1950, 559· The old Austrian
and Polish law had modified this principle, see supra p. 446.
113 Mussulman countries excluding Turkey.
114 Chertok v. Chertok (1924) 208 App. Div. 161, 203 N.Y.S. 163 (divorce
decree by the rabbi of Brooklyn granted to a husband in New York against
his wife living in Russia, held invalid despite recognition by the Russian
Government); In re Spiegel (S.D.N.Y. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 6os.
109

110
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Church, and others. 115 For instance, a divorce of a Yugoslav
and a Russian of Greek Orthodox faith by the Orthodox
diocesan council in Paris was annulled by the Tribunal de la
Seine in 1930.116
This, of course, is a purely negative proposition, leaving
unsolved the dilemma whether such persons should be
granted divorce according to the formalities of the forum or
denied divorce on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction because
their personal law requires religious proceedings. 117
Exceptions to the principle of exclusive municipal formalities are very rare. 118 Even a consulate of a foreign power is
115
Belgium: Trib. Liege (March 21, 1929) Belg. Jud. 1929, col. 428 (decree
by rabbi in Louvain).
France: Circular of the Garde des Sceaux of April, 1909, prohibiting the
recording of divorces granted in France by any judge without civil powers,
an abuse then often committed; Cour Paris (June 21, 1910) Revue 1910, 837;
Cour Paris (Oct. 31, 1910) Revue 19II, 82; Cour Paris (Dec. 26, 1912)
Revue 1913, 424; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, 1920) Revue 1921, 226 at 236;
Cour Paris (March 23, 1922) and (May 10, 1922) Revue 1923, 425; Cour
Paris (Jan. 15, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Cour App. Nancy (June 17, 1922)
Revue 1922-23, 435; Cour Colmar (May 23, 1931) Clunet 1933, 97·
Germany: Law of Jurisdiction of 1877 (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) RGBI.
1877, 41, § rs par. 3 declares that the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in
temporal matters is without civil effect. Though this provision has been
abrogated by the Law of the Federal Republic of Oct. r, 1950, the principle
persists (RAAPE, IPR. 293). The rule applies especially to marriage and
divorce: RG. (April 21, 1921) ro2 RGZ. u8; RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) II3 RGZ.
41; KG. (Dec. r6, 1920) Warn. Rspr. 1921, no. 35; RG. (Feb. 21, 1925)
Warn. Rspr. 1925, no. 133; KG. (Dec. 21, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 143; KG.
(March 21, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 77 (privilegium Paulinum recognized by
the Marriage Law of Warsaw (Kongresspolen) of 1836, art. 207); OLG.
Kiel (Nov. 30, 1926) 91 Schlesw. Holst. Anz., N.F. ( 1927) 145 (repudiation
under the law of Russian Jews); LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, 1937) JW. 1938, 2402
(sending of divorce bill by a Russian Jew from Germany to Russia ineffectual under German law); OLG. Miinchen (Nov. 21, 1949) StAZ. 1950, 130;
LG. Mannheim (March 17, 1953) JR. 1955, 6r.
Switzerland: Justice Dept., BBl. 1937, III 141 no. 9 (divorce by the Council
of the Russian Orthodox Church in France, invalid in France and Switzerland).
Greece: App. Athens (1950) Z.ausi.PR. 1955, 150.
For decisions to the contrary see supra n. 106.
116
Trib. civ. Seine (June 2, 1930) Clunet 1931, 1078.
117
See supra pp. 444-447.
118
For Russian subjects of Armenian origin and faith, the Rumanian Cassation Court recognized a divorce rendered by the Bishop of the Gregorian
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not usually allowed to grant divorces; apparently, the only
exception was contained in the German-Russian Treaty of
October I 2, 1925, which permitted Russians married before
a Russian consulate in Germany to divorce by mutual agreement in accordance with Soviet lack of formalities but with
recordation thereof at the same or another Russian consulate
in Germany. 119
Domestic law also defines the wording of a divorce decree.
German courts have often considered, however, whether they
should insert in a decree divorcing foreign parties the statement required by the German Civil Code declaring which
party is in fault. The Reichsgericht finally decided that the
judgment should omit this statement only when it is either
prohibited by or would be of no significance under the personallaw.120
3· Validity of the Marriage Prerequisite
Apart from some confusion between divorce and annulment,121 a universal prerequisite for divorce is that the marriage be considered valid at the forum or, if voidable, at least
provisionally valid. When, in the eyes of the court, the marriage never existed or has already been dissolved, there is no
Church in Bucharest, Cass. (May 13, 1935) Pand. Romane 1936.!.57; contra:
PossA, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 359 no. 134, in view of the secularization of divorce by the Rumanian constitutional laws.
119 See Final Protocol of the German Russian Treaty of Oct. 12, 1925, German RGBI. 1926, II 6o at 82.
120 RG. (April 18, 1918) Warn. Rspr. 1918, no. 189; RG. (Feb. 24, 1928)
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 64. KG. (March 13, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 81; KG.
(June 27, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 86, etc., confirmed as steady practice, KG.
(May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750; and after the Matrimonial Law of 1938
went into effect, see KG. (Aug. n, 1938) referred to in JW. 1938, 2750 n. I .
Cf. for Dutchmen, KG. (April 9, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 47, but also OLG.
Dusseldorf (Nov. 21, 1933) JW. 1934, 437, IPRspr. 1934, no. 48. Correspondingly, Switzerland: BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43 advised Swiss courts
to state culpability in the case of German spouses, and OG. Solothurn
(June 27, 1949) Schw. Jahrb. 1950, 278, omitted the time limited prohibition
of remarriage against the spouse guilty of adultery.
121 See infra p. 576.
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subject matter for the proceeding to dissolve the marriage
tie. On the other hand, if the marriage is recognized in the
forum, it is immaterial whether it is recognized in the country to which the parties belong.
A significant application of the principle is the case of a
so-called matrimonium claudicans (limping marriage) celebrated either at the forum or abroad under circumstances
warranting its recognition as valid at the forum, which is
considered invalid under the personal law because of formal
or intrinsic defects. If, for instance, without a religious ceremony a Greek married a French woman in Paris before a
civil official, the marriage, valid and dissoluble in France,
would be null and therefore indissoluble in Greece. 122 In such
cases, the countries that ordinarily take the personal law into
consideration disregard it. When the parties marry within
the forum, consistency and dignity of the jurisdiction require
that the forum stand upon the validity of the marriage. 123
Thus, a marriage annullable in the home country of the
party involved may be dissolved in the country of its celebration, each court taking the only way available for the
termination of the marriage ties.
The German courts have made it clear that in these cases
122 Cf.

}. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 450.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 2, 1923) Pasicrisie 1923·3·133,
Clunet 1924, 1098 (Russian-Polish Catholic).
,
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 19, 1920) Clunet 1921, 184, Revue 19221923, 306; cf. also 6 Repert. 431 no. 97 (civil marriage of an Orthodox
Greek); Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 15, 1922) Clunet 1922, 396 (Polish Jew married to Catholic French woman before registrar in Brussels).
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 139, 143; RG. (Nov. r6, 1922)
105 RGZ. 363 (Czarist Russians married in conformance with temporal formalities in Germany); RG. (Oct. r, 1925) JW. 1926, 375, Warn. Rspr. 1926,
no. 15 (Orthodox Greek married to a Norwegian girl in Norway, the marriage being recognized in Germany under the law of the place of celebration,
EG. art. I I par. r sentence z); OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9, 1933) JW. 1934,
1740, IPRspr. 1934, no. 46; RG. (Nov. 7, 1935) Warn. Rspr. 1935, no. 192;
KG. (Jan. 14, 1937) JW. 1937, 96r; LG. Berlin (Nov. 2, 1937) JW. 1938,
395, Clunet 1938, 824; and other decisions, see infra n. 124.
Switzerland: App. Bern (May 30, 1923) 6o ZBJV. (1924) 40.
123
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the law of the forum alone is to be applied and the personal
law entirely ignored. 124 It is not feasible, for instance, to
apply to the divorce by analogy foreign rules of separation.
The cases also have required adjustment of the ordinary jurisdictional rules 125 to meet the needs of the party interested
in dissolution rather than annulment of the marriage.
In this latter respect, an analogous doctrine developed in
England in cases ex misericordia. In Stathatos v. Stathatos, 126
a Greek, having married an Englishwoman at a registry office in London and taken her to Athens, sent her back to
England; at his instance, the marriage was declared null in
Athens, while it was undoubtedly valid in England. In this
and another case, 127 English courts affirmed their divorce
jurisdiction despite the lack of an English marital domicil.
124 RG. (Dec. I7, I908) 70 RGZ. I44, cited supra n. 123; RG. (May 4,
I933) JW. I933, 2582 (the decisive passage was published by LEWALD, Revue
Crit. I934, 663); KG. (Dec. II, I933) JW. I934, 6I9, IPRspr. 1934, no. so;
KG. (April 2o, I936) JW. I936, 2464; LG. Berlin (Nov. I, I937) JW. I938,
395; LG. Berlin (Feb. 3, I938) JW. 1938, 1273; OLG. Konigsberg (Feb. r,
1937) Recht I938, 22 no. I94; LG. Frankfurt/Main (Dec. 6, I950) IPRspr.
1945-1950 no. 66; LG. Berlin (March IS, 1954) JR. 1955, 6o. This theory
was advocated by LEWALD III no. 158, and Revue Crit. 1934, 661; ScHDNDORF,
75 ]he rings Jahrb. 53, 74; I FRANKENSTEIN 233 n. 189, 3 ibid. 425. Contra:
RAAPE 401 and IPR. 285; also Hans. OLG. (Oct. 25, 1933) JW. 1934, 242,
16 Hans. RGZ. ( I933) B. col. 683, Revue Crit. I934, 66r. See on the broader
problem of "limping marriages," supra pp. 251-252.
France: An older doctrine refused to divorce Austrian Jews who had
married only in civil form in France (Cass. civ., Oct. 30, I905, Revue I906,
730) and annulled the marriage under Austrian law (Trib. civil Seine, April
28, I9o6, Revue I906, 751). Recent practice has admitted divorce according
to French law: Cour Toulouse (Dec. 14, 1943) Revue Crit. 1947, 110 affirmed
thus far by Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 25, 1947) ibid. 1947, 444 (note NmoYET);
BATIFFOL, Traite 520 n. 70.
The Netherlands: Rb. s'Gravenhage (Dec. I9, 1950) N.J. 1952 no. 444·
125 According to the Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5 no. 2 in fine, the
foreign jurisdiction exists (even in the case of an exclusive jurisdiction
claimed by the national courts) over a marriage with respect to which action
for divorce or separation cannot be brought before the competent court of
the national state.
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § r par. 2
final words. German OLG. Karlsruhe (June 13, 1933) JW. 1933, 1669.
126 [1913] P. 46.
127 Montaigu v. Montaigu [1913] P. I54·
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This doctrine was later overruled in England. 128 The main
remedy to free the parties from a marriage void in the homeland was then usually found in the recognition extended by
English courts to any annulment decree that might be
granted by the competent authority of the husband's domicil.129 The same attitude has been recommended to the courts
of Canada, 130 and a similar position was taken in a Scotch
case, in which a marriage with a Hindu was held valid in
Scotland, though invalid in India. The Scotch court denied
the application of. the wife, who was living in Scotland, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, although the court knew
that she would be unable to prosecute litigation in India. 131
This unsatisfactory proposition, where at the instance of the
foreign party a foreign annulment is recognized to the disadvantage of the wife while she is denied on a purely formal ground the right to divorce, 132 has been remedied recently by legislation. An exceptional domicil of the wife for
the purpose of divorce is now recognized in England, Scotland, Australia, and New Zealand. 133

IV.

CHOICE OF LAW

r. Lex Fori
United States. The principle in the United State~ is that a
divorce court applies the law of the forum to determine
128
H. v. H. [I928] P. 2o6; Herd v. Herd [1936] P. zos, 105 L. J. P.
D. & A. 108 (the husband abandoned his English domicil of origin and lived
in the United States; divorce denied the wife on ground of lack of jurisdiction of English court); cf. CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 357; for Canada: HOGG, "Domicile of a Married Woman in Relation to Divorce," 6 Can. Bar Rev. (1928)
655, 666; FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation (I932] 4 D. L. R. 37·
129
Unanimous opinion following the Salvesen case, infra p. 585.
130
2 jOHNSON 36-40.
131
Watson-Mangrulkar v. Mangrulkar [I939] S. C. 239 (Session Case).
Cf. Thomson v. Thomson (1935) Sc. L. T. 24 (Outer House of Ct. of Sess.).
132
See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I6 Bell Yard
( I93 5) IS and supra p. 252, n. 142.
133
England: Matrimonial Causes Act, I950, s. IS {r) {b); Scotland: Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, s. 2. Australia and New
Zealand, supra, n. 38.

454

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

whether divorce is admissible, as well as whether the party's
conduct or other event complained of constitutes a ground
for divorce. 134
This system was shared, a century ago, by general European theory and practice. Savigny 135 supported the system
by the belief that divorce law is imperative in nature, because
it expresses moral conceptions purporting to be of absolute
value. Many writers and courts advocated the same idea. 136
This doctrine slowly disappeared, however, until at the
Hague Conference, it was found to have almost no proponents.137
In this country, application of the lex fori seems to have
been justified by the merely statutory nature of divorce, the
effect of statutes being believed to be necessarily territoriala theory going clearly back to such fathers of territorialism
as D'Argentre and Ulricus Huber. It has also been advanced
that divorce remedies are special or equitable and therefore
cannot be exercised except by the courts of the state establishing the remedy. Sometimes there is invoked the general motivation for territorialism that, theures" being located within
the state, the state's interest prevails. It may be hoped that
nowadays nobody cares seriously for all these artificial and
worn-out assertions.
134 Stewart

v. Stewart (I9I9) 32 Idaho I8o, I8o Pac. I65; Restatement

§ I35·

135 SAVIGNY § 379 no. 6.
136 BURGE (ed. 2), 3 Colonial

and Foreign Law 923; LAURENT, 5 Principes
no. I85; I BROCHER 297; OLIVI, Revue I88s, 55," AssER-COHN 67, French tr.
by RIVIER (I884) n6; UNGER, I System I93 § 23 n. 126. This was the prevailing opinion in Germany before the Civil Code, see RG. (June I9, I883)
9 RGZ. I9I; NIEMEYER, Positives Intern. Privatrecht §§ 99, IOO, and in I
Z.int.R. ( I89I) 36I, 2 Z.int.R. ( I892) 473, 5 Z.int.R. ( I895) I67, I68 n. 3 ;
in Austria, see OGH. (March 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hochst. Entsch. nos. I564-,
I565; OGH. (May 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hochst. Entsch. no. I04I; WALKER
722, 728, and I KLANG's Kommentar 324; in Czarist Russia, see MANDELSTAM,
Clunet I902, 490; in former Turkey, see Clunet I903, 86, 96.
137 The learned Norwegian delegate Beichmann, Actes de Ia Deuxieme Conference de Ia Haye (I894) 73, was the main advocate of the lex fori, but
presented it as identical with the law of the domicil. Likewise, I BAR § I73·
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Neither are we any better served, when it is argued, especially in the Restatement, that "the law of the forum governs the right to divorce not because it is the place where
the action is brought but because it is the domicil of one or
both of the parties." 138 Story 139 and his contemporaries
could properly propose such a theory with respect to the matrimonial domicil, whereby they had simply the husband's
domicil in mind. To identify the law of the forum with that
of the domicil is correct when divorce is rendered exclusively
at the matrimonial domicil. The predication is manifestly
wrong so soon as there are two domicils of the parties.
The reasonableness of the rule appears never to have been
questioned. This alone, the unvarying application of the local
statute in every American court, makes it clear that the principle of territorialism with its strong roots in the past common law has in fact here found one more expression. The
spirit of independence and the need to sever an immigrant
or settler from his former associations may have contributed
to perpetuate this indifference to the outside world. As the
story goes, 140 it was almost half a century before the potentialities of the Nevada statute of 1861, with six months'
residence, for affording easy divorces on a large scale was
grasped by a former New York attorney. These early legislations were simple documents of pioneers. If so, we may
wonder why under changed circumstances the application of
foreign divorce law never has been taken into consideration,
while the choice of law problem is so prominent in Europe
and while also in this country the main purpose of conflicts
law is perfectly acknowledged as being the achievement of
uniformity in establishing the solution of a legal question
138 Restatement § 135 comment
13 9 STORY § 229 a.
140 INGRAM and BALLARD, "The

2

a.

Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada,"
Law and Cont. Probl. (1935) 302, 305.
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irrespective of the forum. 141 There may be, indeed, no positive reason at all but only a negative explanation for this
result. At any rate, we cannot overlook the fact that the
actual doctrine has no clear conceptual basis and that this
lack of foundation has greatly contributed to the much deplored confusion and anarchy in this field.
Other countries. The law of the forum is openly applied
to any person in Soviet Russia 142 and in some Latin American countries, 143 upon the basis of the territorial principle.
Also in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, traditionally the
law of the forum is applied, although the writers doubt
whether it is not rather the law of the domicil that is applied,
because usually divorce is not granted unless both parties are
domiciled within the forum or both parties had their last
domicil and one continues to live, within the country.l4 4 It
might be advisable to construe soberly all these rules on the
basis of territorialism and lex fori rather than in terms of
the principle of domiciU 45 The manner in which specific
141

See supra p. 94·
MAKAROV, Precis 396 attests a uniform doctrine; LuNz 304.
143 E.g., see the declaration of the Colombian delegation in signing the
C6digo Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 374; Venezuela: Cass. (June 15, 1914) Memoria 1915, 171, 172; Cass. (Feb. 21, 1921)
Memoria 1922, 162, 163. Uruguay: By virtue of art 2401 C. C. a court has
jurisdiction only if Uruguayan law is applicable; this is the case if one of
the spouses is domiciled within the country, ALFONSIN, Regimen Internacional del Divorcio (1953) 133 ff. The recent law of Brazil (1942) does
not mention separation in Brazil, but includes it in the "domiciliary" law
applicable according to Lei de Introduc;ao art. 7· ESPINOLA, 8-B Tratado ro66
asserts that in the case of different domicils, both laws must be attended
concerning permissibility and causes of separation.
144 Denmark: BoRUM, 122; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 214 no. 8; ibid.
at 220 nos. 48 ff.; MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 747·
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II8.
Iceland: EYJ6LFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762; LONING in 9 Z.ausi.PR.
(1935) 407; see also German RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103.
The Scandinavian Convention arts. 7, 9 starts from a primary rule that
divorce is rendered at the matrimonial domicil, but states exceptions, and
finally declares the law of the forum applicable.
145 But for intrastate conflicts Australia has designated the law of the domicil rather than the lex fori of the residence, cf. (Commonwealth) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1945-1955, s. I I . FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4
142
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problems are solved by prevailing practice is more in accordance with the lex fori principle. Also, the application of
the American rule by Continental courts, resulting from the
nationality principle and renvoi, is much simplified, if we
understand it as based on the law of the forum. 146
Latin American treaties. On the other hand, the Treaty of
Montevideo has unequivocaiiy declared domiciliary law to
determine not only jurisdiction for divorce 147 but also, in a
provision correctly separated, 148 the right to divorce. The
problem, it is true, appeared in its simplest form, since jurisdiction is exclusive for the court of the present or last matrimonial domicil.
In the same way, the C6digo Bustamante clearly isolates
the choice of law question and with one exception subjects
the right to divorce to the law of the marital domiciJ.l 49 This
is a remarkable victory for the domiciliary principle, as
usually the Havana Code does not decide which is the personal law.
2.

Diverse Contacts

As an aftereffect of former conceptions/ 50 divorce sometimes has been assimilated to the dissolution of ordinary contracts; as a matter of fact, all requisites of marr.iage in this
country are considered governed by the law of the place of
celebration, indicated by the historic rule for contracts. This
idea has also played a role in determining the dissolution of
marriage 151 and continues to do so in a few countries. In
D. L R 36 prefers the domiciliary angle but concedes doubts on this point; in
Essays 727, 728, he adheres to the lex fori conception.
146 Infra pp. 480 ff.
147
Treaty on international civil law, text of r889, art. 62; text of 1940, art.
59· On restrictions of the principle, see supra n. 46.
148
Treaty of Montevideo, text of r889, art. 13b; text of 1940, art. rsb.
149 C6digo Bustamante art. 52 (for the exception of art. 54, see infra p.
462).
150
See supra p. 425.
151
PUTTER, 3 Rechtsfiille, part r, So, 85, quoted by 1 BAR 486 § 173 n. 6, tr.
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particular, the Marriage Law of Argentina provides, in a
section known for the incessant complications and doubts it
has provoked in the world, that a foreign divorce of a marriage celebrated in the Argentine Republic does not entitle
either of the spouses to remarry, if the divorce is inconsistent
with the Code/ 52 This means, in the prevailing though contested opinion, that a foreign, e.g., Uruguayan, divorce of a
marriage celebrated in Argentina is invalid in Argentina. 152a
The Treaty of Montevideo of 1889 implying this interpretation 153 invalidates such a divorce in all member states/ 54
although Uruguay departs from this rule on the ground of
public policy. 155 It is a fortunate concession to international
needs that, in the new 1940 draft of Montevideo, Argentina
acquiesced in the elimination of this extraterritorial effect
by GILLESPIE 384 § 173 n. 10; Austrian Imperial Decree of Oct. 23, r8or,
Justizgesetzsammlung no. 542; cf. WALKER 727 n. 14; D'OLIVECRONA in Clunet
1883, 343 at 359· For criticism of this theory, see STORY § 23oa, and \VEISS,
3 Traite 682. But it is the basis on which BARTIN, 2 Principes 323 § 318 advocates application of the national law of the husband at the time of the marriage.
Peru: The Supreme Court of Peru, in a series of decisions declared that a
foreign marriage could not be dissolved for causes not recognized in the country of celebration. See Ej. {July 2, 1929) 25 Anales Jud. (1929) 78 (Japanese
marriage) and cases cited by APARICIO y SANCHEZ, 8 C6digo Civil, Concordancias 70. Contra Ej. {June 20, 1936) 32 Anales Jud. (1936) 100 (consent
divorce). The C. C. of Aug. 30, 1936, art. V par. 2, seems to eliminate this
practice.
Bolivia: The dissolubility of a marriage depends on the law of the place
of celebration (art. 24 of the Divorce Law of April 15, 1932).
152 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 7, cf. art. 82. Divorces of
Argentine marriages and foreign marriages must be distinguished, apart
from the ordinary distinction of domestic and foreign divorces. Cf. the clear
survey by ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 313-320. A related provision of
the Chilean C. C. art. 120 was adopted also by Ecuador: C. C. art. 105; El
Salvador: C. C. art. 170; Uruguay: C. C. art. 103, and refers to all divorces
granted abroad which the municipal law would not permit.
See infra n. 178.
152 a According to GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 392-402 the effects of this provision are limited to denying the capacity of remarriage, within or outside
Argentina; a further relaxation may be expected after the introduction of
divorce into Argentine law by the statute of Dec. 14, 1954.
153 2 VIco nos. 107, 108.
154 Treaty on international civil law, art. 13b.
155 See infra p. 518.
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of the law of the place of celebration; the proviso was
changed into a mere reservation allowing the state of celebration to deny recognition to foreign divorces/ 56
The Polish Supreme Court resorted to the law of the place
of celebration to solve the problem arising from interprovincial conflicts, 157 while the Rumanian Supreme Court rejected this test. 158 The Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia
seemed to have returned to the idea. 159
Any reference to the place where the offense to marital
duties was committed has long been abandoned in all countries.160 But reference to the law of the place where the
cause for divorce accrued is found in America in sporadic attempts to limit jurisdiction for divorce. 161
3· National Law Cumulatively Applied with the Lex Fori
In most civil law countries, the two questions of jurisdiction and applicable law are distinguished as a matter of
course, and, with respect to the latter, consideration is given
to the le.'C fori in conjunction with the lex patriae. However,
the approach varies.
France and others. In France and the majority of other
countries following the French Code, 162 grant of divorce
must accord with the national law of the parties and not
contravene the forum's public policy understood in its broad156 Art.

I5b.
Polish S. Ct., Plenary decision {Oct. 9-I6, I937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (I938I939) 459•
15
' Rumania: S. Ct. {March 3, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( 1937-I938) 320.
159 See Sup. Ct. {Feb. 28, 1929) no. 8745 and (March I, 1934) no. I3328,
10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) I7I; I BERGMANN {ed. 2) 746.
160 STORY § 230a; I BAR 487 § 173 n. 9a, tr. by GILLESPIE 385 § 173 n. 16.
161 See infra p. 488.
162 France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Rumania, Portugal, also Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; and with respect to separation from bed and board,
Brazil (until 1942), Italy and Spain and the more recent enactments of
French and Spanish Morocco. See subsequent footnotes for cases. This system has been adopted by numerous Latin American writers, e.g., MATOS no.
258, cf. also no. 264.
157
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est sense. The observance of the national law is the rule,
and public policy intervenes as a basis for exceptions, the
determination of which is left to the discretion of the courts
and which therefore remain ~easurably uncertain. 163 In fact,
they cover many, if not most, cases. 164
The Dutch courts, which started with this basis, seem
now to apply exclusively Dutch divorce law, disregarding
the personal law where they are not bound by the Hague
Convention to consider it. 165 For the Netherlands, this is
extraordinary.
In the German legislation, and those following its lead,
viz., those of Austria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Sweden, China,
and Japan, and by the unwritten law of Greece, divorce depends directly and concurrently upon conformity with the
national law and the law of the forum. 166 This system of
1 63 See NIBOYET 746 and 5 Traite 422, 428; BATIFFOL, Traite no. 459, 462;
POULLET 446 ff. no. 379; KOLLEWI]N, Het beginsel der openbare orde ( 1917)
90.
1 64 N!BOYET, Notions Sommaires (1937) 187 no. 310 bis, even formulates a
simple principle of cumulative application of the personal and the French
laws, parallel to the German system.
165 The decision of the Hooge Raad (Dec. 13, 1907) W. 8636, Clunet 191 I,
1334 had attracted attention, as it applied Dutch law to American citizens
domiciled in the Netherlands, not by renvoi but as the lex fori. Cf., for instance, the criticism by KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der openbare orde 87. See
the later decisions Rb. Amsterdam (Jan. II, 1924) Clunet 1925, u2o; Rb. den
Haag (April 7, 1932) W. 12661; Hof den Haag (June 22, 1933) W. 12715;
Hof Amsterdam (June 27, 1935) W. 12956; Rb. Almelo (Jan. 22, 1936)
W. 1937, no. 54 (Lithuanians}; Hof den Haag (June 5, 1936) W. 1936, no.
1052 (Germans, after Germany had left the Hague Convention); Hof den
Haag (June 16, 1949) N.J. 1950 no. 578; Hof den Haag (Oct. 24, 1956) N.J.
1957 no. 467.
1 6 6 Germany: EG. art. 17 par. 4· Divorce cannot be pronounced in this
country upon the ground of a foreign law, unless it is permissible according
to both the foreign law and the German laws.
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 8.
Albania: Marriage Law of 1948, art. 84.
Yugoslavia: Family Law of 1946, art. 86.
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3, § 2.
China: Law of 1918, art. II.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 16.
Greece: App. Patras ( 1936) no. 171, Clunet 1937, 369; App. A then ( 1950)
no. 1365, Revue Hellen. 1951, 150. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 372; FRAGISTAS,
Z.ausi.PR. 1955, 150.
Also the Benelux-Draft, art 6.
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cumulation was adopted by the Hague Convention. 167 Although in this group the domestic divorce law does not
operate merely by way of exception, the rule refers, here
too, to the national law in the first place, with the internal
law controlling permissibility and causes for divorce. Hence,
also under these statutes, the divorce decree is founded on
the foreign law.
Under the Swiss statute, however, the roles are reversed;
if both laws consent, divorce is "pronounced according to
Swiss law." 168 The courts have concluded from this provision that Swiss law must be applied to all legal effects of
divorce, such as alimentary obligations and guardianship
over children. 169

V.
I.

APPLICATION OF THE NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE

Permissibility of Divorce and Grounds for Divorce Distinguished.

The disposition of the Hague Convention relating to Divorce and Separation, that the granting of divorce or separation must conform with the national law of the parties as
well as with the law of the forum, is in two parts:
"Art. I. Married persons may apply for a divorce provided the law of the state to which they belong (national
law) and the law of the place where the application is made
both permit divorce.
"The same applies to separation from bed arid board.
"Art. 2. Divorce may be granted only if obtainable in the
particular case under both the national law of the spouses
167
Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. I: " .•• provided their
national law and the law of the place where the application is made both
admit divorce."
168
Swiss NAG. art. 7h last paragraph. Similarly, Belgian Congo: C. C.
book I art. I3 par. 2.
169
BG. (June I3, I9I2) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; BG. (May 28, I9I4) 40 BGE.
II 305, 308; BG. (Nov. 27, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 453, 454; BG. (Feb. 2, I92I)
47 BGE. II 6; BG. (Dec. Io, I936) 62 BGE. II 265.
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and the law of the place where the application 1s made,
though on different grounds.
"The same applies to separation from bed and board."
There is nothing in the Convention to justify such a division of the rules, but this division had been established by
the discussions of the Institute of International Law 170 and
during the Hague Conference 171 for the purpose of a differentiated regulation. The distinction has regained significance in the C6digo Bustamante; under article sz, the right
to separation or divorce is governed by the law of the matrimonial domicil, while under article 54 the causes for divorce
or separation are subject to the law of the place of suit, provided that the parties are domiciled in the forum. 171a It is
difficult to understand this provision.
Generally, such distinctions are made for the purpose of
analytical discussion but without any intended contrast. 172
2.

Permissibility of Divorce

(a) Under the law of the forum. Complete dissolution of
the marriage bond is at present prohibited in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Paraguay, and since 1938 again in
Spain; also for Catholics under the Austrian Civil Code in
Liechtenstein and for marriages celebrated before a Catholic
priest in Portugal.
Although legislators generally do not envisage persons
170 Annuaire 1887-1888, 125, the national law should govern the question
whether or not divorce is allowed at all, and the law of the forum decides
the grounds for divorce.
171 See Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia Haye, 1900, 193; KAHN, 2
Abhandl. 321.
171a Similarly, the Siamese Law on private international law of 1939, § 27,
makes the permissibility of divorce depend on the national law of the
spouses, whereas the grounds for divorce are governed by the lex fori.
172 In the Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889,
art. 13b, it is required that "the alleged cause" be agreeable to the law of
the place of celebration. This is too narrow an expression, as it must have
been intended to include permissibility of divorce in the first place. This
mistake was not corrected in the 1940 draft.
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other than subjects of the forum, a divorce not granted to
domiciliaries or nationals is not granted to foreigners. Religious and ethical reasons, as well as respect for the judicial
institutions of the forum, motivate this rule. The rule, which
was observed in France until divorce was reintroduced in
1884, 113 is in force in Spain, 114 Italy (with short interruption,
however, much noticed during the preparation for the Hague
Convention) ,175 Brazil, 176 Argentina (though with considerable opposition) ,177 and probably everywhere in the countries
mentioned in the previous paragraph.
By an analogous rule, foreigners cannot obtain any form
of limited divorce unknown to the forum. Whatever type of
judicial separation short of complete dissolution of the marriage ties may be prescribed by the national law, no form of
WEISS, 3 Traite 689 If.
TRIAS DE BEs, 6 Repert. 255 no. I I I ; GOLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 313·
175 Following the contemporary trend toward permitting divorce of foreigners whose national law did not oppose it, divorces were granted to
foreigners by App. Ancona (March 22, 1884) Monitore r884, 365, Giur. Ita!.
r884, II, 247; App. Genova (June 7, 1894) Monitore 1894, 784, Giur. Ita!.
1894, I, 2, 554, Clunet 1898, 412; Trib. Milano (June 2, 1897) Monitore 1897,
514 and (June 30, r898) Giur. Ita!. 1898, I, 2, 765, aff'd App. Milano (Nov.
24, 1898) Monitore 1899, 64. But the last-mentioned decision was reversed
by Cass. Torino (Nov. 21, 1900) Monitore 1900, 981; similarly, Cass. Firenze
(Dec. 6, 1902) Clunet 1903, 910, and all later decisions, applauded by the
writers; see Bosco, 22 Rivista (1930) 461, 500; FEDOZZI 466 n: 3· On the sensation caused at the Hague meetings by this temporary liberalism, see KAHN,
2 Abhandl. 313 ff. Among the other literature see 2 FIORE no. 68g, generally
followed in Latin America; see, eg., MATOS, no. 564.
In order to correct the more liberal attitude of some Northern Italian Appellate Courts (e.g. Turin, April 13, 1951, Foro padano 1951 I 471) the law
of July 30, 1950 amended art. 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to
give the state procurators a wider power to contest sentences in matrimonial
matters; the Supreme Court firmly declines to divorce foreigners: Cass. (May
17, 1952) Foro Ita!. 1952 I rr88, reversing the above-mentioned decision of
Turin.
176
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. r8, 1920) App. civ. no. 2, 755, 23 Revista
Jur. (1921) 496; Distr. Fed. (Sept. 1, 1932) per EDMUNDO DE OLIVEIRA FIGUEIREDO in 23 Arch. ]ud. 478, cf. OCTAVIO, Dicionario, Divorcio absoluto 88
no. 408 If.; 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 8o and 6 Repert. 166 no. 44·
177
Argentine Civil Marriage Law of r888, arts. 81, 82. There is opposition now to the rigidity of excluding divorce for foreigners; cf. RoMERO DEL
PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 314.
17 a
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separation not provided by the law of the forum is granted.
Where, for instance, no divorce other than absolute divorce
is allowed, it is not possible to obtain any limited kind of
separation. These principles, not so natural as they sound, as
we shall see, may create real hardship. Nevertheless, the
maxim is universal and fully adopted by the Hague Convention on Divorce (art. 1).
(b) Under the national law. By virtue of the nationality
principle, divorce a vinculo is denied if the national law does
not permit dissolution of a marriage during the lifetime
of both spouses. If, for instance, formerly an Italian subject
were married to an Argentine bride in Argentina, 178 divorce
cannot be obtained in Germany, because the husband's national law forbids it, 179 nor in France because neither national law allowed it. 180
The question has been raised, however, whether, in a
country having the institution of divorce, the public policy
that regards the institution as based on morality and social
sanity is so strong that it must oppose foreign prohibitions.
178 Case of Trib. civ. Seine (May II, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 129. It is
disputed in Argentine literature whether under the Argentine Civil Marriap:e
Law of 1888, art. 82, a marriage celebrated in Argentina can be dissolved in
a foreign country that has not signed the Montevideo Treaty, so that remarriage abroad is legal. The negative answer, presented by the decision in
100 Gac. del Foro (1932) 78 col. 2, and ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der Int. Priv.
319 (with CALANDRELLI, WEIS5--ZEBALLOS, LLERENA, GOLDSCHMIDT) has been
approved also by the Camara civil de Apelaciones de Ia Capital (March 14,
1935) 49 }.A. 505, Clunet 1937, 124; see also SCHLEGELRERGER, 4 Z.ausl.PR.
(1930) 756. The opposite view (GONZALEZ, MACHADO, LAFAILLE, ALCORTA,
VIco, REBORA) has been said to be the prevailing opinion by a mistaken German author GoTTSCHICK in JW. 1930, 1827, who has been followed by numerous German decisions, such as those enumerated by 2 BERGMANN 8 n. I and
KG. Berlin (Feb. 9, 1931) IPRspr. 193 r, no. 68.
17 9 EG. art. 17 par. 4· It makes no difference whether the marriage was
celebrated in Germany, OLG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) Hans.RGZ. 1936, B
486 no. 171.
1 80 Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, 1918) Clunet 1918, II82; Cour Paris (April
30, 1926) S.1926.2.89, D.1927.2.1. Correspondingly, in Trib. civ. Seine (May
II, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 129 (see supra n. 178) a divorce granted to the
parties in Uruguay was not recognized in France. Czechoslovakia; S. Ct. civ.,
nos. 6787, 9079; but cf. S. Ct. (March 1, 1934) no. 13328.
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When the temporary Spanish Republic had solemnly introduced dissolution of marriage, it seemed unbearable to refuse its benefits to any category of persons, even foreigners.181 Analogous decisions have occasionally occurred
elsewhere. 182 But prevailing opinions have preferred strict
application of divorce prohibitions imposed on the parties by
their nationallaw. 183 It must be admitted that by this strict
application the policy of permitting the dissolution of marriage appears weaker than its counterpart, the policy of inseparability of spouses.
(c) Separation. A further consequence of the nationality
principle is that separation from bed and board, or judicial
or administrative separation of any other kind, except provisional measures, depends upon the approval of such an
institution by the national law of the parties. 184 Since, according to present general opinion, 185 the kind of separation
granted must also conform with the law of the forum, doubts
arise when each law has a form of limited divorce, but the
forms are not identical. The varieties are numer.ous indeed. 186
But, apart from the very complicated problems caused in
181 Republican Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. 27, 1933) 207 Sent. 56; cf. Revue
1933, 533, 24 Rivista (1932) 567.
B 2 Rumania: PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. 192 notes decisions both ways.
Belgium: Divorce to two Catholic Austrians was granted by App. Liege
(:'\ov. 2, 1937) J.d. Tr. 1937, col. 672 no. 3512, 23 Bull. Inst. Beige (1937)
76; 24 ibid. (1938) 52; this decision joins several other Belgian manifestations of a liberal policy stronger than the usual; cf. infra ns. 217-219, 222.
183 See, for instance, German RG. (Jan. 13, 1936) 150 RGZ. 61, Nouv.
Revue 1937, 109; Belgium: Cass. (March 9, 1882) Pasicrisie 1882.1.62;
Cass. (May 16, 1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 398; Cass. (Ch. reunis) (Feb. 16,
1955) Pasicrisie 1955 I 647, Revue Crit. 1955, 143. Cf. POULLET 441 no. 377
and the foregoing notes 179 and 180.
184 See for the late law of Brazil: Josii F. MANSUR GuERIOs, "Desquite por
mutuo consentimento," 53 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1941) 113, 114.
1 85 Under the former pure theory of national law, the Trib. civ. Bruxelles
(May 8, 1908) Pand. Per. 1908.604 granted a separation on the mutual agreement of the parties according to the foreign law unsupported by the Belgian
law.
1 8 6 See for comparative legislation, RocurN, 1 Traite de droit civil compare, le Mariage ( 1904) 237; BERGMANN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb 723.
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Germany by the creation of a particular type of "dissolution
of the marital union" in the Civil Code of 1896, 187 problems
which disappeared in 1938 with the abolition of this unfortunate institution, few difficulties seem to have been encoun tered. 188
A much deplored result 189 of the double legal requirements concerning separation occurs in the numerous international situations where one of the legislations involved
provides only for absolute divorce and the other only for
separation, or where the spouses loyal to their faith or to
their national legislation do not want the absolute divorce
available at the forum. In these cases, neither form of relief
can be conferred under the system of nationality. 190 The
consequences are apt to include special inconveniences, espe187 Cf. RAAPE 381; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 474 j cf. also 3 FRANKENSTEIN 468.
See LEWALD, 57 Recueil 1936 III 313 on the decisions of the highest Dutch
and Swiss courts.
188 Italians are separated in Switzerland; see decisions in 6 Z.ausl.PR.
(1932) 836; 7 ibid. (1933) 644; II ibid. (1937) 656. The effects of such a
separation are governed by Swiss law (SCHNITZER 379); but alimony is
generally not given under art. x6o C. C. as in case of a Swiss separation but
according to art. 152 C. C. as in case of a divorce, BG. (Feb. x6, 1926) 52
BGE. liz, contra: OG. Zurich (March 23, 1950) 8 Schwz. Jahrb. (1951) 292.
In France, it was decided that the effect of a French separation of Italians
should be determined by Italian law rather than French; see Cour Dijon
(March z8, 1939) Clunet 1939, 634. Portuguese nationals before 1931 could
be separated but not divorced in France; see Trib. civ. Seine (June xz, I 888)
Gaz. Pal. 1888.1.902. Nationals of countries recognizing judicial separation
may likewise obtain separation in Portugal; see CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, Direito
Civil 696 (where also conversion of separation into divorce is treated).
A judicial separation under South African law was not recognized as
basis for a conversion into divorce under Danish law, ¢stre Landsret (Feb.
19, 1952) zo Z.ausl.PR. (1955) 514; but see BoRUM 123 n. 4·
189 Cf. especially KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 330, 339, 342 (more violently than is
justified by his strong position against the law of the forum) and WALKER
702.
190 OLG. Kiel (May 16, 1934) JW. 1934, 2349, IPRspr. 1934, no. 59
(Danish law); RG. (Nov. 4, 1937) 156 RGZ. 106. Austrian separations from
bed and board have been transformed, according to the Law of July 6, 1938,
§ II5 by a simple procedure and without instituting a new suit, into full German divorces between persons who have become German subjects, RG. (Dec.
15, 1938) 159 RGZ. 76.
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cially when the parties, faced with barred doors at their
domicil, are refused jurisdiction even in their homeland. 191
A court having only absolute divorce, besides merely provisional orders, at its disposal, such as the Rumanian or the
German tribunals, 192 is unable to give any relief to parties for
whom Italian, 198 Brazilian, 194 etc., law is considered applicable, although these legislations allow separation from bed
and board. Inversely, Italian courts deny such separation to
Rumanian or German nationals, because the parties' national
law does not provide separation. 194a For the latter case, it
was suggested that this hardship should be alleviated on the
ground that the larger remedy is agreeable to the personal
law,l(J 4 b anJ some Brazilian courts have proceeded in consequence,m while others have been opposed. 196 Yet at the
Hague Conference, it was answered that limited divorce is
101 Compare, for instance, Rumanian C. C. art. 216, and KAHN, 2 Abhandl.
339· But see WALKER 703.
192 Since 1938, no limited divorce has existed in Germany, but the situation
was materially the same before, according to the opinion prevailing in the
court decisions. See OLG. Breslau (Sept. 8, 1933) JW. 1933, 2400, IPRspr.
1933, no. 33·
1
" ' Compare PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. 195, and FEDOZZI 461.
194
Just. Fed. Nictheroy (Oct. 31, 1922) 66 Revista Dir. Civ. (1922) 314;
cf. OCTAVIO, Dicionario no. 319 If.
194
a However, the Trib. Rome (Feb. 18, 1950) Foro Ita!. 1950, 488, has
admitted the separation of Greeks; MoRELLI, Elementi II7·
194
b The Benelux-Draft, art. 7 sentence 2, has apparently proceeded on a
related theory admitting separation according to the lex fori though the national law only admits divorce.
195
The cases of this note and notes 196 and 198 have been kindly pointed
out by Miss Magdalene Schoch, Harvard Law School. Rumanian spouses or
husband: Ap. Pernambuco (1938) II5 Rev. dos Trib. 745; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo
(1938) II6 ibid. 157; 126 ibid. 171; German spouses: Ap. civ. Sao Paulo
(1941) 131 ibid. 243; Ap. civ. Rio de Janeiro no. 8260 (Jan. 13, 1942) 61
Arch. Jud. (1942) 314; Japanese husband: Trib. Sao Paulo (Dec. 4. 1931)
cited by 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 83.
196
The Appellate Court of Parana in Plenary Meeting of its chambers
(June 6, 1941) 34 Parana Jud. (1941) 59 adopting the nationality principle
denied separation by consent to German parties. Sao Paulo (1941) 133 Rev.
dos Trib. 152 (German husband, Russian wife; no desquite in Brazil, as
both German and Russian law, in case she should have retained Russian nationality, do not provide separation).
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not a "minus" which may be subtracted from absolute divorce, but a different thing. 197
The Brazilian practice, previous to the law of 1942, was
interesting. The courts in principle required agreement of
the national laws of both parties for granting separation by
mutual consent (desquite amigavel) but granted it also in
three exceptional cases, viz., the case just mentioned of the
national law allowing absolute divorce, the case of renvoi, 198
and the case where one party is of Brazilian nationality. 199
These decisions seem to retain authority in cases where foreigners are not domiciled in Brazil.
3· Grounds for Divorce
Under the principle of lex fori or lex domicilii as well as
under that of nationality, applied exclusively, the right to
divorce is governed by one law. The English courts demonstrate how seriously they accept this doctrine by applying, on
the one hand, only English law in any divorce suit in England and, on the other hand, by recognizing foreign divorce
decrees of the matrimonial domicil without inquiring into
what law was applied in the case. Similarly, when French
courts adhered to the pure nationality rule, they granted
divorce for reasons found in the national law but not in
French law. 200 This point of view still exists in some countries.201 Of course, causes repugnant to the public policy of
the forum are always excepted.
197 See documentation in OLG. Kiel (May 16, 1934) JW. 1934, 2349,
IPRspr. 1934, no. 59·
198 Sup. Fed. Ct. (1937) 112 Rev. dos Trib. 334 (obiter dictum); Ap. civ.
Sao Paulo (1938) 118 ibid. 715; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo (1939) 123 Rev. dos
Trib. 597 (Czechoslovakian law of husband applied as the German law of
the wife refers also to that Ia w).
199 See infra n. 236.
2oo See SuRVILLE 440.
2° 1 The Polish Law of 1926 on private international law, art. 17 par. 1
declares the national law applicable without any qualifications; likewise the
Czechoslovakian law on private international law of 1948, § 18, the Bul-
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At present, however, courts in France and many other
countries are disinclined to apply a foreign ground for divorce, unless it corresponds with a ground acknowledged in
the forum. 202 Absolute identity, it is true, is not demanded.
For instance, in the relations among the countries following
the Code N apolion, divorce for injures graves is granted
without regard to the varying meanings of this term, which
term is also held to correspond to gross insults, cruelty, or
desertion, constituting grounds for divorce under American
statutes, 203 and even covers adultery as a foreign requisite. 204
The result of this system is, of course, that divorce is denied, if the personal law includes no ground to support the
action. Englishmen (except where renvoi was applied) were
refused divorce in most cases because of the narrow limits
of the right to divorce in the English matrimonial law before
the reforms. 205 The same is still true of citizens of New
garian Family Law of 1949, art. 58, and in case of foreigners, the Egyptian
C. C. ( 1948) arts. 13 par. 2, 14 as well as the Syrian C. C. ( 1949) arts. 14
par. 2, 15.
Greece: Court of Athens (1937) no. 1952, 49 Themis 473, Clunet 1939, 463
granting separation from bed and board to Italian nationals according to
Italian Jaw on a ground unknown in Greek law.
In Portugal: CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, r Direito Civil 692 thinks that outside ot
the Hague Convention a cause of the national law unknown to the Portuguese law suffices in principle.
202
Belgium: Trib. civ. Verviers (March 7, 1932) 19 Bull. Inst. Beige
( 1933) 74 (Swiss parties; grave injury required by Belgian law must be
proved, as well as disruption of the marriage by a lesser injury, ground for
divorce under Swiss law).
France: Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, goo, Revue Crit.
1935, 759 requires identity of grounds in both laws, while LEREBOURs-PIGEON)>:IERE 394 ff. no. 336 suggests that equivalence should suffice. '
The Netherlands: Cf. VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1937, 155·
203
E.g., Trib. civ. Seine (April 6, 1922) Clunet 1922, 674 (equation with
gross insults under California law); Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 19, 1926) Clunet
I 926, 66 3 (equation with desertion under the Indiana statute).
204
POULLET, no. 379; NIBOYET 746. Adultery may be defined very differently
(cf. SAITER, 5 Giur. Camp. DIP. rr), but the differences are not considered
material.
205
Cour Paris (March r, 1933) Gaz.Pal. 1933·1.884; App. d'Aix (March
23, 1936) Rec. Somm. 1936, no. 1736; Cass. (req.) (April 20, 1937) Gaz.
Trib. 1937.1.87: "injures graves" no cause for divorce under English law.
Switzerland: BG. (Feb. 21, 1935) 58 Sem. Jud. (1936) 209, I I Z.ausl.PR.
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York, domiciled in New York. 206 But the internal conceptions
of what are sufficient grounds for divorce also play a large
role, although a certain elasticity in their application rests in
the discretion of the court. 207
A more definite position is taken by the German Code,
the Hague Convention, and the codifications following
them. 208 Divorce must be supported in this system by the
lex fori as well as by the national law.
This group, however, divides on the following point. In
some of the texts involved, it has been made clear that, although divorce must be justified by some ground under each
of the two laws, the ground need not be the same in both. 209
Hence, the Swiss Federal Tribunal declared it sufficient if
the facts of a case supported, at the same time, disruption of
the marriage according to Swiss law and injures gra·ves
within the French meaning 210 or disruption in the Swiss sense
(1937) 656 no. 2 (facts insufficient to constitute "injures graves" under
French law, C. C. art. 23 r).
206 Trib. civ. Havre (Nov. 17, 1923) Clunet 1924, 1000.
207 A Dutch observer, KOLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der openbare orde 90, thinks
Belgian courts are more inclined than French judges to recognize foreign
divorce grounds unknown to the lex fori; the most authoritative writer on
Belgian conflicts law, PouLLET, no. 379 makes no such distinction, but he
seems to favor a liberal interpretation of the similar ground theory.
2os Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 2.
Germany: EG. art. 17 par. 4·
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 8 par. 4·
Sweden: Law of July 8, 1904, with subsequent amendments, c. 3, § 2.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. r.
Albania: Marriage Law of 1948, art. 84.
Yugoslavia: Family Law of 1946, art. 86.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. r6.
China: Law of 1918, art. II.
209 Hague Convention on Divorce, German, Austrian and Swedish statutes (see supra n. 208). The Swiss statute is interpreted the same way. Cf.
German RG. (April 5, 1921) 102 RGZ. 82; OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 21, 19q)
Hans. GZ. 1915, BBl. no. 45; OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 5, 1915) ibid. no. 46;
OLG. Restock (Dec. 16, 1921) 77 Seuff. Arch. 174; OLG. Frankfurt (July
II, 1929) JW. 1929, 3507; OLG. Kiiln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932, 2304. The
Netherlands: Rb. Haarlem (Oct. 29, 1935) W. 1936, no. 756 (under the
Hague Convention).
210 Swiss BG. (May 26, 1932) 58 BGE. II 183, 188.
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and violation of the marital duties under the then unmodified German Code. 211 Conversely, the disruption of the Swiss,
German, and Austrian law being excluded by French and
Belgian courts as contrary to public policy, 2lla a Belgian
court found in the facts a violation of the marital duties. 211 b
And if the national law of Polish Jews allowed divorce by
mutual agreement, German courts granted it, provided that
in addition, to satisfy the lex fori, a valid reason, such as
adultery or fault in disrupting the marriage existed. 212 The
case of mutual agreement of Soviet Russian nationals has
been treated in the same way. 213 The statutes of Japan and
China 214 by their wording seem to exclude such interpretation and hence to require in fact that the same or a similar
ground exist in both laws.
Cumulative application of two laws of any sort results in
dismissal of a divorce suit when, according to only one of the
two legislations, such events as condonation, recrimination
(compensation of causes), 215 or lapse of time 215 a negates
the right to divorce.
Moreover, the double requirement opens a strange gap
when divorce cannot be granted according to the national
211

Swiss BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, Erw. 3, 4·
Trib. civil Sarreguemines (Feb. 3, 1954) Clunet 1954, 958; Cour Bruxelles (June 26, 1951) J.d. Tr. 1951, 679.
211
b Cour Bruxelles (March 1, 1952) Pasicrisie 1952 II 58.
212
OLG. Frankfurt (July II, 1929) JW. 1929, 3507 (supra n. 209) and
constant practice, despite some controversy in the literature whet:!er divorce
by agreement is opposed to German public policy and, if so, whether it may
be taken as a basis for a German divorce decree; the dominant opinion interprets EG. art. 17 par. 4, which is less well drafted than art. 2 of the
Hague Convention on Divorce, as satisfying all the exigencies of German
pub! ic policy, irrespective of logical relation to par. 1 of art. 17. Cf. PRETZEL
in JW. 1928, 3030; LUTTERLOH, JW. 1929, 419; HOLLANDER, }W. 1929, 1863.
213
KG. (Sept. 14, 1936) JW. 1936, 3579; cf. RG. (April 4, 1928) 121
RGZ. 24.
214
China and Japan, suPra n. 208.
215
Cour Paris (July 7, 1920) Clunet 1921, 518 states that evidence is lacking for compensation of grounds according to the American law; cf. BARTIN,
2 Principes 305 § 314.
21
5a OG. Ziirich (June 25, 1941) 2 Schwz. Jahrb. (1945) 187.
211

a
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law, because the forum would grant another type of relief.
Laws that leave the right to divorce without any limitation,
like formerly the Soviet Russian law, or which broaden the
right, like the Belgian law, may eliminate or closely limit,
respectively, the right to sue for annulment of the marriage.
For instance, a marriage may be annulled under German
law, because the husband was ignorant of an incurable serious illness of the wife at the time of the marriage, but it
would not be voidable under Russian or Belgian law, as
divorce takes the place of annulment there. Couples of these
nationalities married in their respective countries and coming
to live in Germany would not obtain either relief at their
new domicil. 216
Permissive policy. Divorce laws are sometimes quaint.
even if they do not equal the Chinese rules before I 9 3 I ,
under which the husband could divorce his wife because of
her garrulity and the wife had no right of divorce. The
tribunal of Brussels, in fact, reacted against the latter
provision 217 and recently also reacted against barring divorce to Catholics of the former Polish kingdom, 218 as well
as against the religious distinctions of the law of Iran. ~ 19
The basis for its opposition is that it is contrary to the Belgian public order to investigate the religious denomination
of the parties. In all these cases, Belgian divorce law was
substituted.
But German courts have not considered the wife's definitely inferior position in suing for divorce under the legisla216 Annulment was denied where the national law of the party who was in
error does not regard the mistake as an impediment by RG. (Oct. 6, 1927)
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 13, IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 68, Revue 1930, 129; the
prevailing opinion is in accord. See however, RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. (ed. 1) 179
and infra p. 584.
217 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 3, 1923) 9 Bull. Inst. Beige (1923) 146. See
also App. Liege (Nov. 2, 1937) J.d. Tr. 1937, col. 672 no. 3512, supra n. 182.
218 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 22, 1938) }.d.Tr. 1938, col. 646 no. 3550.
219 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 30, 1938) 53 J.d.Tr. 1938, col. 329 no. 353+·
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tion of Austria and Italy as contrary to public policy. 220 Nor
has the former English law, allowing only the husband to
sue on the ground of adultery, ever been repudiated on the
Continent. More doubt has been expressed about the Jewish
laws prohibiting the wife from suing even on the ground of
adultery or attempt on her life, but they have been applied;
the wife of a Mohammedan Persian was similarly treated. 221
Again, the court of Brussels once granted divorce in such a
case. 222 According to the prevailing opinion, it is considered
undesirable to increase the number of unfortunate cases
where marriage exists with geographically limited force. 223
So even bizarre foreign institutions are admitted.
4- Different National Laws

N a tiona! law of the husband. Upon the same historical
basis of coverture as in England, the national law of the
husband alone is applicable, without regard to that of the
wife, in Germany, Portugal, China, and Japan; 224 according
to part of the French doctrine, the national law of the husband is said to govern the causes for divorce. 225 Independently of the historical background, this system has been
appraised as the simplest and most convenient in practice. 226
220
OLG. Dusseldorf (July 6, I91I) IIO Rhein. Archiv I 58; OLG. Kiel
(Feb. 28, 1923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 267, Clunet 1925, I053·
221
Germany: RG. (May 26, 1930) 43 Z.int.R. (r93o-3r) 391; RG. (Sept.
29, 1930) JW. 193 r, 148; LG. Niirnberg (Jan. 22, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no.
81; KG. (May n, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 142.
France: Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) Clunet 1906, 410.
222
App. Bruxelles (June 8, 1899) Clunet 1899, 859.
223
RAAPE 435·
224 German EG. art. 17 par. r; followed by Japan: Law of 1898, art. 16
and China: Law of 1918, art. r r. This is also the rule adopted in the Treaty
of Montreux, Egyptian Mixed Tribunals, Regulations of Judicial Organisation, art. 29 par. 3, pub!. in U. S. Treaty Series, No. 939, now superseded by
Egyptian C. C. (1948) arts. 13 par. 2, 14, followed by the Syrian C. C. (1949)
arts. 14 par. 2, 15 (in both codes only for foreigners).
225
BARTIN, 2 Principes 323 § 318 states that this rule in the French system
is not doubtful, but the decisions are not homogeneous; cf. infra pp. 474 ff.
226 ROLIN, 2 Principes no. 591.

474

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

In the last decades, however, such preference for the husband has found less and less favor, in conformity with the
increasing tendency to allow a married woman to retain or
resume her original citizenship. 227
Last common nationality. In the Hague Convention on
Divorce, the law of the last common nationality of both
parties was adopted. 228 The Sixth Conference added in its
non-ratified drafts that where the parties never had a common nationality or where they changed from one common to
two different new nationalities, divorce and separation depend on both laws cumulatively. The recent Greek Code
more conveniently calls in such cases for the application of
the national law of the husband as of the time of the marriage celebration 229 whereas Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria
in this case resort to the lex fori. 229 a
Both laws cumulatively. According to another theory, the
granting of divorce must be permitted by the laws of both
spouses. 230
227 There is no advocate in France any longer, ]. DDNNEDIEU DE VABRES
474 n. 2 asserts, in ignoring Bartin's recent book supra n. 225.
The West German Supreme Court (]an. r8, 1954) NJW. 1954, 837, Revue
Crit. 1954, 8os, has held, that the predominance of the husband's law is not
incompatible with the constitutional principle of equality of the sexes.
2 28 Hague Convention on Divorce, arts. r, 2, 8; followed by Poland: Law
on international private law, art. 17 par. 1; Rumanian Preliminary Draft
of C. C. art. XXIV; Czechoslovakia: Law on private international Ia w of
1948, § r8; Bulgaria: Family Law of 1949, art. 58.
229 Greek C. C. (1940) art. 16.
229a See the provisions cited supra n. 228.
2so Finland: Law of Dec. 5, 1929, art. ro.
Siam: Law on private international law of 1939, § 27 par. z.
Belgium: App. Liege (July 7, 1938) Pasicrisie 1938.2.129 (particularly exacting, as the wife had resumed Belgian citizenship); Rb. Antwerp (May n,
1939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1938-1939, 1552 no. 312; Cass. (May 16, 1952) Revue
Crit. 1953, 398; Cass. {Ch. reunis) (Feb. I6, 1955) Pasicrisie 1955 I 647.
Revue Crit. 1955, 143·
Italy: UoiNA, Elementi no. 136; SALVIOLI, 19 Rivista (1927) 354 (admits
difficulties); and some decisions in France. Only Trib. civ. Seine (April 27,
1933) Revue Crit. 1935, 759 states that the grounds for divorce must agree
with the foreign laws of both parties as well as with the French law.
NrBOYET, Note ibid. 762 declares regard for the defendant's Jaw unnecessary.
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The law of the plaintiff. In contrast, the French courts
usually pronounce divorce at the instance of a party whose
national law as such permits it. Although occasionally under
this system foreign law has been applied/ 31 the usual result
is a resort to French law.
This conforms to a general trend. Suppose that the applicable conflicts rule calls for the municipal law of the husband, he a foreigner and the wife a national; or suppose that
the last common nationality law should be applied, the wife
alone having acquired the nationality of the forum during
marriage,-courts are tempted to abandon the conflicts rule
for the sake of the wife. The same development that has
fostered favor for the wife's separate nationality induces the
courts to permit the wife such rights of divorce as the law of
the forum, which is also her national law, permits. Hence,
early examples of exceptions made for nationals in some
European and particularly in Latin American jurisdictions,
have been multiplied in recent times.
From about 1906, French courts have granted divorce
according to French law to the French wife of a mixed marriage.232 If the husband were of Italian nationality, however,
they were bound by article 8 of the Hague Convention on
Divorce to observe the last common national law of the
parties. But precisely for this reason, France renounced her
participation in the Convention in 1913, and in 1927 a
French woman marrying a foreigner was allowed to retain
her French nationality. These two events reinf.orced the
Portugal: Sup. Trib. de Just. (Jan. 5, I9I8) so Direito 250, cited by CUNHA
GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 693.
Switzerland: BG. (June 23, I933) 59 BGE. II II3; App. Zurich (June 23,
I934) 34 BI. f. Zurch. Rspr. (I935) 72 no. 27; and App. Zurich (June I2,
I937) 37 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (I938) 304 no. I5I.
281
Cour Paris (March I, I933) Gaz. Pal. I933· I. 884, Revue I933, 629
(English law applied against English husband in favor of his French wife).
232
Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 26, I9o6) Revue I907, 590; Cour Paris (Oct. 31,
I9Io) Revue I911, 82; etc.
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trend of the French tribunals. In the outstanding case of the
Marquis de Ferrari, a French woman who, by marrying an
Italian, had become an Italian national and had been judicially separated from her husband in Italy, recovered French
citizenship. She was granted a divorce a vinculo in spite of
the prohibition of Italian law which had controlled her
marriage and was still the law of the Marquis. The basis
was surprisingly simple: the Court of Cassation declared
that French law is an indispensable attribute of French nationality.233 This decision attracted world-wide attention; its
exact scope remains obscure, except where the application
of the French law is in issue. 234 Much criticism has been
aroused by the inconsistency with which the foreign prohibition has been discarded in cases analogous to those in which,
before dissolution of marriage was allowed in 18 84, the
French courts refused to recognize foreign divorces of a
French national married to an alien, and the further inconsistency with the theory of fraud, which the French courts
were fostering at the very time of the Ferrari suit. 235 Nevertheless, the precedent of the Ferrari case has been followed
for 2 5 years.
In 1953, however, in recognizing a divorce decreed at the
matrimonial domicil in Ecuador the Court of Cassation was
satisfied that also under French rules the Equatorian law
233 Affaire Ferrari no. 1, Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.I922.1.137, 8.1923.1.5,
Clunet 1922, 714, Revue 1922-1923, 444; no. 2, Cass. (civ.) (March q,
1928) S.1929.1.92, Clunet 1928, 383.
2 34 BARTIN, 2 Principes 308 concludes that these are purely French solutions,
of mere French interest, which we have no reason whatsoever to apply to
foreign couples; he does not even want to suggest recognition of an analogous decree of a foreign-say, a Brazilian-tribunal.
235 See PILLET, Revue 1922-1923, 464 frankly regretting the decisions as a
break with international private law; AUDINET, rr Recueil 1926 I 230; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83; SALVIOLI, "Conflitto di leggi personali in materia
di divorzio," Rivista 1927, 354. NIBOYET, Note S.1929.1.9. As to the theory
of fraud, J. DONNilDIEU DE VABRES 480 has answered that fraud is relevant
only if committed against the law of the forum.
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was applicable, even though the wjfe was a French citizen. 235 a
The recent Lewandowski case has confirmed, for a family
living in France, the new rule, that the divorce of mixed
marriages is governed by the law of the matrimonial domicil.235b The new doctrine will certainly not exclude any special
protection accorded to French wives, especially in cases
where the law of the matrimonial domicil does not admit
divorce. If divorce is demanded by a foreign plaintiff against
his French wife and contrary to his national law, the lower
courts make the plaintiff's law prevail.235 c
In addition to France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany,
and Sweden successively left the Hague Convention to avoid
the divorce prohibition of the member state, Italy; in all
these countries, migratory Italian workers had married and
deserted native women. Except for the little influence the
Convention has preserved, it has become a habit in most of
the European countries to allow divorce to a national party
of a mixed marriage according to the lex fori. 236 In Germany,
the enacted law was adjusted to this end. 231
235a Cass. (civ.) (April 17, 1953, Riviere v. Roumiantzeff) Clunet 1953,
86o, Revue Crit. 1953, 412 (note BATIFFOL) ; note BATIFFOL in 4 Am. ]. Comp.
Law (1955) 574-581.
235 b Cass. (civ.) (March 15, 1955) Revue Crit. 1955, 320 (note BATIFFor.).
235 cTrib. civ. Seine (Jan. 27, 1956) Revue Crit. 1956, 497; Trib. civ. Nice
(Oct. 24, 1956) Gaz. Pal. 1956.2.371.
23 6Brazil: (Before the law of 1942) Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 6, 1918) Recurso Extraordinario no. 587, 20 Revista Sup. Trib. ( 1919) 246; Ap. civ.
Rio de Janeiro (Jan. 16, 1942) no. 8oo, 62 Arch. J ud. 58. Cf. Ap. civ. Rio
de Janeiro (Oct. 25, 1934) no. 4·332, 121 Revista Dir. Civ. (1936) 322 (the
constitutional provision that Brazilian law is to be applied to the dissolution
of a marriage even if only one of the spouses is of Brazilian nationality applies also in cases of judicial separation if nationality is acquired by naturalization).
Egypt: C. C. (1948) arts. 13 par. 2, 14.
Syria: C. C. (1949) arts. 14 par. 2, 15.
Albania: Marriage Law of 1948, art. 83.
Yugoslavia: Family Law of 1946, art. 85.
France: Cass. (civ.) (May 7, 1928) S.1929.1.9, Revue 1928, 653 (conversion of separation into divorce after naturalization) ; Cass. ( civ.) (Feb. s,
1929) Clunet 1929, 1258; Cass. (req.) (Feb. 4, 1931) Clunet 1932, 451; Cour
Colmar (Feb. 13, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1937, 240; Cour Paris (Dec. 21, 1937)
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In Belgium, however, the courts have been thus far in disagreement. Their decisions are significant. In a series of
cases, divorce was denied to a woman who had married an
Italian and later recovered Belgian nationality, and to wives
of Austrian origin and Catholic faith who had acquired
Belgian nationality, on the unmodified rule that divorce must
agree with the national laws of both spouses and on the consideration that at the time of the marriage both parties
knew that their bond would be indissoluble. 238 It has been
argued, furthermore, that, logically, to free the party who
belongs to the forum by application of his or her national
Revue Crit. 1938, 251, and decisions of lower courts; cf. PERROUD, Clunet
1926, 24 n, 19; J, DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 475; Note, Trib. civ. Seine (Jan.
19, 1926) Clunet 1926, 663 (through renvoi, applying French law as the
personal law of an American woman domiciled in France); Trib. civ. Seine
(Dec. 20, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1938, 324 (granted divorce to the wife who had
resumed French nationality, while under the husband's Dutch law adultery
would have been required); Cour Colmar (Jan. 7, 1938) Clunet 1938, 797•
Nouv. Revue 1938, 326 (French wife granted divorce without regard to the
German law of the husband).
Luxembourg: Cass. (April 28, 1949) 14 Pasicrisie Lux. 541, 548 (plaintiff's
national law).
Rumania: Cass. (Sept. 13, 1876); Trib. Ilfov (April 8, 1935) Clunet 1937,
625. The contrary rule obtains because of the Hague Convention in the case
of an Italian wife naturalized in Rumania: Cass. Bucarest (Oct. 25, 1928)
Revue 1930, 517.
Spain: (during republican times) Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1934) 214 Sent. 642,
Clunet 1936, 210 (Spanish wife, Italian husband).
Switzerland: BG. (June 5, 1901) 27 BGE. I 180 proclaimed that a Swiss
spouse could apply for divorce notwithstanding the prohibition of divorce by
the national law of the other spouse; BG. (June 13, 1907) 33 BGE. I 355 (one
spouse a naturalized Swiss former Austrian Catholic); BG. (July 9, 1914) 40
BGE. I 418, 428; BG. (March 2, 1922) Clunet 1922, 752 (one party a naturalized Swiss, former Orthodox Russian); BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93,
Clunet 1932, II51, Revue 1932, 710 (Swiss nationality resumed by wife of an
Italian after Switzerland had left the Hague Convention).
237 German EG. art. 17 par. 3·
238 App. Bruxelles (July 9, 1932) Revue Crit. 1933, 5II (sees the ideas of
the Hague Convention transferred to the Belgian common law); App. Gand
(July II, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 302 no. 136; App. Liege (July 7, 1938)
Pasicrisie 1938.2.129, Belg. J ud. 1939, 303 (the more severe of the two national laws must be applied); App. Liege (Jan. 12, 1939) Belg. Jud. 1939,
401 (the wife "submitted' to the indissolubility of the union); Cass. (May 16,
1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 398; Cass. (Ch. reunis) (Feb. 16, 1955) Pasicrisie
1955 I 647, Revue Crit. 1955, 143·

DIVORCE

479

law, would leave the other party married. As a matter of
fact, this is the Swiss practice and the prevailing opinion in
Germany, 240 so far as remarriage is concerned. The Belgian
authorities 241 to the contrary, who admit divorce, have replied that if the non-Belgian spouse remains married under
his or her national law (not by Belgian law), it should be
realized that this undesirable result is due to the fact that the
unity of the law governing the marriage has been broken by
allowing the wife a separate nationality. 242 This consequence
is not strong enough "to prevail over the absolute and unconditional right that the wife derives from her national
status and entitles her to break up a union the continuation
of which might dainage her." A Belgian writer has added
that attitudes of high indifference to the misery of others are
repugnant to the basic tendency of public life in Belgium. 243
The analogy of the granting of divorce by the courts of
the domicil of one party in the United States is the more
striking, as in these Continental cases the plaintiff is generally domiciled at the forum. Niboyet suggests, however,
that a wife should not be allowed to sue for divorce under
her separate national law, unless the matrimonial domicil
was established in France by both parties at the marriage or
later. 244 This means a step toward the exclusive dominance
of the domiciliary jurisdiction, desirable in all respects.
239

239
Thus, LABBE, Note in 8.1878.1.195. Cj. also DEGAND, 5 ~epert. 553
no. 76, with earlier French decisions rejecting divorce; Trib. civ. Mons
(April 8, 1927) Belg. Jud. 1927, 508 (applying exclusively the foreign husband's law "to avoid inextricable complications and eminently wrong situations").
240
See infra p. 558.
241
Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 27, 1928) Belg. Jud. 1928, 635 (despite the
'"bizarre and absurd" consequence that one party is not allowed to remarry);
Trib. civ. Mons (May 8, 1930) and Trib. Bruxelles (May 20, 1931) J.d.Tr.
1931, cols. 462, 673 cited by ]OFE, 22 Bull. Inst. Belg. (1936) 132; App.
Liege (Feb. 2, 1931) Clunet 1932, 489. These cases are overruled by the latest
decisions of the Court of Cassation, see n. 238.
242
Trib. Arion (April 23, 1937) Pand. Per. 1938, 31 no. 8.
243
JOFE, 22 Bull. Inst. Belg. ( 1936) 133.
244
NIBOYET 749 no. 641.
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VI.

RENVOI

The problem of renvoi is presented when, according to the
principle of nationality, the divorce law of the state to which
a party belongs should be applied, while, according to the
conflicts rule of the foreign state, this law is not to be applied. The Hague Convention on Divorce 245 denied renvoi
between member states, all of which followed the nationality
principle, but renvoi is observed, as usual, in most countries
following the principle, particularly by the French, 246 German,247 Swiss, 248 and Belgian 249 courts. 249 a The situation in
245 See RG. (Nov. 8, 1922) 105 RGZ. 340; KG. (Nov. 27, 1933) IPRspr.
1934, no. u6 and KG. (April 9, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 47·
246 France: Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 19, 1926) Clunet 1926, 663 (American
wife); Trib. civ. Fountainebleau (June 24, 1932) Clunet 1933, 666; Cour
Paris (Dec. 24, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1936, 108; Cour Paris (July 24, 1937)
Nouv. Revue 1937, 772 {two English parties; the English law even declares
itself incompetent); and finally Cass. (req.) {May 10, 1939) Gaz.Pal.
1939·1·962, Nouv. Revue 1939, 153, Revue Crit. 1939, 472 with a note by
NIBOYET declaring that now he renounces his opposition to renvoi, although
he construes it merely as a theory of national interest in cases not regulated
by the national law. Trib. civil Seine (June 28, 1950) Revue Crit. 1951. 6+8,
Clunet 1952, 174 {transmission over). Among the four decisions against renvoi listed by J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 472 n. g, and now overruled, the
fourth, Cour Paris {March x, 1933) Gaz.Pal.I933-I.884, Revue 1933, 629,
Clunet 1935, 99, decided against the English husband, plaintiff, in favor of
the French wife, defendant; the third, mentioned by KuHN, Comp. Com. 172
n. 66, Trib. Basses-Pyrenees (May 28, 1930) Clunet 1931, 1092, was a curious
mistake.
247 Germany: as to American citizens: RG. (March 21, 1904) 48 Gruchot's
Beitriige {1904) Sox; OLG. Frankfurt (June 20, 1910) cited by LEWALD 110
no. 156; LG. Miinchen (July x, 1921) JW. 1921, 1471; LG. Berlin (April 2+,
1928) JW. 1928, 3128; OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 6ox; RG.
{Nov. 21, 1929) JW. 1930, 1309. As to British subjects: KG. (Sept. 20, 1901)
3 ROLG. 365; OLG. Darmstadt (May x8, 1906) DJZ. 1907, 1327; RG. (Jan.
7, 1907) JW. 1907, 127; OLG. Hamburg {Nov. 6, 1912) Hans. GZ. 1913,
Beibl. 84 no. 52; OLG. Hamburg (March 31, 1927) Hans. GZ. 1927, Beibl.
139 no. 99; KG. (March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3572; OLG. Hamburg (April
22, 1937) Hans. RGZ. 1937, B 222 no. xox; LG. Berlin (May 21, 1938) J\V.
1938, 1916. Argentine nationals: (where marriage is celebrated outside of
Argentina) OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 2, 1929) and {May x6, 1930) IPRspr. 1930,
nos. 75, 76; KG. {Feb. 28, 1938) JW. 1938, 2748. Danish nationals: dictum
in RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 106, correcting RG. (Feb. 24, 1928)
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 64.
Iceland: RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103.
Norway: OLG. Celie {Oct. 15, 1925) JW. 1926, 388.
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German and Swiss divorce courts, however, is further complicated by the provisions forbidding them, as we have seen
above, 250 to assume jurisdiction unless recognition of their
jurisdiction appears fairly certain in the national country of
the parties. Generally, it seems, these courts have not been
aware of all the intrinsic difficulties in this matter; however,
most of their decisions can probably be justified. We must
here distinguish the questions of choice of law and of jurisdiction.
The problem of the law of conflicts is rather simpler in
this case than in status questions generally. 251 It is quite
easily settled, if we understand the position of English,
American, Danish, and Norwegian lawyers in the sense that
they recognize the jurisdiction of the domicil under certain
conditions and that, as they themselves apply the law of the
forum at home, they are not interested in what substantive
private law would be applied by a foreign divorce court. 252
Hence, a French or German divorce court is permitted
(though not directed, as was so often believed in Europe)
by the national law of a British subject to apply the law of
the forum. It does not matter that by another mistake 253
Nicaragua: KG. (March 30, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 70.
Switzerland: BG. (June 15, 1928) 54 BGE. II 225, 231; cf. SCHNITZER 174•
24 9 Belgium: Trib. Bruxelles (April 13, 1951) Pasicrisie 1952 III 42, Clunet
1953, 384; Trib. Bruxelles (March I, 1952) J.d.Tr. 1952, 250. Contra: Rb.
Antwerp (May n, 1939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1938-1939, col. 1552 no. 312.
249a The absurdities brought about by a legislative exclusion of renvoi are
well illustrated by Trib. Cairo (March 31, 1953) Revue Egypt. 1954, 157:
the divorce of British subjects, born in Cyprus, but domiciled (in the English
sense) in Egypt, was submitted to English law.
250 Supra pp. 441-443.
2 5 1 Cf. supra n. 146.
2 52 This seems to agree with KuHN, Comp. Com. 171; it is true that KUHN
concludes just contrary to the text that renvoi is particularly unsound with
respect to common law countries.
253 For instance, OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 6o1, and BERG·
MANN in the note ibid. assume a renvoi from the California law because the
party had formerly been domiciled in California. See supra p. 144.
2 48
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European courts have often referred to the common law
country where a British or American national was last domiciled instead of to the general principles of British or American law. Recently, German courts have realized that they are
applying German law as the lex fori 254 (and not qua lex
domicilii) with the blessing of that national law. This was a
new realization, as observers in Germany had thought that
there never is a renvoi referring to the law of the forum. 255
With national laws such as that of Argentina, the situation
is theoretically different; the law governing at the domicil of
the husband is applicable. 256
The entire problem, otherwise almost desperate, is reduced in this manner to the question of determining in which
cases a Continental court may assume jurisdiction for divorce
with the expectation that the decree will be recognized in
the national country. As a matter of fact, the answer must
be different with respect to the individual jurisdictions where
recognition is sought.
It is easy to answer the question when the husband is a
national of a country such as England or Argentina, where
the domicil of the husband is the matrimonial domicil anJ
the law of this domicil governs the right to divorce (possibly
also after one party has deserted the rna trimonial domicil) .
German courts have scrupulously investigated whether a
British husband was domiciled within their territory, making
certain that domicil at the forum exists not only in the German sense but also in the British sense. 257
If one or both of the parties are of American nationality,
254

See, e.g., KG. {March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570 in fine.
MELCHIOR 215 § 143·
256 This was overlooked by LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 565, who uses the
Argentine law as an argument against renvoi.
257 See the detailed instructions about what a German court ought to ascertain concerning the American requirements for recognition of divorce decrees
in RG. {Nov. 21, 1929) ]W. 1930, 1309, and the careful statements as to the
domicil under English law in KG. (March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570.
255
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the solution is simple where both have their effective domicil,
common or separate, in the country of divorce. But if not,
which of the approximately fifty individual American territorial laws should be considered? It is incorrect to assume
that the last domicil within the United States, now abandoned, should control, and the Continental court would
scarcely be justified in speculating before which court in the
United States the matter could probably be brought on
the grounds of the situs of property, the residence of children, etc.
The requirements of full faith and credit to divorce decrees under the Constitution as developed by the Supreme
Court of the United States would not be directly decisive,
since they do not include foreign nations. Recognition seems
to be granted in virtually all American jurisdictions to alien
decrees of divorce, however, if no party is domiciled within
the forum to which such a decree is presented for recognition
and one party was domiciled at the divorce forum, while the
other was personally served with process or appeared and
litigated on the merits. Hence, it would be safe to assume
jurisdiction in such a case in Germany, 257a Switzerland,
Sweden, Hungary, etcetera. Although not certain, it is probable that these conditions have been fulfilled in most, if not
all, cases of admitted renvoi. And there is no necessity of
allowing more divorces to foreigners.

VII.

CHANGE oF DoMICIL OR NATIONALITY

Conditions on which the granting of divorce depends may
change in different respects, viz., (I) domicil or nationality
as the foundation of the court's jurisdiction may be' altered
while the lawsuit is pending; ( 2) domicil or nationality as
determining the applicable law may be modified during the
2 5 1a LG. Kassel (Dec. 10, 1952) NJW. 1953, 307, IPRspr. 1952-1953 no.
157 (stateless wife of American husband domiciled in Germany).
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proceedings; and (3) the status may have been changed
after the occurrence of the circumstances on which the divorce action is based.
1.

Change of Factor Determining Jurisdiction

As the three questions just mentioned have sometimes
been confused, it has not always been clear that the first is
dependent simply on the definition and the effects which the
rules of civil procedure give to the commencement of an action for divorce. Generally, so soon as the action is considered instituted according to the conception of the forum,
the jurisdiction established at this moment remains fixed for
the duration of the suit-forum perpetuatur-jurisdiction
continues. 258 That, conversely, the ground for jurisdiction
can be supplemented later, is not universally affirmed.
2.

Change of Factor Determining the Choice of Law After
Beginning of Litigation

The second question may be illustrated hy three German
cases, which result in the following paradigm. An American
citizen, at the time domiciled in Germany but formerly of
California, instituted a divorce suit in the German court of
his domicil but afterwards during the proceedings moved to
Copenhagen, Denmark. There was no doubt that by American principles (or, as it was construed, by the law of California) German family law was to be applied by way of
renvoi, so long as the domicil of the husband was in Germany. But did American law, after the change of domicil,
refer to German or to Danish law, and was this reference
still decisive for the German court? The Court of Appeals
of Stuttgart thought the question solved by the principle of
258

par.

See, for instance, Restatement § 76; German C. of Civ. Proc. § 263
2.
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perpetuation of the forum mentioned above. 259 But, although
this reasoning may seem consonant with the conception,
prevalent in this country, that the lex fori governs divorce,
in Germany the matter is undoubtedly part of the choice of
law problem and cannot be answered by procedural rules.
The Reichsgericht, in another case also, in inquiring whether
reference should be made to the new domicil, refused to
consult the national law but based its solution on the deliberate wording of the German conflicts rule, 260 invoking the law
of the state to which the husband belonged at the time of
the commencement of the action. The same rule seems to
prevail in France 261 and Belgium 262 as a matter of course.
As the question is not identical with the procedural problem,
the German courts permit the choice of law to be that of the
time when the defendant is served in the action 263 or when
the ground for divorce is pleaded in court; 264 a subsequent
unilateral change of status by the husband is disregarded. 265
The Polish statute (art. I 7 par. 1) also declares applicable the law of the state to which the spouses belong at the
time of the action; 26 sa the Polish Supreme Court has under2 '' 9 OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 601. Contra: RG. (April 6,
I9J6) rsr RGZ. 103.
~cu EG. art. 17 par. r; RG. (March 19, 1936) 150 RGZ. 374; RG. (April
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108 (husband of Icelandic nationality served with
process in Germany returned to Iceland; in this case the Icelandic law, investigated as to its position on the question, revealed that it did not contain
any rule concerning the effect of a change of domicil upon the law applica·
ble).
261
LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 304 ff. no. 280 and 361 no. 335·
262
However, Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940, 120 rejects
the action for divorce of Spaniards, divorce having been prohibited by the
government of Franco during the pendency of the trial.
263
RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108; cf. HABICHT 135; WALKER 685.
Expressly the Czechoslovakian statute on private international law of 1948,
§ 18 sentence r.
264
RG. (April :n, 1902) 46 Gruchot's Beitrage (1902) 959; •RG. (April
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103; cf. KG. (Dec. 17, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 58.
265
RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, ro8; against RAAPE 378 and IPR.
277 and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 438.
265
a Also Bulgaria: Family Law of 1949, art. 58.
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stood this to mean, however, the country to which the parties
belong when judgment is rendered. 266 In fact, the danger of
arbitrary changes made by one party is eliminated by this
statute, since it refers to the law of the common domicil.
3· Changes of Factor Determining Choice of Law Before
the Divorce Suit Is Brought
To understand the problem in question, suppose that the
domicil of the husband is the test in two states, X andY, and
that adultery is the only ground for divorce in X (e.g., New
York), while desertion is a sufficient ground in Y (e.g., New
Jersey), and suppose that:
{i) The husband changes his domicil from X toY, suing
his wife in Y on the ground that she deserted him when he
resided in X; or
(ii) The husband leaves his domicil in Y, suing his wife
in X, alleging that she deserted him in Y.
Three solutions have been advanced:
(a) The court should consider the ground for divorce
exclusively under the law ordinarily applic:tble, irrespective
of whether the facts occurred before or a { ter the acquisition
of the new personal law.
Hence, desertion in X in case (i) is sufficient for divorce
in Y; desertion in Y in case ( ii) is insufficient in X.
(b) Conversely, the facts which happened when the personal law was not yet changed should be evaluated by the
personal law of the party at that time.
Hence, desertion in X is no ground; desertion in Y is a
sufficient ground for both courts in both cases ( i) and ( ii).
(c) Divorce should be granted only if the facts warrant
divorce under both laws, the former personal law of the
time when the facts occurred and the present personal law.
266

Polish Sup. Ct. (Dec. 9, 1935) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 742·
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Hence, action is dismissed in both cases ( i) and ( ii) .
The first view- (a) -is naturally taken by courts applying the lex fori. Under this theory, decisions were formerly
rendered by the German courts, as by the great majority of
American cases. 267 It is also applied by the French courts in
determining grounds for divorce according to the lex fori
when the applicant is a French national; in the leading case,
the Ferrari case, the Court of Cassation justified the granting of divorce under French law by events preceding the renaturalization of the plaintiff wife by declaring that the action was to be based not so much on the material events as
upon the harm done by them to the conjugal life. 268 It is
remarkable that this view was accepted by the Swiss Federal
Tribunal in a case analogous to the Ferrari case, so that the
court applied only Swiss law, although for this purpose a
strictly contrary statutory provision had to be daringly interpreted as referring to foreign plaintiffs only. 269 French
courts, however, seem to extend the retroactive force of the
lex fori to divorce actions of foreigners. 210
The second view-(b )-agrees with a literal construction
of the Japancse statute providing that divorce is governed
by the national law of the husband at the time when the
facts causing divorce occurred. 211 This method avoids in a
radical way any attempt at evasion by the husband but ts
highly impractical.
267
Germany: RG. (June 19, 1883) 9 RGZ. 191, I93·
England, see WESTLAKE § 5Z.
United States: MINOR § 84; I BEALE § II0.5.
268
Cass. (civ.) (March 14, 1928) Clunet 1928, 383; see particularly App.
Limoges (Feb. z6, 1929) and App. Nimes {April 15, 1929) Clunet 1930, 368.
C antra: AUDINET, Note to Cass. ( civ.) (Feb. 5, 1929) 8.1930.1.81 ff., criticizing the retroactive effect given to a naturalization; but see LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 367 no. 339·
26
" BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93·
270
LAURENT, 3 Principes 537 ff. no. 306, and many decisions, particularly,
Cass. {civ.) (May 7, 1928)) 8.1929.1·9·
211
Japan, Law of 1898, art. 16.
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The third opinion- (c) -goes far back and was strongly
advocated by an editor of Story's work, Judge Redfield,
claiming that:
"It would be an intolerable perversion that an act which by
the law of the State where committed was no cause of divorce should, by the removal of the parties to another State
where the law was different, become sufficient to produce a
dissolution of the married relation." 272
In this assertion, the words "State where committed" are
evidently a mistake. That the state where the act was committed should be of any importance was sharply denied by
Story. 273 Redfield plainly meant the state where the party
was formerly domiciled; an act or conduct should not warrant divorce, if insufficient in the state where the party was
domiciled at the time when it occurred. 274 The rule as formulated, however, was adopted by many statutes and even by
the American Uniform Draft of 1900 and 1907, that of
I 900 running as follows :
"No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to
the residence of the complainant or the defendant in this
state which was not a ground for divorce in the state where
the cause arose." 275
This confusion of the time when, and the place where, the
offence occurred, makes the interpretation of the various
American statutes difficult.
The sanction that Story himself would have had in mind
was certainly the refusal of jurisdiction. 276 Correspondingly,
REDFIELD in STORY (ed. 6) § 230C.
STORY § 230a.
274 REDFIELD in STORY ( ed. 6) § 23oc speaks of the transfer of the domicil.
§ 23od, however, sounds again perplexing.
2 75 Draft printed in 14 Harv. L. Rev. (1901) 525, sec. r. The explanation
at 526 is rather confused.
2 7 6 See STORY's own quotation § 230a of Gibson, C. J., in Dorsey v. Dorsey
(1838) 7 Watts (Pa.) 349; and see WHARTON § 231 on the later events in
Pennsylvania.
272

273
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the actual statutes possess two kinds of clauses. On the one
hand, jurisdiction for divorce is often denied, with or without statutory provision, when the cause of action occurred
outside of the state and the spouses were domiciled at the
time out of the state. On the other hand, in many statutes
the required time of residence preliminary to the action is
prolonged, if the cause took place outside of the state. Whatever the exact sense of these clauses may be, their tendency
is to prevent or to render it difficult for a fact to be appreciated by a court under a law other than would be relevant
if the party in question had stayed at his domicil. Apparently
the draftsmen of the statutes have felt bound to the law of
the forum, if once jurisdiction is assumed, and therefore have
thought that the only remedy is to deny jurisdiction. A connected provision of the Uniform Act of 1906 211 seems to
follow this conception. The wording of the draft that had
preceded in 1900, 218 however, reproduced in the preceding
paragraph, may possibly be understood as involving a choice
of law, meaning that the divorce ground is governed by the
law of the domicil as of the time when the facts complained
of happened. A consequence would be, that where the alleged
cause fails to agree with such foreign law, the suit ought to
be dismissed as to the merits, and not only quoad instantiam.
The same idea was to be found in Europe in the early
nineteenth century and is now frequent. 279 The German
statute, after providing that (EG. art. !7 1 par. I) divorce
is governed by the law of the husband as of the time of the
commencement of the action, prescribes that (ibid., par. 2)
a fact that has occurred while the husband belonged to an211 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra
n. 4, at §§ 8(b), w(b) adopted in Del. Rev. Code (1953) 13 §§ 1525(2),
1527(2); N. ]. Stat. Ann. (1952) § 2A: 34-10(2).
278 Draft of Uniform Divorce Law loc. cit., supra n. 4, cf. Ky. Rev. Code
(1953) §403.035(2).
279
App. Liege (April 24, 1826) Pasicrisie 1826, 125, 127; for the practice
of the Prussian courts, compare Gebhardsche Materialien r88.

4-90

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

other state cannot be claimed as a ground for divorce, unless
the fact is ground for divorce or separation also according to
the laws of that other state.
Correspondingly, the law of a former common nationality
of the parties is to be consulted according to the Hague Convention and the Polish, Swedish, Swiss, Czechoslovakian,
and Hungarian statutes/ 80 and the law of the former domicil
is influential in the Scandinavian countries 281 and under the
Codigo Bustamante. 282
A special problem arises, if permanent conditions, such as
mental deficiency, venereal disease, or habits of drunkenness,
are recognized reasons for divorce under the new but not
under the old statute; can desertion be said to begin only
after the acquisition of the new status? The American cases
are divided. 283 Suppose a married couple was domiciled in
New York, where insanity is not a cause for divorce, and
280
Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 4·
Poland: Law of L926 on international private law, art. r7 par. 2.
Sweden: Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 2 par. 2.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. 2; cf. BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93;
SCHNITZER 175.
Hungary: Formerly Marriage Law of 189+, § rrs par. r.
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, s. 19, as previously the treaties of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia (March 17, 1923, art.
34 par. 2), Poland (March 6, 1925, art. 7, abrogated by that of Jan. 2 I,
I949), and Rumania (May 7, 1925, art. 19 par. 2); cf. SvoBODA, 4 LeskeLoewenfeld I 313 n. 186.
In Republican Spain LASALA LLANAS 140 advocates the same principle.
281 Denmark: prevailing opinion, see MuNcH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 747; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. so; HoEcK, Personalstatut
33; BORUM 123.
Norway: see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II9.
Iceland: see EYJOLFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762.
282 Art. 52; cf. art. 54 and BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes
de Rio 121, no. 124.
Cf. Guatemala: former C. C. art. 209.
283 I BEALE 473 § rro.5. The courts of New Jersey are consistent in requiring that the two year period for desertion must have run after the deserting
party became a resident of the state; see Berger v. Berger ( I918) 89 N. ]. Eq.
430, 105 Atl. 496, and citations at 497· The other view was taken by two old
decisions of New Hampshire, see I BEALE 474 n. 2; Batchelder v. Batchelder
(1843) 14 N.H. 38o; Hopkins v. Hopkins (1857) 35 N. H. 474·
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later transferred their domicil to Norway, where it is, if
continued through three years. Should a time of lunacy
spent in New York be counted? This question ought to be
affirmed, to avoid an unreasonable rule. 284
The choice of law rule just contemplated, although systematically better justified than the refusal of jurisdiction,
makes the task of the judge delicate. Under the European
formulas, several legislations must be simultaneously applied; if the parties have changed from a foreign nationality
to two other foreign ones, this makes three, and with the
law of the forum, four. No judge will like so much complication. All these rules may be questioned. Some of them seem
practically superfluous. The German provision was designed
to prevent the husband, whose national law alone is decisive, from changing his nationality so as to force his new
law on his wife, if the new law were more favorable for
obtaining divorce. 285 Similar are the purposes of enactments
preserving the divorce law of a former domicil. But there is
no sufficient reason to complicate things where the last common nationality or domicil of the parties is chosen to govern,
just for the reason that it renders a change of status of one
party harmless.
As a whole, the contrast of opinions concerns the basic
theory. Where the law of the domicil dominates' ideas, it is
likely that this law will be regarded as determining the judicial value of the facts occurring during its reign. The
European rules described above are derived in an analogous
way from the personal national law. On the contrary, the
majority view in this country is manifestly conceived within
the sphere of territorialism.
While American courts, at least, are consistent in followContra, RAAPE 388 and IPR. 277.
Conversely, it seems that the husband is able to avoid a threatened divorce by changing to a more rigid law; LETZGUS, 145 Arch. Civ. Prax. 299·
284
285
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ing the idea of a territorial law of the forum, some important European courts inaugurating a similar theory have
rebelled against the current respect for the national law. We
have mentioned above the leading case of Ferrari; the
French Court of Cassation granted divorce to the wife who
was Italian by marriage but had recovered French nationality. No new facts had arisen since the separation of the
parties from bed and board, rendered before the wife's
re-naturalization. If the French Court of Cassation granted
the divorce upon the anterior facts because the action was
based, not so much upon the material facts as upon the harm
done by them to the conjugal life/86 the reasoning certainly
is untenable; the different legislations determine precisely
what kind of facts should be regarded as essentially disturbing the marital community. 287 However, in view of the fact
that one of the most reliable courts in the world, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal, followed the French example all the way,
in the face of the express contrary legal provision, 288 we must
conceive that the application of the foreign law appears
unbearable to judges.
Hence, the European courts are coming back to where the
English and the American courts have remained; the case
where the plaintiff has changed to the domicil or nationality
of the forum is the really important one. Of course, there is
the evident danger of encouraging evasion of foreign laws,
and the French courts have been reproached on this ground,
the more so since they had been extremely sensitive to foreign
divorce "in fraud" of French law. English criticism of this
system emphasizes that a husband can, by transferring his
domicil to England, escape the indissolubility of marriage
See suPra n. 268.
Note to Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 5, 1929) S.1930.I.8I.83; but
LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 368.
288 See supra n. 269.
286

28 7 AUDINET,
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inherent in the law of his former domicil, and thus cause
hardship to the wife and provoke legal difficulties, since the
resulting decree, in all probability, will not be recognized in
other countries involved. 289 This case has not been covered
by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937. That Act only
helps the wife to maintain the English home, but even for
this it is not clear whether the English jurisdiction is exclusive. The majority of the American statutes have tried to
define the jurisdiction of the courts by those various additional requirements which we have mentioned before; these
clauses are complicated and not really effective, except where
the minimum residence is seriously upheld.
The case where both parties change their personal law
in favor of that of the forum, has always been felt as less
shocking than the circumvention of a divorce law by one of
the spouses to the detriment of the other. Also the means
of repression need not be necessarily the same. The German
provision was intended to prevent the husband from arbitrarily changing his law, which was the governing law; but
the Hague Convention avoided this peril by constituting the
law of the last common national law as governing. Both
cases, however, ought to be clearly envisaged in future
discussions.

VIII. CoNcLusioNs
Three systems are outstanding. The first, the American
method of applying the lex fori to divorce suits w)th foreign
elements, has revealed itself as being unique. In the wide
domains of the British commonwealth of nations, and under
the Montevideo and the Scandinavian Treaties, the litigation takes place at the actual or, in certain cases, the last
matrimonial domicil, so that the law of the forum is in
harmony with the genuine domiciliary principle. The third
28

°CHESHIRE

( ed.

3) 479·
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main solution presented by the Continental European and the
Chinese and Japanese legislations has been derived from the
doctrine that the national law of the parties must be respected, although the domestic law has to be consulted at the
same time. The courts, in these latter countries, are open to
foreigners domiciled in the state and in many cases as well
to nationals domiciled abroad. Now here, however, in these
two systems do courts accept divorce suits at the domicil
of the plaintiff alone and at the same time apply exclusively
the local divorce statutes, even though the plaintiff is of
foreign nationality. This is literally the rule in this country
in the case of an alien petitioner. But the characteristic point
of comparison is that where the plaintiff, an American citizen, has by his domicil therein become a citizen of the state,
this state will assume jurisdiction and apply its own statute
exclusively, irrespective of the past and present legal situation of the other spouse. We have seen that no learned doctrine is able to justify this principle. We have also alluded
to some of the evils to which it leads. But we have begun our
comparative study for the purpose of finding out whether
the methods used abroad are preferable.
The answer is, flatly, no.
The system centered around the matrimonial domicil is
of tempting simplicity and offers a splendid basis for international cooperation. However, the United States and the
states of the nationality principle cannot be expected to restore the idyllic conditions permitting such unity of rules. 290
Again, it has never been discussed whether it would not be
feasible and advisable to have a court, sitting at the domicil
of one party, apply the law of the last common domicil instead of its own law, irrespective of the time when the cause
occurred.
2 90 However, the latest development in France clearly tends into this direction.
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The system of cumulative application of laws is so complicated that the difficulties connected with it seem out of
proportion to its usefulness. More fateful still, the precarious balance between the foreign and the domestic law
achieved in the German Code and the Hague Convention has
been finally destroyed by the judicial and legislative movement characterized by the Ferrari case. Such a fervent advocate of the nationality principle as Pillet immediately perceived how incompatible with this principle it is to apply the
domestic law to a foreign husband. This system is in ruins.
A radical clearing up will be inevitable sooner or later.
Thus, really, it cannot be contended that the methods used
outside of this country are superior to the framework of the
American law of this ~ubject.
Reforms can consist of a very simple development. The
requirement of a minimum residence time is today the chief
vehicle for correcting the scope of divorce jurisdiction. Uniform drafts have acknowledged its importance and insisted
that the minimum should be of one or two years. This requirement ought to be freed from the wild-grown tendrils
with which it is surrounded, and it should be enforced with
the utmost rigidity. This method demonstrated by a century's
history as being suitable to exigencies of life in America,
brings us nearer to the much spoken of "interest of the state"
in the married status of its domiciliaries. In the twilight
under which it is hard to distinguish a freshly acquired actual
domicil from a fictitious one, that is, a non-domicil, a court
that must predicate its jurisdiction upon the "interest of the
state" so defined is in an unenviable position. In order to
compete with another state in the task of adjudging any
status of a person, the state should ascertain that the person
belongs to the life of the state, regularly and definitively.
Such competition cannot be helped. But at least evasion
among the states, and evasion by one spouse at the cost of
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the other, would be eliminated. With a two years' residence,
or even a period of one year, strictly observed, any intention
of obtaining divorce under the conditions is immaterial. Besides, very few individuals are able to change their local
connections completely and to maintain their new center of
private and business life during such a time merely to gain
a divorce. Not every necessary improvement, of course, can
be accomplished by such a measure alone; perhaps this is the
reason why the uniform drafts have not appeared to attract
sufficiently active support to accomplish a general reform.
Where the parties are actually domiciled in two different
states, the adequate method of dealing with the case is not
to apply the statute of either state, but rather to apply that
of the last common domicil. This suggestion should be appreciated by future European legislators. Whether it could
be brought into the structure of the American statutory
systems might be a matter of discussion.
More important, however, are reforms in the field of
domestic divorce practice. They are prerequisites also of a
better and sounder system of reciprocal recognition of foreign decrees.

CHAPTER 12

Recognition of Foreign Divorce

1

IVERGENCES concerning recognition of foreign
divorces are too great to allow any systematic comparison. 2 A few texts, representing the three systems described in the preceding chapter, illustrate the
situation:

D

Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, § I I3. A
state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve
the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the
state and the other is domiciled outside the state, if
(a) the spouse who is not domiciled in the state ( i) has
consented that the other spouse acquire a separate home; or
( ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to
object to the acquisition of such separate home; or (iii) is
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state which
grants the divorce; or
(b) the state is the last state in which the spouses were
domiciled together as man and wife.
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law
(I 940), Article I 5. The law of the matrimonial domicil
governs: (a) conjugal separation; (b) dissolubility of marriage; but recognition of the dissolubility shall not be obligatory upon the state where the marriage was solemnized, if
1
Comparative literature: LORENZEN, "The Enforcement of Rmerican Judgments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. ( 1919) 188, 268; VREELAND, Validity of Foreign
Divorces ( 1938) ; GurrERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Matrimonial
Suits," 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 1938) 19; READ, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Common Law Units of the British
Commonwealth ( 1938) ; GRISWOLD, "Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of
Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study," 65 Harv. L. Rev. (1951/52) 193233, 217 If.; HOYER, Anerkennung von Entscheidungen in Ehesachen im A usland auf Grund inneren Staatenrechts ( 1951); W. JELLINEK, Die zweiseitigen
Staatsvertriige iiber die Anerkennung ausliindischer Zivilurteile (with texts)
(Beitriige zum ausliindischen und internationalen Privatrerht, Heft 24, 1953).
2
See VREELAND, Validity of Foreign Divorces 319 If.
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the ground invoked for dissolution was divorce and if the
local laws do not admit of that ground as such. In no case
shall the celebration of a subsequent marriage, in accordance
with the laws of another state, constitute the crime of
bigamy.
Article 59· Actions for annulment of marriage, divorce,
or dissolution, and, in general, actions regarding all questions which affect the relations of spouses, shall be instituted
before the judges of the matrimonial domicil. . . .
German Code of Civil Procedure, § 328. Recognition of
the judgment of a foreign court is excluded:
I. If the courts of the state to which the foreign court
belongs are not competent, according to the German laws;
2. If the unsuccessful defendant is a German and has not
defended the proceeding, provided that summons initiating
the proceeding has been served on him neither personally
within the state of the court of suit nor by means of German
judicial assistance;
3· If the judgment, to the detriment of a German party,
disagrees with the provisions of article 13, par. I, 3 or
articles 17, IS, 22 of the Introductory Law to the Civil
Code, . . .
4· If recognition of the judgment would violate morals or
the purpose of a German law;
5. If reciprocity is not guaranteed. . . .

l.
r. England

INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS

3

4

A foreign final decree of divorce is recognized by English
courts, if (I) it is rendered by the court of any other coun8

With respect to countries not considered here, see:
For Switzerland, GAuTSCHI, "Die Anerkennung von ausHindischen Ehescheidungsurteilen," SJZ. 1926, I.
For Italy: SERENI, "Legal Problems of Divorce in Italy," 28 Iowa L. Rev.
( 1943) 286, 291; CANSACCHI, "L'Evolution depuis 1945 du droit italien en
matii~re de reconnaissance et d'execution des decisions etrangeres d'annulation
du mariage et de divorce," Revue Crit. 1952, 241-252.
For Brazil: H. VALLADAO, Estudios de Dire ito Internacional Privado
(1947) 151-157·
For Ecuador: ScHWIND, "New Conflict of Law Rules in Divorce Cases,"
4 Am. J. Comp. Law (1955) 603-606.
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try, which is competent according to its own lex fori,S and
( 2) if (a) the husband was domiciled in the English sense
in that country 6 at the time of the commencement of the suit
for divorce 7 or (b) if the de.cree would be recognized by
the court of the husband's domicil. 8
Illustrations: (a) An English married couple went to live
in Detroit, Michigan; the wife returned to England; by
agreement with her, the husband brought action for divorce
and obtained a decree by default in the Wayne County Court.
The High Court of England presumed that both spouses
were domiciled in Detroit, as the husband certainly was. 9
Therefore, recognizing the Michigan divorce, the High
Court dismissed an action of the wife for divorce. 10
(b) A husband, resident in Michigan according to American conceptions but domiciled in Canada according to British
law, obtained a divorce decree in Michigan. The decree was
For Venezuela: ]. SANCHEZ-COVISA, La Eficacia de las Sentencias Extranjeras de Divorcio {1956).
4
FALCONBRIDGE, "Recognition of Foreign Divorces" [1932] 4 D.L.R. 39,
now Essays 736; FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of
Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 89; ELKIN, Clunet 1938, 98;
CHESHIRE 374·
5
Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209.
6
Harvey v. Farnie [188o] 5 P. D. 153, [1882-1883] 8 App. Cass. 43; Le
Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] 20 App. Cas. 517; Lankester v. Lankester
[1925] P. 114; Simons v. Simons [1939] I K. B. 490 {Massachusetts decree).
Gatty v. Att. Gen. [1951] P. 444, Clunet 1954, 152 {North Dakota decree;
dictum: domicil cannot be acquired in the USA. as such but only in one of
the states).
7
Wilson v. Wilson {1872) [1869-1872] L. R. 2 P. & D. 435·
8
Armitage v. Att. Gen. [1906] P. 135 {divorce decree in South Dakota
would be recognized in New York, where the husband was domiciled; hence
recognized in England). Cass v. Cass (1910) 102 L. T. R. 397, Clunet 1910,
1259 (South Dakota decree not recognized in Massachusetts, where husband
was domiciled; hence recognition denied in England); Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi
(no. 2) [1953] P. 220 (Jewish divorce in England valid at the husband's
domicil in Israel recognized in England); Walker v. Walker [1950] 4
D. L. R. 253 (Reno divorce valid in California recognized in British Columbia).
9
Crowe v. Crowe {1937) 157 L. T. R. 557, [1937] 2 All E. R. 723, Clunet
1938, 97; similarly, Leigh v. Leigh [1937] I D. L. R. 773 (if nothing is
proved, the court will presume that the foreign tribunal (again a Detroit
court) had jurisdiction over the parties by reason of domicil and that the
domicil was properly and validly established).
1
Cf. the reasoning of FALCONBRIDGE in [1932] 4 D. L. R. 41, supra n. 4.
before the Amendment Act of 1937.
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not recognized in Canada 11 and therefore not m England
either.
English courts are known, however, by courtesy to recognize the finding of domicil by trustworthy foreign courts. 12
The recent change of legislation (Matrimonial Causes
Act of 1937) by which a deserted wife may institute suit at
the last marital domicil would seem to bring about recognition of foreign jurisdiction under analogous circumstances; 13
no authorities are yet known.
The English rule is so exclusively influenced by jurisdictional considerations that the reasons upon which a foreign
court bases its decree are immaterial. The grounds of the
foreign decree need not be in accord with the grounds for
divorce established in English matrimoniallaw, 14 provided,
of course, the decree does not violate good morals.
2.

The United States 15

While recognition of decrees of foreign countries attracts
scant attention, recognition of divorces rendered in sister
11 Rex v. Woods {1903) 6 Ont. L. R. 41; similarly, Green v. Green [1893]
P. 89 {Pennsylvania decree).
12 Information obtained in a Swiss divorce case; see WYLER, SJZ. {1933-34)
199·
13 The Court of Appeal expressed itself favorably in this sense, Travers
v. Holley [1953] P. 246, [1953] 2 All E. R. 794; the dictum was followed by
Carr v. Carr [1955] 2 All E. R. 6r, Arnold v. Arnold [1957] P. 237, and
Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott [1957] 3 All E. R. 473· But the foreign "extraordinary" jurisdiction must be similar to the English, Dunne v. Saban
(1954) [1955] P. 178 (Florida decree based on 90 days residence of wife not
recognized) .
Before the Act of 1937, recognition in England and throughout the British
Dominions of a divorce rendered in New Zealand under the provision enabling a deserted wife to sue at the last matrimonial domicil was anticipated
by Mr. Justice Denniston in Poingdestre v. Poingdestre (1909) 28 N. Z. L. R.
604, I I G. L. R. 585, but doubted in the case of a Victoria decree by Chief
Justice Irvine in Chia v. Chia [1921] V. L. R. 566. See READ, Recognition and
Enforcement 229, who shared the doubts. The Victoria Supreme Court has
now expressly disapproved of the doctrine of Travers v. Holley, see Fenton v.
Fenton [1957] V.L.R. 17.
14 Harvey v. Farnie [r88o] 5 P. D. 153, cited supra n. 6; Pemberton v.
Hughes [1899] I Ch. 781; Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209, cited supra n. 5;
Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19, [1936] 3 All E. R. 130.
1 5 Selected older literature is listed by I BEALE 467 n. 3 ; GOODRICH 408
n. 42. For recent literature see supra p. 418, n. 12.
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states is one of the most discussed subjects of American law.
The formidable complications ensuing from conflicting social
policies and constitutional controversies have not been met
with consistent and purposive judicial methods, in part due
to the limited federal control exercised over the subject
matter by the Supreme Court under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. One school of thought, indeed, has seemed to
prefer cautious case construction to any rules. However, in
recent decades before Williams v. North Carolina 16 revived
the conflict of opinions, it was prevailingly assumed that the
recognition due under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Federal Constitution depended upon the following requirements :
(a) Under that Clause as construed by the Supreme
Court, it was assumed that a state had the duty to recognize
a divorce pronounced in a sister state X:
( i) When both parties were domiciled in X; 17
( ii) (Probably) when the defendant was domiciled in X;
(iii) When the plaintiff was domiciled in the state and,
in addition, one of the following three conditions
was fulfilled, viz., that:
X is the state where the parties lived together for the last
time before they separated 18 or
The defendant has been personally served with process or
voluntarily appeared in X 19 or
(In a disputed opinion) the defendant has caused the
parties to be separated by his or her marital mtsconduct.20
16 Williams et al. v. North Carolina (1942) 317 U. S. 297, 143 A. L. R.
1273; (no. 2) (1945) 325 U.S. 226.
1 7 Restatement § uo; Haddock v. Haddock ( 1906) 201 U. S. 562 at 570.
1 8 Atherton v. Atherton ( 1901) r8r U. S. 155; Thompson v. Thompson
( 1913) 226 U. S. 551; Crimm v. Crimm ( 1924) 211 Ala. 13, 99 So. 301.
1 9 Cheever v. Wilson (1870) 9 Wall. 108, 19 L. Ed. 6o4; for state cases, see
t BEALE 506 n. 7·
2o Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. I. 87; "generally accepted as law in the
United States," ]ACOBS, Cases and Other Materials on Domestic Relations (ed.
2, 1939) 354 n. 2.
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Inversely, no state, in the prevailing opinion, was obligated to recognize a divorce pronounced by a sister state, if
the plaintiff alone was domiciled in the divorce state and
none of the three additional facts also appeared, particularly
when the court had assumed jurisdiction only on the ground
of constructive service of process on the defendant. 21 According to the Restatement, 22 such a divorce would be void even
in the state where it was rendered; this view, however, has
been generally disapproved. 23
Without the obligation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the majority of the states also recognize a divorce
granted a resident plaintiff as valid when the defendant has
been served by publication only. 24 A small minority, however,
have refused recognition either generally or when, at the
time of the decree, the defendant was domiciled within the
forum of recognition or in a third state which did not recognize the divorce. 25
In principle, a divorce rendered in a state in which neither
of the parties was domiciled is not recognized, irrespective
of whether the defendant was personally served or put in
an appearance. 26 This is fundamental.
(b) This set of rules has been modified by the Williams
case to an extent still discussed. To an unbiased mind, how21

Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 201 U. S. 562.
Restatement § II3 comment g.
23 BINGHAM, "The American Law Institute vs. the Supreme Court," 21 Cornell L. Q. ( 1936) 393· At present, however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring vote in the Williams case postulates equal treatment of divorce
decrees in all jurisdictions.
24 Miller v. Miller ( 1925) 200 Iowa II93, 206 N. W. 262.
25 New York, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and others
which are variously listed by the writers; cf., for instance JACOBS, "Attack
on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 749, 756 n. 38; VREELAND
327, 328; GOODRICH 348, n. 40.
26 Bell v. Bell ( 1901) I8I U. S. 175; Andrews v. Andrews ( 1903) 188 U. S.
14; Jardine v. Jardine (1937) 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N. E. (2d) 645; Voorhis
v. Voorhis (1936) 184 La. 406, 166 So. I2I; Restatement §III.
22
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ever, the impression made upon most practical lawyers 27
appears right; the decision eliminates the alternative requirements described under (iii) above altogether, so as to hold
it unqualifiedly sufficient that the decree be rendered at the
domicil of the plaintiff. This construction of the case is supported by the facts of the twin cases decided, as the Nevada
court had taken jurisdiction in the one case on service by
publication and in the other by personal service beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. The express declaration of the
Supreme Court that Had dock v. Haddock is overruled,
therefore, should not be taken as an obiter dictum or a noncommittal announcement of a future policy. Not even wrongful desertion of the wife by the husband, according to the
majority of the Justices, is relevant to the jurisdictional
question whether the new domicil of the husband suffices for
the purpose of divorce. A divorce pronounced in the state of
the plaintiff's domicil ought to be recognized in any state including that of the defendant's domicil or that of the former
matrimonial domicil. Whatever criticism may be aroused, it
may be justifiably claimed that the decision frees courts and
lawyers from "hopeless refinements," 28 as well as from
many extremely difficult fact findings, 29 and narrows considerably the number of cases where the validity of the
divorce and of a remarriage is subject to contrary holding in
different states. The rule of the Williams case has been incorporated into the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act
( 1948) adopted, so far, in nine states. 29a An unfortunate
feature of the case is due to the fact that the majority of
the Supreme Court, for certain technical reasons which are
27 See in particular the Annotation in 143 A. L. R. 1294 ff., as against the
subtle polemics by BINGHAM, "Song of Sixpence," 29 Cornell L. Q. {1943) I.
28 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Williams case, supra
n. 16, at 307.
29 Note, 143 A. L. R. 1296 ff.
2 9 a Viz., California, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin.
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approved by learned critics, 30 failed to enter into a discussion
of the question whether the two plaintiffs, Mr. Williams and
Mrs. Hendrix, actually were domiciled in Reno. The court
in Reno established its jurisdiction on their residence, during
the six weeks prescribed, in the "Alamo Auto Court" of
Reno. The very fact that awakened the indignation of the
courts in North Carolina, to which the victorious parties
brazenly returned immediately as newly married husband
and wife, became the issue of the second fVi!liams case. 30 "
Here the finding of the North Carolina courts that the parties had not acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada was
admitted by the Supreme Court; therefore, the Nevada decree was not entitled to full faith and credit. An interested
party has the right to challenge the jurisdictional facts of a
foreign divorce.
(c) Either under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or
under the doctrine regarding the invoking of jurisdiction,
several courts, particularly those of New York, 31 have developed a bar to the impeachment of an invalid divorce. A
person who has been an active party to a divorce suit or a
person who has in some way profited from a divorce, for
instance by remarrying, is not allowed to allege the invalidity
of the divorce. This doctrine results in consequences which
approach recognition of decrees that would otherwise have
been held void or voidable. But the application of the doctrine is confused and uncertain. 32
30 BINGHAM, 29 Cornell L. Q. ( 1943), supra n. 23, at 3: "few lawyers will
disagree." But see the dissenting vote in the Williams case, supra n. 16, by
Mr. Justice Jackson, at p. 320 under "III, Lack of domicile."
soawilliams v. North Carolina (no. 2) (1945) 325 U. S. 226; Rice v.
Rice ( 1949) 336 U. S. 674.
31 In re Ellis' Estate ( 1893) 55 Minn. 401, 412, 413, 56 N. W. 1056, 1059,
106o; Kelsey v. Kelsey (1922) 197 N.Y. Supp. 371, aff'd 237 N.Y. 520, 1+3
N. E. 726; Krause v. Krause (1940) 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290; Maloney v. Maloney (1940) 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 334· Restatement§ 112.
32 Cf. JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936)
749, 771; Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1255 and literature cited therein;
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(d) Another limitation on the right to impeach a foreign
divorce decree involves the review of jurisdictional facts.
On general principles, the court where recognition is sought
would be free to reopen the question whether the plaintiff
was domiciled within the state of judgment or whether the
defendant unjustifiedly deserted the plaintiff, as facts upon
which the jurisdiction for granting divorce was based. 82a
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, however, seem to indicate that the forum is bound to give full
faith and credit to the finding of the divorce court when the
defendant put in a special appearance and litigated the question of domicil or desertion 33 or had at least full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issue. 33a
Most influential is the tendency of courts, disturbed by the
inconsistent treatment of divorces in the different states, to
cover up defects in the jurisdictional justification of divorce
decrees or, in the apt description by Lorenzen, "to close their
eyes to the actualities of the situation and to allow juries to
find the existence of a bona fide domicile in the state of divorce on technical grounds." 84 What palpably constitutes a
temporary stay of a plaintiff ready to return to his real home
immediately upon rendition of the decree, is dissembled as a
Note, 122 A. L. R. (1939) 1321. Cf. the caveat in Restatement § II2 meanwhile eliminated ( 1948 Supp.).
32
a Williams v. North Carolina (no. 2) (1945) 325 U. S. 226; Esenwein
v. Commonwealth (1945) 325 U. S. 279·
33
Davis v. Davis ( 1938) 305 U. S. 32; Case note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
(1939) 290; Note, 3 U. of Detroit L. J. (1939) 32; Note, II8 A. L. R. (1931)
1524; Coe v. Coe (1948) 334 U. S. 378; cf. other applications of the theory:
Stoll v. Gottlieb (1938) 305 U. S. 165; Chicot County Drainage District v.
Baxter State Bank (1940) 308 U. S. 371, rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S.
695. See also FARRIER, "Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. ( 1935) 552; and Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev.
(1940) 652.
asa Sherrer v. Sherrer ( 1948} 334 U. S. 343, distinguishing Williams v.
North Carolina (no. 2) (supra n. 32a); Nappe v. Nappe (1956) 20 N.J. 337,
120 A. (zd) 31.
34
LoRENZEN, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L. J. (1943) 341,
348, 352, 353·
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domicil replacing it for good, first by the divorce forum and
subsequently by that of recognition.
(e) On the other hand, the courts tend to limit the effects
of such liberally recognized divorce decrees obtained at the
domicil of only one spouse to the marital status of the parties as distinguished from other personal or proprietary
consequences. Thus, a decree for alimony granted in a separation proceeding in New York was held unaffected by a
subsequent Nevada divorce because the second spouse had
not been subject to the jurisdiction of the divorce court and
support decrees survive a divorce under New York law. 34a
Even an unadjudicated claim for alimony survives a foreign
ex parte divorce. 34 b Likewise, lack of jurisdiction over the
wife justified refusal to give full faith and credit to a custody
order included in an otherwise valid divorce decree granted
at the husband's domicil. 34c

(f) A divorce rendered in a foreign country is, of course,
not covered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Nevertheless, a state will ordinarily recognize such a divorce under
the same circumstances that it gives credit to a sister state's
decree. 35 Also the method followed in ascertaining the domicil of the divorced party ordinarily is that customary in
34 R Estin v. Estin {1948) 334 U. S. 541; Kreiger v. Kreiger (1948) 3H
U. S. 555; Mr. Justice Douglas in Esenwein v. Commonwealth {1945) 325
U. S. 279, 281; Worthley v. Worthley {1955) 44 Cal. {2d) 465, 4ti8, 283
P. (2d) 19, 21. Conversely, in the case of a Massachusetts alimony decree
followed by a Nevada divorce in which both parties had appeared, Coe v.
Coe (1948) 334 U.S. 378, 383; Nappe v. Nappe (1956) 20 N.J. 337, 120 A.
(2d) 31, 37·
34b Armstrong v. Armstrong ( 1956) 350 U. S. 568; a conforming New York
statute {s. 117o-b Civil Practice Act) enacted in 1953 was held constitutional,
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt (1956) 1 N.Y. (2d) 342, 135 N. E. {2d) 553, aff'd
354 u. s. (1957) 416.
34 c May v. Anderson ( 1953) 345 U. S. 528 (the children were at the
mother's domicil).
35 For recent cases see Note, 143 A. L. R. at 1313; cf. HACKWORTH, 2 Digest
of International Law ( 1941) 382 s. 168.
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American courts rather than determination according to the
view of the foreign divorce court. 36 Yet it has been decided
in agreement with the foreign law whether a married woman
shares the domicil of her husband. 37 Differences from the
treatment of American decrees are most likely to occur in
the respect that the place of domicil is more easily to be
found situated in an American state than in a foreign country.38 But in Gould v. Gould, the Court of Appeals of New
York, although stating that the domicil of the parties had
remained in New York, held their bona fide residence in
France sufficient for recognition of the French decree, in
deviation from the doctrine of Andrews v. Andrews; 39 it
was, however, a special case. Since both parties had appeared
in the French suit and the decision was based on New York
law, the court held that "under the circumstances of this case,
the policy of this state is not offended by the recognition." 40
(g) Judicial separation, granted at the matrimonial
domicil, has been held by the United States Supreme Court
to be entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 41
More generally, it has been concluded from the cases that
whenever a decree for judicial separation is granted under
circumstances such as would have supported jurisdiction for
36 RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, JW. 1930, 1309 no. 14 (the German court, in an Iowa case, respects whatever method is followed in the
United States).
37
Torlonia v. Torlonia (1928) 108 Conn. 292, 142 At!. 8431
38 See supra p. 151, n. 157.
39 (1903) 188 U.S. 14.
40
( 1923) 235 N.Y. 14, 29, 138 N. E. 490, 494· STUMBERG 308 thinks estoppel was the ground of the decision. In the discussion of the American Law
Institute, 4 Proceedings, Appendix {1926) 348, 354 Judge Page observed
that the matrimonial domicil was in Paris; Professor Beale declared himself
extremely well satisfied by this statement. The court seems to have affirmed
the domicil in New York for reasons lying outside of the case.
41
Thompson v. Thompson (1913) 226 U. S. 551; cf. GOODRICH 415. Note
33 Yale L. J. ( 1924) 426.
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absolute divorce in the sense of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, recognition cannot be withheld. 42
Traditionally, however, where statutes have requirements
for judicial separation different from those for dissolution
of marriage, separation may be granted on the basis of
personal jurisdiction, residence of both parties being sufficient. This, it is understood, only "protects the spouse
against certain acts of the other spouse while they are within
the state," 43 without extraterritorial effect. 44
3· France

45

France has no written law on the recognition of foreign
divorce decrees, but the practice has developed, in addition
to the rules concerning foreign judgments in general, certain
peculiarities as regards foreign judgments affecting status
and capacity of individuals. 46
(a) Foreign divorce decrees, like other foreign judgments creating or modifying status and capacity, are held
effective without exequatur by the French courts for purposes
not requiring physical execution on property or coercion of
persons. 47
42 Restatement § II4 comment b; STUMBERG 320; GOODRICH 416. In the
cases concerning extraterritorial effect of divorce decrees, a state may refuse
to give effect to a limited divorce, while it would recognize a decree of absolute divorce, Pettis v. Pettis (1917) 91 Conn. 6o8, 101 Atl. 13.
43 Restatement § 114 comment a.
44 There is no authority, GooDRICH 415.
45 See DEGAND, 5 Repert. 559 and (with reference to the almost identical Belgian law) PouLLET, nos. 50o-5o4; Novelles Belges, z D. Civ. Divorce, nos.
1760, 1761. A report was issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and reproduced in the decision of the German RG. (March 19, 1936) 150
RGZ. 374, Clunet 1939, 122; an excellent discussion by MEZGER, "Scheidung
von Franzosen im Ausland im Licht der neuesten franzosischen Rechtsprechung," Festschrift Lewald ( 1953) 317-337; BATIFFOL, "Recognition in
France of Foreign Decrees Divorcing Spouses of Different Nationality," 4
Am. J. Comp. Law (1955) 574-581.
46 The subject matter of the practice is extended by LEREBOUR&-PIGEONNIERE 333 no. 310 to all judgments which modify a legal situation ( Gestaltungsurteile in the German doctrine).
47 The principle initiated by the Court of Cassation in 186o (infra n. so)
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Neither the conditions nor the scope of this rule are
settled, with respect to which the courts seem to enjoy almost absolute discretion. One condition certainly is that the
decree conform to the French rules of choice of law 47 a and
that the court was competent under the rules of its own law. 48
The requirements for the international jurisdiction of the
divorce court are rather obscure; modern writers do not
seem to be satisfied unless the jurisdiction complies with the
French rules or, at least, no French jurisdiction for the
instant case had existed. 48 a Often, public policy may intervene, especially when a fair opportunity for defense appears
to have been lacking. 49
Without being made executory by exequatur, a foreign divorce decree has the effect of forming a proper basis for
remarriage before a civil official 50 and has been held in a
much discussed decision to mark the beginning of the three
was confirmed and formulated in Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 1900) S.1901.1.185;
App. Aix (July 9, 1903) D.1905.2.73, S.1906.2.257; cf. WEISS, 6 Traite 41 ff.;
and with final clarifications in Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930.1.377; cf.
::\'ll30YET, 5 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1931) 479· Occasionally, it is true, exequatur is asked
and granted without apparent necessity; see App. Agen (July 29, 1936)
Revue Crit. 1937, 721 and the Note, ibid. (annulment in Chile).
470 See, e.g., Cass. (civ.) (April 17, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 412; Cour
Paris (Oct. 30, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 825.
4
" Cass. (civ.)
(May 9, 1900) S.1901.1.185; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16,
1935) Revue 1936, 519 (the Supreme Council of the Armenian Church in
Constantinople no longer had divorce jurisdiction).
480 BATIFFOL, Traite 836; NIBOYET, 6 Traite no. 1951-1956. In view of arts.
q, 15 C. C. a French defendant "has to waive French jurisdiction, even if
only impliedly by not contesting the foreign jurisdiction, see, e.g., Swiss BG.
(]an. 14, 1953) 79 BGE. II 7, 9·
,
49
Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 1900) S.1901.1.185; Trib. civ. Seine (June 29, 1938)
Clunet 1939, 61 (rejecting a decree of Cuernavaca, Mexico). Cf. App. Aix
(March 27, 1890) and Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 25, 1892) S.1893.1.505; Cour Paris
(July 2, 1934) Revue Crit. 1936, 500 (recognizing a decree of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island granted by default against the husband who was
notified of the decree and failed to appeal; the note finds this holding "too
absolute"); Cour Paris (Dec. 15, 1948) Revue Crit. 1949, II3, affirmed by
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 22, 1951) Revue Crit. 1951, 167 (nonrecognition of Reno
divorce); Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 19, 1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 8o6 (nonrecognition
of California divorce obtained by default).
5 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 28, 186o) S.186o.1.210. The writers base the custody
of children on the foreign divorce decree.
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months during which a divorced wife under French law 51
must claim, or otherwise lose, any participation in marital
community property. 52 These decisions are understood to
express the idea that a final foreign divorce decree is assimilated to a French decree. A foreign judicial separation, if
recognized, may be converted into divorce. 5 3
(b) Application for exequatur, however, is necessary not
only if execution is sought, as for alimentary rights 53a or
rights of restitution, but also if, in litigation between the
spouses, one of them denies the validity of the divorce. In a
case where divorce had been granted in the United States
at the instance of the husband, the wife sued for divorce
again in France; the mere fact that she challenged the
American decree persuaded the Court of Cassation to prevent recognition otherwise than by means of exequatur proceedings. 54 Further, the regular record of divorce at the
registry of civil status, essential for terminating marital
liability of spouses against third persons, cannot be obtained
without exequatur. 55
The decree of exequatur must be sought in a special proceeding in the same way and under the same conditions as
in all cases of foreign judgments. Just what is the subject
matter of this proceeding is highly controversial, but there
is no doubt that, despite all contrary theories, the courts
reserve to themselves in addition to the general control
51

C. C. art. 1463.
Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930.1.377 cited supra n. 47·
53 Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.1922.1.137; S.1923.1.5; Trib. dep. AlpesMaritimes (Oct. 25, 1927) Revue 1928, 328.
53 a Cour Paris (Oct. 30, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 825.
54 Cass. (req.)
(Nov. u, 1908) Revue 1909, 227, Clunet 1909, 753,
S.l909.1·572.
55 Trib. civ. Seine (May 19, 1926) La Loi, Dec. 30, 1927; Cass. (civ.)
(Jan. 9, 1951) Revue Crit. 1951, 313; contra: Trib. civil Seine (April 26,
1950) Revue Crit. 1952, 734· Cf., on the effect of omission of transcription,
Trib. civ. Seine (May 27, 1938) Nouv. Revue 1938, 326. Marginal entry in
the register is allowed but has informational, not legal, effect.
52
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mentioned under (a), the right to unlimited re-examination
of every point of procedure and substantive law and even of
the facts of the case, 56 although they may not exercise this
control completely in every case. Ordinarily, they will investigate whether the divorce was based on a ground acknowledged by the French municipal law. Where, for instance, a Swiss court pronounced divorce on the ground of
disruption of marriage (C. C. art. 142), the decree was not
recognized, the cause not being existent under French law. 57
Recent decisions, however, on the basis of the acquired rights
theory, have been quite liberal in recognizing, for example,
foreign decrees based on mutual consent. 58 But it has rather
astonished the commentators that the Court of Appeals of
Paris, in an exclusively foreign case involving an Argentine
husband and his American wife, refused exequatur to a divorce decree of the Court of Monaco on the ground that the
husband had in fact never resided in Europe, although both
parties had been fully represented in the suit and only the
parents of the husband wanted to prevent recognition of
the divorce in order to keep their son from concluding another marriage. 59 French courts always feel repugnance to
collusive influence on judicial acts.
This system has been adopted in several countries 00 but
00
GLASSON et TISSIER, 4 Traite de Procedure Civile {ed. 3, 1932) nos. 1015,
1016 and 5 ibid. Suppl. no. 1015 bis.
But there is a distinctive trend against such a revision of the foreign decree, Cour Paris {Nov. 10, 1952) Revue Crit. 1953, 615 (approving note
MOTULSKY); BATIFFOL, Traite 855, 571.
5 7 Trib. civ. Seine (June 10, 1936) D. H. 1936. 420.
58 Cass. (civ.) (April 17, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 412; Cour Paris (Oct.
30, 1954) Revue Crit. 1954, 825.
Luxemburg: Cour d'appel (June 18, 1952) 15 Pasicrisie Lux. 4II {German
decree based on disruption).
" 9 Court Paris (March 24, 1930) Revue 1930, 272 criticized by NIBOYBT,
ibid. In the decision of Cass. (req.) {Nov. II, 1908) 8.1909.1.572, supra n.
54, a divorce decree of Pensacola, Florida, was declared ineffective because
the husband was found to have obtained the decree by declaring under oath
false facts supporting jurisdiction.
eo See, for instance, for Belgium cases cited in Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ.
(supra n. 45); recently Cass. (Jan. 16, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 813.
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has been criticized by French 61 as well as by I tali an writers, 62
who have influenced their courts to the extent that, according
to the opinion now prevailing in Italy, a foreign judgment
never has binding effect unless it has been rendered executory
by proceedings of delibazione. 63
4· Germany 64 and Austria

65

The statutory provisions laid down in section 328 of the
German Code of Civil Pr9cedure concern the conditions of
both recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
general. Since 194 I, the recognition of a foreign matrimonial decision is, as a rule, exclusively declared by a judicialadministrative agency. 66 This regulation is complete and the
most elaborate of all, but questionable in form and substance; its most serious defect was the requirement of reciprocity (C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 5, par. 2). In recent
For Brazil: C. C., Introductory Law of I942, art. I5. As to the former practice, see Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I920) no. 7I4, 24 Revista Sup. Trib. (I920)
356; App. Civ. Rio de Janiero (Dec. 9, I922 and April IS, I926) no. 540S, 8I
Revista Dir. Civ. (I926) I74 ff.; App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. 25, I927)
no. 2.980, 86 Revista Dir. Civ. (I927) 389.
Uruguay: Exequatur is required for all purposes, ALFONSIN, Regimen Internacional del Divorcio (I953) I4I, I47·
61 BARTIN, I Principes § I90; NIBOYET 952 ff. nos. 8so-8sz; PERROUD, 5
Repert. 384 nos. I47, I48; BATIFFOL, Traite 849 ff.
6 2 ANZILOTTI, I Rivista (I9o6) 227; s ibid. (I9IO) I31; see further citations in MORELLI, Dir. Proc. Civ. Int. 289 n. I.
6 3 Italian C. Civ. Proc. ( I940) arts. 796 ff., generally without re-examination of the contents of the foreign judgment. In most of its recent bilateral
treaties, however, Italy has required an action for executory confirmation
only for the purpose of forcible execution, see PERASSI in I7 Rivista (I925)
I09; UDINA, Elementi 95· Thus, in relation to Switzerland, no exequatur is
required; see note of the Italian Government to the Swiss Government, BBl.
I938, II 499 no. 8. A comprehensive survey in MIELE, II riconoscimento delle
sentenze matrimoniali straniere ( 1949).
6 4 STEIN-JON A&-SCHONKE, I ZPO. § 328 II; RAAPE 4I 8-424.
65 The German decree of Oct. 25, I94I, § 24, enacted also for Austria and
upheld there after I945 (SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, IS Z.ausl.PR. (I949/5o) 458)
declared § 328 of the German C. Civ. Proc. applicable.
6 6 Decree of Oct. 25, I94I, § 24.
Competent for declaring the recognition are the Ministers of Justice of
Austria, East Germany and of the Lander of West Germany, respectively.
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years, especially the rules on jurisdiction in matrimonial matters directly relevant for the recognition of foreign decrees
have been modified several times, the last change having
occurred in Western Germany in I957·ssa The final result
may be briefly presented as follows.
There are two general grounds which exclude recognition
of any foreign decree: if the foreign court at the time of
recognition would not have jurisdiction according to German
law (C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. r), 66 b or if the decree is
at variance with German public policy (ibid., no. 4).
In addition, a foreign decree may have to comply with
various requirements:
(a) Where both parties are nationals of the country of
divorce, a final divorce decree is almost always granted
recognition and enforcement; 67 such a decree is even exempted from the administrative procedure establishing its
recognition. 68 Seldom can the matter be connected with German interests closely enough to affect public policy. 69
(b) A decree concerning two foreigners is also certain
66
a The Law of June z8, 1957, has replaced C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 by §§ 6o66o6b.
66
b German jurisdiction has to be derived from C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6 and
6o6b.
67
RG. (Feb. 28, 1938) JW. 1938, 1518; see also RG. (Jan. 5, 1925) 109
RGZ. 383, JW. 1925, 765, Clunet 1926, 173 (Czechoslovakian decree); KG.
(Dec. 21, 1935) ]W. 1936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 (Hungarian decree
upon ground of alleged collusion of the parties). The same !}oint of view
was observed in Austria, see Walker 729, 730.
68
Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 24 par. 4· If one of the spouses is resident in
Germany and if he or his spouse is stateless or the ensuing decree wiii be
recognized by the husband's national law, either spouse may sue in Germany,
C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6-6o6b. Since jurisdiction, in these cases, is granted in
Germany, recognition depends on reciprocity, C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2.
Hence, even with respect to foreigners, recognition was excluded in many
cases until the Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 24 par. I sentence 3 authorized
reciprocity to be waived and C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2 (in Western Germany
§ 6o6a, as amended 1957) restricted, for purposes of recognition, German
jurisdictional claims.
69
RAAPE 419. A divorce decree validly rendered by the national court of
the spouses by default was recognized, although not in conformance with
German divorce procedure, LG. Dresden (Oct. 16, 1935) JW. 1935, 3493·
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to be recognized if it is rendered at the marital domicil and
recognized by the husband's national country. 70
(c) Where one party is of German nationality, the divorce decrees of many countries were not recognized because
reciprocity of recognition was not guaranteed. 71 Recent legislation has mitigated the requirement of reciprocity. Since
1941, reciprocity may be waived. 72 Further, in spite of
German jurisdiction and without regard to reciprocity, a
foreign matrimonial decision may be recognized, if the
defendant (in the foreign suit) is a foreign national or if
the defendant's residence is, or the last common residence
of the spouses was, abroad or if the defendant asks for
recognition. 73
If none of these conditions is fulfilled, reciprocity with
the state of the judgment has to be established. The list of
countries guaranteeing reciprocity, however, is not altogether
confined to those countries that have concluded treaties on
recognition with Germany or to those recognizing all German judgments; it suffices that German divorce decrees are
regularly recognized. Therefore, the list has been believed
to be rather comprehensive. 74

°

7 C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6, 6o6b, EGBGB. Art. I7 par. I; cf. RAAPE, IPR. 301.
The OLG. Hamburg (Oct. I, I935) JW. I935, 3488 held a Mexican decree
void because obtained in a shocking manner. It is doubtful whether German
public policy should have been invoked since the husband was an American
citizen domiciled in New Jersey and the wife had lost her German nationality
by her marriage, JONAS, JW. I936, 283, LORENZ, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 326.
The decree would not have been recognized in New Jersey, however, if
properly attacked, and could be disregarded for this reason in Germany.
71 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 5, par. 2 exempting from reciprocity does
not apply when there is German jurisdiction, which exists always if a
German national is involved, see supra note 68.
72 Decree of Oct. 25, I941, § 24 par. I sentence 3·
73 C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6a. This provision has to be read in conjunction with
C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2 as described supra note 68; it dispenses, for the
purpose of recognition, in some cases with the consequences of the inclusive
German jurisdictional claim and therefore with reciprocity.
74 See especially WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 88-92; and for instance AG. Hannover (Oct. 26, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, no. 73 (Uruguay); KG.
(Dec. I9, 1932) ibid., no. 74 (Yugoslavia).
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However, relations with Great Britain and the United
States in particular are in doubt. Leading authorities declare
that in neither country is there any certainty of recognition
because courts in common law countries are prepared to reexamine the jurisdiction of the individual German tribunal
and that English courts in particular may inquire into the
question of fraud. 75 On the contrary, as a practical matter,
one may presume that, in most courts of the United States,
German divorce decrees rendered at the domicil of one party
are enforced with greater probability of excluding defenses
than in Germany. 76
Again, even if reciprocity is dispensed with or if the divorce is rendered in one of the countries with which reciprocal recognition is assumed to exist, such as Denmark, Norway, or the Netherlands, it must comply with a number of
other requirements. Recognition is denied, if the losing
defendant is a German national and in the suit was not
served personally through the German authorities; 11 or if
divorce was granted on a ground unknown to German law
and without stating facts which constitute a sufficient ground
for divorce under German law; 78 or if divorce was denied
to the disadvantage of a German party, while it should have
been granted according to German law. 79 Conformity with
German public policy includes, in the case of German parties, numerous possibilities, most of which are cov~red by
75
STEIN-}ONAs-ScHONKI!, I ZPO (ed:l7, I949) § 328 VIII E no. 2I (now
recognizing reciprocity with the United Kingdom), no. 53; RAAPE, 2 D. IPR
(ed. I) r8s considers the position of England and Sweden not clear.
76
See FELLER, "Die Vollstreckbarkeit von U rteilen amerikanischer Gerichte
in Deutschland," ]W. I93I, 112; Ruo. MuELLER, "Die Anerkennung von
Urteilen, Besch!Ussen und Anordnungen ausliindischer Gerichte und von ausliindischen Schiedsspriichen im Recht der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika,"
5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 905 (on divorce) 927; KG. (May 3, I93S) JW. I935,
2750 (as to Illinois).
77
C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 2; RG. (June IS, I936) ]W. I936, 2456.
78
C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. r no. 3; cf. EG. art. I7 par. 4·
70 Same provision as supra n. 78.
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the other conditions of recognition. 80 In fact, not often is a
foreign divorce concerning a German subject recognized
except by virtue of some international treaty.

5. Soviet Union
In consequence of the principle that either spouse was
able to terminate the marriage at his pleasure, it was presumed in Soviet Russia that any act of an authority in other
countries designed to dissolve a marriage of Soviet citizens
is supported by the intention of at least one party and therefore valid as a nonregistered divorce. A decree of the People's Commissary of Justice of July 6, 1923, 81 stated that
every dissolution of marriage obtained in a foreign country
according to the local laws will be recognized in the U.S.S.R.,
irrespective of where and when the dissolved marriage was
celebrated, unless the marriage of a Soviet citizen has been
dissolved or annulled on formal grounds contrary to the will
of both spouses. 82 No provision has been held necessary in
the case where only one party is of Soviet nationality. 83
In consequence of the radical changes in the family legislation of 1944, Soviet Russia now claims exclusive jurisdiction for the divorce of spouses when both are Russian nationals but seems to recognize foreign divorces affecting only
one Russian spouse. 83a
80

RAAPE 4IO.
Sec. 2 of the Decree, which in German translation was reproduced and
analyzed together with the Circular letter of the People's Commissary of the
Interior of June 2, I92I, no. I9 and the Decree of the Commissary of Justice
of Feb. 2I, I927, by H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht in der Sowjetunion (I927) I,
in 4 Die Zivilgesetze der Gegenwart 7I; H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht Sowjetrusslands (I924) 69; MAKAROV, Precis 399; see also German RG. (June 24,
I927) IPRspr. I926-27, no. 70; Swiss BG. (June I5, I928) 54 BGE. II 225,
228 1 23 I.
82 On the limitation expressed in the last sentence, see German RG. (April
4, I928) I2I RGZ. 24, 27.
83 MAKAROV, Precis 400 with hypothetical comment.
saa HOYER, Anerkennung (supra n. I) 34; see supra p. 427 n. go.
81
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6. The Hague Convention on Divorce
By the Hague Convention on Divorce, article 7, the member states agree to recognize a divorce or separation decreed
by a court competent according to the Convention, provided
the dispositions of the Convention have been observed, and,
in case the decision has been rendered by default against a
defendant who fails to appear, he has been cited in accordance with the special provisions of his national law for the
recognition of foreign judgments. 84
A divorce or separation decreed by an administrative jurisdictional authority shall likewise be recognized everywhere,
if the law of each of the spouses recognizes such divorce or
separation.
Since under articles I and 2 the national law of the parties
must be observed by the divorce court, recognition depends
upon a re-examination of facts and motives. 85
The Convention is understood not only to authorize but
to obligate the courts to refuse recognition, if the treaty requirements are not satisfied. 86
7. Latin-American Conventions
The Montevideo Treaty provides for reciprocal recognition of divorces decreed at the matrimonial domicil, 87 or at
the last matrimonial domicil, in case the parties have been judicially separated or, according to the recent draft, the wife
has been deserted and has not established a new domicil of
her own. 88 This simple principle was incorporated in the
84

For comment see MEILI-MAMELOK, IPR. 240 § 45·
LG. Miinchen I (Jan. 17, 1908) 4 Z. Rechtspflege Bayern (1908) 295·
86
App. Milano (Nov. 21, 1906) Monitore 1907, 133, 3 Rivista (1908) 390,
Clunet 1908, 1267; KosTERS 528; LEWALD in Strupp, 1 Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatie 470 VII; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 571 n. 104; VREELAND 229.
87 Treaty on international civil law (1889) art. 13, (1940) art. 15.
88 Treaty on international civil law (1940) art. 59 par. 2 with art. 9·
85
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C6digo Bustamante which for once, abandoning its neutrality
to the criterion of the personal law, prescribes that the law of
the matrimonial domicil is to apply. 89 Of course, the court
must have observed the treaty requirements respecting the
applicable law, which are not quite so simple in the Havana
Convention as in the Treaty of Montevideo. The reservations for non-recognition vary in scope. The C6digo Bustamante 90 reserves to "each contracting state the right to permit or recognize, or not, the divorce or new marriage of persons divorced abroad, in causes which are not admitted by
their personal law." The reservation contained in the new
draft of the Montevideo Treaty is much more restricted; it
covers only the case where the country of celebration does
not permit divorce and grants the right to refuse recognition
on this ground only to this country. 91
8. The Scandinavian Convention on Family Law of 193 I

92

This Convention assures reciprocal recognition, without
confirmation or re-examination, of all decisions rendered in
matrimonial causes according to the treaty provisions. Actions for separation or divorce between nationals of the participating states are decided, under the basic rule of these
provisions, according to the law of the state where both parties are domiciled or where they had their last common domicil, if one of them is still domiciled there.
There are, thus, no defenses to a divorce decree of another
Scandinavian country, except that the case does not come under the Convention or, perhaps, that the matter is pending
in the forum. 93
Art. s6.
Art. 53, see comment by BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes
de Rio 121.
91
(1940) art. 15(b). See supra p. 458.
92
Art. 22 referring, among others, to arts. 7, 8, 10.
93 Art. 7 par. 1.
s9

90
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Other inter-Scandinavian conventions provide for the mutual enforcement of alimentary awards (Feb. 10, I 93 I) and
other judgments (March 16, I9J2) .94
9· Bilateral Treaties
Before the first World War, very few conventions existed
for securing mutual enforcement of judgments; the most outstanding is still in force-the French-Swiss Treaty of June
I 5, I 8 69, which, according to present prevailing opinion, is
applicable also to divorce decrees. 95 In the nineteen-twenties,
a wave of international adjustment in Europe brought about
a series of treaties for reciprocal judicial assistance, especially through negotiations of France, Germany, Italy, and
the states succeeding the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 96
The latter group of conventions has been revitalized and
substantially broadened since World War ll_9 6 a
Great Britain, however, while also endeavoring to establish a system of reciprocal recognition upon a treaty basis,
4

See BLOcH, 8 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1934) 627, 636.
See SEcRETAN, Revue 1926, 199; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 574 no. 193. The
contrary view formerly frequent in Switzerland is maintained by GAUTSCHI,
z6 S]Z. 1929, 1. The treaty also covers recognition of measures ancillary to
divorce, such as awarding custody of children. See Cass. (req.) (Nov. 3,
1936) Clunet 1937, 293· The French-Belgian Treaty of July 8, 1899, was
facilitated by the identical codes; see on the content, PERRour,; 5 Repert. 409.
Also still in force is the Treaty between Colombia and Ecuador of June 18,
1903 on international private law, art. XVI of which deals with divorce, only
to deny the right of remarriage if the divorce fails to agree with the law of
the other state.
96 Generally, W. ]ELLINEK, Die zweiseitigen Staatsvertrage iiber die Anerkennung ausliindischer Zivilurteile (with texts) ( 1935).
On the French-Italian Treaty of June 3, 1930, see PERROUD, Clunet 1934,
275; on art. 3 of the German-Swiss Treaty of Nov. 2, 1929, 109 League of
~ations Treaty Series (193Q-1931) 274, see VoRTISCH, 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936)
17; KG. (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577; JoNAS, ibid.; LoRENZ, 7 Giur.
Comp. DIP. no. 33· On the application of the Italian-Swiss Treaty of Jan. 3,
1933, to matters of status, see App. Roma (Nov. 27, 1934) with Note, ScERNI,
3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 31 and the cases cited infra p. 521, n. roo.
ona A contracting party's divorce decree is recognized if one of the spouses
was a national of the decreeing court when its decision came into force,
unless there is a prior judgment within the recognizing country, see DROBNIG,
5 Am. J. Comp. L. (1956) 487, 495·
"

"
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has concluded only two treaties with foreign countries, the
first of which, with France, declares itself inapplicable to
matters of status and capacity 97 and the second, with Belgium, renders inoperative its most important provision with
respect to these matters. 98

Il.

PARTICULAR PROBLEMS

As the general doctrine of recognition and enforcement of
judgments ought to be discussed in its proper place, topics
involved in this problem, such as jurisdiction of the foreign
court, finality and conclusiveness of the decision, reciprocity,
opportunity for defense, and fraud, cannot be treated at
length here. There are, however, a few typical situations
found in the field of foreign divorces, which permit comparative survey. Courts in contemplating such groups of cases
may apply different legal categories to obtain the same result; indeed, several of the numerous legal requisites for
recognition may be invoked at once without entirely exact discrimination, if a court feels that the foreign divorce decree
should not be accepted.
I.

Scope of Recognition as Contrasted with Enforcement

Recognition, as contrasted with enforcement, 99 has more
importance in the matter of divorce decrees than in ordinary
judgments, but the effects of recognition are not uniformly
determined.
(a) Usually, as a minimum effect, a foreign divorce decree which agrees with the essentials for recognition can be
97 Treaty of Jan. 18, 1934, art. 2 § 3b, 171 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1936-1937), 183 at 186.
98 Treaty of May 2, 1934, art. 4(3), 173 League of Nations Treaty Series
( 1936-1937) 291 at 299.
99 Cf. Restatement § 42(d); YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales," 2 Memoires de l'Academie lnternationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 357; Hague Draft of a Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, arts. I and II, Actes de Ia Cinquieme Session 193.
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set up as a defense against the alleged existence of the marriage in any suit for separate maintenance or restitution of
conjugal rights, for separation, or for divorce, etc., without
bringing an action on the judgment or, on the continent,
without an application for an executory decree. 100
(b) Likewise, the decree provides full evidence of the dissolution of the marriage before a civil official or other marriage officer when remarriage is attempted. 101 The conditions
of its fitness for recognition are to be examined by the officer
or any authority or any court supervising him and not
through an action on the judgment.102
(c) The effects of a divorce on the name of the wife, on
her ability to be reinstated in her former nationality, or on
her domicil, fall within the scope of mere recognition. 103
1 ''" France: Cass. ( req.) (March 3, 1930) 8.1930.1.377; Cour Paris (] uly 2,
1934) Revue Crit. 1936, soo; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16, 1935) Revue Crit.
1')36, 519.
Belgium: Cass. (Jan. r6, 1953) Revue Crit. 1953, 810.
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 328; RG. (June 24, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-27, no.
]0.

Greece: App. Athens, no. 33, (1926) 37 Themis 470 (not recognizing an
•\merican divorce) ; but cf. TENEKIDES, Clunet 1937, 598.
Italy: App. Torino (July 25, 1930) Monitore 1930, 9II, 5 Z.ausi.PR.
( 19 3 r) 84+ (see also five Italian decisions, ibid. 843, concerning recognition
outside the Hague Convention); App. Fiume (June 10, 1937) 29 Rivista
( 1937) 398, Clunet 1938, 932; cf. SCERNI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp .. (1934) 340;
but see supra p. 519, n. 96.
Scotland: The Court of Sessions, Outer House, by Lord Moncrieff, in Arnott
v. Lord Advocate [1932] Scots L. T. 46, in recognizing an Ohio decree,
granted a decree of declarator for exceptional aid, while as a rule the grant
of a decree to give validity to the domiciliary decree which already had universal validity would "be a trespass against international comity."
Switzerland: App. Bern (July 6, 1935) 72 ZBJV. (1936) 429; cf. I I
Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 669 (divorce of Swiss nationals in Oregon recognized without action because the award required no enforcement); cf. also BECK, NAG.
378 no. r6o.
101
Belgium: App. Liege (Jan. 29, 1924) Jur. Liege 1924, 76; cf. PoULLET
628 n. 4·
France: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 28, r86o) S.r86o.r.21o; see supra p. 508.
Germany: RAAPE 416 VII r.
Switzerland: BEcK, NAG. 379 no. 161.
1°2 See citations in preceding note.
10a BECK, NAG. 379 no. 161.
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(d) While the decree is entered upon the records of civil
status without the steps necessary for enforcement, according to the German and Swiss regulations/ 04 in France, on the
contrary, transcription in the register of civil status is denied
unless a decree of exequatur is obtained. 105
(e) Recognition nowhere covers the enforcement of pecuniary duties arising from the decree or of rights to exercise
custody over children, or other provisional orders. 106 It has
been asserted, 107 and seems correct, that recognition of a
foreign divorce repugnant to the domestic principles of the
forum may be granted, while executory enforcement would
be denied. In the Netherlands, foreign divorces may not be
executed and enforced at all but are capable of being recognized.108
2.

Scope of Res Judicata

Is full faith and credit due to a foreign decision dismissing
an action for divorce on the merits? This question has arisen
on the Continent, because generally defeat in a lawsuit as
well as victory may constitute res judicata. Nevertheless, it
has been argued that a subject of the forum should not be
barred from suing under his own law after having been rejected under a foreign law less favorable to him. In fact, in
Switzerland foreign decrees denying divorce to a Swiss citi104 Germany: RG. (May r8, 1916) 88 RGZ. 244 against former practice
of lower courts; but the declaration of recognition by the competent Minister of Justice has to be made (Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 24).
Switzerland: Civil Status Regulation § n8 par. r.
1os Trib. civ. Seine (May 19, 1926) cited supra p. 510, n. 55·
Italy: C. Civ. Proc. ( 1940) art. 796.
Portugal: Decree on Civil Status of Dec. 22, 1932, art. 391 § 2.
However Sweden: Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments c. 3 § 7, requires a confirmation of the foreign divorce decree for the celebration of a new
marriage in Sweden.
106 BECK, NAG. 381 no. 168.
107 }ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE, in Republica de Colombia, Comisi6n de
Reforma del C6digo Civil (193Q-1940) 217, 218.
108 See I BERGMANN (ed. 2) 404.
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zen are said not to be entitled to recognition. 109 A better considered solution is given in Germany; a foreign judgment
unfavorable to the application of a German national is recognized, if the decision is in conformity with German divorce
law.110
In the United States, the binding force of a judgment dismissing a suit for divorce on the merits seems to be virtually
the same whether it is rendered by a domestic or a foreign
court. It could hardly be otherwise, since the divorce court
applies its own law, and the forum of recognition does not
re-examine the merits.
3· Divorce Without Judicial Litigation
Many legislators and even treaty-makers are so accustomed to contemplate contentious proceedings and a decree
of a state court as the only way to obtain divorce, that they
overlook the possibility of other forms of divorce being used
abroad. The difficulties of interpreting the pertinent narrowly drafted texts are increased in numerous systems, for
instance, in the elaborate but contradictory and incomplete
German enactments, 111 by failure to coordinate the procedural rules on recognition of foreign judgments with the
choice of law rules on the extraterritorial effect of private
acts and by failure to regulate clearly the recognition of foreign acts of administrative justice. 112
Recognition of foreign forms of divorce unknown to the
forum is traditionally barred by public policy with respect to
nationals or subjects of the forum, as distinguished from
See BECK, NAG. 377 no. 157.
uo See RAAPE 410 V 1.
111 See supra p. 512.
112 See on the "inchoate" state of the Anglo-American doctrine of administrative acts, YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales,"
2 Memoires de I'Academie Internationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 at
1°9
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foreign married couples. But the general trend is in the direction of replacing the former reluctance to recognize foreign
modes of divorce by a broader-minded outlook.
(a) Decisions of foreign ecclesiastical courts are probably
everywhere treated as equivalent to decrees of ordinary
courts. The minority opinion is, however, that religious divorces should be recognized even when they are not supported by the consent of the state in whose territory they are
rendered, 113 provided only that they are recognized by the
state of which the parties are nationals-a species of renvoi.
The prevailing view 114 requires an ecclesiastical court to be
authorized by the state where it is sitting, as well as by the
state of which the parties are nationals or domiciliaries,
according to the principle governing status.

Illustration: Orthodox Russians are divorced by the
Council of the Orthodox Church in Paris, Polish Jews by a
rabbi in the Netherlands, divorces are not recognized by the
country where pronounced nor under the prevailing opinion
in third countries, but recognized by the national law. Supposing that the domicil was in the home country, the answer
would probably be negative also in American courts.
Recognition of a religious decree means giving full civil
effect to the divorce. Where a Bulgarian national of Orthodox faith had been married in the Netherlands to a Dutch
woman according to both temporal and ecclesiastical ceremonies and the Bulgarian Church decreed divorce, the Orthodox tribunal of course considered only the religious marriage
and ignored the Dutch civil ceremony. But a Netherlands
11 3

See 3 FRANKENSTEIN 560 n. 70 and the decisions cited by him.
3 ARMINJON §§ 34, 35; M. WoLFF, IPR. 2o4; NussBAUM, D.IPR. 164
n. 5; this also seems to be the meaning of American cases such as In re Rubenstein's Estate ( 1932) 143 N. Y. Misc. 917, 257 N. Y. Supp. 637; In re
Spondre (1917) 98 N. Y. Misc. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 943; Miller v. Miller
(1911) 70 N. Y. Misc. 368, 128 N. Y. Supp. 787; Leshinsky v. Leshinsky
(1893) 5 N.Y. Misc. 495, 25 N.Y. Supp. 841; cf. FREEMAN, 3 Treatise of
the Law of Judgments (1925) 3095 § 1510 formulating the condition "if
valid where given."
114
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court recognizing this divorce should not have assumed that
the Dutch civil marriage remained undissolved. 115
(b) Divorce or separation pronounced by an administrative jurisdictional authority has been expressly declared recognizable by the Hague Convention on Divorce (art. 7,
par. 2), provided that the national law of either spouse recognizes such act. This leaves the national laws free to decide. But there is no reason why, under any system of nationality or domicil, a decree rendered in the name of the King of
Denmark 116 or by bill of Parliament (if still available)
should not be recognized as readily as a court decree; the
protection against arbitrary dissolution seems greater than
in many courts.U 7
It is true that administrative jurisdiction over divorce is
usually given upon the basis of a mutual agreement of the
parties, and this circumstance raises a doubt that we may consider separately.
(c) In fact, non-contentious proceedings, if followed by a
decree of any independent authority, need not necessarily be
regarded as an obstacle to recognition at a forum where
mutual agreement is excluded by the municipal law. But in
11 " Rb. Amsterdam (March 3, 1930) W. 1930, 12175 approved by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 409 n. 2; analogously LG. Berlin (May 23, 1949) IPRspr. 19451949 no. 68.
116 On recognition of a Danish royal decree in Italy, see Trib. Roma (April
8, 1908) Clunet 1910, 67o; Germany: KG. (Jan. 23, 1939) Dt. Recht 1939,
1015 no. 38, 9 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1943) 230, has pronounced the principle
that the Danish Royal decree, as an administrative decree, is to be recognized but depends on the same conditions as a judicial decree and fulfills all
requirements of German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 by analogy. In the instant case
recognition was refused, the husband being a German and domiciled in
Germany, according to § 328 no. I. For a Danish husband, Reg. Praes.
Schleswig (Jan. 23, 1932), see StAZ. 1932, 197, b; for a Danish couple, the
husband being domiciled in Brazil, see Brazil Sup. Trib. Fed. (Jan. 31, 1933)
21 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1933) 26. Cf. for various opinions, WIERUSZOWSKI, 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 78 n. 485 and VALLADAO, "Homologo~;ao de Decreta Real
de Div6rcio," Estudios de Direito Internacional Privado (1947) 499-525.
117 CHESHIRE 380, declaring inconceivable nonrecognition in such cases,
goes too far in extending recognition to any local form. See also KEITH,
"Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard (1935) 4 at 11.
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such cases difficulties have been experienced with respect to
subjects of the forum of recognition and also with respect
to foreigners when the forum reviews the grounds for
divorce. 118
A particular problem exists with regard to the conversion
of a foreign limited divorce into a domestic absolute divorce.
In several countries, a judicial separation may be transformed into a divorce a vinculo without proving new
grounds, after some time has elapsed since the separation.
This institution usually presupposes contentious litigation, in
which the disruption of the marriage has been examined by a
court before granting separation. If so, a separation obtained
abroad upon a mere mutual agreement, as is possible in
Chile, Italy, the Netherlands, in the countries of Austrian
law, and others, cannot suffice as the only ground for an absolute divorce at the forum; this has been held in Belgium, 119
France/ 20 Hungary, 121 Switzerland, 121a etc. It is also agreed
118 For instance, French courts refused recognition to a judgment on
"acquiescence," regarding the procedure as affected by "irregularity," arg.
C. C. art. 92 (new, art. 249); likewise Swiss App. Freiburg i. Ue., IO SJZ.
I76, no. 49· But recent French decisions have recognized foreign decrees
based on mutual consent even though French parties were involved, Cass.
(civ.) (April I7, I953) Revue Crit. I953o 4I2; Cour Paris (Oct. 30, I954)
Revue Crit. I954, 825. In many countries the matter is in doubt; also under
the Hague Convention, see 3 FRANKENSTEIN 567.
119 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (July 4, I9I3) KOSTERs--BELLEMANS 2I8.
1 2 France: Cour Paris (May I4, I902) I4 Z.int.R. (I904) IOO (separation
in Chile); App. Amiens (March 2I, I906) Clunet I906, 1138; App. Grenoble
(May 23, I924) Revue I924, 222; Cass. (civ.) (July 6, I922) Clunet I922,
7I4 (Ferrari case no. I); Cour Paris (July 11, I930) Revue I930, 68o. Trib.
civ. Seine (July IS, I935) Nouv. Revue I935, 553; Cour Paris (Feb. 4, 1937)
Clunet 1937, 283 (decree of the Italian Consular Tribunal in Alexandria on
the basis of Italian law )-all concerning Italian mutual agreements. Cf.
LEREBOUR8--PIGEONN!ERE 367 § 339a, against BARTIN, I Principes 424 § 171;
cf. BARTIN, 2 Principes 328 § 319.
Of another character is the Argentine separation of a Chilean man and a
French woman in the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 13, 1898) Clunet 1921
(sic), 215.
121 Hungarian law applied for the province of Burgenland by the Austrian
Supreme Court (April 25, 1925) 37 Z.int.R. (1927) 393 in the matter of an
Austrian mutual agreement of separation from bed and board.
121
a BG. (July 2, I953) 79 BGE. II 337·
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that the Hague Convention, in providing that separation
ought to be recognized by the participant states (art 7),
means a separation pronounced by a court upon contested
proceedings. 122
Although these limitations are reasonable, the German
courts took an intransigent attitude in construing the dissolution of the conjugal union, which was the only separation admitted by the Civil Code, as a unique institution, indispensable for conversion under the Code, and hence irreplaceable by any foreign type of separation. 123
(d) The forms of divorce permitted by the laws of Soviet
Russia have engendered special problems. Under the initial
Soviet legislation of I9 I 8, a divorce could be obtained either
by mutual consent and official registration or by application
of one party to a court, notice to the other party by summons,
and a decree which the court was bound to give. The marriage law of I926 emphasized still more sharply, by abandoning any court action, the nature of divorce as a private
declaration that may be pronounced by one of the spouses
without cause. It is said that, if the marriage has been recorded, registration of divorce is possible but not essential,
except under the Ukrainian Family Law of May 3 I, I926,
which recognizes only registered marriages and divorces, and
under the White Russian Code (art. 23), if a factual marriage has been judicially established. 124 The Family Protection Law of June 27, I936 (art. 27) orders the. registrars
Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5·
See supra p. 466, n. r87. The Decree of Oct. 25, 1941, § 2, provided for
the conversion of any separation; but it is disputed whether the provision
is still in force.
Rather narrow-minded is the refusal of a Danish appellate court (!Z}stre
Landsret, Feb. 19, 1952, U.f.R. 1952, 631, 20 Z.ausl.PR. (1955) 514) to convert a South African judicial separation obtained by the Danish husband
into a divorce on the ground that the South African separation, unlike its
Danish counterpart, has a permanent character and cannot be converted.
124 This seems to be the thesis of MAURACH, 3 Z.osteurop.R. ( 193 6) roo,
xo6. I do not assume any responsibility as to the statements on Soviet law.
122
123
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to summon the parties to appear at the registrar's office but
does not change the divorce law. 125
Whether these various forms can be recognized has been a
much discussed question, especially in Germany. The German Reichsgericht finally established the view that all Russian types of divorce may be recognized in application to nonGermans domiciled in Soviet Russia 126 but that the forms
now in use whereby the private dissolution of marriage is not
declared by any sort of decree, though possibly registered,
are unable to affect the marriage of a German spouse. 127 For
Russian nationals domiciled and divorced in Russia, recognition seems to be unquestioned everywhere; thus, a seemingly absolute rejection of Russian divorces in Italy, 128 for
instance, cannot be taken literally. But Russian divorces,
which may be recognized in Switzerland,m have been refused
recognition with respect to their own nationals in Poland. 130
Opinions in England are in conflict; the thesis of Cheshire
that consistency demands recognition of any Russian divorce
form with respect to a married couple in Russia, irrespective
125 See WERTHER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938} 437: the official Sovetskaja Justicija warned that art. 18 of the Family Law remained in force.
126 RG. (April 4, 1928) 121 RGZ. 24; RG. (Feb. 28, 1938} 92 Seuff. Arch.
244, JW. 1938, 1518; and the unanimous opinion of writers; see FREUND,
]W. 1928, 88o.
127Leading case: RG. (April 22, 1932) 136 RGZ. 142, 146; see also the
decision of Feb. 28, 1938 cited in the preceding note. A Russian divorce decree before 1926, involving Germans, was recognized in the decision of the
RG. (April 4, 1928} 121 RGZ. 24, assuming that the wife's adultery which
under Russian law was not to be stated in the Russian decree, was the real
cause of the divorce, and this was a sufficient ground under German law,
though irrelevant under the Russian; this method is no longer applicable to
Russian divorces without decree.
128 App. Milano (June 30, 1927) 19 Rivista ( 1927) 575; affirmed by Cass.
(June 14, 1928} Foro Ital. 1929, 44; Cass. (March 17, 1955) Rivista 1955,
380 {the court did not consider the validity under Russian law of a unilateral repudiation effectuated in 1947!).
129 Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. 1928, II 310 no. 17; a unilateral divorce
by declaration of one spouse is excepted as offending public policy by BECK,
NAG. 391 no. 197.
130 Poland: Supreme Court (Feb. 5, 1931) 6 Z.f.Ostrecht {1932) 383. ~lith
respect to Latvia see the note in I Z.osteurop.R. ( 1934-1935} 82.
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of the nationality of the parties or the place of celebration, 131
results in a perfect parallel to the doctrine of the Reichsgericht, nationality being replaced by domicil. It is doubtful,
however, whether a court in America would make use of
such a doctrine. Since in this country the domicil of one
party is deemed to support jurisdiction for divorce, analogy
would result in recognizing a Russian divorce where one
party is domiciled in Soviet Russia and the other in the
United States. For the purposes of immigration, the State
Department recognizes such a divorce. 132
Recent Soviet legislation. The special problems of Soviet
divorces have been alleviated by the introduction, in 1944,
of a judicial divorce proceeding. 132a
(e) The same principles that applied in Germany to Russian divorce procedures have prevailed in German courts and
probably elsewhere, with respect to the arbitrary repudiation
of a marriage by the husband under old patriarchal regimes,
such as the Jewish, the Egyptian, or the former Turkish law.
True, it would be intolerable for a foreign husband to be allowed to send his bill of divorce to his wife from a place
within the forum. 133 But there is. nothing to affect the territory of the forum where a customary right to divorce is
exercised abroad and both parties are members of the same
creed and nationality which permit such dissolution. 134 A
131
CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 36s. For the actual British cases see infra n. 134.
KEITH in DICEY, Append. 939 and in 16 Bell Yard (193s) 'ID-12, supra
n. 117, seems to reject Russian divorce of an "English marriage" because
they lack a proceeding of judicial character. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932]
4 D. L. R. so suggests recognition of mutual agreements in the country of
common domicil but non-recognition of any decree without due notice to the
defendant and a fortiori of a unilaterally registered divorce declaration.
MAKAROV, Precis 404 recommends recognition of registered and judicial unilateral divorces but not of non-registered divorces of Soviet citizens.
132
HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of International Law (1941) 383.
132
a See supra p. 416 n. 9a.
133
LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, 1937) JW. 1938, 2402, cf. supra p. 449, n. liS;
see, however, Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi (no. 2) [19s3] P. 220.
134
Case of Helene Bi:ihlau, a noted writer, who had married a Moham-
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court, however, may feel interested in the wife's right, if
she is, or was until the marriage, a subject of the forum. 135
4· Jurisdiction 136 and Procedure of the Divorce Court
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction. No foreign divorce decree is
recognized when exclusive jurisdiction is claimed at the forum
where recognition is sought. This is the case in England,
Argentina, etc., if the matrimonial domicil is located within
the forum, in Hungary, Soviet Russia, Poland, etc., with
respect to nationals of these countries, 137 and in many counmedan, LG. Miinchen (Sept. 28, I904) I4 Z.int.R. ( 1904) 585; OLG. Miinchen (March 24, I905) I6 ibid. (I906) 38; Bay. ObLG. (Sept. 29, I905) I6
ibid. (I906) 286; OLG. Miinchen (Nov. 22, I909) 20 ibid. (I9IO) 529,
Clunet, I906, II73· See also LG. Dresden (Dec. 22, 193I) IPRspr. 1932, no.
72 (Egyptian repudiation).
The British cases Spivack v. Spivack (I930) 46 T. L. R. 243 and Sasson
v. Sasson [I924] A. C. I007, although distinguishable by some particularities, are arguments for an analogous doctrine; see CHESHIRE 382. On the
problematic case of Rex v. Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Hammersmith, ex parte Mir-Aiiwaruddin [I9I7] I K. B. 634, 6:p, see CHESHIRE 38o383; FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6
Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I935) 9I; KEITH, I6 Bell Yard (I935) 10, supra
n. II7.
135 OLG. Dresden (Jan. I8, I927) StAZ. I927, 219 and AG. Dresden
(Oct. 6, I930) IPRspr. I93I, no. I50 (former German nationality of the wife)
refused recognition of Egyptian or Turkish tribunals. Where one spouse is a
German national, the RG. now requires a foreign "judgment" according to
BGB. § I564, RG. (April 4, I928) I2I RGZ. 24; RG. (April 22, I932) 136
RGZ. I4Z (on Russian divorces supra n. I27). The Biihlau case, supra n. I34,
and that of OLG. Dresden (Jan. I8, I927) IPRspr. I926-27, no. IO would
probably be decided by non-recognition nowadays.
England: Maher v. Maher [I95I] P. 342, adopting both reasons of the
Hammersmith case (supra n. I34), viz. marriage in England and nonjudicial divorce.
136 On the subject of jurisdiction with respect to foreign judgments in general, comparative studies have been undertaken by LORENZEN, "The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. (I9I9) 188, 268;
YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales," 2 Memoires
de l'Academie Internationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 and "The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law," 33 Mich. L. Rev.
(I935) II29; NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. I6I ff., 44I and his Principles 229 ff.; GuTTERIDGE, "Le conflit des lois de competence judiciare dans les actions personnelles," 44 Recueil I933 II III. As to the special field of recognition of
divorce decrees, see the conclusions of VREELAND's book, Validity of Foreign
Divorces 326 ff.
137 Supra p. 426.
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tries, if the parties are domiciled in and nationals of such
countries.
(b) International jurisdiction. 138 Despite the many confusing differences relating to the jurisdictional requirements
of recognition in the enactments and doctrines of the world,
there is one condition universally observed, viz., that the
court of judgment must have had jurisdiction in the international sense, i.e., according to the conceptions of the forum
where recognition is sought. A better considered formula
demands only that courts of the state of judgment, not just
the court of the instant case, be competent in the eyes of the
law of the forum.
The most firmly established ground for defense to a foreign decree in this country is that neither party was domiciled
at the divorce forum. 139 This, in general, or even the absence
of the matrimonial domicil, 140 is a defense everywhere, 141
with the important exception, however, that under the nationality principle divorce may be decreed by the national
138
On the conception see NEUNER, Internationale Zustandigkeit ( 1929) and
in 13 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1938) part I, 349.
139
Restatement §III. See I BEALE III.I. For decisions invalidating for
this reason Mexican divorces see Note I43 A. L. R. I313 ff.
140 Apart from the English and Argentine materials, see, for the Brazilian
practice under the former law, Sup. Trib. Fed. (Oct. 6, I906) 2 Revista dir.
civ. ( 1906) 373 (a Portuguese court was incompetent to render a divorce, the
defendant husband being domiciled in the Federal District of Drazil). In the
case Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I92o) 64 Revista dir. civ. (I922) 505, the
husband was both domiciled and naturalized in Brazil.
141 See for instance German C. Civ. Proc § 328 par. I in connection with
§ 6o6 par. I; France: Seine (April II, I935) mentioned by BATES, "The
Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. (I935) 322 at 325
n. IO (Reno decree, neither party residing in Nevada).
Both this rule and the American principle were egregiously ignored by
OLG. Hamburg (Oct. I, I935) JW. I935, 3488 and its critics, JoNAS, JW.
I936, 283 and LORENZ, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 322 no. 253, discussing a strange
"new way" believed necessary by the court to justify not recognizing a frivolous Mexican divorce granted the husband, an American domiciled in New
Jersey, against his wife, who had been formerly and afterwards became a
German national but was an American at the time of the decree.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7g par. 3; a divorce of a Swiss domiciled in the
Gnited States is recognized if rendered by the judge of the domicil but not
if rendered in Mexico, Just. Dept., BBl. I938, II 499 no. 9·
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state without the fulfillment of domiciliary requirements. 142
This is the foremost consideration in the struggle against the
"divorce mills," but it also has a much less desirable effect on
the various cases where the wife is considered by the divorce
court to have a separate domicil but is not so considered in
the forum where recognition is sought. 143
(c) International treaties. A remarkable advance has
been conceded to the principle of domicil in recent international treaties. The C6digo Bustamante (art. 52) proclaimed international jurisdiction for divorce to be at the
matrimonial domicil, in contrast with the general policy of
the Convention not to specify the personal law (art. 7) and
despite the protest of Brazil, which then followed the nationality principle. 144 The Franco-Italian Treaty of June 3,
1930, on the enforcement of judgments (art. II, par. r)
secured recognition for the decisions of the court of the domiFrance: Cass. (req.) (April 29, 1931) S.I93I.I.2-1-7·
Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2.
Brazil: S. Ct. (Jan. 31, 1933) 21 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1933) 26.
English courts generally are not supposed to recognize such jurisdiction.
They have recently been said, however, to give effect to a decree rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction dealing with its own nationals, both of
whom had agreed to submit their dispute to that tribunal "as a clear, final
and binding decision upon all the world." See Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P.
19 at 28 per Langton, J. This would mean that the parties can dispose of the
question of jurisdiction.
14 3 There is a line of decisions rejecting American decrees for this reason
in Canada: see Thompson v. Crawford [1932] 2 D. L. R. 466 (Ont. 1932),
aff'd [1932] 4 D. L. R. 206, 41 0. W. N. 231 (Nevada decree with consent
of the husband), cf. FALCONBRIDGE, 1 Giur. Comp. DIP. 37i Wyllie v. Martin
(1931) 44 B. C. 486, [1931] 3 W. W. R. 465 (California decree); MacDonald v. Nash [1929] 4 D. L. R. 1051 (Manitoba court did not recognize the
Nevada decree); Gilbert v. Standard Trusts Co. [1928] 4 D. L. R. 371.
Italy: App. Trieste (July 19, 1933) 25 Revista (1933) 469 and citations
(on the occasion of a Swiss annulment of marriage).
Belgium: supra p. 436, n. 71.
144 See Reservation of the Delegation of Brazil in signing the Treaty of
Habana, and the law enforcing the treaty, Diario Off. (Jan. II, 1929); see
also EsPINOLA's letter to the Conference of Habana of January 27, 1928, and
the full statement by EsPINOLA, printed with the judgment of the Federal
Supreme Tribunal May 14, 1937, App. Civ. no. 6831, 26 Rev. de Critica
Judiciaria 361, 364.
142
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cil or, in their absence, decisions at the residence of the defendant, without excepting status matters, and the same devices have been adopted in other European treaties, 145 despite
the fact that all the countries involved are traditional followers of the nationality principle.
(d) Opportunity for defense. Due notice of the divorce
suit, whether considered an independent requirement or a
requisite of jurisdiction is often qualified to exclude service
by publication, as was done until1942 in a minority of states
of the United States. 146 It is not a new experience that "every
country claims for its own courts wider extraterritorial authority than it concedes in return to foreign tribunals." 147
This position is also taken in countries which allow service
by publication in their own rules of procedure. 147a
Lack of due notice may be cured, according to many rules,
by the personal appearance of the defendant. But it is the
second most used ground of defense to a foreign divorce decree rendered by an ill-reputed court. Another typical case is
that in which the husband in suing abroad causes the notice
to be sent to a false address of the wife to impair her defense; this case has also been handled in the category of
fraud or public policy. 148
145 153 League of Nations Treaty Series (1934) 135, 141. It is interesting
to see how vigorously the Italian Supreme Court, leading the judicature of
the country of Mancini, in interpreting the Italian Treaty of April 6, 1922,
with Czechoslovakia, emphasizes the importance of the husband'!! domicil for
jurisdiction in matrimonial causes; Cass. (April 26, 1939) Giur. Ita!. 1939,
I, 1, 879, affirming App. Roma (July 19, 1938) Foro Ita!. 1938, I, 1314, Giur.
Ita!. 1938, I, 2, 452, Clunet 1939, 177.
1-1 6 VREELAND 328 enumerates with some doubts: District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming.
147 Cave, J. in Heinemann & Co. v. Hale & Co. [1891] 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 83,
87; cf. YNTEMA, supra n. 136, at 396.
147 n However, the English courts are very reluctant to speak of an offense
against "natural justice" in these cases: Boettcher v. Boettcher [1949] W.N.
83; Igra v. Igra [1951] P. 404.
148 Drastic illustrations:
England: Rudd v. Rudd [1924] P. 72 rejects a decree of the state of Wash-
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Other particulars of the proceedings of the judgment
court are not re-examined as a general rule, 149 except under
the French system of unlimited control. But when the defense
is believed to have been obstructed, for instance with respect
to evidence, 150 some way is usually found to protect the offended interest; modern regulations contain express clauses
for this purpose. 151 It may be quoted, incidentally, that the
Federal Supreme Court of Mexico has, in repeated decisions,
declared divorce statutes of such states as Yucatan and
Campeche unconstitutional on the ground that they impair
the right of defense. 152
ington of the United States, the plaintiff husband having mailed a copy of
his application to an English address where his wife had never lived, and
by advertising the suit in a Seattle newspaper which she never read.
Switzerland: BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74, 79 refused recognition
to a Spanish divorce because the husband, knowing that his wife lived in
Switzerland, did not notify her of the proceedings; in this case not even the
judgment was served on her; BG. (March II, 1948} 5 Schwz. Jahrb. (1948)
217.
Canada: Delaporte v. Delaporte [1927] 4 D. L. R. 933, 61 Ont. L. R. 302.
France: Cass. (req.) (Nov. II, 1908) S.1909.1.572, Revue 1909, 227 (United
States decree; the husband had falsely pretended not to know the wife's
residence). See also infra n. 150.
149 England: In Crowe v. Crowe (1937) 157 L. T. R. 557, [1937] 2 All
E. R. 723 it is expressly stated that the defense based on fraud, as authorized in Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209, is limited to fraud in affecting jurisdictional facts.
1 50 The United States: In Bethune v. Bethune (1936} 192 Ark. 8II, 9+ S. \V.
(2d) 1043 a Mexican decree was refused recognition on several grounds
among which insufficient evidence is mentioned.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (June 19, 1931) Clunet 1932, II04 (fraudulent statements to make the defense impossible).
France: Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, 1938) Clunet 1939, 87 and (June 29,
1938) Clunet 1939, 61 (both regarding Mexican decrees and fraudulent manoeuvres of the husband to impair the defense of the wife).
In the Argentine case, Cam. civ. 2 de Ia Plata (Nov. 21, 1939) 68 J. A.
577 a Mexican decree was rejected because no contact whatever with the
divorce state existed.
15 1 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 8 and all recent treaties on enforcement of judgments.
German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2, etc.
In France "freedom of defense" is always considered an essential and in
some decisions indicated as flowing from natural justice, quite as in England;
see PERROUD, 5 Repert. 337 no. Il8.
152 See S. Ct. (May 9, 1934) 41 Seman. Jud. part 1, 191; S. Ct. (May 12,
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S· Anti-Divorce Policy of the Forum
(a) Nationals of the forum. If a:bsolute divorce is forbidden by the municipal law of a country, it is perfectly understandable under the principle of nationality that the subjects of the forum are also prohibited from divorcing abroad.
This interpretation seems obvious to the Italian courts, which
will not recognize a foreign absolute divorce where both, or
even only one, of the parties have been of Italian nationality.153 The same point of view obtains in Spain 154 and was
held in France before divorce was reestablished in 1884. 155
All the recent French divorces of Italians, like that in the
Ferrari case, are naturally regarded as invalid in Italy and
have been criticized in France also, precisely because they are
inconsistent with former practice as well as with the fraud
theory of the French courts.156
But this attitude is not the only one possible. In Brazil the
matter is in doubt and has formed the subject of the most
diverse decisions involving the submission of foreign divorce
decrees for homologa~ao, i.e., confirmation for the purpose
of enforcement. Some authorities had considered a foreign
divorce as capable of full recognition in case the wife was of
Brazilian nationality, the personal law of the husband being
decisive for status questions. 151 The prevailing opidion, howI 93 6) 48 ibid. part 2, 2290; S. Ct. (July 8, I 93 3) 3 8 ibid. part 2, I442; S.
Ct. (Nov. 29, I933) 39 ibid. part 3, 2547·
On the American reaction to Mexican divorces see HAcKWORTH, 2 Digest
of International Law (I94I) 384.
153 Cass. Torino (June 6, I9I9) Revue I92o, 498; Cass. Roma (Nov. I3,
I9I9) Revue I920, 498; App. Milano (Dec. 7, I9I6) Clunet I9I8, 3I2; App.
Milano (March 3, I92I) Monitore 1921, soo; Clunet 1922, 194; App. Firenze
(March 10, 1923) Monitore 1923, 401, Clunet I923, 1021; App. Genova
(Feb. 28, I938) Rivista 1939, 331, Clunet I939, 171 (English divorce of two
Italians having married in England).
H 4 Unanimous opinion, see MANRESA, I Comentarios a) C6digo Civil Espafiol 99; INGLOTT, 115 Revista Gen. Legis). y Jur. (1909) 258, 288.
155 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 28, 186o) S.186o.1.210.
15 6 See supra p. 476.
157 See RoDRIGO OcrAviO, Le droit international prive dans Ia ll~gislation
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ever, held for a long time by a majority of the Federal Supreme court and adopted by Rodrigo Octavio when he
joined the Court/ 58 was that the foreign husband may remarry abroad, but that homologa{ao with respect to effects
of divorce in Brazil is to be limited to property effects which
a Brazilian judicial separation can also produce. Such partial
enforcement was also granted when both parties were of
Brazilian nationality/ 59 The new law of 1942, despite its
principle of domicil, provides that a foreign divorce of two
Brazilian parties is not recognized; if one of them is a Brazilian, the divorce is recognized with respect to the other who,
however, may not remarry in BraziU 60 This provision seems
to place husband and wife on an equal footing; it probably
does not interfere with the enforcement of property effects. 161
Still another solution was given by a surprisingly liberal
construction of the former Austrian prohibition of absolute
divorce for Roman Catholics. In its last thirty years, the Austrian Supreme Court admitted that, if one spouse 162 was a
bresilienne no. 61; BEVILAQUA 322 n. 19 and in 6 Repert. 167 no. 41. V\7 here
the husband was of Brazilian nationality and domicil, the Sup. Trib. Fed.
(July 24, 1920) 64 Revista dir. civ. (1922) 505 spoke of Jack of jurisdiction
of the Portuguese court.
l58 Sup. Trib. Fed. (Aug. 28, 1929) no. 86o, Clunet 1932, IIII; the opinion
of RODRIGO 0CTAVIO is also published in II Arch. Jud. Suppl. (1929) I9i·
See ten other decisions ( 1913-1933) in GUIMARAES, I I Brasil-Acordaos 167
no. 29.229, particularly that of Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 4, 1916) also in Clunet
1919, 402.
159 In this sense, the most general opinion is summarized in the decision of
the App. Div. of the Distr. Fed. Court no. 4830 (Jan. 29, 1935) 115 Revista
dir. civ. (1935) 155, Clunet 1936, 975· Sup. Trib. Fed. (July r, 1942) no.
1.032, 64 Arch. Jud. (1942) 194·
160 Lei de Introdu.;;ao art. 7 § 6; EsPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 1067.
The recognition of a divorce of two foreign spouses is usually granted
without limitations (e.g. Sup. Trib. Fed. Dec. 26, 1946, 116 Revista For.
(1948) 62) against a minority of the judges who want to exclude remarriage in Brazil; this opinion prevailed in Sup. Trib. Fed. (June 17, 1946)
II3 Revista For. (1947) 385.
1 61 EsPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 1067 no. 3, however, declares that in the case of
two Brazilian spouses foreign divorce will not be recognized for any effect.
1 6 2 Divorce of two Catholic Austrian spouses, of course, was not recognized, OGH. (Nov. 6, 1934) Oest. Anwalts Zeitung 1935, 15, 8 Jahrb. H. E.
( 1936) No. 619.
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foreigner at the time of the marriage or even only at the
time of suit, a foreign divorce not only had full effect for
him but also freed the other party, although the latter was
of Austrian nationality and Catholic religion. 163
Courts of third countries facing contrasts between the
law of the divorce court and the personal law have sometimes
felt themselves to be in a dilemma; some have recognized a
divorce irrespective of the public order of the national law,
where their own public policy was not offended. 164 But actually courts generally follow their own principle on status
questions. An Italian national who has obtained a divorce in
the United States is not allowed to remarry in France, Germany, Cuba, or any other country following the nationality
rule. 165 Under the Swedish statute, however, the exception
obtains that, if a party's marriage has been dissolved in one
country and he is prohibited from remarrying under another
foreign law, i.e., his personal law, his second marriage should
not be annulled on this ground. 166
(b) Marriage celebrated within the forum. The Argentine Civil Marriage Law 167 declares that a party to an Argentine marriage cannot remarry after a foreign absolute
divorce. The prevailing, though contested, interpretation
considers the foreign dissolution of a marriage celebrated in
Argentina invalid 168 and the foreign dissolution of a foreign
marriage valid, even to the extent that the parties may remarry in Argentina. Consistently with the principle .of domicil, no distinction is drawn according to the nationality of
the parties.
The situation is still more striking with respect to the
163

/nfra notes 224, 225.
See, for instance, Trib. Seine (Nov. 18, 1901) Clunet 1902, 103.
165
Cf. RAAPE 424; differently 3 FRANKENSTEIN 100, 563.
166 Swedish Marriage Law of 1904, c. 2 § 2.
167 Art. 7·
168 See supra p. 464, n. 178.
164
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Treaty of Montevideo on civil international law, which expressly forbids the dissolution of a marriage celebrated in a
country not permitting divorce (i.e., a participant state) .169
The courts of Uruguay feel authorized, by the clause of the
Final Protocol reserving public policy, to pronounce divorces
of Argentine nationals domiciled in Uruguay without any
regard to the place of celebration of the marriage. 170 In Argentina, while there remains some doubt about the Civil
Code, there can be none concerning the express provision of
the treaty (art. 13), requiring that the law of the place
where the marriage was celebrated must concur with the law
of the matrimonial domicil in permitting a divorce. This provision inserted in favor of Argentine law leaves the Argentine courts no choice in refusing recognition to Uruguayan
divorces of parties married in Argentina. 171 A second
marriage celebrated in Uruguay is considered null, 172 i.e., as
either adultery or concubinage with appropriate effects, 173 the
children illegitimate, 174 the wife unable to obtain maintenance
or, after dissolution of the second marriage, alimony. 175 All
this construed under the sanction of an international treaty
169 The courts are decided on this point; see RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int.
Priv. 319; 2 Vrco 87, and recently Cam. civ. 2 de Ia Cap. (Dec. 30, 1940)
21 La Ley 440 (marriage celebrated in Delaware, U. S., dissolved in Montevideo) with dicta for the case of marriages celebrated in a country where
divorce is prohibited.
17 For a recent example see Ap. Montevideo (Feb. I9, I94I) 39 Rev. Der.
Juris. Adm. 82. Opinion of CALANDRELLI cited and aproved by Cam. civ. 2
de Ia Cap. {Dec. 30, I94o), supra n. I69.
171 Recent surveys on the attitude of the Argentine courts: 5 Boletin del
Instituto de Enseiianza Practica de Ia Facultad de Buenos Aires (I939) I99;
Note in 39 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (I941) 82.
172 Cam. civ. 2 de Ia Cap. (May 8, 1931) 35 Jur. Arg. 94I; (Nov. I4, I932)
IOI Gac. del Foro 100; Cam. civ. I de Ia Cap. (Sept. I2, 1932) 39 Jur. Arg.
37I and {Feb. 19, 1934) 45 ibid. 270; and after others (Oct. 24, 1938) 35 Jur.
Arg. 94I.
173 Cam. civ. I de Ia Cap. {Sept. 12, 1932) 39 Jur. Arg. 371-408; Cam. civ.
2 de Ia Cap. (Nov. I4, I932) IOI Gac. del Foro 100.
174 2 Vrco 8I no. I09b.
175 Ap. Buenos Aires (March I4, 1935) Revista del Foro (Peru) I935, 952,
954, Clunet I937, I24.
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sounds strange. 176 All these complications will be alleviated
for the future in consequence of the introduction of divorce
in Argentine law in 1954.
Under the new draft of the Montevideo Treaty, third
member states are to recognize any divorce rendered at the
marital domicil; this, of course, restores the full impact of
the domiciliary principle, which is otherwise considerably restricted by the present treaty. 177
In Chile, the matter is covered by three sections not quite
consistent, from which it has been concluded that persons
married in Chile, whether Chileans or foreigners, if divorced
abroad, may not remarry in Chile, although their foreign remarriage would be recognized. 178
(c) Foreigners. Divorce of foreigners by a foreign decree
has usually been recognized despite a municipal law hostile
to divorce, although often after some hesitancy. The forum
is considered not really interested in the status of foreigners.179 Moreover, a foreign divorce has been regarded as
creating vested rights. 180
The French Supreme Court, at the time when divorce was
forbidden in France, held that a foreign divorcee could
marry a Frenchman in the country. 181 Along the same line of
thinking, Italian courts, after having been divided on the
176 2 V1co 84. Yet the new draft, art. 15, changes nothing in this particu1ar, except that the Argentine courts will not be explicitly compelled by the
wording of the treaty to maintain the prevailing interpretation of art. 7 of
their Civil Marriage Law.
177
Treaty on international civil law, draft of 1940, arts. 15 and 59·
178 Chile, C. C. arts. uo, 121; Ley de Matrimonio Civil, art. 15. See VELOSO
CHAVEZ, Derecho Internacional Privado (1931) 117, 118.
179 See QUADRI, 3 Guir. Comp. DIP. no. 32.
18
° Cf., e.g., NIBOYET, Revue Crit. 1936, 130; ZULETA (Colombian), Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil {1939-1940) 96; SoTo, ibid. 233·
181
French Cass. (civ.) {Feb. 28, 186o) D.186o.1.57, S.1861.1.21o; cf.
Cour Orleans (April 19, 186o) D.186o.2.82 {same case); Cass. (civ.) (July
xs, 1878) D.1878.1.340, Clunet 1878, 499· For justification see 3 ARMINJON 44,
suggesting that the most practical and also most equitable solution is not to
question what has been done in the domain of another system.

540

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

question for a long time, are now prepared to grant a decree
of exequatur for foreign divorce decrees concerning non-Itaiian parties, including former Italian nationals, 182 and do not
object to the remarriage of such parties in Italy/ 83 This liberal attitude suffers an exception, if any, only in the case of a
marriage celebrated in Italy in accordance with a canonical
ceremony and with civil effects/ 84 for such a marriage is exclusively subjected to the ecclesiastical tribunals and therefor susceptible only of annulment and separation from bed
and board. 185
While in Italy a canonical ceremony is always voluntary,
since a secular form also exists, in Spain every marriage of
Catholics pertains to the Church. 186 But even an American
citizen, not a Catholic, married in Spain and divorced anywhere, is considered unable under Spanish law to remarry in
Spain. 187 Likewise, the Polish Supreme Court held that, under
See infra n. 221.
App. Roma (Oct. 29, 1884) Clunet 1886, 62o; App. Milano (Nov. 29,
1887) Clunet 1889, 168; Cass. Torino (Aug. I, 1922) Clunet 1923, 391; Cass.
(April 8, 1931) Foro Ita!. 1931, I, 546, Clunet 1932, 222; App. Milano
(April 23, 1931) Clunet 1932, 519 (Hungarians divorced in Hungary).
184 A pure ecclesiastical ceremony does not count here because it is of no
effect under Italian law.
185 App. Milano (Dec. 27, 1938) Foro Ita!. 1939, I, 1216, Clunet 1939,
763, 19 Rivista ( 1940) 99, on the basis of Cass. (June II, 1934) Foro Ita!.
1934, I, 1062; Cass. (Aug. 6, 1949) Foro Ita!. 1949, I, 908. Contra: App.
Brescia {Nov. 9, 1938) Foro Ita!. 1939, I, 1222, Clunet 1939, 763; and App.
Brescia (Oct. 27, 1938} Rivista 1939, 407. Cf. Bosco, 25 Rivista (1933) 38.
186 Spanish C. C. arts. 42, 75 ff.; Trib. Supr. {March 31, 19II) Revue 191+,
182
183

635·
187 In the prevailing opinion, the law of Spain is identified with Canon Law
to the extent that, on principle, no divorce a vinculo is either granted or
recognized, even to non-Catholics, despite their national law permitting it.
Trib. Supr. {March 31, 19II) Revue 1914, 635; Direcci6n General de Registros y Notariado (Oct. 3, 1952) Revista Espan. Der. Int. 1952, 933; LASALLA LLANAS 139; TRIAS DE BES, Estudios de derecho internacionaJ privado
429 n. 2 and Der. Int. Priv. no. 143. It is no true exception that a foreign
civil marriage of Catholics may be divorced abroad; the marriage itself is
invalid in the eyes of Canon Law; See COVIAN, Art. Divorce in 12 Enciclopedia Jur. Esp. 446, 448. For other literature, cf. SERIN, Les conflits de lois
dans les rapports franco-espagnols en matiere de marriage, de divorce et
de separation de corps ( 1929) 87.
In Brazil to the same effect Ct. App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. 2, 1919} 55
Revista dir. civ. (1920) 523, Clunet 1921, 990; but see supra n. 159·
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the applicable Polish law, an American citizen of Catholic
faith who had been married and divorced in the United
States could not remarry in the former Austrian and Russian
part of Poland. 188
Particular rigor obtained in Brazil, as the courts, despite
their former nationality principle, generally denied recognition to foreign divorces not only of Brazilian nationals but
also of foreigners domiciled in BraziU 89 In spite of the domiciliary principle prevailing in the new law of 1942, the courts
have interpreted the pertinent provision ma as an exception
in favor of the national law. Consequently, divorce decrees
of foreigners Jomiciled in Brazil are recognized. 189b
(d) Bigamy. It must be noted that nonrecognition in the
cases discussed under (a) and (c) supra does not mean that
remarriage following the divorce is bigamous in the criminal
sense. Even the Spanish Supreme Court, after having declared invalid a German divorce of a German national who
had undergone a Catholic marriage ceremony in Spain, refused to consider his remarriage bigamous because in accordance with his national law he could well think his action justified.190 As the Treaty of Montevideo has been understood 191
and as its new draft expressly states, 192 entering upon a
second marriage after divorce at the matrimonial ,domicil
188 Polish

S. Ct. (Dec. 17, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 47·
The principle has been stated, although breaking it by majority vote by
a very cautiously framed exception, in the decision of the Sup. Trib. Fed. no.
993 (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 on the ground of jurisdictional considerations that may be questioned.
189 a Introductory Law of 1942, art. 7 § 6.
189 b Supr. Trib. Fed. (June 27, 1949) 93, Arch. Jud. (1950) 229; Supr.
Trib. Fed. (May 3, 1954) II2 Arch. Jud. ( 1954) 577·
190 Trib. Sup. (April 7, 1915) 12 Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. (Chile)
( 1915) part 3, 9, Clunet 1917, 732, Revue 1919, 6u (the divorce in the case
was invalidated by Trib. Sup. (March 31, 19u) Revue 1914, 635, cited
supra p. 540, n. 187).
191 Argentina: Cam. crim. de Ia Cap. (July x, 1932) 38 J. A. 1237. See also
2 VICO 81 no. 109a.
192 (1940) art. 15b.
189
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does not constitute bigamy under any law in the member
states, including Argentina.
6. Requirement of Similar Grounds
(a) In most states of the United States, at English common law, 193 and in many other countries, it is immaterial
whether the ground upon which a foreign divorce is based is
adequate under the law of the forum too.
(b) In a number of jurisdictions, however, domiciliaries
or nationals, as the status principle may be, are protected
against foreign divorce decisions, unless there is agreement
with the divorce grounds established by the lex fori.
An important example is given by the New York courts,
whose traditional policy so far has been to refuse to recognize any decree of divorce obtained "upon grounds insufficient for that purpose in this state, when the divorced defendant resides in this state and was not personally served with
process and did not appear in the action." 194 This policy
seems to be in accord with Gould v. Gou!d, 193 dealing with a
French decree. However, the last mentioned limitation evidently is affected by Williams v. North Carolina.
British subjects, domiciled in England, Northern Ireland.
or Scotland, but living in British possessions, may obtain divorce in the local courts under the Indian and Colonial Di193 The doubt whether the lex domicilii abroad could also govern the case
of an English marriage was removed by Harvey v. Farnie [1882-1883] 8
App. Cas. 43; Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] I Ch. 781; Bater v. Bater [1906]
P. 209 by Sir Gore11 Barnes at 2I7; the principle was recently confirmed
by Mezger v. Mezger [I936] 3 AU E. R. I30, [I937] P. I9 (conduct short of
adultery under § I568 German C. C.).
Similarly, Canada: Leigh v. Leigh (Ont. Ct. App.) [1937] I D. L. R. 773
(Michigan decree on the ground of desertion to Canadian residence).
Greece: 6 Repert. 430 no. 98.
194 Johnson v. Johnson (1933) I46 N. Y. Misc. 93, 95, 261 N. Y. Supp.
523, 526; the rule has been steady since Jackson v. Jackson (18o6) I N. Y.
(Johns. Cas.) 424; cf. Beeck v. Beeck (I925) 211 App. Div. 720, 208 N. Y.
Supp. 98.
1 95 (I923) 235 N. Y. I4, I38 N. E. 490.
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vorce Jurisdiction Act of 1 9 2 6; among other conditions,
the grounds of divorce must be those recognized by English
law. loa
An analogous restriction with respect to foreign divorces
of their nationals obtains in a number of countries following
the nationality principle. 197
In Germany, however, it is sufficient that the foreign decree state facts which constitute valid grounds for divorce
under German law/" 8 although the decree may have been
based upon other grounds or no grounds at all or upon mutual agreement. This theory of substitute ground is a conces196 Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, x6 & 17 Geo. V, c.
40; 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 3 5: Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1940,
301; Colonial and other Territories (Divorce Jurisdiction) Act, 1950, 14 &
I 5 Geo. VI, c. 20.
197 France: Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, 1918) Clunet 1918, n82 (even with
respect to foreigners). Trib. civ. Seine (June xo, 1936) D. H. 1936, 420
(exequatur denied one spouse being of French nationality and the ground for
divorce not agreeing with French law). NIBOYET 754 bases the rule on the
idea that there is no vested interest. As to the recent liberal trend, see supra
pp. 508 ff.
Greece: Trib. Athens, 47 Tbemis 582, Clunet I937, 597 {Turkish decree).
The Netherlands: H. R. {Nov. 24, I9I6) W. I0098; Rb. Rotterdam (June
28, 1935) W. 12991 {South African decree). Does H. R. {April I, I938) W.
193 8, no. 989, however, give the judge discretion even over status judgments? See VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1939, 204, 208.
Poland: Law of 1926 on private international law, art. I7 § 3 provides that
Polish law must be applied; in more recent practice, however, recognition is
denied unless a treaty assures reciprocity, see supra p. 427, n. 28.
Portugal: {probably also beyond the domain of the Hague Convention)
see CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 692 pars. I and 2.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 10, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335 and (May 13, I938)
64 BGE. II 76 at 78 (if one of the spouses is a Swiss National and domiciliary, the rule of NAG. art. 7g par. 3 that Swiss jurisdiction and law give
way to the foreign domicil is inapplicable).
Cuba: Divorce law (Decreto-Ley) 206 of May IO, I934, art 58: Foreign
divorce judgments between Cubans and foreigners are recognized if the
basis of the judgment was equal or analogous to any of the divorce grounds
recognized in the above Decreto-Ley 206.
In Peru a similar principle seems indicated by the decision of the Lima
court of Oct. 4, 1935, Revista del Foro I935, 9I3 1 Clunet I937, 124, recognizing dissolution of a marriage celebrated in Peru between a foreign diplomat and a formerly Peruvian woman, because the divorce was based on
grounds recognized in the recent Peruvian C. C.
19 8 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 no. 4 in combination with EG. art. 17 par. 4. as
interpreted by RG. (April 4, I928) I2I RGZ. 24.
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sion to a more liberal conception of migratory divorce but
gives meager justification for the fortuitous chances cf
searching in a foreign decree for facts held irrelevant by the
foreign court.
(c) A corresponding regard for the legislation of third
states is shown by the Swedish law, 199 providing that a divorce decree rendered by a foreign authority may not be recognized unless a ground for divorce existed under the law
of the state whose nationals the parties were.
7· Evasion
(a) Fictitious change of personal law. The requirements
of similar grounds and also in part of jurisdiction result in a
bar to subjects of the forum who seek dissolution of their
marriages abroad under easier conditions than they find at
home. Indeed, a considerable number of the cases which have
been termed evasion from or circumvention of the domestic
provisions on divorce are sufficiently dealt with under the
heading of exclusive jurisdiction of the forum or lack of international jurisdiction of the divorce court.
(b) Fictitious change of domicil. Fictitious change of
domicil occurs in the frequent cases where the parties falsely
assert that a domicil exists within the divorce forum, as demanded both by the divorce court and the court of recognition. The British 200 and Swiss 201 authorities consider collusion or fraud going to the root of the jurisdiction as a defense against recognition. Similarly, all American courts
seem to hold that recognition is not due to a divorce obtained
under a "residence simulated for this purpose" or not established "bona fide with intention of a permanent domicil." 202
1 99
200

Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3 § 5·
Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209; cf. Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19;
Crowe v. Crowe (1937) 157 L. T. R. 557·
2o1 BECK, NAG. 359 no. xoo with literature.
202 See cases in 27 C. J. S. ( 1941) Divorce § 332 n. II; see also ScHOULER,
Domestic Relations § 1983, 2101; I WHARTON § 228.
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This rule has been developed, in contrast to the English doctrine, 203 under the standard of the state where the judgment
is rendered and not of the forum of recognition. With respect to divorce decrees, however, the result·is hardly distinguishable, and this is true also of the five state statutes
and various court practices 204 that contemplate the same factual situation from the angle of the evaded domiciliary law.
The Massachusetts and Maine statutes preceded and the
statutes of Delaware, New Jersey, and Wisconsin followed
and adopted the evasion section of the otherwise ill-fated
Uniform Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act; 205 they
deny force to a foreign decree of divorce if, to use the wording of the former Delaware statute: 206
"any inhabitant of this State shall go into another State,
territory or country in order to obtain a decree of divorce for
a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this State,
or for a cause which is not ground for divorce under the laws
of this State."
This text with its twin clauses, however, is puzzling. In the
second clause, "inhabitant" clearly means, as it does generally, a domiciliary who has remained domiciled in the state.
This case, "or for a cause, etc.," may be fairly well defined
by assuming that the parties were in fact continuously domiciled in the state of recognition and that they or the plaintiff fraudulently alleged that they were domiciled in the divorce forum and, furthermore, that the ground upon which
the decree was rendered is no cause for divorce in the state.
The first case, "cause which occurred, etc.," looks mysterious. "Inhabitant" must have the same meaning as in the seczoa See YNTEMA, supra n. 136, 387.
204 VREELAND 329 places twelve states in this category.
205 The Uniform State Law was drafted by the Divorce

Congress of Philadelphia in November, 19o6, and approved by the Commissioners but finally
retired by them to be replaced by the draft of a Uniform Divorce J urisdiction Act of 1930, based on other principles.
206 Del. Rev. C. (1935) § 3525, identical with the model.
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ond alternative, and this seems to be generally agreed, since
the statutes, with the possible exception of New Jersey, are
not applied where the parties move to another state for purposes other than to obtain a divorce. 207 If, thus, the first case
is also concerned with a fictitious foreign domicil, what is left
for the second case? For, if all causes that occurred during
the residence of the parties in the state are precluded from
consideration by the divorce forum, what other cause can
practically be in question? Perhaps the draftsmen thought
that even a cause which is legally sufficient in both jurisdictions should be averred and decided exclusively by the court
at the actual domicil; thus, the first clause would favor the
jurisdictional and the second the substantive law of the domicil. But there is no confirmation of such an interpretation
to be found anywhere. Vreeland, the sole critic, contents
himself with rejecting the entire clause as indefensible on
principle. 208
It appears doubtful, whether these provisions can be reconciled with the standards set by the United States Supreme
Court in the first Williams case 209 for the recognition of foreign divorces. 209a
(c) Fictitious change of nationality. In a less obvious
way, change of nationality has also sometimes been termed
fictitious and hence regarded as incapable of supporting recognition of a divorce granted under the new national law.
For a better understanding, one ought to remember the mi20 7 See I WHARTON § 229 for the Massachusetts statute; Note in 7 Minn. L.
Rev. ( 1923) 240 and especially as to and against some mysterious decisions
of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Note, 21 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1923) 922; GoonRICH ( ed. I) § 127 n. 39 j VREELAND 135, 330.
208 VREELAND 340. We may presume a connection with the obscure limitations of jurisdiction discussed supra p. 488.
209 Williams v. North Carolina (1942) 317 U. S. 287.
209 &The Delaware statute (see supra p. 545), as amended 1945, has
dropped the express provision against recognition, see Del. Code Ann.
(1953) 13 § I5JI. Similarly, the Wisconsin provision ~eems to be superseded
by the adoption of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 1948 (Wise. Stats.,
1953, § 247·22).
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gratory divorces, typified by the pilgrimages of Americans to
Paris, Reno, and Chihuahua. When divorce was forbidden in
France, the Bauffremont-Bibesco case discussed below was a
celebrated example. Austrian Catholics went over the Hungarian border for divorce. Italians, whose law still prevents
absolute divorce, emigrated to Fiume to be divorced, so long
as that city did not belong to Italy.
The Bauffremont case was the cornerstone of a French
doctrine of fraude la loi, which, enjoying for a time great
prominence, opposed evasion of the law of the forum by
agreements, adoptions, and gifts, as well as by divorces and
judicial separations, the latter, however, being known as the
classic domain of this doctrine. 210 The princess of Bauffremont, Belgian by birth and French by marriage, changed her
citizenship by naturalization in the then independent German
state of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and was there divorced under
her new personal law; then she married the Rumanian prince
Bibesco. The French Court of Cassation declared the naturalization of the woman, as well as her divorce and remarriage, fraudulent and void, these acts having occurred for the
sole purpose of escaping from the prohibitions of the French
law .211 This doctrine has been followed in other French decisions and by Belgian, Italian, and Latin American courts, 212
but has slowly lost its force in France itsel£. 213 The writers
are aware that the acquisition of a foreign citizenship is an
exercise of foreign state sovereignty that cannot be denied. 214

a

DEGAND, 5 Repert. 554 no. So.
Cass. (civ.) (March 18, 1878) 8.1878.1.193; see also the similar case
Vidal, Cour Paris (June 30, 1877) Clunet 1878, 268, where the 'fraud was
agreed upon by both parties.
212 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Aug. 5, 188o) Clunet 188o, 508 (in the same
affaire Bauffremont); Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 19, 1882) Clunet 1882, 364.
Italy: App. Torino (July 22, 1912) 6 Rivista (1912) 588, Revue 1914, 187;
App. Trento (Feb. 26, 1930) 23 Rivista (1931) 248.
213 PERROUD, Clunet 1926, 19; AVDINET, II Recueil 1926 I 226; J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 481; cpntra: DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83.
214 See especially the Italian writers ANZILOTII, 6 Rivista ( 1912) 595;
210
211
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Moreover, the conception of fraude la loi has made way in
prevailing theory for a more general and elastic idea of public policy.
In Italy, however, where the subject of forbidden divorce
remains of particular importance, courts and writers insist
that a change of nationality may well be simulated by the
parties for divorce purposes, i.e., not seriously intended,
which is different indeed from acts so intended to evade the
law. If they intend in reality to remain Italians and formally
to regain their Italian citizenship at the first possible moment, especially when they have not transferred their domicil
to their alleged new homeland, according to an express requirement of the Italian nationality law, 215 they may have
acquired a second nationality abroad but not lost the Italian
one. Since they have double nationality, they are treated, according to the rule, 216 as nationals. 217
(d) Effective change of personal law. Indeed, the main
doctrine of divorces in fraudem legis has been abandoned in
France. 218 By changing nationality, a party changes his personal law automatically. Divorce under the acquired statute
is said to be fraudulent not against the prohibition of divorce
but against the law of nationality, and consequently the former country cannot react through private lawsuits, though
UDINA, Elementi no. 137; also FEDOZZI 277, 482, although he retains a distinct theory of fraud.
215 Act no. SSS of June 13, 1912, art. 8.
-216 See supra p. I 30.
217 Cass. Torino (April u, 1921) IS Rivista (1923) rs3; App. Brescia
(Jan. 24, I923) Clunet I924, 2s7; App. Genova (May 24, 1923) Clunet
1924, 1129. Cf. the writers cited in note 214 supra.
In France, LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 123 no. IOS contends that the courts
are unable to set aside the acquisition of a foreign nationality by an individual but are able to restore his character as a Frenchman, if the conditions
of naturalization have been proved fictitious, the naturalized person never
having intended to settle outside of France.
2LB Cass. (civ.) (Feb. s, I922) Clunet 1929, I2S8; Trib. civ. Seine (July
IS, I93S) Clunet 1936, 867. With respect to the underlying theory, cf. ]. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 481 n. 4•
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it may refuse the person's reinstatement to his previous
nationality.
Italian courts have recognized most of the Fiume divorces 219 and similar decrees that came before them. 220 The
highest court recently confirmed the principle, hitherto prevailing though contested, that exequatur is not denied a foreign decree, even if the parties were formerly of Italian
nationality. 221
Italy, however, resorts to political measures against former Italians divorced abroad. Ordinarily, they are barred
from regaining I tali an citizenship, 222 and an Italian intending
to marry such a person was not likely to obtain a governmental authorization prescribed by Fascist discriminatory legisIation.223
The Austrian Supreme Court went so far as to recognize
not only the divorce of a former Austrian of Catholic faith
who had become a Czechoslovakian citizen, but also the unmarried status of the other party who had remained an
:\ustrian national, 224 and to consider unmarried an Austrian
10
"
The divorce decrees of Fiume granted to Italian nationals have finally
been confirmed on the whole by Royal Decree of March 20, 1924, no. 352 art.
+; cf. App. Roma (May 31, 1927) Giur. Ita!. 1927, I, 2, 400.
22
" E.g. App. Milano (Nov. 24, 1920) Monitore 1921, 18, Clunet 1921,
625; and now in the first place Cass. (June 8, 1932) Foro Ita!. 1932, I, 1452,
25 Rivista (1933) 91; App. Bologna (June 4, 1936) Giur. Ita!. 1936, I, 2,
.p2 (Hungarian decree); App. Trieste (April 22, 1937) Giur. Ita!. 1937, I,
2, 298 (Greek decree). There are contrary decisions, however, where the
Hague Convention does not eliminate the question, see e.g. Cass. Roma (May
15, 1928) Clunet 1931, 758; App. Roma (Dec. 15, 1936) Giur. Ita!. 1937,
I, 2, 209 (Turkish decree).
221
Cass. (July 13, 1939) Foro Ita!. 1939, I, 1097, Rivista 1940, 478, the
court recalls the plenary decision of Cass. Rom a (Dec. 30, 1911) Foro Ita!.
1912, I, 148 and others; cf. the note ibid.
222
Law of June 13, 1912, no. 555 on nationality, art. 9·
223
Law of November 17, 1938, no. 1728, art. 2, abrogated by law of Jan.
20, 1944; see SERINI, "Legal Problems of Divorce in Italy," 28 Iowa L. Rev.

( 1943) 293·
224
OGH. (June 30, 1937) Zentralblatt 1937, 814 no. 460; Clunet 1938,
354· This liberal practice was initiated by the plenary decision of Dec. rr,
1924, 6 SZ. no. 396, Judikatenbuch no. 18, and continued in numerous later
decisions, for instance OGH. (May rr, 1932) 14 SZ. no. 108; (Nov. 14, 1934)
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Catholic woman who had changed to a foreign nationality,
obtained a divorce, and then resumed her Austrian citizenship.22s
The Tribunal of Amsterdam had recently to decide a case
which could be regarded as a true prototype of a fraudulent
divorce. 226 A Dutchman clandestinely acquired Estonian nationality and, on the basis of a brief residence in Riga, obtained a Latvian divorce from his wife under the rather
scandalous procedure of Latvia. The court acknowledged
that the woman had become an Estonian citizen without
knowing it and thereby was subjected to the law of that nationality. Fortunately, the judges found an older agreement
of maintenance which could be taken as a basis for allocating
adequate compensation to the wife. This rule also obtains in
Brazil. 227
An important limitation is contained in the Hague Convention on Divorce (art. 7 in conjunction with art. 4). It
may be illustrated by the following example. Italian spouses
acquired Hungarian nationality and obtained a divorce in a
Hungarian court on the ground of desertion; the time of the
desertion was calculated by including six months during
which the parties still had been of Italian nationality. Recognition was refused in Italy. 228
8 Jahrb. HR. I93S, no. 28; (Sept. 24, I93S) 8 J ahrb. HR. I93S, no. 216I,
with the exception, however, of that of OGH. (March 27, I93S) 8 Jahrb. HR.
I93S, nos. IS64, IS6s, Clunet I93S, 1028. Cf. WALKER 63S·
225 OGH. (May u, I932) I4 SZ. no. 108, I Giur. Comp. DIP. 327; OGH.
(Oct. 8, I93S) J.BI. 1936, 103; Clunet 1937, 33S· Cf. WALKER in I KLANG's
Kommentar 32I, 322.
2 2 6 Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 22, I936) W. I937, no. 47·
2 27 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. I67 no. 43·
228 See ultimately App. Firenze (Feb. 2S, I933) 2S Rivista (I933) 467;
Cass. (Nov. IS, I932) I Giur. Comp. DIP. 39I no. Io4; Cass. (Jan. IS, I937)
Foro Ita!. I937, I, 2I7, Giur. Ita!. I937, I, I, I20 and the literature cited by
MoNAco, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. IS3·
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8. Additional Application of Public Policy
With all the many specific obstacles to recognition of for·
eign divorce decrees, it seldom happens that the subsidiary
intervention of public policy in its general functions is invoked. Just one case may be reported; the Tribunal de Ia
Seine rejected the prayer of a French woman for recognition
of a German decree of divorce which declared her guilty of
anti-German utterances-a paradoxical treatment of the
applicant. 229
9· Renvoi

An interesting regard for the personal law has been introduced into the English and the New York law by a practice
related to renvoi. In the English case of .Armitage v . .Attorney General, 230 a divorce decree granted in South Dakota was
recognized in England, because it would have been recognized in New York where the matrimonial domicil was. It is
generally concluded therefrom that any decree affecting the
status of husband and wife which is held valid by the private
international law of the domicil, is effectual in England. 231
New York courts have established an analogous practice
in connection with their well-known special rule by which
they refuse to recognize as binding a foreign divorce decree
against a spouse domiciled in New York, who was not personally served with process. Although the rule is said to be
for the protection of New York citizens, in the case where
the defendant is domiciled in another state, th~ courts of
229 Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 23, 1922) Clunet 1923, 295 criticized by 3 FRANK·
ENSTEIN 543 n. 16. For the disregard of penal prohibitions to remarry contained in foreign divorce decrees see SECRETAN, Revue 1926, 219, and supra
p. 305, n. 169.
2so [ 19o6] P. 135.
231
CHESHIRE 375; cf. FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws as to Nullity and
Divorce," [1932] 4 D.L.R. 1, 44, now Essays 736, and supra pp. 498-500.
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New York make their position dependent upon the effect
given to the decree in the state of the defendant's domicil
when rendered. 232 Extension of this renvoi has been advocated as a vigorous contribution to greater uniformity. 233
In an analogous way, under the principle of nationality,
as we have seen, consistency requires that a divorce rendered
in a state other than the national state should be recognized
in third countries, if recognized in the national state. 234 Thus,
indeed, some uniformity is achieved.
Illustrations: (i) (AG. Hannover (Oct. ro, 1931)
IPRspr. I932, no. 73.) Both parties were of Argentine nationality; they had married in Argentina. A divorce obtained
in Uruguay was not recognized by the German court, because it was not recognizable under Argentine law.
(ii) (KG. (Feb. II, I938) JW. I938, 870.) The husband of Austrian nationality and Catholic faith was domiciled in Budapest, Hungary; the wife had acquired Hungarian nationality. The divorce rendered in Hungary was
sufficient to allow the woman to remarry even under Austrian
practice. 235 This Austrian practice has to be followed, said
the Court of Appeals of Berlin.
232 Ball v. Cross (1921) 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106; Dean v. Dean
( 1925) 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844; Powell v. Powell ( 1925) 211 App. Div.
750, 208 N.Y. Supp. 153; cf. Restatement, New York Annotations § II3, 86.
233 39 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1926) 640; LoRENZEN, "Renvoi in Divorce Proceedings Based upon Constructive Service," 31 Yale L. J. (1922) 191, 194; Lorenzen suggests applying this doctrine to foreign parties; this seems possible
without difficulty if we conceive of the New York rule as based on domicil
rather than on the citizenship of the parties.
234 Austria: WALKER 730.
Czechoslovakia: C. Civ. Proc. (1950) art. 641 par. 2.
Germany: supra n. 165.
In France, a similar result should follow from the two generally adopted
requirements for recognizing a foreign decree, that it must originate from a
court having jurisdiction by French conceptions and that the decision should
agree with that obtainable in application of French conflicts law; but see the
controversy reported in xo Repert. xso.
Switzerland: controversy, see BECK, NAG. 396 no. 12.
The Netherlands: Rb. Arnheim (Jan. 20, 1955) N.J. 1955 no. 789 (recognition of Florida decree divorcing American husband and Dutch wife since
decree would be recognized at last common domicil of parties, i.e. New
York).
235 Supra n. 224.
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A further case brings us to a combined application of the
New Y ark rule and this European rule.
(iii) (KG. (Oct. 14, 1932) IPRspr. I932, no. I47.)
Both parties were Germans who had emigrated to the United
States, seemingly to New York. The wife established domicil
in Reno and obtained a divorce there. The husband lived at
the commencement of the suit in Brooklyn and later in Manhattan. The first condition for recognizing the Nevada decree in Germany was (C. Civ. Proc. § 328, no. I) that the
courts of the state to which the foreign tribunal belongs are
competent according to German laws, i. e., of the domicil of
the husband (C. Civ. Proc. § I 3 par. I) at the decisive moment of the divorce suit (C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I). The
Court of Appeals of Berlin held that the "state" to which
the Reno court "belonged" was Nevada and not the United
States, an obviously correct statement. 236 But the court dismissed the suit for recognition for the sole reason that the
husband was not domiciled in Nevada but in New York. It
should have asked the question whether a New York court
would recognize the decree, although the answer might have
been in the negative on the ground of the special rule of New
York.

If the domicil of the defendant husband, at the time of the
commencement of the action had been, for example, in Connecticut and later in New York, the Nevada decree would
have been recognized in Connecticut-upon the mere personal service of the husband in Connecticut 237-and therefore also in New Y ark, since commencement of the divorce
action is regarded as the decisive moment for fixing jurisdiction. In consequence, the German court would have to recognize the divorce, whatever the German theory as to the time
element may be .
.r-·-

Cf. also annotation on the case, I Giur. Comp. DIP. ISO no. 39·
Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve ( 1914) 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684 (regarding a South Dakota decree).
236
231
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III. CoNCLUsioNs

The Supreme Court of the United States, in recent times,
has evidently found it necessary to smooth out the complicated conditions of mutual recognition of divorce decrees
among the states. Thus far, the Court has increased the import of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in two respects. The
Davis case 238 has declared that a party contesting in the divorce state the validity of a divorce on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, for instance, by appeal, forfeits his right of collateral attack in all other states. The first Williams case 239
enlarges the domain of compulsory recognition by elimina ting the defense based on lack of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.
This second step effectuates a far-reaching simplification
of the rules on recognition. Moreover, and this is a point
well to be noticed, an ancient remainder is eradicated, to the
great benefit of rational procedure; the lawyers of this country customarily think of "personal jurisdiction" as based on
determinate manners of service of process. But the manner
in which a defendant is cited to attend the trial seems out of
relation to modern circumstances. What does it practically
mean in our days, whether a party receives a summons to
appear in court by the hands of a sheriff or marshal, by Federal mail, or by any reliable means of communication at
whatever place in the United States? A husband or wife, in
particular, may very well be required to traverse any distance in the country in such a vital cause. The costs of travel
may make a difference, but, at that, the matter of bearing the
costs may or may not need a general reform. On the whole,
the ruling that the dom:icil of one party supports divorce jurisdiction, according to most of the state statutes before the
Williams case and under the Constitution according to this
238
289

Supra p. 505.
Supra p. 501.
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decision, is not so much of an innovation as a clarification
and simplification of the subject.
However, this change of law will signify salutary progress only if the domicil of at least one of the parties in the
divorce state remains a basic postulate, strongly enforced by
all courts involved. It is not very encouraging that this point
was discarded so easily in the decision of the first Williams
case. The necessity of a serious and honest domicil has become the only remaining protection of deserted spouses and,
what is more, of the divorce legislations so ambitiously advanced in individual states. Without this last barrier, it
would be true that the laxest divorce practice would prevail
over all others.
In the light of this experience, the tendency of the Davis
case or, to be specific, the application of the "boot strap doctrine" to divorce, is frankly to be regretted. If divorce jurisdiction be assumed on a fake affirmation of domicil, the mistake is not effaced by its repetition. Courts may be inclined to
construe a defendant's acquiescence to allegations of domiciliary facts or to a judgment as effective waiver of the right
of collateral attack, although this clearly runs against the old
established principles prohibiting parties to a matrimonial
cause from disposing of their rights. But to treat a protesting
party like an agreeing one, in conflict with the principle that
a party specially appearing for the purpose of denying jurisdiction should not lose thereby his analogous defense in another state, is particularly bad law in a field where truth
should prevail.
The most effective weapon to fight evasion would be the
requirement of a "minimum residence," if sternly observed
in granting jurisdiction by the court of divorce and likewise
in other courts when they re-examine the existence of a bona
fide domicil in the divorce state. Quite recently, Lorenzen
also has suggested that residence should extend over a rea-
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sonable period of residence, "say six months" and seriously
considers that the Supreme Court or Congressional legislation should require such period as a requisite of due process.
This corroborates my postulate, with the difference that Lorenzen admits mere residence as sufficient, on these conditions, as a fair basis for jurisdiction in divorce. 240 In my
opinion, jurisdiction in these cases has been stretched as far
as it may reasonably be, if it is to be grounded in the domicil
of only one party. That such domicil should be replaced
altogether by a mere temporary residence of one party is an
idea that is becoming familiar through the operation of the
divorce mills, but which grievously encourages the evil of
migratory divorce.
As to international relationships, the present chaos can be
remedied only by thorough reforms of the domestic and conflicts laws. The claims of countries following the national
law principle must be decisively relaxed; on the other hand,
the irresponsible attitude with which lex fori is applied m
other countries ought to be renounced.
240 LORENZEN,

35Z·

"Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L. ]. ( 1943) 341,
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Effects of Divorce
I.
I.

EFFECTS OF NoN-RECOGNIZED FOREIGN DIVORCES

View of the Country of Divorce and of Third States

N the United States, it is possible that a divorce pronounced in one state may not be recognized in a sister
state, because the court did not possess the jurisdiction
required under the Constitution. In such cases, it is disputed
whether the divorce is valid in the state where it was decreed.1 But if so, as is commonly agreed, both parties to the
dissolved marriage are undoubtedly able to remarry in the
state of divorce, although not in every other state.
Yet, in comparable situations in countries following the
nationality principle, other solutions have been reached. In
France 2 and Switzerland/ an Italian (or a Spaniard, a Chilean, a Colombian), whose national law forbids the dissolution of his marriage, is not permitted to remarry, despite his
divorce in a French or Swiss court. Such a divorce may have

I

1 For invalidity, Restatement §§III, 113 comment g. Supra p. 502, n. 22.

2 Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, 1919) S.1921.2.9, Revue 1919, 543; cf. NIBOYET,
S.1921.2.9; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557 no. 92; BATIFFOL, Traite 527. Contra; Trib.
civil Seine (March 17, 1948) Revue Crit. 1948, 112 (approving note NmoYET) ; HOLLEAUX, "Les effets du divorce," Le droit international prive de Ia
famille ( 1954) 167. It is notable that the reporting judge at the Cassation
Court in the Ferrari case considered remarriage in Franc.e quite possible for
the Italian husband; see Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 104. LEREBOUR&PIGEONNIERE 400 no. 338 is of the same opinion, although he thinks the husband would be unable to sue for divorce.
3 Swiss Circular Letter (June 29, 1929) Clunet 1930, 539 advises civil officials to refuse remarriage to an Italian whose marriage has been dissolved
in Switzerland; BG. (Nov. II, 1954) So BGE. I 427. Contrary, however,
on the ground of public policy Regierungsrat Kanton Ziirich (Oct. 16, 1952)
48 SJZ. (1952) 376, 19 Z.ausi.PR. (1954) 659.
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been granted either by inadvertence or on a theory like that
of the Ferrari case, whereby one party of French nationality
is entitled to divorce irrespective of the national law of his
spouse. 4
In Germany, the question whether an Italian divorced in a
German court for some exceptional reason-for instance because the wife was of German nationality-could be permitted to marry in Germany, has been difficult. In such case,
which should prevail: the authority of res judicata owing to
a domestic judgment, and in consequence the man be considered unmarried, or compliance with the Italian family law
ordained by private international law, and the capacity of the
man to remarry be denied (EG. art. 13)? While the older
decisions followed the first, procedural, line of thought, 5
numerous writers have insisted on the requirement allegedly
posited by the principle of conflicts law 6 and by this construction have impressed several courts. 7 Opposition to this view
exists 8 and is justified. It is well-nigh absurd to regard a person divorced at the forum as married. Should he succeed in
having the new marriage celebrated, not even those who recognize the foreign impediment presume to regard it invalid. 9
Dutch and Belgian courts have realized that divorce
4

Supra pp. 475-479.
KG. (March 13, I9II) 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 331, aff'd RG. (March 21,
1912) JW. 1912, 642.
6 LEWALD n8 no. 163; STEIN-}ONAs-ScHONKE, I ZPO. § 328; RAAPE 404;
M. WoLFF, IPR. 212; 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. 401; and particularly 3
FRANKENSTEIN IOI n. 159; ibid. 102; NEUMAYER, "Ehescheidung und WiedererJangung der Ehefiihigkeit," 20 Z.ausi.PR. (1955) 66-85. MELCHIOR 251
reaches the same result on his theory of the preliminary question.
7 0LG. Hamburg (Jan. 3, 1923) 43 ROLG. 347; AG. Hannover (1928)
IPRspr. 1929, no. 71 and especially KG. (July n, 1924) StAZ. 1924, 306;
KG. {Oct. 17, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 62; KG. (March 7, 1938) JW. 1938,
1258 no. 27; LG. Weiden (Feb. 28, 1953) NJW. 1953, 1955.
8 BAR, 8 Z.int.R. ( 1898) 463; REICHEL, Ausliinderscheidung, 124 Arch. Civ.
Prax. zoo; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 163 n. 2, and cf. 439; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 77 n. 479; MASSFELLER, JW. 1938, 1259·
9 KG. {March 13, 19II) 24 ROLG. 19, approved on this point by RAAPE
404; KG. (March 7, 1938) JW. 1938, 1258 no. 27.
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should never mean dissolution of the marriage for one party
and continuance of marriage for the other. A Spaniard of
Catholic faith, mistakenly divorced in a Netherlands court,
was permitted to remarry in the jurisdiction in view of the
formally binding force of the Dutch decision and of the record in the register of civil status. 10 In Belgium, as we have
seen, courts for the same reason either deny divorce to a
couple of mixed nationality, when the personal law of one
party is hostile to divorce, or grant dissolution with effect
for both parties. 11
A similar problem arises in a third state when a foreign
divorce decree is not recognized by the personal law. Again,
the opinion classifying the question as concerning capacity to
marry rather than the effects of divorce, has found favor. 12
In fact, in this case, refusal of remarriage is not in open conflict with the authority of the forum, so that the primary rule
for questions of status may have free play.
2.

View of the Personal Law

The country to which a party belongs will normally deny
any legal effect to a foreign divorce which it does not recognize; maintenance will be granted as by virtue of a valid marriage. Thus, remarriage or further marriages of either party
will be considered invalid, the issue illegitimate, et cetera. A
maintenance order, predicated on the assumption of jurisdiction in rem by a foreign divorce court, even though issued in
personam, has been regarded as void in England, because the
foreign court was considered incompetent to grant divorce
and the order was ancillary to divorce. 13
10

Rb. Rotterdam (April 14, 1930) W. 12197·

11

Supra pp. 478-479.

12
See for France: AumNET, II Recueil 1926 I 236; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557
no. 91; for Brazil: Trib. Sup. Fed. (Nov. 4, 1916) Clunet 1919, 402; for
Germany the authors supra n. 6.
13
Simons v. Simons [1939] 1 K. B. 490.
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In actual fact, of course, any divorce subjects the conjugal
union to a most severe shock. 14 The facts that one party has
instituted an action for divorce, that this party has remarried
and cohabited with a new spouse, may each constitute a
ground for divorce by the other party, if divorce is allowed
at all in the home country. 15 The same result is reached
through those statutory provisions in the United States
whereby the procuring of a divorce outside the state by one
party gives the other party a ground for divorce, although
these provisions also cover other cases. 16
A foreign decree, however, may be partially recognized in
the country of the personal law. Thus we have seen that in
some cases a foreign spouse has been regarded as released
from the bonds of marriage, while the spouse who is a subject of the forum remains bound. Under the Ohio statute,
this particular case entitles the latter to a divorce. 11 The out14 3 ARMIN JON 50 thinks indeed that a prohibition of divorce by the law of
the forum should be directed exclusively against a second marriage, the marital union being hopelessly destroyed by the foreign divorce. Cf. DEGAND, 5
Repert. 556 no. 88. Refusal to restore conjugal community after a foreign
divorce is not considered desertion in Denmark; see l\1UNCH-PETERSEN, 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 748 n. 96.
1 5 England: Adultery, at that time the only ground for divorce, was found
in Clayton v. Clayton [1932] P. 45; in Lankester v. Lankester [1925] P. 114
a similar result would have been adjudicated but for connivance of the applicant in the foreign divorce.
Germany: ObLG. Bayern (May 24, 1924) 2 Jahrb. FG. 148; OLG. Konigsberg (Oct. 29, 1914) Pas. Mschr. 1914, 157, cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 164
n. 2. LG. Berlin (Jan. 9, 1937) JW. 1937, 1307 (adultery committed by celebration of a marriage "by dispensation" in Austria). Doubts in other decisions were concerned with the requisite of fault for divorce, which is no
longer indispensable under German law.
1 6 Florida: Stat. ( 1941) § 6 s.o4, No. 8: "that the defendant has obtained a
divorce from the complainant in any other state or country."
Michigan: Stat. Ann. (1937) § 25.86, No.6: "And the circuit courts may, in
their discretion, upon application, . . . divorce from the bonds of matrimony any party who is a resident of this state, and whose husband or wife
shall have obtained a divorce in any other state." Cf. supra p. 433·
Ohio: Code Ann. (1953) § 3105.01 {]): "procurement of a divorce without this state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who procured it is released from the obligations of the marriage while such obligations remain binding upon the other party."
17 See preceding note.
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standing example of one-sided effect ascribed to divorce is
presented in this country by the special rule in New York
that, in the absence of personal jurisdiction, a foreign decree
of divorce obtained against a spouse domiciled in New York
is good by estoppel as to the libelant but not good as to the
respondent. 18 Under the Brazilian practice mentioned
above/ 9 the Brazilian party to a mixed marriage dissolved
abroad remained married in the eyes of Brazilian law, but
the non-Brazilian spouse was capable of remarrying even in
Brazil. 20 The new Brazilian law seems to reverse the latter
rule. 21
Moreover, a foreign divorce a vinculo, though not recognized in Brazil, is given the same effect upon the property of
the spouses as a Brazilian separation from bed and board;
this concession has been termed the only possible compromise.22

II.

EFFECTS OF VALID DIVORCES

The effects of divorce or, pursuant to another conception,
the continued effects of marriage after "dissolution" 23 are
usually discussed in the United States with respect to ( 1) alimony, ( 2) dower, and ( 3) custody of children. In recent
times, civil law lawyers have used broader categories for each
of these subjects; they distinguish the influence of divorce
18 People v. Baker (1879) 76 N.Y. 78, 32 Am. Rep. 274, consistently followed; see Restatement, New York Annotations § 113 at 8 5·
19
Supra PP· 535-536.
20 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 167 no. 41.
21 Brazil: Lei de Introdu~;ao ( 1942) art. 7 § 6.
22 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 4, 1916) Clunet 1919, 402.
23 NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. z) 21. It need hardly be mentioned that no problem
exists with respect to the fact that every divorce decree, if recognized, determines the time, the extent, and the conditions for terminating the bond of
marriage. E.g., a Belgian court grants exequatur to a French divorce without
requiring that the decree be recorded within two months, as is necessary for
a Belgian decree, by a different interpretation of art. 264 of the Civil Code
common to both countries; Trib. civ. Termonde (Oct. 17, 1936) Rechtsk.
Wkbl. 1936-1937, 1634, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 183.

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
upon (I) personal relations between husband and wife, ( 2)
marital property, and ( 3) parental rights.
For the purpose of conflict of laws, further division of the
subject is necessary. On the one hand, we must distinguish the
inquiries: (a) whether the divorce court has power under its
own law to decide upon those effects or some of them; (b) if
it has power so to decide, which law it must apply; and (c)
whether its decision is recognized and enforced in other jurisdictions. On the other hand, there are analogous problems
in case a divorce decree has been rendered in one jurisdiction
and a related suit, as for alimony or custody, is brought in
another.
Not all these diverse problems have been dealt with explicitly, although some have been vividly discussed in a few
countries and others are engulfed within other topics. There
is no point in subjecting all these questions to one sole conflicts rule. Earlier writers in Europe contended that all effects
of divorce are governed by the national law, whereby ordinarily the law presiding over the divorce was meant. 24 But
the conflicts rules derived from the nationality principle have
been differentiated; there are different rules for personal relations of the spouses, for property relations, for parental
rights and duties incident to the granting of divorce, and,
moreover, there exist problems peculiar to marriages of
mixed nationality. The prevailing tendency, briefly reported
below, favors in each topic application of the rule that is
called for by the most nearly related sphere of family life.
We still find rules of broader scope in a few regulations,
characterized by the preponderance of the last matrimonial
or common domicil. For instance, a Danish court will recognize not only the limitations on the right of remarriage resultant from a divorce decree of the foreign matrimonial
domicil, but also its legal effects on the property of the par24

See, e.g.,

2 FIORE

no. 695; also though more careful,

WEiss, 3

Traite

702.
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ties. 26 By article 55 of the C6digo Bustamante, "the law of
the court before which litigation is pending" determines the
judicial consequences of the action and the terms of the
judgment with respect to the spouses and their children. It
seems that this court is ordinarily that of the matrimonial
domicil. Particularly elaborate is a provision of the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law, in which divorce jurisdiction with certain exceptions is fixed at the last common domicil. It seems instructive to reproduce this provision:
In connection with petitions for separation or divorce, the
same or another authority of the divorce state may decide
also on the provisional suspension of conjugal rights to property division, damages, alimony, and parental rights. (Art.
8, par. I.)
Claims later instituted concerning alimony or parental
rights are decided in the state in which the defendant spouse
is domiciled. This applies also to modification of awards rendered in another of the participant states. If, by the law of
the state in which separation or divorce has been pronounced,
alimentary sums for a separated or divorced party may not
be awarded or increased, no such decision can be made in the
other participant states. (Art. 8, par. 2.)
In rendering decision under articles 7 and 8 in each state,
the law there in force is to be applied. Decisions, however, on
division of property or on damages always must be based on
the law applicable to the conjugal property relations according to article 3· (Art. 9, par. 1.)
For civil law countries, it should be borne in mind that
jurisdiction is a matter entirely different from choice of law;
the former is not here involved.
1.

Effects on Personal Relations between Husband and Wife

(a) Name, capacity, gifts, etcetera. What law determines, for instance, whether a divorced wife ought to resume
25 MuNcH-PETERSEN,

4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 747

n.
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her maiden name, to retain that of her husband, or to have
her choice as under the common law? Should a divorce court
determine this question according to its own family (or
other) law, or according to the same family law that was applied in granting the divorce, or according to the law that
governed the personal relations of the parties during coverture? The subject matter includes, among other things, alimony, a topic presenting peculiarities.
(i) The law of the forum. The application of the domestic law seems natural within systems that make the matrimonial domicil the exclusive basis for jurisdiction and choice
of law in granting and recognizing divorce. But also in Switzerland, although divorce is not granted unless the foreigners' national law accords, Swiss law determines every
divorce decree and its ancillary effects. 26
In the United States, probably the law of the divorce
forum governs. Except for alimony, however, the question
seems not to have been discussed.
(ii) The law of divorce. To control the effects of divorce,
the decidedly prevailing opinion on the European Continent
has selected, among the various possibilities offered by the
nationality principle, the law under which the marriage was
dissolved. 27 In Germany, this is the national law of the husSee supra p. 461 and ibid., n. 169.
OG. Zurich (Dec. 8, 1937) 38 BI. f. Ziirch. Rspr. 1939, 105 no. 42 therefore
states that even if in the national courts the effects of divorce would not be
expressed in the divorce decree itself and established by rules different from
the Swiss rules, a Swiss divorce decree always causes Swiss law to be applied
to all problems of damages and moral compensation, support, property, etc.
27 France: for status and capacity see DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 86;
NIBOYET nos. 642, 753 pars. 6 and 7 and 5 Traite 443 ff.; BATIFFOL, Traite
527.
Germany: RG. Plenary Decision (June 25, 1898) 41 RGZ. 175, 9 Z.int.R.
(1899) 382, Clunet 1900, 161; KG. (May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750 (explains
in agreement with the dominant opinion that EG. art. 17 par. I also governs
the effect of divorce on personal relations such as name and alimony, while
the reservation in par. 4 for German law is inapplicable).
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. n, I9II) 37 BGE. I 400 (foreign divorce of Swiss
nationals); cf. BECK, NAG. 398 no. 16; ibid. 375 no. 148.
26
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band at the time when the divorce suit was instituted (EG.
art. 17, par. 1); in France, the national law of the parties or,
in case of diversity, the law of the matrimonial domicil. This
rule refers to problems such as:
What name the wife ought to bear; 28
Whether restrictions on the wife's capacity to contract disappear automatically with the end of the marriage; 29
Whether gifts between the spouses may be revoked; 30
Whether confidential communications between the spouses
remain privileged in testimony. 31
In addition, agreements between the spouses concerning a
future divorce, since not operative during coverture, do not
Similarly Guatemala Law on Foreigners of Jan. 25, I936, as amended I944,
art. 38.
The Hague Convention on Divorce contains no rule on the effect of divorce, see LEWALD in Strupp, I Wiirterbuch des Viilkerrechts und der Diplomatie 47I VIII.
28 France: Cour Paris (Dec. 15, 1936) D. H. 1937· 72 (the national law of
the foreigner); Cour Paris (June I6, 1904) Revue I905, I46 (French law
applied to the name of an American ex-wife because of renvoi); Trib. civ.
Seine (Dec. 22, I923) Gaz. Trib. I924.2.204 (Frank Jay-Gould, after his
divorce [see the New York case of Gould v. Gould cited suPra p. 542], sued
his former wife and the Alhambra Theater in Paris to enjoin them from
advertising her performances under the name of Edith Kelly-Gould; the
injunction was granted under French C. C. art. 299 because the defendant
had submitted to French law in the divorce suit with the collateral argument that New York law permitted the same right to the plaintiff). For
literature see PILLET, I Traite Pratique 627; TAGER, Clunet I933, 96.
Germany: law of divorce, not the personal law of either spouse: KG. (Oct.
I3, I9I6) 33 ROLG. 343; LG. II Berlin (May 2o, I927) IPRspr. I926-27,
no. 75; cf. KG. (Dec. I7, I926) IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 74; differentiating
FICKER, "Der Name der geschiedenen Ehefrau im deutschen internationalen
Privatrecht," I6 Z.ausi.PR. (I950 /5I) 32-43.
Switzerland: controversial; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no. IS; BECK, NAG.
373 no. 145, ibid. 466 nos. 226, 227; cf. ibid. 398 no. 16, ibid. 4I4 no. 67.
A Swiss divorced woman must resume her premarital name, but if a
woman after a foreign divorce recovers Swiss nationality, she is entitled to
the name she has according to the foreign law. See Just. Dep. BBl. 1924, II
24 no. 2; GAUTSCHI, 26 SJZ. 22; Government of Bern, 27 S]Z. 137, no. 23.
29
RAAPE 430 no. 6; M. WoLFF, IPR. ( ed. I) I32 n. I4· In France BARTIN,
who had advocated the law of the forum, now suggests with WEISS, 3 Traite
702, the personal law of the woman; see BARTIN, 2 Principes 311 § 316.
30
RAAPE, IPR. 303.
31 This point familiar in American law is not expressly mentioned in the
European literature.

s66

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

pertain to the law of marital relations but to that of divorce.32 According to this law, such agreements may be licit;
if so, resort to a divergent public policy of the forum seems
unnecessary to German courts. 33 French judges, however,
always suspicious of an intention to facilitate divorce by consent, are inclined to assume that such agreements constitute
an offense to the French public order. 34
(b) Alimony following a foreign divorce. 35 In accordance
with an old conception, in England divorce ended any duty
of support between former spouses. Therefore, no action can
lie to obtain alimony after a divorce a vinculo, whether pronounced by an English or a foreign court. 35a A recognized
foreign decree of divorce even terminates a former English
maintenance order. 36
In the United States, many difficulties have been encountered. Although the English conception that the duty of support does not survive the dissolution of the marriage has not
been maintained in this country, only this English back32 Germany: KG. (Sept. 25, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 32 (Hungarian law);
OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, 1936) JW. 1936, 1798; cf. RAAPE, IPR. 303;
LORENZ, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 102.
3 3 Cf. also KG. (Dec. 21, 1935) JW. 1936, 2466.
34 See Cass. (req.) (July 29, 1929) Revue 1931, 33+; Cass. (civ.)
(Jan.
26, 1938) Nouv. Revue 1938, 567 (where the decree was rendered in France)
and the decisions cited in Nouv. Revue 1938, 570 n. x, and contra: CosTEFLORET, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 215 no. 121.
3 5 See especially HARWOOD, "Alimony after a Decree of Divorce Rendered
on Constructive Service," 24 Kentucky L. J. ( 1936) 241. See }A COBS, "The
Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl.
(1939) 250; Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. (1940) u8o; Note, 40 Mich. L. Rev.
(1942) 596; SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for Judicial
Separation and Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. ( 1943) 321. On the
enforcement of alimentary decrees throughout the world, see International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des
obligations alimentaires (Rome, 1938).
3Sa But the court can provide for alimony in the divorce decree or within a
reasonable time after the decree absolute, Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950,
s. 19; Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1950, Rule 44 (1); TOLSTOY, The Law and
Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes ( 1954) 137.
36 Pastre v. Pastre [1930] P. So, 82 (French divorce); Mezger v. Mezger
(1936) 155 L. T. R. 491, [1937] P. 19, Clunet 1937, 138 (German divorce).
Contra: Wood v. Wood [1957] 2 All E. R. 14 (C. A.).
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ground seems to explain a certain opinion that has proved
very strong in the past, viz., that the rendering of the divorce
decree is the last moment for alimony to be recovered.
Where such a doctrine is invoked against a suit for alimony,
undesirable situations may arise. Thus, a divorce court in
one state may refuse to order the defendant to pay alimony,
because it knows that according to the prevailing opinion, it
does not have the necessary jurisdiction in personam. 37 Yet,
the court of another state having the required personal jurisdiction, regards a suit for support after divorce has been pronounced as impossible. The result is the same as when the
foreign court awarded alimony but did not have proper
jurisdiction.
The diversity of jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in
personam presents a second source of difficulties. Paradoxically, it follows from the historical development, that the requirements for service of process on the defendant in such
ancillary actions in personam, as enunciated by the Supreme
Court, are greater than in divorce suits. It seems a neglected
fact that the social importance of marriage and its dissolution surpasses the significance of any alimentary orders. The
result of this divergence is the doctrine of "divisible divorce" under which it is held that alimony claims, whether
adjudicated or not prior to a foreign ex parte divorce, do
survive the sister state divorce decree. 37a
A third unexpected complication arises from interference
of the estoppel idea. In cases where a wife sued for divorce
in a jurisdiction powerless to grant alimony but where the
right thereto was at issue, she has been deemed to have
waived her claim to alimony once and for all by choosing
such a divorce court. This all too technical idea, which has
87

This has been contested but is now treated as settled. See
See supra p. 566.

37a

2 BEALE 1435.
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not been adequately criticized, is so faulty that its influence
should not go far.
Finally, difficulties of another kind are encountered when
an alimentary order is sought to be enforced in another jurisdiction. In particular, orders which may be altered have been
considered to lack the finality necessary for enforcement.
It would not be helpful to discuss all these disturbances at
length. Recent writers assure us that the entire doctrine is in
an evolutionary stage, and that extraterritorial effect is given
to decrees for alimony "with very great completeness." 38
Courts and statutes show themselves more and more anxious
to overcome formalistic obstacles, to help deserted wives
and children. The indigent ex-husband has also found more
favor than before. Through such an evolution, the American
doctrine approaches the views of the European laws.
In civil law countries, the nature of the duty incumbent
upon a former spouse is far from undisputed in theory; does
it follow from a breach of the marital duties? That it does
was the leading idea of older codifications, including the German Civil Code. Or is the family relation partly conserved
despite the dissolution of the marriage tie? Modern doctrines are inclined in some degree, indeed, to consider the obligation imposed by law as an effect of the former family relation and therefore as belonging to the field of family law
rather than to the domain of ordinary obligations ex lege.
In any case, the existence of such obligations is not doubted;
their incidence is continuously extended. For instance, the
recent German marriage law no longer maintains that only
an exclusively guilty ex-spouse can be required to support the
innocent other party; it declares it to be sufficient that the defendant was mainly at fault in disrupting the marriage and
even allows equitable awards beyond this limit. Thus, since
alimony rests on the same foundations as any family law inas

SAYRE,

z8 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 333, supra n. 35·
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stitution, no technical impediment obstructs the application
of a foreign alimentary regulation. Moreover, litigation for
alimony is usually separable from the divorce suit so that
nothing prevents an action for alimony being brought in another country than that where the divorce was pronounced.
Difficulties arise, however, first, because a foreign divorce
is quite often refused recognition and, secondly, because of
the intervention of some distinct local policy at the court
where the award is sought.
In Germariy, the law of divorce is applied with nicety; it
signifies the law of the husband at the time when the action
for divorce was instituted. 39
In France, it seems that the law governing marital relations during coverture is preferred, 40 the alimentary obligation being traced back to the marital duty of support. Bartin, however, limits this classification to that part of the
39 KG. (Feb. 16, 1909) 19 ROLG. 106, 20 Z.int.R. (1910) 227, Clunet
I911, 286 (without any doubt) ; LG. Altona (March I9, I926) JW. I926,
I357 (Danish law denying judicial remedy applied); KG. (Feb. 9, 1929)
IPRspr. I929, no. I5; OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, I936) JW. 1936, 1798.
This practice was in force before the Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch, see RG. (June
25, I898) 4I RGZ. 175 (supra n. 27) and RG. (July II, I898) JW. 1898,
545, 9 Z.int.R. (I899) u6, Clunet I9oo, 635· In the case of a German husband, a technical difficulty was presented by the requirement of guilt of the
defendant and innocence of the applicant when the foreign decree of divorce
contained no statement on the matter. But this obstacle could be overcome;
see KG. (May 3, I935) JW. I935, 2750, and also RAAPE 426 II I; the question is certainly not worse under the new law.
The Italian Court of Cass. (May 3, I934) Monitore I934, 889 gives much
weight to the statements and awards of the foreign divorce decree but seems
to decide the case according to Italian law perhaps because the plaintiff
wife had recovered her Italian citizenship.
40 NIBOYET 753 and Traite no. 1429. However, the majority of the writers
and the courts seem to base the alimentary obligations on the lex fori, BATIFFOL, Traite 528; HoLLEAUX, "Les effets du divorce," Droit international
prive de Ia famille ( I954) I73·
In Portugal, CUNHA GoN<;ALVEs, I Direito Civil 695 seems to advocate
application of the husband's national law under the same viewpoint.
In accord the Swedish Supreme Court, H.D. (March 12, 1934) N.J.A. 1934.
77 (alimony between German spouses divorced in Sweden governed by
German law).
Argentina: Camara xa de Apelaci6n de Ia Plata (May 28, 1945) 39 La
Ley (I945) 534·
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money award that the French courts base on article 301 of
the Civil Code, while other grants of alimony under the
heading of damages should be governed by the law of the
place of wrong. 41
Jurisdiction for alimony is assumed in the Netherlands at
the instance of domiciled persons on the basis of foreign divorces. Here again the law applied seems to be the lex fori.' 2
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has taken another view in considering the problem of jurisdiction. If the divorce was rendered abroad, even if involving Swiss citizens, jurisdiction
for ancillary effects is not exercised, unless the foreign courts
refuse to assume jurisdiction because of the Swiss domicil of
the party; 43 in such event, the Swiss court is required to intervene in order to prevent a denial of justice, 44 the lex fori
being applied. 45
2.

Effects on Marital Property

If a foreign decree of judicial separation has been recognized, it must be examined, in the first place, to determine
whether it is intended to terminate the property regime.
With this purpose in mind, French courts have stated that
an Italian separation by mutual agreement and judicial confirmation,46 as well as a Spanish separation from bed and
BARTIN, 2 Principes 313.
See BW. amended by § 828a Rv. {Law of May 16, 1934, S. 253) and
H. R. (April 5, 1937) W. 1937, no. 661 declaring that the alimentary duty
falls under the first book of the Code and also if based on a divorce pronounced in Germany. Cf. H. R. (March 8, 1934) W. 12752 for a decree of
the Netherland Indies; see other cases in I I Z.ausl.PR. ( 1937) 210.
43 BG. (March 29, 1928) 54 BGE. II 85; BECK, NAG. 370 nos. 133 ff.; ibid.
420 nos. 89 ff.
44 BG. {Dec. 10, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, Praxis 1937. s6. On modification
of a domestic decree, if the defendant is domiciled abroad, see BG. (Nov.
22, 1935) 61 BGE. II 225, Clunet 1938, 973, and criticism ibid. 974·
45 Constant practice since BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; see BG.
{Dec. 10, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, 267.
46 Cour Lyon (June 3, 1926) 8.1928.2.121.
41
42
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board 47 does not have the effect of property separation
(separation de biens), which the French separation de corps
has under the Civil Code (art. 3 I I) . 48 But a separation from
bed and board rendered in a Netherlands court necessarily
effectuates a separation of property under article 298 of the
Civil Code; 49 if the parties be Germans, therefore, this effect would not be recognized by their national courts. 50
All remaining questions concerning property regimes must
obviously be answered by the law governing the property relations of the parties during coverture. For instance, after a
dissolution of community property by an absolute divorce,
whether a domestic divorce or a foreign divorce recognized
as valid, the mode of partition of the community fund is naturally governed by the law governing marital property. 51
Often a marital property settlement or a statute provides
explicitly what must be done in case of divorce. Where such
provision is lacking, a rule applicable in the event of the
death of one spouse may reasonably be resorted to, while the
lex fori of the divorce court is ruled out. 5 2
In agreement with this view, in common law countries the
effect on movables of any divorce, domestic or foreign, and
in Argentina of a foreign recognizable divorce, is governed
by the law of the husband's domicil at the time when the
movables were acquired; the effect on immovables by the law
of the situs. In accordance with this rule, a wife's claim to
dower depends upon the law of the situs regarding dower
and estoppel rather than upon that of the divorce court, unTrib. civ. Seine (Feb. 13, 1908} Clunet 1908, 832.
BARTIN in 7 Aubry et Rau 402, and NIBOYET 752 are in doubt whether
this effect belongs under the heading of rules on marital property or those on
the personal relations of husband and wife.
49 Rb. Haag (Dec. Io, 1929) 6 Z.ausi.PR. (1932) 849; Rb. Almelo (June
24, 1931) W. 12370 and App. Arnhem (June 29, 1932) W. 12627, I I
Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 209 no. 59·
5o M. WoLFF, IPR 212; STAUDINGER-ENGELMANN § 1586 III A, c(4).
51 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan, 25, 1882) Clunet 1882, 74·
52 DEGAND, 5 Repert. 558 no. 96; NIBOYET 752 II I.
47

48

572

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

less the implications of the divorce decree as to dower be recognized at the situs. 53 In France, in conformity with the conflicts rules on matrimonial property and in contrast with the
conflicts rules on inheritance, immovables are not subject to
special treatment. 54
The question, too, whether or when an agreement to regulate property relations after divorce is valid, has appropriately been decided according to the law governing marital
property during coverture. 55
A particular position is taken in the United States when divorce courts are empowered to make dispositions of property
of the spouses or to adjudicate damages between them. It
would seem that a corresponding order of the court ought to
supplement the regulation of property between the parties.
In connection with the unsettled extraterritorial effect of
personal decrees of a court of equity, dispositions of this
kind, particularly when one party is ordered to convey land
in another state to another party, have produced interstate
difficulties. 56
3· Custody of Children
American courts disagree greatly on the conditions under
which a court has jurisdiction in divorce proceedings to settle
53 On the effect on the wife's claim for dower, see HARPER, "Effect of Foreign Divorce upon Dower and Similar Property Interests," 26 Ill. L. Rev.
(1931) 397; HARPER, TAINTOR, CARNAHAN and BROWN, Cases 650 n. 32.
54 App. Monaco (May 7, 1910) S.I912.4.25, Clunet 1910, 1327; App. Monaco (March r6, 1912) Revue 1912, 789.
55 KG. (Dec. 21, 1935) JW. 1936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 {agreement valid under Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § 92, recognized according to EG. art. 15, setting art. 17 (law of divorce) aside). Contra: KG.
{Sept. 25, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 32 (applying EG. art. 17 not only to alimentary but also to property agreements).
56 Enforcement was granted at the situs, probably in view of fraud committed against the order in Spalding v. Spalding ( 1925) 75 Cal. App. 569, 243
Pac. 445; Matson v. Matson (1919) 186 Iowa 6o7, 173 N. W. 127; Mallette
v. Scheerer ( 1916) 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182; refused in Bullock v. Bullock ( 1894) 52 N. ]. Eq. 561, 30 At!. 676; Fall v. Fall ( 1905) 75 Neb. 104,
113 N. w. 175· Cf. STUMBERG 126.
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a dispute concerning custody of the children. It is disputed
whether a pronouncement of this sort affecting the children
is to be treated as a judgment in personam or as a judgment
in rem. Statutory power conferred on a divorce court to
award custody, however, seems to be recognized in other
states 57 unless circumstances are changed, provided both
parties were residents of the divorce forum and the child,
therefore, had no other domicil. For, in the most widespread
and authoritative opinion, jurisdiction to determine the custody of children is primarily located at the domicil of the
child. 58 Modifications of a decree by a foreign court in th~
best interest of the child or of the parents are admitted insofar as the original decree, as is the rule, lacks finality. 58a
There is concern expressed in the literature, however, that
the jurisdiction of the forum for awarding custody should
not be obtained unilaterally by one spouse, drawing the child
away without the other's consent.
Every court in the United States applies its own municipal
law, so that again there is no question of choice of law. In
England and Argentina, and under the Conventions of
Montevideo and of the Scandinavian States, the forum coincides with the conjugal domicil. In France, the lex fori,
rather than the personal law, is applied, even in cases such as
the Ferrari case, where only one of the spouses had acquired
French nationality; 59 but probably not where two foreigners
are concerned and the child is of foreign nationality too. 60
Restatement§ 146; see Z7 C. J. S. (1941) Divorce § 329.
Restatement §§ 117, 145. GooDRICH, "Custody of Children in Divorce
Suits," 7 Cornell L. Q. (1921) I and GooDRICH § 324- A disturbing element
is the view "that a court having jurisdiction to award the custody retained
jurisdiction to modify its award although the domicile of a child has been
changed in the meanwhile to another state," LORENZEN, "Developments in the
Conflicts of Laws 190Z-194z," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (1942) at 798.
58 a New York ex rei. Halvey v. Halvey (1947) 330 U. S. 610.
59 Cour Paris (Dec. ZI, 1937) Gaz.Pal.2938.1.405, D. H. 1938.186, Clunet
1938, 48z.
6
Cf. WEISS, 3 Traite 7oz; HOLLEAUX, "Les effets du divorces," Le droit
57

58

°
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In Germany, however, the conflict of law problem has
been thoroughly separated from that of jurisdiction and extensively discussed. The lex fori was applied in a single case
where the divorced wife of foreign nationality had later acquired German nationality, on the ground that the domestic
regulation (BGB. § 1635) was mandatory. 61 But this construction has been generally rejected as an excessive expression of the exigencies of public policy. According to another
opinion the relationship between the former spouses as respects custody of the children was considered governed by
the law determining the right to divorce (EG. art. 17),
while other matters would fall under the conflicts rule determining the parent-child relation (EG. art. 19) .62 But prevailing opinion now holds that every right of a parent to custody, education, or visiting affects the children's interest and
has to be determined by the law that governs legitimate filiation.63 Where German spouses have been divorced abroad by
a recognized decree but custody was not awarded in accordance with German family law, the order is regarded as a
temporary measure only. 64
In the Netherlands also, not the law of the forum, now repeatedly applied to govern divorce, but the ordinary conflicts
rule on parental and filial relations is applied. 65 Accordingly,
international prive de Ia famille ( 1954) 174. But Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 29,
1904) Clunet 1905, 187 has applied French law to decide the provisional
custody of the children in a suit of an American wife against her Turkish
husband.
61 RG. (Feb. 20, 1913) 81 RGZ. 373·
62 HABICHT 143, 152; LEWALD 120, 137. Another opinion suggested simply
applying EG. art. 17 (law of divorce), see NIEDNER 54, art. 17 comment 4d;
NIEMEYER, IPR. des BGB. 157; RGR. Kom. (ed. 8) pre!. no. 6 to § 1616.
63 KG. (March 6, 1929) 41 Z.int.R. (1929) 413; KG. (Feb. 10, 1933) JW.
1933, 2065; KG. (May 3, 1935) JW. 1935, 2750; KG. (May 12, 1938) Nouv.
Revue 1939, 251; OLG. Breslau (May 9, 1938) Dt. Recht 1939, 869 following
RAAPE 482; Bay. ObLG (March 21, 1952) Bay. ObLGZ 1952, 74; see also
RAAPE, IPR. 303; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 164 n. 4·
64 See decisions of KG. preceding note.
65 See Rb. Amsterdam (June 24, 1937) W. 1937, no. 970; Hof Amsterdam
(Feb. II, 1937) W. 1937, no. 950.
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the law of the child governs, while in Germany that of the
father is applicable. The classification is the same, however,
and would be suitable to any country.
By this time, it should be understood everywhere that custody of children or any other incident of parental relations
is not a matter substantially ancillary to divorce, although
the divorce court may have power to take care of these matters and a divorce is a seasonable occasion to regulate custodianship. If the court applies its own family law, as it does
in this country, it should qualify its application in the not infrequent cases where the applicant has been able to choose
the forum at will. Whatever the principle of assuming jurisdiction may be and whatever the binding effect of an award
of custody, the applicable law should be determined in conformance with the standard adopted in filiation matters.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March I, 1928} Clunet 1928, 482 (personal law
of Australian parents applied in principle).
Italy: Trib. Napoli (July 13, 1932) Rivista 1933, 281 (Italian law, the
Parents having, after Hungarian divorce, recovered Italian nationalty).
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Annulment of Marriage
I.

ANNULMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM DIVORCE

ONFLICTS rules determining the extraterritorial
effect given to annulment of marriage are concerned in the first place with any decree or judgment declaring a marriage void or annulling it and intended
to operate in rem throughout the world, i.e., with the effect
of res judicata for all persons. These rules, however, must
evidently also be applied to annulments, such as those in certain of the states of the United States, that are conclusive
only against the parties and those claiming under them. All
types of void and voidable marriages are included.
Annulment is no longer confused with divorce, as it was in
former times,t although some American statutes still speak
of divorce granted for antenuptial causes such as bigamy,
incest, duress, physical incapacity, or near kinship. 2 It is certain that a decree of "divorce" in such cases has nullifying
effect.3 In exact terminology, nullity cannot be based on
grounds other than those existing at the moment of the
solemnization of the marriage, while divorce must have a
cause either posterior to the celebration or at least continuing during coverture. In the law of conflicts, this seems to be
accepted. 4

C

1

COKE on LI'ITLETON (HARGRAVE and BUTLER) 235a; BLACKSTONE 440·
VERNIER §§ so, 68, 70, 72, 73; ScHOULER, Domestic Relations §§ 1154,
II 55; Reese v. Reese ( 1929) 128 Kan. 762, 280 Pac. 751.
3 See 27 C. J. S. (1941) 537-538.
4 Restatement § II5 comment c; Sorenson v. Sorenson ( 1924) 122 N. Y.
Misc. 196, 202 N. Y. Supp. 62o, 625.
Brazil: App. Civ. Capital Sao Paulo no. 6441 (Aug. 5 and July 27, 1912)
6o Gaz. Jur. Sao Paulo (1912) 195.
2 I
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Nevertheless, the Restatement mentions annulments, the
causes of which antedate the marriage but the effects of
which operate only from the time of the decree. 5 These are
considered in the Restatement according to the rules of conflicts established for divorce rather than those relative to annulment.6 It is difficult to understand the reason for this
treatment. The Swiss Code and also the German law as recently reformed contain precise parallels; they provide for
rescission of marriages on grounds that existed at the time of
the marriage celebration and with the effect of terminating
rather than annihilating the bond of marriage. 7 The effect
described is similar to divorce. Yet, for the purpose of conflict of laws, the Swiss and German institutions have rightly
been classified in the category of annulment. They are governed by the personal law of the person entitled to sue and
not by the law which would govern divorce. 8 Annulment can
never be governed by the law of the forum, as divorce is in
the United States. The reasons are perfectly understood in
0 Restatement § II5(2). I BEALE§ II5.2 asserts that in most states annulment takes effect at the time of the decree of annulment and therefore takes
place at the present domicil. A contrary statement that such effect is prescribed by only a few statutes is to be found in 38 C. J., Marriage § 139 with
the citation of New York only, for which state the Restatement, New York
Annotations, § II5 (2) declares that no such annulment exists there. In fact
the text of the New York Domestic Relations Law § 7 on marriage "void
from the time its nullity is declared by the court of competent jurisdiction,"
has been construed as meaning retroactive operation of the judgment and
destruction of the marriage ab initio. See Matter of Moncrief ( 1921) 235
N. Y. 390, I39 N. E. 550; SEALY, Law of Persons and Domestic Relations
(ed. 2, I936, New York) 562; HAMMILL, "The Impediment of Nonage,"
3 The Jurist (I943) 475, 477 n. II.
6 Restatement § 136(a).
7 Swiss C. C. art. 132.
German Marriage Law of I946, § 37 par. I which provides that the effects
of a rescission of a marriage are determined according to the provisions
concerning the effects of divorce.
8 RG. (May 7, 1936) I5I RGZ. 226 classified the Swiss action annulling
the marriage under EG. art. 13 par. I; R.<\APE, 2 D.IPR. ( ed. I) 145; his
assertion that the wife does not lose the nationality acquired by the marriage (at I75) is inexact; cf. for Switzerland, BECK, NAG. 263 no. 159.
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this country; 9 an impediment vitiating the celebration of a
marriage must be evaluated under the law establishing the
requirements of that celebration.

II.
1.

ANNULMENT OF THE MARRIAGE OF FOREIGNERS

Jurisdiction

(a) Court of the place of celebration. When marriage was
conceived of primarily as a contract, 10 jurisdiction for deciding on its validity or invalidity was throught to be vested
naturally in the tribunal of the place of celebration. This is
still the rule in Argentina, 11 and as recently as 1938 a court in
Paris tried to justify French jurisdiction over a marriage of
foreign parties by a similar argument. 12
The English authorities asserted the jurisdiction of the
English courts to annul English marriages until recent
years. 13 The present decisions are understood to say that
where the parties are domiciled abroad, the jurisdiction loci
celebrationis of the English courts is neither exclusive nor
complete; it concurs with that of the foreign domicil and is
restricted to absolutely "void" marriages, such as those vitiated by bigamy or the non-observance of formalities. Annulment of "voidable" marriages on the ground of coercion, essential error, or impotence, was considered exclusively reserved to the domiciliary court, because it effects a change of
status. 14 This distinction seems formalistic. 14a In order to
o Cf. on this point, the explanation of GooDRICH 320.
1o I BEALE 5IO professes this conception and strongly advocates the jurisdiction of the place of celebration.
11 2 VICO no. 79· For Spain see GoLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 297.
12 Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, I938) Revue Crit. I938, 668, Clunet I939• 87.
1 3 Simonin v. Mallac ( I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; Linke v. Van Aerde ( I894)
IO T. L. R. 426; Valier v. Valier (I925) I33 L. T. R. 830 and the problematic cases Ogden v. Ogden [I9o8] P. 46 and Sottomayor v. De Barros
[I877] 3 P. D. I, [I879] 5 P. D. 94· Expressly overruled for voidable marriages in Casey v. Casey [I949] P. 420 (C. A.).
14 Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [I93I] P. 29; see the important comment by
CHESHIRE 344; Goddard, L. J., in a dictum in Simons v. Simons [I939] I
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alleviate the hardship caused to English wives of husbands
domiciled abroad, l4b a statutory amendment now grants an
exceptional jurisdiction as in divorce cases, viz., in favor of a
deserted wife and in case of a wife who for three years has
been ordinarily resident in England. 14c It has also been
pointed out that, in view of the British reluctance to recognize a change of domicil, a place where the parties live(without, however, being there domiciled) and have been married,
provides a natural forum to try the validity of the marriage. 15
In the United States many cases have favored the older
English rule, 16 and some statutes have also preserved it, at
least under certain circumstances.17 Thus, the jurisdiction of
the place of celebration has not completely disappeared. 17a
But it no longer has a significant role-the principle of domicil has decidedly won out. 18
K. B. 490, 498, summarizes the law to the effect that since I748 the court of
the place of celebration has been regarded as having jurisdiction to pronounce the marriage null and void for failure of due celebration. The problem was ignored in Easterbrook v. Easterbrook [I944] I70 L. T. R. 26; see
Note, 6o Law Q. Rev. ( I944) 115.
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S. C. I934) [I934] 0. R. 588, [I934]
4 D. L. R. 90; W. v. W. (Manitoba, C. A.) [I935] I W. W. R. 293; cf.
FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I932] 4 D. L. R. 2, 28 ff.; 3 Giur. Comp. DIP.
I90 no. 88. See also READ, Recognition and Enforcement 243·
Ha But it has been approved by the Court of Appeal, de Reneville v. de
Reneville [I948] P. Ioo; Casey v. Casey [I949] P. 420.
14 b Especially by the strict domiciliary rule for voidable marriages, see
e.g. the cases cited in preceding note.
14c Matrimonial Causes Act, I950, s. I8 (I).
15 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I6 Bell Yard (I935)
4 at I6; Hutter v. Hutter [I944J P. 95; favorable language in de Reneville
v. de Reneville [I948] P. 100 (C. A.) on p. 116 per Lord Greene, M. R., and
in Casey v. Casey [I949] P. 420 (C. A.) on p. 433 per Somervell, L. J.,
recently confirmed by Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax [I956] P. 115
(C. A.). MoRRIS, Cases I79 criticizes the entire doctrine.
16 See I BEALE 511; GooDRICH 420, and, as a recent illustration, Mayer v.
Mayer ( I929) 207 Cal. 685, 696, 279 Pac. 783, 788.
17 See I VERNIER § 52 table XXI and Supplement.
17 a It seems to be concurrent; see Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum (I946) ziO
Ark. I86, I9o, I94 S. W. {zd) xo12, 1013.
18
See McMuRRAY and CuNNINGHAM, "Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null a
Marriage Celebrated in Another State or Foreign Country," I8 Cal. L. Rev.
(I930) xos.
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(b) Court of the domicil. At present, the regularly competent court is that of the domicil, and this is true, not only
in the countries which use domicil as the test for determining
status and consider paramount the interest of the domiciliary
state in the validity of the marriage bond, 19 but even in the
countries generally following the principle of nationality. 20
The motive of the rule is to permit domiciled foreigners to
bring their matrimonial causes before the local courts instead
of compelling them to travel to their national countries.
As the matrimonial domicil is normally at the husband's
domicil, the latter is usually regarded as decisive. There are
exceptions not unlike those for granting divorce; 21 they cannot be discussed here.
In contrast with divorce, which is refused to foreigners in
a number of states when the jurisdiction of the forum is not
recognized by the homeland/ 2 jurisdiction for annulment is
not made dependent on such considerations, except perhaps
in Switzerland. 23
GooDRICH 420.
zo The United States: Restatement § 115; GooDRICH 420.
England: Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [1931] P. 29, cited supra n. 14.
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S. C.) [1934] 0. R. 588, [1934] 4 D. L.
R. 90; Diachuk v. Diachuk (Manitoba, K. B.) (1941) 49 Man. R. 102.
South Africa: Ex parte Oxton [1948] 2 S. A. L. R. IOII, 1016 (in case of
a void marriage one party's domicil is sufficient).
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 62; text
of 1940, art. 59·
France: (if there is no domicil abroad) Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, 1927)
Revue 1928, 332; Trib. civ. Seine (April 3, 1930) Revue 1930, 460.
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6; cf. KG. (June 4, 1934) IPRspr. 1934. no.
141; same for a declaratory statement that the marriage is non-existent: RG.
(Jan. 5, 1925) 109 RGZ. 384.
Switzerland: The domicil of the plaintiff spouse is considered decisive by
BECK, NAG. 252 no. 123.
21 Restatement § II 5 and about eleven state statutes allow suit to be brought
in the country where either party resides; see 1 VERNIER § 52. For England
see supra p. 579·
22 German C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I was until 1941 limited by par. 4 only
with respect to divorce; see KG. (Nov. 7, 1935) 27 Warn. Rspr. 192; 3
FRANKENSTEIN 203 n. 85.
23 OG. Zurich (Oct. 10, 1928) Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. (1929) 139, no. 66, Clunet
1930, 524. To the contrary effect, App. Bern (Oct. 27, 1927) 24 SJZ. (192719
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(c) Court of the national country. Consistently with the
nationality principle, in practically all Continental countries
nationals of the forum may sue for annulment irrespective of
their domicil. 24 In a few countries this jurisdiction is exclusive of foreign courts. 25 Sometimes a court defies its own general principle of domicil in order to help a national of the
forum. 26
Moreover, for a wife who had belonged to the forum up
to the time of her marriage, jurisdiction is assumed without
difficulty on the consideration that a void marriage did not
actually change her nationality.
The provisions of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
are not applicable to annulment. 27
2.

Applicable Law

(a) Rule. It has been explained above 28 that the rule
embodied in section 136 of the Restatement is universally
adopted. A court will apply the sanctions of the same law
that is applied in ascertaining whether a marriage has been
validly celebrated. 29 While in the United States this means
that generally the law of the place of celebration alone is
1928) 235 no. 54 assumes that the legislator forgot the case, and that the German provisions furnish the best solution; in the instant case jurisdiction is
granted to a former Swiss woman who married an Italian in Switzerland.
24 Cf. for instance France: Cour Paris (May 28, 188o) Clunet x88o, 300;
GouLf, 9 Repert. 8o nos. 403 ff.
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. §§ 6o6, 6o6b no. 2.
Switzerland: App. Bern (Oct. 27, 1927) 24 SJZ (1927-1928) 237.
25
Supra PP· 426-427.
In the Netherlands, art. 154a of the BW. has been interpreted as requiring a petition of the Dutch State Attorney and annulment by a Dutch court;
see Rb. s'Gravenhage {August 26, 1938) W. 1939, no. 36.
26
See, for instance, Denmark: Ostre Landsrets Domme (May 12, 1920)
U.f.R. 1920, 628, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 866, applying, moreover, the Danish law
instead of that of the domicil.
27
KG. (June 14, 1913) 27 ROLG. 108; RG. (May 7, 1936) 151 RGZ. 226.
28 Supra pp. 247• 309·
29
• • See LASALA LLANAS 130, 133; TRfAs DE BEs 83, xoo. In Spain the jurisdiction of state courts applies to few nullity cases only for which the writers
seem to favor the lex fori.
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consulted, with the sole exception of certain absolute prohibitions of the law of the domicil of either party, in most countries formalities and intrinsic validity are tested by different
criteria. The law of the forum, so significant for divorce,
in principle is immaterial for annulment. 80
In consequence, the judgment usually pronounces the kind
of nullity provided for by the applicable law rather than that
of the lex fori. The German Supreme Court, for instance, in
a case where a Swiss national obtained an annulment on the
ground of having been deceitfully induced to enter into the
marriage, adopted the sanctions of the Swiss Civil Code
rather than those of the German law, and declared the marriage void ex nunc only, with the effects ordained by Swiss
law. 31 The Swiss Federal Tribunal declared a marriage void
under the Austrian law of the parties whereby the marriage
was retroactively destroyed (Allg. BGB., § I 6o), holding
no support for the time previous to the judgment to be due,
contrary to Swiss law (C. C. art. 132, par. 2) .82
(b) Policy of the forum in favor of marriage. The principle described above has been limited by special clauses in
favor of the marriage in Sweden and Switzerland. The Swedish statute provides that a marriage between two foreigners,
formally valid but void because of an intrinsic defeat under
the national law of one or both of the parties, should not be
annulled in Sweden, unless it is also void under Swedish law
or unless the King orders the foreign law to be applied. 38
The Swiss statute contains another clause; a marriage cele80 This has been confirmed, against contrary opinion in Switzerland, by
BG. (Dec. 2, I943) 69 BGE. II 342, 34431 RG. (May 7, I936) I5I RGZ. 226; cf. MASSFELLER, JW. I936, I949;
LORENZ and ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 54·
32 BG. (Feb. 22, I934) 6o BGE. II 75 no. 2.
33 Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of I90+. c. 2 §I.
Finland : Law of Dec. 51 I 929, § 9·
Chile: C. Sup. (Sept. 26, 1939) Gac. Trib. I939 II I82, likewise refused
annulment of a German marriage on a ground of German law unknown to
the forum.
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brated abroad, invalid according to the laws of the place of
celebration, cannot be declared invalid in Switzerland, unless
it is also invalid according to Swiss law. 34 Hence, no marriage
is annulled for formal defects. The Federal Tribunal, in a
recent decision, restricts this provision to Swiss citizens. 85
Both provisions give substance to the otherwise very obscure rule that traditionally goes through the Continental
literature-that, even in the field of conflicts law, public
policy of the forum is more favorable to the marriage after
its celebration than when its celebration is still pending. In
general, the difference between curable and nullifying defects
is taken care of by the private law distinction between directory and mandatory prohibitions of marriage, and there is
usually no question but that this distinction is observed in accordance with the law governing marriage requirements,
without consulting the laws of the forum.
(c) Policy of the forum against the marriage. The forum
may nevertheless impose its own grounds for impeaching a
marriage. American courts, exercising jurisdiction for annulment, are inclined to consider nullity on the ground of
bigamy or incest without regard to the law of the place of
celebration or that of the domiciJ.3 6 Moreover, in particularly shocking cases, public policy will be affirmed. 87 In Europe, the best formulation of prohibitive public policy seems
to agree with the result attained in practice in this country
NAG. art. 7f par. 2.
BG. {Dec. 2, 1943) 69 BGE. II 342, 345· Many other doubts exist.
GAUTSCHI, "tl'ber die Anerkennung ausliindischer Eheschliessungen" 27 SJZ.
321, 323 explained that foreign marriage may be simply contested by collateral attack so long as they have not been recorded in the Swiss register.
36 See STUMBERG 284. Expressly Philippine C. C. ( 1949) art. 71.
37 In Cunningham v. Cunningham ( 1912) 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N. E. 845, Clunet 1913, 663, an 18-year-old girl married the valet of her parents secretly in
New Jersey; the Court annulled the marriage on the ground of nonage and
lack of parental consent according to the principles of discretion prevailing
in New York irrespective of the unsettled question whether the marriage was
valid in New Jersey.
34
85
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and in England with respect to polygamous marriages. A
marriage valid under the law applicable according to the
ordinary rule of conflicts will be regarded as valid at the
forum, provided not only its celebration but also its existence
within the forum does not offend the local public order. 38 In
this field, it may happen that any law may be applied in order
to help a deceived woman. 39
(d) Adjustment of the applicable law. We may recall
here the conflicts arising out of the varied scope of annulment
of marriage in the national laws. While under Soviet Russian
law a marriage was very simply dissolved but could not be
annulled, some German writers suggest either that a Soviet
marriage may nevertheless be annulled 40 or that it may be
dissolved, 41 on the assumption that the Russian institution of
divorce also covers the ground of the German annulment.
Analogous cases may occur everywhere.
But where divorce is forbidden and annulment allowed on
an abnormal scale, especially by a broad construction of error in marrying, neither divorce nor annulment will be
granted to foreigners against their personal law.

III.

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ANNULMENTS

In the recognition of foreign annulments, reference may be
made in every respect to the principles governing the recognition of foreign divorce decrees. The Restatement, § I IS,
even considers the matter identical with dissolution of marriage by divorce.
38

See, for instance, RAAPE 8o2; M.

WOLFF,

4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb.

402.
39 Brazil, Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 20, 1932) App. Civ. no. 3533, 23 Arch.
Jud. 421 applied the New York law to the marriage of a German wife
with a husband, native of Austria and naturalized United States citizen, in
view of the fact that under German law, applicable to a deceived party, her
action was lost by limitation.
40 3 FRANKENSTEIN 196.
41 RAAPE, IPR. 274·
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Thus, it has been decided according to this principle in
England that a nullity decree pronounced by the court of the
foreign matrimonial domicil is entitled to universal recognition; while this was first settled only with respect to a marriage celebrated abroad, 42 it has now been declared also in
the case of an English marriage. 43 The distinction between
void and voidable marriages 43a is here again held relevant.
A decree at the husband's domicil annulling a void marriage
is denied recognition if the wife acquired the husband's domicil only by virtue of the purported marriage. 43b
In France, it has been held that in the event one party is
of French nationality, French law must be applied and a decree of exequatur is indispensable for recognition. 44
In Italy, jurisdiction of the state courts is not exclusive/ 5
but a canonical marriage with civil effect celebrated in Italy
after the effective date of the Concordat cannot be annulled
by any temporal tribunal. 46 A fraudulent, i.e., not serious and
42

Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. (H. L.) 641.
This point, left open by the House of Lords in the Salvesen case, was
decided more definitely than in De Massa v. De Massa [1939] 2 All E. R. 150
(Note, 48 Law Q. Rev. (1932) 13; CHESHIRE 36o}, in Galene v. Galene
[1939] P. 237, [1939] 2 All E. R. 148 (English marriage, French domicil of
the husband, French decree of nullity on the ground of want of the father's
consent; the decree was recognized irrespective of the choice of law).
43 a See supra p. 578.
43 b Chapelle v. Chapelle [1950] P. 134 (Maltese decree avoiding a marriage celebrated in England by Maltese man with English woman both living thereafter in Malta).
Contra, in parallel cases but on different grounds de Bono v. de Bono [1948]
2 S. A. L. R. 802 (separate domicils, domicil of one spouse sufficient for
recognition); Vassallo v. Vassallo [1952] S. Aust. S. R. 129, 135 (common
domicil, in spite of void marriage).
44
See VALERY 838 no. 594, and 1074 no. 749, and the French diplomatic
note in RG. (March 19, 1936} 150 RGZ. 374·
45
Cass. (July 22, 1930) Testa v. Rosasco, Giur. Ita!. 1930, I, 1041; see
Swiss Federal Tribunal (June 17, 1932) 58 BGE. II 190. On the requisite
of domicil for recognizing a Swiss decree of annulment see PERASSI, 25 Rivista
( 1933) 473·
46
App. Milano (June 27, 1933) Giur. Ita!. 1933, IV, 222, 25 Rivista (1933)
260; cf. FEDOZZI 456; App. Torino (March I, 1937) Giur. Ita!. 1937, I, 2,
212, Clunet 1938, 929; Cass. (June II, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1934. I, 1061; App.
Trieste (Nov. 29, 1934) Clunet 1937, 165; Cass. (June 25, 1949) Foro Ita!.
43
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effective, change of domicil by the parties does not create international jurisdiction for annulment. 47
Where a foreign annulment based on the incapacity of a
party has applied a law other than the national law of the
party, the court of the national country, following the principle of nationality, will not recognize the decree. 48 But it
will, if the legal provisions are fairly similar. 49
A curious combination of recognition and exclusive jurisdiction is illustrated by an Austrian case of 19 3 7. 50 The marriage of an Austrian with a Yugoslav woman was annulled
by the competent ecclesiastical court in Yugoslavia. The Austrian court found that the decree was to be recognized under
the treaty existing between the two countries. But to satisfy
formally the constant axiom that the Austrian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the status of nationals, the marriage
was again annulled. This recalls certain duplications of divorce, such as in Michigan. 51
Public policy may prevent the recognition of foreign decrees if granted, e.g., because of difference of faith. 51a
1949, I Sox. An ecclesiastical tribunal is a court: RG. (Dec. 16, 1920) Warn.
Rspr. 1921, no. 35·
Excepted are the cases enumerated in the Law of May 27, 1929, art. 12,
in which an Italian civil court is competent: Cass. (June 19, 1952) Rivista
1953. 463.
4 7 App. Genova (Aug. II, 1936) Monitore 1937, 237, Clunet 1937, 910.
48 Italy: Cass. (June II, 1937) Foro Ita!. 1937, I, 1371.
49 App. Trieste (Sept. 17, 1936) Monitore 1937, 17, Clunet 1937, 389 (decree of Lima, Peru, annulling the Italian marriage of two Italians on the
ground of impotence according to the Peruvian C. C. (1852) art. 167, art. 107
of the Italian C. C. being similar "in substance"). While Swiss nullity decrees
based on impotence are also generally recognized, in the case of App. Milano
(May 28, 1936) Monitore 1936, 456, Clunet 1937, 164, recognition was refused for other reasons, among which was the fact that the allegedly incapable woman had a living child; in this respect an element of re-trial entered under the guise of public policy. Contra: Cass. civ. (June II, 1937) Giur.
Ita!. 1937, I, I, 762; and see on the problems involved, PAGANO, Note to Cass.
civ. (April I7, I939) Giur. Ita!. I939, I, I, 705; App. Bologna (Jan. I6, I939)
Giur. Ita!. I939, I, 2, 309.
50 OLG. Graz (March 3I, I937) 55 Zentralblatt ( I937) 437 no. 248.
51 See supra pp. 433, s6o, n. x6.
51a App. Firenze (April 17, I953) Rivista I954, 129 (Israeli decree declar-
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1.

EFFECTS OF ANNULMENT

Partly Effectual Void Marriage

A delicate question concerns the phenomenon that a void
or annulled marriage may nevertheless produce legal consequences. There are institutions marking a middle ground between valid and invalid marriages; the most widely known
and, indeed, the most benevolent 52 of them is the French
mariage putatif, which has its roots in the canon law and its
ramifications in numerous jurisdictions including Louisiana,S 8
Quebec," 1 and Latin America. 55 Yet French writers and
courts disagree hopelessly on the proper conflicts rule.
Illustration: In the case of Stephens v. Falchi, which came
up in Quebec,S 6 the parties were domiciled and married in
ing null a civil marriage in Italy between Italian woman and Israeli husband).
52 French C. C. art. 20I declares that marriage that has been declared null
produces nevertheless civil effects as regards both the spouses and their children when contracted in good faith. According to art. 202, if only one of the
spouses acted in good faith, the marriage produces its civil effects only in
favor of this spouse and the children born of the marriage. This provision
goes so far as to treat the protected persons as though the marriage were
valid. Furthermore, it includes all possible defects of marriage and even
non-existent marriages; see Cass. ( req.) (March I4, I933) D.I933.I.28, Gaz.
Pal.r933·1.966; cf. for an invalid ceremony before an English consul, Cour
Paris (Jan. I6, I895) Clunet I895, I057, and for bigamy, Trib. civ. Seine (May
n, I933) Gaz. Pal. I933.2.202; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Nouv. Revue
1937, 85; Cour Paris (March 30, I938) Nouv. Revue I938, 353· In the case
of a marriage of Canadians from Quebec before a Catholic priest in France,
see Berthiaume v. Dastous [I930] A. C. 79, supra p. 229; cf. LEE, "Cases on
the Conflict of Laws from the Law Reports of the British Dominions ( I93S1937)," 2I Journ. Comp. Leg. (I939) 28. Finally, good faith is presumed; cf.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, I Precis 229 No. 478; BINET on Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 5,
19I3) D.I9I4.I.28I. To contrary effect, e.g., the Belgian Rb. Antwerp (Oct.
28, I939) Rechtsk. Wkbl. 889 no. I46, declares that a non-recorded religious
marriage between Polish Jews in Warsaw is non-existent and does not produce the protection under C. C. art. 20I.
58 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) arts. 117, 118 identical with French C. C.
arts. 20I, 202.
54 C. C. Lower Canada: arts. I63, I64.
55 See on the law of Chile, with comparative notes, R. M. ECHAVARRfA,
"Apuntes sobre el matrimonio putativo y Ia bigamia," 34 Rivista Der. Jur. y
Ciencias Soc. (I937) part I, 37·
56 Stephens v. Falchi (Queb. K. B.) [I937] 3 D. L. R. 6os, aff'd by Sup. Ct.
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Montreal and divorced in a French court. The woman then
married in Paris an Italian, Falchi, who was domiciled in
Italy. A marriage settlement was expressly made subject to
Italian law. The Stephens divorce was invalid under the law
of Quebec (and, hence, also in Italy). Therefore, the second
marriage was "annullable." 57 Suppose it was annulled.
Should the provisions of the French, the Italian, or the Quebec statutes be applied to determine whether the second husband married in good faith, and whether he could sue for the
usufruct arising from the settlement?
Are there no such questions in the common law countries?
In England, in fact, there are none, since an annulment of a
marriage seems to annihilate all its effects. The courts of
many of the states of the United States, however, have the
power, by or without a statute, to grant alimony or compensation in the decree of annulment and to dispose of the property of the spouses "as in divorce." 58 It has probably never
been doubted that such powers are to be exercised exclusively
in accordance with the rules of the forum, even when the
voidness of the marriage was based on the fact that the parties had gone through a formally defective marriage ceremony in Louisiana or that one of them had been incapable of
marrying as a domiciliary of Louisiana.
In both England and the United States, however, problems of conflicts law have arisen with respect to the legitimacy of children born of void marriages. 59
On the effects which a putative marriage exercises on the
personal rights and duties of husband and wife, the following
of Canada [1938] S. C. R. 354; cf. LEE, 21 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1939) 28,
supra n. 52.
5 7 Because the marriage never was annulled, the court awarded the usufruct flowing from the marriage settlement according to Italian law, upon a
complete, though unconvincing, reasoning under the French law of the place
of celebration. It is not clear why the doctrine of putative marriage is also
mentioned.
58 See I VERNIER §53·
59 See infra n. 73·
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theories have been advanced by writers and adopted by
courts on the Continent and especially in France:
(a) The personal law should govern, a theory that comprises several propositions:
(i) If both parties are nationals of the forum, the law of
the forum should be applied under all circumstances. 60 The
same should be done, if the personal law of both spouses
contains rules approximately similar to the lex fori. 61
(ii) In mixed marriages, the old rule that the law of the
husband governs the personal marital relations has been extended to questions of what effects of marriage survive an
annulment. 62 ·
{iii) According to another opinion, where one party is a
French national, this party should always enjoy the farreaching benefit of the French Civil Code, article 299. 63 In
a generalized and now widely adopted version, a party having married in good faith enjoys the benefit which may be
granted to him by his nationallaw. 64
(b) Some courts have applied the law of the forum "for

°

6 Cass. (civ.) (March 25, I889) Clunet I889, 642 and other decisions; see
VALERY I076 no. 750.
61 App. Alger (June 28, 1887) Clunet I889, 6I6; Trib. civ. Seine (June
I6, I906) Clunet I907, I42; App. Agen (July 29, I936) Revue Crit. I937,
72I.
62
App. Alger (May 26, I879) D.I88o.2.I6I; App. Orleans (Jan. 10, I894)
Clunet I894, 536; Cour Paris (Aug. 3, I898) Clunet I898, I08o; Cour Paris
(Feb. I5, I950) Clunet I95I, I90; PILLET, I Traite 566 no. 268; NmoYET 737 no. 627; CUNHA GoNc;ALVES, 1 Dire ito Civil 687. Contra: 2 ARMINJON 460 reproaches the writers that they forget that the existence of a marriage is precisely in question. But see the text against this pseudo-logic.
BATIFFOL, Traite no. 447, pleads for the personal law of each spouse.
63
VALERY I076 no. 750; AumNET, Clunet 1930, 322; NIBOYET, Revue Crit.
I934. I34 and 5 Traite 335 n. I (d), 366.
64
WAHL, Note to Cass. (civ.) (July 30, I9oo) S.I902.1.225; cf. App. Alger
(May 26, I879) S.I879.2.28I; Trib. civ. Seine (May 11, I933) Revue Crit.
I934, I29; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Revue Crit. I938, 84 (expressly against the lex fori and the lex loci celebrationis and for the personal law); BARTIN, 2 Principes 2I2 § 29I; LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 358 DO.
333; in Italy, FEDOZZI 455·
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(c) A theory allegedly flowing from general principles,
and for this reason preferred by recent German writers, considers that the law violated by the attempted marriage is
the naturally competent law to determine what legal effects
are left to the apparent conclusion of the marriage. 67
As a matter of fact, the French courts have always found
a ground for applying the French provision in favor of a
French party, unless his or her bad faith was proved or both
parties had fraudulently evaded the French marriage requirements, in which case good faith was considered absent. 68
This practice involves exaggerated protection of nationals
and is a measurably excessive extension of public policy to an
ordinary rule of private law, as Batiffol has pointed out. 69
6 5 App. Aix (Feb. 13, 1912) Clunet 1913, 1229; Trib. civ. Tunis (June 14,
1906) Clunet 1907, 439; and a general trend described by BATIFFOL, Revue
1937. 433·
66 Trib. civ. Seine (June 28, 1913) Clunet 1916, 170; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan.
10, 1912) Clunet 1916, 178; Cour Paris (Nov. 12, 1913) Clunet 1916, 178;
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, 1937) Revue Crit. 1937, 650 (Orthodox Serb and
French woman married in Serbia by Catholic priest; on the lack of motivation see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432); Cour Paris (March 30, 1938)
Revue Crit. 1939, II9 (Italian wife, later of French nationality).
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (July 7, 1932) 19 Bull. Inst. Beige (1933)
174 (lack of consent by the English father of the bride).
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 12, 1933) 28 Arch. Jud. 456 in the case of a
Brazilian woman separated by judicial decree, marrying in New York an
Englishman, held that she and her issue were not entitled to any rights of
putative marriage, because she must have known her disability to remarry
(this result could be reached in several ways). An analogous case of a Brazilian woman was decided to the same effect by Trib. civ. Seine (June 28,
1913) Clunet 1916, 170.
67 CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 56; 2 ARMINJON 46o; AUDINET, II RecueiJ 1926 I 175 at 210 and in Clunet 1930, 322; Cass. (civ.) (July 30, 1900)
D.1901.1.317, S.1902.1.225.
Germany: KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht ( 1928) § 39 A III at 144, and M.
WOLFF, IPR. 196; RAAPE 339, 451; rejected by the Reichsgericht (Nov. II,
1937) JW. 1938, 108 infra n. 73·
68 Cour Paris (Aug. 3, 1898) Clunet 1898, 1080.
69 BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432. To the opposite effect, § 1344 of the
German BGB. is believed of public order by RAAPE 340; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 55; M. WoLFF, IPR. 197·
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A suitable theory may perhaps be derived from the opinion described under (a), ( ii), referring to the law of the
husband. We should, however, consider on the one hand that
the conflicts rules by no means have to be identical for personal relations between husband and wife (maintenance,
name of the wife, alimony), property relations, custody of
children, and succession on death. 70 On the other hand, the
protection which the French, German, Swiss, and other systems in varying degree grant to an innocent pseudo-spouse
should be technically construed as a residuum from the
parties' attempted marriage, some shelter left in the ruins
of the house. The benefit to that party is not so much an
effect of the violation of prescriptions, as suggested in connection with the opinion under (c) , as it is an effect of the
marriage despite its "nullity." We may observe generally
that what in legal terminology is called void may nevertheless have some effects. Such rudimentary consequences, however, must lie within the framework of the normal effects
which the transaction would have had if it had been valid. 71
Hence, it is submitted that all relations between the parties
should be determined by the law that would have been applied to the respective kind of relation, had the marriage
been valid. 12 Consequently, in common law countries the
personal relations of the parties should be treated according
to the law of the domicil on the ground of which jurisdiction
has been assumed. Suppose a party to a marriage celebrated
in Louisiana was under age and the marriage therefore void,
10 See 2 ZITELMANN 751 and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 217 (not one but several different "statutes"). But for property relations, the latter (3 FRANKENSTEIN
396), like his adversary, RAAPE, 340, applies a separate personal law of the
wife in contradiction to the German Code, EG. art. 15.
71 See my construction of "damages from reliance": RABEL, "Der sogen.
Vertrauensschaden im schwei2erischen Recht," 27 Z. Schweiz. R., N. F. (1908)
291 ff.
12 This suggestion seems to agree with some remarks of DIENA, 2 Prine. 156
and UDINA, Elementi 180 n. 130.
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either because the party was domiciled at the time in Louisiana or because of the law of his or her domicil applied by
Louisiana according to its domiciliary principle. The personal relations of the parties have to be treated without
regard to the Louisiana doctrine of putative marriage, if the
marriage is annulled in a common law state where the parties
are now domiciled. This solution agrees with the result of a
lex fori theory but is based upon the lex domicilii as governing the personal effects of marriage. With respect to movables, the law obtaining at the domicil when the movables
were acquired governs, as it would if the marriage were
valid, in favor of the party acting in good faith, et cetera.
The status of children born of void marriages must certainly be treated under the law governing legitimacy 73 ( unless a special rule is devised as in the C6digo Bustamante), 14
and the share which a pseudo-spouse may be allotted in the
distribution of assets of the other party is governed by the
rules on inheritance/ 5 Whether an innocent wife may also
acquire the nationality of the husband by a putative marriage
is a matter of public law; in France, the question is now
73The United States: Restatement§ 137 and comment; Moore v. Saxton
(1916) 90 Conn. 164, 96 Atl. 96o; Green v. Kelley (1917) 228 Mass. 6o2,
118 N. E. 235; McNamara v. McNamara (1922) 303 Ill. 191, 135 N. E. 410.
Cf. on the statutory provisions declaring legitimate the issue of prohibited
marriages I VERNIER § 48 j 4 ibid. § 247·
England: The rule would be the same if Shaw v. Gould (In re Wilson's
Trusts) (1865) L. R. I Eq. 247 had not partly disturbed the doctrine;
CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 387 asks for overruling and FosTER, "Some Defects in the
English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84,
89 for a reform law.
Germany: RG. (Nov. II, 1937) ]W. 1938, xo8 (against RAAPE 451); KG.
(July 9, 1937) JW. 1937, 2526, Clunet 1938, 341; also KG. (Dec. 9, 1921)
42 ROLG. 97i KG. (Feb. 27, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 83: they apply the law
governing filiation, i.e., EG. arts. 18 and 19.
Contra France (law of the husband): Cour Paris (Feb. 15, 1950) Clunet
1951, 190; Trib. civil Seine (March 31, 1952) Revue Crit. 1952, 330.
74 C6digo Bustamante art. 49 as compared with art. 57·
75 See supra p. 404.
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expressly negatived against the former apparently prevailing
opinion which included it in the "civil effects" of marriage/ 6
2.

Protection of Third Parties

Under a probably general American rule, a man is liable
for necessaries furnished to a wife to whom he is not legally
married, if he lived with her and held her out to the world
as his wife. 77 The conflicts rule on necessaries, as stated in
section 459 of the Restatement, recognizes an implied authorization by the husband, either as part of the law of the
man's domicil or under circumstances defined by the law
of the state where the necessaries are furnished. Is this rule
applicable also if the man is not a husband legally? No
reason seems to exist why the answer should not be in the
affirmative.
A related question was prompted by the provision of the
German Civil Code protecting a third person who has entered into a transaction with, or obtained a judgment against,
a spouse of a void marriage. The nullity cannot be set up to
defeat his rights, if it was not pronounced in a judgment and
was unknown to him ( BGB. § 1344, German Marriage Law
of 1946, § 27). It has been suggested in Germany that this
domestic provision be extended by analogy to international
situations, i.e., where German spouses have celebrated an
invalid marriage abroad and live in the forum, or foreign
spouses whose marriage is void under their national law are
domiciled in the forum. 78 Third parties should be protected
against the effects of a nullity not stated in a judgment and
unknown to them.
76
Code de Ia nationalite (1945) arts. 42, 43· As to the former view see App.
Douai (April I, 1936) D.1936.2.70, with note by RouAsT; Revue Crit. 1937,
75, with note by CALEB at 78; see also VALERY 237 no. zoo; NIBOYET 194
no. 147; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 3) 124 no. 104.
77
Frank v. Carter (1916) 219 N.Y. 35, 113 N. E. 549; Jordan Marsh Co.
v. Hedtler (1921) 238 Mass. 43, 130 N. E. 78.
78 M. WoLFF, IPR. 197.
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15

Parent and Child

1

l.. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
r. Subject Matter
TER dealing with marriage and divorce rules,
American case books on conflict law and the Restatement finish the chapter on family or status law
with the four topics of legitimacy, adoption, custodianship
of parents, and guardianship. We shall see, as we have seen
in considering the subject of marriage relations, that the
relationships created by legitimate birth, legitimation, and
adoption have a broader scope in the civil than in the common law. For instance, under the civil law, support is an
important incident of legitimate as well as of illegitimate relationship and is governed in principle by the personal law,
while in the Restatement it is treated separately and left to
the law of the forum. To do justice to all legislations, we
have to divide the matter into smaller topics, viz., in the first
place, ( i) legitimate birth, ( ii) legitimation, (iii) rights and
duties of legitimate parents, ( iv) adoption, and ( v) illegitimacy. On the other hand, custodianship, which in the common law is the inclusive and essentially homogeneous repository of all rules concerning infants, must, for the purposes
of our survey, be subdivided into two different parts. Family

X

1 Among the special articles on the subject reference will be made more
particularly to RAAPE, "Rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," 50 Recueil 1934 IV 405, and to TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy, and Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 589, 691.
For a comparative survey of the municipal laws, see VEITH, Kindschaftsrecht, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. 770; for materials, vols. x and 2 of
BERGMANN'S work.
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law principles are embodied in the rules that determine the
rights and duties of parents as such, while the constitution of
other guardians and the management and supervision of the
estate of a child or any other ward may be better treated in
connection with the administration of other estates. Our discussion, therefore, will be limited to the matters more closely
allied with the special consideration of family law.
The existing written conflict rules differ, as in other respects, also with respect to their subject matter. While, for
instance, the recent Italian code contains one provision on
the relationship between parent and child, 2 the German Introductory Law 3 has different provisions relating to ( 1)
legitimacy as the origin of legitimate relationships, ( 2) the
relationship between parents and a legitimate child, (3) the
relationship between an illegitimate child and his mother,
( 4) the duties of support of the illegitimate father, ( 5) legitimation and adoption, and ( 6) custodianship of all kinds.
And, whereas Germany treats legitimation and adoption
together, 4 Poland joins legitimation and recognition, 5 Switzerland legitimation, recognition, and adoption, 6 and the
C6digo Bustamante/ as well as the recent Greek code, 8 have
one rule on legitimation alone.
2.

Institutions Involving an Act of a Party

(a) In some statutes of this country, the term adoption
is given to the institution otherwise known as legitimation
by voluntary declaration. Moreover, legitimation in the
proper sense is often confused with the qualified recognition
2 C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I.
EG. arts. 18-23.
4 EG. art. 22.
5 Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 22;
1918, art. 13; Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18.
3

6
7
8

NAG. art. 8.
Arts. 6o-62.
C. C. ( 1940) art. 22.

cf.

China: Law of
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by a parent through which an illegitimate child obtains an
ameliorated position, although remaining illegitimate. Also,
in some other countries, the terminology oscillates. In fact,
there are in this field many institutions of mixed character
existing in the world. For the purpose of the law of conflicts,
however, it is of primary importance to distinguish the following groups of institutions:
(i) Acts through which an illegitimate child receives the
full status of legitimacy (legitimation in the ordinary sense).
(ii) Acknowledgment of paternity or maternity whereby
(as by certain other circumstances) an illegitimate child may
receive an improved position without reaching the full position of a legitimate child. This group includes very different
degrees of position. The child may be assimilated to a legitimate child in most respects, or it may, on the contrary, be
granted only particular prerogatives, as under those numerous statutes of the United States which confer nothing but
rights of inheritance upon a recognized child. 9
(iii) Recognition as a condition for any effect of illegitimate filiation as required in the French and in the other legislations following the French system.
( iv) Institutions of a still more restricted nature such as
the faculty of the husband to give his name to an illegitimate
child of his wife under Austrian and German laws. 10
(b) The broad distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children is considered fundamental, legally as well as
socially, except in a few countries. It would seem natural,
therefore, that the same conflicts rules should govern legitimacy by birth, legitimation, and adoption, insofar as by
these institutions the full degree of legitimacy is reached.
9
See, for instance, Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (2d) 464; cf. Note, 29
Mich. L. Rev. (1930) 258.
10
Austria: Allg. BGB. § 165 par. 2; Germany: BGB. § 1706 par. 2; see
infra p. 656, n. u.
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On the other hand, we can understand that conflict rules with
respect to illegitimacy are different from those governing
legitimacy by birth. However, existing rules do not altogether agree with these simple distinctions.
(c) Recognition of foreign institutions has been strongly
influenced by some aprioristic doctrines :
(i) The influential English doctrine that a status unknown to the forum cannot be recognized has considerably
impeded the progress of reciprocal recognition of institutions
regarding parent and child. As stated in our general discussion in Chapter 5, the hope is justified that this doctrine
may be cunsidered overruled. 11
( ii) American courts are inclined to recognize foreign
acts but to give them the same effect as ascribed to the most
nearly related domestic institutions. This doctrine is preferable to the English rule just mentioned, but it too is unsatisfactory. By such an approach, e.g., a child, illegitimate
abroad, has been treated as legitimate at the forum for
purposes of inheritance.
(iii) The idea mentioned under ( ii), inexact in application to illegitimacy, is perfectly right with respect to legitimacy. In the various countries, the status of legitimate
children, though qualified by different minor features, is regulated in an essentially similar manner so far as the personal
relations between parent and child are concerned. Hence,
recognition of a foreign created legitimacy means that a
child born or legitimated or adopted in one country will be
treated as legitimate in another, with the incidents determined by the law of the forum. This means also that, if the
domicil or the nationality determinative of personal status is
changed, the rights of legitimate parents and children are
transformed accordingly. This mutability of parental rela11

Supra pp. 188-193·
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tions is a phenomenon that has only begun to attract some
attention. 12
3· Liberal Trends
Recently, some well-meaning courts and writers have tried
to counteract the narrowness of traditional doctrines. Thus,
it has been postulated that the personal law of the child
should govern rather than that of the parent, 13 or that public
policy should override any conflicts rule referring to a foreign law less favorable to legitimacy than the domestic law. 14
But the advantage of the child can only be secured by a conflicts rule that directly refers to that law most favorable to
the child in each particular case. Conflicts rules formulated
in this manner 15 have proved to be of difficult application in
German law. 16 Moreover, consideration of family policy
should be left to substantive legislation, except in a very restricted domain of public policy, where courts consider
foreign bastardy statutes as plainly backward and a disgrace
to the law.

II.

LEGITIMATE BIRTH
A. RULES

I.

Personal Law of the Parent

Common law and civil law agree in submitting the question of birth in lawful wedlock to the personal law of the
parent. The tests are domicil or nationality respectively.
American law, however, disagrees with all others by the
distinctly proclaimed principle of determining the child's
12 RAAPE 464 III I. Application to English law has been attempted by
MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law
Q. Rev. (I94I) IIZ, 126.
13 See infra p. 604HTAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 700, 70I, supra n. I,' cf. ibid. 7I5.
15 Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. 2I par. 2.
16 See RAAPE 211 ff., 359 ff. on EG. arts. I2, 16, par. 2.
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legitimate relationship to each parent separately.17 In fact,
such an equal position of men and women, although apt to
create complicated situations with respect to the child, may
be considered fair to all parties. In other countries, however,
the law of the male parent is applied to determine the legitimate relationship also between mother and child in order
to maintain the unity of the family and particularly in view
of the consequences for the nationality of the issue.
The head of the family whose law governs legitimacy is,
in the German law, correctly characterized as "the husband
of the mother." To say that legitimacy is predicated on the
personal law of the "child's father" is a tautology that has
caused confusion to English writers. 18
Hence, under American law, if the parents are domiciled
in different states at the time of the birth of the child, the
law of each party's domicil decides his relationship to the
child. Where, for instance, the marriage of the parents is
recognized as valid in Iowa and considered invalid in New
York, the child is legitimate as to the mother, domiciled in
the first state, and illegitimate as to the father, domiciled in
the second state. Under English law, the child would be illegitimate with regard to both parents.
Contacts: domicil or nationality. The domicil of the father
or mother is the test in the United States. The domicil of the
father, as head of the family, is the test in England and the
other countries generally following the domiciliary principle.19
Restatement § 137, cf. ibid. § 138.
(ed. 2) 380, caught in that tautology which he believes to be
a "theory," feels compelled to state that "practicability must not be sacrificed
to theory"; see now CHESHIRE 395·
19 England: CHESHIRE 393, 395·
Argentina: 2 Vrco no. 140.
Denmark: BoRuM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 220 no. 52; BoRuM 125. lZ)stre
Landsret (June 14, 1949) 20 Z.ausl.PR. (1955) 514.
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. VI ( 9).
The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law starts pronouncing
17

18 CHESHIRE
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Nationality of the mother's husband is decisive almost
everywhere in the rest of the world. 20 The personal law has
to govern because the stability of the family, the honor of
the married woman, and her marital rights stand upon this
matter. 21 An exorbitant exception in favor of the lex fori is
made by a National Socialist law of 1938 that extends the
application of the German laws to the contestation of legitimacy in the case where only the mother is of German nationality at a certain date. 22
Renvoi is applied according to general rules. 23
in art. I6, unchanged by the text of I940, art. 20, that "the law that governs
the celebration of the marriage determines legitimate birth and the legitimation by subsequent marriage." However, the next section (art. I7, text of
I940: art. 2I) submits "the questions of legitimacy other than those concerning the validity or nullity of the marriage" to the domiciliary law. This
means probably that art. I6 is corrected by art. I7; the special rule on marriage, as in the other countries, governs only the question whether the marriage, or subsequent marriage, is valid. This seems to be the opinion of 2
VIco, no. I74· But why has art. I6 not been cancelled at least in I940?
20 Austria: Decree of Oct. IS, I94I, § 9; WALKER 782 n. II (the Austrian
law of parent and child has stayed in force).
Belgium: POULLET 46I no. 387.
Belgian Congo: C. C. (1895) book I, art. I2.
Czechoslovakia: Law of March II, I948, s. 20.
Finland: Law of I929, § I8.
France: prevailing opinion; cf. BATIFFOL, Traite 532. Contra: Cour Paris
(June 21, I955) Revue Crit. I955, 529 (common domicil of the spouses).
Germany: EG. art. I8.
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. I7 par. I.
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § I7 (with reservation in favor of
children with Hungarian domicil or nationality).
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. 1.
Switzerland: NAG. arts 8 and 32 (for Swiss domiciliaries).
China: Law of 19I8, art. I2.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 17.
Siam: Law of March IO, I939, on private international law, § 29.
Treaties: H ungarian-Czechoslovakian Treaty on Judicial Assistance of
March 6, 1951, § 23, and the parallel Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty of August
8, I953, § 24, see DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. ( I956) 487, 492.
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. I8.
Sweden: H. D. (Jan. 27, 1953) 22 Z.ausi.PR. (I957) 287.
21 LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 375 no. 346.
22 Cf. EG. art. 18 par. 2, added by art. 2 § 8 of the Law of April I2, I938,
to modify and complete family law provisions and on the condition of apatrides (RGBI. I, 38o).
23
Germany: RAAPE 487 whose illustration however is questionable; M.
WoLFF, IPR. 216 no. 6.
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Personal Law of the Child

The personal law of the child has been advocated by a few
writers/ 4 although sparsely applied in actuallaws. 25 According to this opinion, it would be material in this country
whether the child's domicil at birth is with the father or the
mother. 26 In a country following the principle of nationality,
the child's national law cannot be found without knowing
whether it is legitimate; thus nationality would depend upon
legitimacy, and this again upon nationality. Such a vicious
circle, it is true, may be avoided by legislation on nationality
whereby the child acquires a nationality of its own on the
ground of jus soli or a temporary nationality which may
suffice for provisional legal situations. It must be conceded,
furthermore, that the traditional system based on nationality
is weakened to the extent that separate nationality of wife
and child has been recognized. But the idea of applying the
child's law instead of that of the parent seems to come
simply from the desire to employ in the forum of the child
once more the law of the forum. 27 It is still the dominant
opinion that the child's domicil or nationality is perfectly
immaterial, 28 the reason still proclaimed being that the existence and unity of the family is at stake. 29
Indeed, if the state of the child's domicil is said to have a
24 France: WEISS, 4 Traite 27; AuniNET no. 625, see contra: SuRVILLE 447
no. 305; DUGUIT, Clunet, 1885, 353 1 359; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910,
57, 61.
Belgium: see RoLIN, 2 Principes 137 no. 613; Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ.
618 no. 581.
25 C6digo Bustamante art. 57· Art. 8 sentence 2 of the French law of July
24, 1921 concerning the conflicts law of Alsace-Lorraine, refers to the law of
the child the "proof of filiation," whatever that means. Two decisions of the
court of Bucharest to this effect, conflicting with others, are cited by PLASTARA,
7 Repert. 68 no. 198.
26 TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) at 597, supra n. I; cf. ibid. 602.
27 See, e.g., LEREBOUR5--PIGEONNIERE 378 no. 349 (B).
28 Germany: unanimous opinion, see RAAPE 447; Bay. ObLG. (March 22,
1924) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56.
Switzerland: BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE. I 230.
29 DIENA, 2 Prine. 179; RAAPE 447·
-
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concurrent interest in its status, 30 this interest is negligible
compared with the interest of the family. Moreover, the
interests of the child are not, and certainly should not be,
more protected by the court of his domicil than by any other.
And the law of his domicil may as well be unfavorable to the
child as favorable.
3· Time Governing Ascertainment of Applicable Law
The decisive and natural time for determining the applicable law is considered to be the moment when the child is
born. In the German and other enactments, it is added that,
if the child is born after the death of the mother's husband,
the personal law of the husband at the time of his death
governs; 81 in a generalized version, the same rule applies in
the case of any dissolution of the marriage occurring before
birth. 32
It follows that the law determining whether a child is
legitimate is immutable; no change of status of parent or
child after this date alters the result. This is in sharp contrast to the fact that a voluntary change of status elected by
the husband before the child's birth may influence its legitimacy.
Precisely in view of this liberty of the father, occasionally
the decisive time has been assumed to be that of the conception rather than that of the birth,S 3 a solution generally held
30

TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 603, supra n. 1.
Germany: EG. art. 18.
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 18 par. 2.
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, § 20.
China: Law of 1918, art. 12, 2nd sentence.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 17, 2nd sentence.
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § 29 par. 2.
Treaties: see the provisions cited supra n. 20.
82 Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 17 par. 2, in agreement with the German interpretation of EG. art. 18; cf. RAAPE 449·
83
Denmark: App. Copenhagen (July 17, 1916) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 866
no. 7· SURVILLE 447 no. 305 advocates a fiction of earlier birth where it would
be more favorable to the child; RAAPE 448 would like an exception to the rule
in the case of a fraudulent change of nationality.
31
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impractical, because birth can be ascertained much more
easily than conception. 34 But an American author 85 has
recently suggested that "the rule should be stated in terms
of the creation of legitimacy by the law of the domicile of
the parents either at conception or birth of the child." He
thinks that the writers and the courts have been wrong in
regarding only the time of birth or have overlooked the
possibility of the parents' change of domicil between conception and birth of the child. Yet, no mistake has occurred in
the formation of the rules. The purpose of conflicts law is
not the same as that of substantive private laws. These may
consider a child born during the time of wedlock as legitimate (as common law does) or declare a child en ventre sa
mere as already born inasmuch as this fiction is advantageous
to the child (as Roman law does). Conflicts law refers to
one legislation and leaves it to this legislation whether to go
back from birth to conception. The suggested terms would
essentially modify the rule; this seems inadvisable, if for no
other reason than because of the wide uniformity already
reached. Moreover, the law of the time of birth has been
adopted in the different legislations, because this is a fact
that can be ascertained without any fiction.
4· Soviet Russia and Other Socialist Countries
The law of Soviet Russia and other socialist countries
knows only one category of parent-child relations: it does
not admit any difference between legitimate and illegitimate
children. 86 How, therefore, ought we to classify in a Western
court children whose parents were domiciled in or nationals
of these countries? Are they to be regarded without distinc34

ScHNITZER 430, concerning Swiss law.
TAINTOR, IS Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at S97, supra n. I.
RSFSR Code of family law ( I926) art. 2S; Chinese Marriage Law of
April IS, 19SO, art. IS (16 Z.ausl.PR. (19SO/S1) IZ3) j SCHMIED, "Das
Familienrecht der Volksdemokratien," 17 Z.ausl.PR. (1953) 227-243, 239 ff.
B5
86
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tion as legitimate or illegitimate? 37 The second answer is
absurd, and, since these laws intend to abolish the category
of illegitimate children, the solution must be the same as in
the case of the statute of Arizona which declares all children
the legitimate offspring of their natural parents. 38 In the
latter case, indeed, there is no doubt regarding the effects
in a foreign court.
B. SCOPE OF THE RULES
I.

Validity of Marriage as Condition

The first condition for legitimacy by birth is normally a
valid marriage between the mother and the man alleged to
be the father. Validity of the marriage, therefore, is a "preliminary question" in examining legitimacy according to the
law governing lawful birth. But this law does not extend to
the validity of the marriage. It is universally agreed that
the law governing the formal and the intrinsic validity of
marriage according to the rules discussed above in Chapters 7 and 8 are applicable also to this question. Even the
writers who regularly assign preliminary questions to the law
governing the principal question agree that marriage is always, without exception, tested according to its own particular rule of conflicts. 39
A remarkable consequence occurs where a foreign marriage is regarded as valid under the main conflicts rule of the
forum. Children born of such a marriage are considered
legitimate, even if the personal law of the parents at the time
of the birth considers the marriage invalid. 4 ° For illustration,
37 The question has been discussed with reference to legitimation by the
writers cited infra p. 621, ns. II3, II4.
as Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §27-4.ox; see comment in Fladung v. Sanford
(1938) 51 Ariz. 2II, 75 P. (2d) 685; Hazelett v. State (1940) 55 Ariz. 141,
99 P. (2d) 101.
39 MELCHIOR 259 § 173; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 148, 206 (with
different explanations).
40 WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 148, 214.
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if two Greeks, being of Orthodox faith and domiciled in
Greece at the birth of a child, had gone through a temporal
marriage ceremony in Paris, the marriage, though considered invalid in Greece, is recognized as valid in most countries; in the latter countries, the children must, therefore, be
considered legitimate, provided that they would be so under
Greek family law if the marriage had been celebrated by a
Greek Orthodox priest.
There are complications also on the opposite side of the
problem. The forum may regard a marriage as invalid either
in accordance with the law governing marriage, for instance
because formalities are lacking, 41 or despite this law for
reasons of public policy respecting polygamy, incest, or
adultery. We might well question the wisdom of holding a
Chinese marriage of Chinese domiciled persons invalid for
local purposes as being polygamous; but if we do so, the
marriage cannot be regarded as valid for the purpose of
personal relations. Even if the law governing legitimacy
(for instance the law of the parent's domicil at the time of
the birth) recognizes such a marriage, the special conflict
rules on marriage prevail. 41 a
The situation is different, of course, where the law governing the problem of legitimacy accords legitimacy without a
valid marriage. 42 This situation will be considered later. 43
41 A religious ceremony without civil marriage is non-existent in Germany,
under EG. art. 13 par. 3• Is the father's national law recognizing the marriage applicable to the parental relations? No: OLG. Miinchen (March 10,
1921) 42 ROLG. 98; Yes: KG. (July 9, 1937) HRR 1937 no. 1446.
4la Contra numerous cases:
England: In re Bischoffsheim [1948] Ch. 79, 92 (legitimacy of child governed by the Ia w of the domicil of his parents at his birth irrespective of the
original invalidity of their marriage).
Austria: OGH. (Oct. 25, 1952) 25 SZ. (1952) no. 285, Revue Crit. 1955,
no {child of consular marriage, invalid in Austria, valid under Bulgarian
law, legitimate).
Germany: see infra n. n7.
42 For this reason only, the criticism by 1 FRANKENSTEIN 236 on the decision of OLG. Miinchen (supra n. 41) is justified.
43 See infra pp. 610 ff.
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Presumptions of Legitimacy

The well-known presumptions for establishing birth in
lawful wedlock, which form the main body of the municipal
regulations of legitimacy, are not mere rules of evidence;
they are substantive law. 44 This may safely be alleged with
respect to any present legislation and seems to be acknowledged almost everywhere. Hence, the law applicable to legitimacy governs the questions at what time, and under what
circumstances, the presumption of legitimate birth arises, on
what ground the presumption may be rebutted/ 5 within what
period, by whom, 46 and against whom, legitimacy may be
contested or action for a declaratory statement denying
legitimacy may be brought; what events terminate the right
to disown the child, whether alleged recognition of paternity
may be revoked, under what conditions and in what time/ 7
and similar problems. In particular, European courts apply
the provision of a foreign personal law to determine the time
within which an action for contesting paternity must be
brought; for instance, an Austrian 48 or a Swiss 49 husband is
given a period of three months for this action.
H France: WEISS, 4 Traite 25; LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 375 no. 347 j BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 4I2 no. 52.
Germany: RAAPE 460 j 4 FRANKENSTEIN 22.
Quebec: Lefebvre v. Digman (I894) 3 Rev. de Jur. I94 and others; see
I }OHNSON 339·
45
E.g., OLG. Miinchen (May I5, 1933) 29 Z.Rechtspflege Bayern (I933)
278; 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. I35 no. 48 (the Austrian law of father allows proof
of the impossibility of cohabitation, even though he was at the same place as
the mother).
46
E.g., Swiss BG. (June zo, I923) 49 BGE. II 317 (children born in Switzerland during the formal existence of their mother's marriage with a German are not entitled to contest their legitimacy, according to the German law
of the time).
47 One year in Germany (BGB. § 1594 par. I) ; one or two months in
Louisiana (Rev. Civ. C. Ann. ( 1932) art. I91) ; one month in Turkey (C. C.
of Feb. I7, 1926, art. 242) ; etc.
48 Austria: Allg. BGB. § I 58; RG. (Jan. I2, I939) HRR. I939, no. 376 (4) ;
OLG. Naumburg (Dec. 3, 1936) HRR. I937, no. II46.
49 Swiss C. C. art. 253; LG. Mainz (June 6, I926) 4I Z.int.R. (1929) 4I5,
IPRspr. 1929, no. So. See also KG. (Feb. 28, 193I) JW. 1932, 2296, IPRspr.
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3. Public Policy
Public policy is not interested in regard to the problems
just mentioned.
However, as usual, French courts reserve many provisions
of their code for imperative application, irrespective of the
nationality of the parties. This is done, for instance, with
that French rule, which exists also in Louisiana/ 0 that a husband is not allowed to disown a child by alleging and proving
his own impotence; such a source of scandal must be closed,
the French courts think. 51
C. CHILDREN OF INVALID MARRIAGES

(a) United States: general rule. Many statutes in the
United States legitimize the issue of certain or of all prohibited marriages. 5 2 Marriage, in this case, is not a condition
precedent to legitimacy. The comments on these statutory
provisions have made it perfe_ctly clear that legitimacy is not
an incident of marriage, but an independent subject. Hence,
the law of the domicil of the parents, whose relationship to
the child is in question at the time of birth, determines legitimacy or illegitimacy. 53 It is the same conflicts rule as though
the marriage were valid.
I932, no. 89 (father a national of the former Kingdom of Poland). Trib. civ.
Bruxelles (April 28, I9IO) Pasicrisie I9IO. III. I95· Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Feb.
6, I9I4) Clunet I9I4, 993 (Bavarian, became father in I893). Contra: OLG.
Frankfurt (Dec. 3-I7, I925) JW. I926, 2858, IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 77·
SOLa: Rev. Civ. Code Ann. (I932) art. I85.
51 Even in France: WEiss, 4 Traite 23; PouLLET 460 no. 386. Many French
decisions deal with the form necessary for foreign documents of birth, see
]. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 385.
52 See I VERNIER § 48, 4 VERNIER § 247·
53 Restatement § I37 and comment. Moore v. Saxton (I9I6) 90 Conn. I64,
96 At!. 960 (bigamous marriage, birth in California); Green v. Kelley (I9I7)
228 Mass. 6o2, uS N. E. 235 (bigamy); Harding v. Townsend (I932) 280
Mass. 256, I82 N. E. 369 (bigamy); apart from the special rules of New
York (discussed belo·w on p. 612) exceptions for public policy are rare; see
Greenhaw et a!. v. James, Executor (I885) So Va. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 603
(miscegenous marriage).
As to polygamy see TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o) at 594, 7II supra
n. I.
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Sometimes this conflicts solution has been explained as
due to the policy of favoring the innocent issue, 64 which
naturally forms the reason of the statutory provisions. This
is an erroneous transplantation of social purposes from the
substantive law into international private law. The law of
the domicil of the parents applicable under our rule may be
decidedly more favorable to the child than the law governing the marriage.
(b) England. The rule is the same in England with the
exception that the House of Lords' decision in Shaw v.
Gould 55 has disturbed the problem in the case where a child
is born to a marriage not recognized in England, because a
previous divorce of one parent is not recognized there. In
the case mentioned, the child was declared illegitimate, although the father was domiciled in Scotland at the time of
the birth and Scotch law had no objection to legitimacy. This
decision has been sharply disapproved by recent English
writers. In their opinion, the court should have recognized
the legitimacy of the children under Scotch law, while appropriately refusing to recognize the validity of the marriage. Cheshire 56 suggests that the case should be overruled,
while Foster 57 thinks a statutory enactment is necessary.
Against this criticism, American writers have emphasized
the interest of the English law in the matter because of the
English domicil of the mother. 58 But under English as well
as generally under Continental conflicts rules, the child's
relations to both parents are governed by the personal law
of the father alone, that of the mother being entirely
immaterial.
H

n.

Cf. cases cited by TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o) at 595, 697, supra

I.
55 In

re Wilson's Trusts, Shaw v. Gould (I86s) L. R. I Eq. 247, aff'd I868
L. R. 3 H. L. 55·
56 CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 387.
57 FOSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (I935) 84, 89.
58 2 BEALE 706; TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 6oo, supra n. I.
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Also, New York courts have declined to recognize legitimacy under similar circumstances, viz., when, according to
the New York "special rule," a foreign divorce and, in consequence thereof, a remarriage was invalid and the child was
born during the second marriage. 59 This evidently must be
taken as a part of the general policy of New York courts
against marriages that are "polygamous, incestuous, or prohibited by law," 60 the New York courts resolving for themselves what marriages are to be so qualified. In the leading
case, Olmsted v. Olmsted, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided that by such an attitude the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was not violated, 61 but it remains uncertain
whether the independence of state doctrines would likewise
be maintained in cases other than those where inheritance of
real estate or a remainder under a will is at issue and only
immovables in the state are involved. 62 However this may
be, the peculiar policy of the courts of New York has been
severely and convincingly criticized, in particular with respect to a repetition of the doctrine in the Bruington case of
19 3 6 63 after the legislature of New York had begun to follow the trend of courts and statutes benevolent to children. 64
(c) Germany. The prevailing American rule has its exact
counterpart in the German practice. 65 The national law of
5 9 Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N. Y. 458, 467, 83 N. E. 569, 571, aff'd
216 U. S. 386, see infra n. 61 (bigamous subsequent marriage with following
divorce from first wife); In re Thomann's Estate (1932) 144 N.Y. Misc. 497,
258 N. Y. Supp. 838 (divorce not recognized in New York for lack of per-

sonal service, remarriage in Russia).
60 See In re Bruington's Estate (1936) 160 N.Y. Misc. 34 at 37, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 725 at 729 (children of bigamous marriage).
61 ( 1910) 216 u. s. 386.
62 See TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 691, 692, supra n. 1.
63 Supra n. 6o.
64 Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1049, 1054; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev.
( 1940) at 710, supra n. 1,
65 RG. (Nov. n, 1937) JW. 1938, 108; KG. (Dec. 9, 1921) 42 ROLG. 97;
KG. (Feb. 27, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 83; KG. (July 9, 1937) JW. 1937,
2526, Clunet 1938, 341.
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the pseudo-husband is applied in determining legitimacy,
whether this law acknowledges legitimacy irrespective of the
good faith of the parties 66 or conditionally upon the good
faith of one party (putative marriage) .61 The Reichsgericht
has expressly rejected the theory that the law governing the
nullity of the marriage should determine also whether or
not the children are to be considered legitimate. 5 8
(d) Other countries. The policy practiced in other countries probably runs along similar lines. French writers, it is
true, advocate again the exclusion of children born in adultery, from any recognized legitimacy, 69 but even this restriction is not certain. 70

Ill.

LEGITIMATION BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE

An old institution of civil law but unknown to the British
common law and expressly rejected by the Statute of Merton,
legitimation by the marriage of the child's natural parents,
has been introduced by statute in all but three jurisdictions
in this country, 11 in all of the common law provinces of
Canada during 1920 to 1928, 72 and in England by the
Legitimacy Act, 1926. 73
An important difference exists on the question whether in
addition to the marriage some recognition of the child is required. This requirement, in contrast to the German tradi66

E.g., Swiss C. C. art. I33·
E.g., French C. C. arts. 201, 202; Ita!. C. C. (1865) art. II6, C. C.
( 1942) art. 128; German BGB. § 1699.
68 RG. (Nov. II, I937) JW. 1938, 108 rejecting RAAPE 499·
69 See especially LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE 377 no. 348.
7 Compare the practice whereby the spouse in good faith and his or her
children of the bigamous marriage enjoy the benefit of putative marriage.
See supra pp. 587-593 and particularly Cour Paris (March 30, 1938) Nouv.
Revue 1938, 353·
71
4 VERNIER § 243·
72
I JoHNSON 344 n. I; for Ontario see Ontario Legitimation Act, 1921, II
Geo. V, c. 53, as amended 1927, Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. 187 s. I, same in Rev.
Stat. Ontario 1950, c. 203.
73 16 & I7 Geo. V, c. 6o.
67
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tion, exists in the Latin systems and in almost half of the
American statutes, a fact regretted by Vernier 74 as inconsistent with the purpose to improve the status of children
born out of wedlock. It ensues from this system that a child
may be considered legitimate only in relation to one parent.
Moreover, the French system takes into account which
parent is first to recognize the child.
A. RULES

Decisive Time

1.

English courts, starting from the thesis that legitimacy is
determined by the law of the child's domicil of origin, viz.,
his father's domicil at the time of his birth, regarded it es·
sential that this law recognize the possibility of legitimation
by a later marriage. 75 This artificial theory, already rejected
by Savigny/ 6 has been eradicated in England by the Legiti·
macy Act of 1926 77 but has nevertheless been adopted as a
common law rule by Beale 78 and the Restatement. 79 The
ancient basis for this rule, namely, that birth may give the
child a certain faculty to be legitimized, 80 appears in the
older English doctrine and also in Beale's theory in the form
of a supposed logical necessity that the child must have a
"potential legitimacy" by the law of the father's domicil.
Probably no American decision of actual importance reflects
this preconceived idea. 81 However, under the circumstances,
4 VERNIER § 243•
In re Wright's Trusts (I856) 2 K. & J. 595, 6o4; In re Goodman's Trusts
(1881) 17 Ch. D. 266; In re Andros (1883) 24 Ch. D. 637; In re Grove,
Vaucher v. Treasury Solicitor (I888) 40 Ch. D. 216. For history and criticism see MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law,"
57 Law Q. Rev. (1941) n2, II5-122.
76 SAVIGNY 338 § 380, tr. by GUTHRIE 302.
77 Legitimacy Act, I926 §I (1) for English and § 8 (I) for foreign domiciliaries.
78 2 BEALE 706-709 §§ 139.1 and 139.2.
79 Restatement § I37·
8 C/. SCHAEFFNER, Entwickelung des Internationalen Privatrechts (Frankfurt, 184I) 49 § 37, tr. in GuTHRIE's translation of SAVIGNY 308.
81 See cases in 73 A. L. R. 941, 952 ff. and cf. MINOR 216 ff.; Notes, 20 Harv.
74
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Scott, L. J ., in In re Luck ( 1940), 82 was justified in thinking
the theory to be connected with the American law, although
eliminated from the English. He stated:
"The very idea of attributing to a newly-born child, to a
filius nullius, a sort of latent capacity for legitimation at the
hands of the natural father to whom he is denied any legal
relation, seems to me an even more absurd legal fiction and
even less convincing than that mythical contract of marriage
supposed by the canonists to have been entered into at the
moment of procreation."
In England, 83 as well as in the United States, 84 it has become perfectly certain that, in the case of a subsequent marriage, the time when the child was born is of no importance.
Also in other legislations, although some provisions contain obscure elements, 85 as a rule the applicable law is simply
that of the time of legitimation. In some texts, this is emphasized with the express statement that the status of the parent
at the time of the conception and of the birth are immaterial.86 Such a statement corresponds in the broader field of
legitimacy in general with the idea that legitimacy is acquired
or denied by the law of the time when it originates, whether
by birth or by marriage or by decree or "any other cause," as
is the formula of the recent Finnish law. 87
We may take 'it that where, under the legislation thus
governing, an act of legitimation is void, it cannot be helped
L. Rev. (1907) 400; 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1051 n. 15; also STUMBI!RG 333334, although he surprisingly acknowledges the "logic of the English point
of view"; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 619, 62o, 628, supra n. 1.
82 /n re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. 864, 912.
83Jn re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. D. 259·
84 Stack v. Stack (1887) 6 Dem. Sur. (N.Y.) 280, 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 416;
Dayton v. Adkisson ( 1889) 45 N. J. Eq. 603, 17 Atl. 964; De Wolf v. Middleton (1893) 18 R.I. 810, 31 Atl. 271; cf. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1049,
1051 n. 15.
85 Especially art. 315 (new 349) of the Argentine Civil Code is defectively
drafted.
8 6 E.g., Argentina: C. C. art. 315 (new 349).
Portugal: Law for the Protection of Children of Dec. 25, 1910, art. 2.
87 Finland: Law of 1929, § 22; cf. Poland: Law of 1926, § 22.
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by later events. This is also the general proposition of the
American cases. 88 The status created at the time of a subsequent marriage (or any other act of legitimation) is permanent.
Adequate application of this principle to the legislations
of the French system (where a formal acknowledgment of
paternity or maternity is an essential part of legitimation by
subsequent marriage) depends upon the question whether
recognition is allowed after the marriage. In the older style
of these enactments, the recognition had to take place before
or as part of the act of celebrating the marriage, 89 so that
the status was fixed at the moment of the marriage. 90 Now
the French and some other municipal laws permit recognition
of paternity or maternity after a subsequent marriage, 91 and
either postpone the effect of legitimation until the later
event 92 or make it retroactive to the time of marriage. 93 It
may well be concluded that the decisive moment for the
choice of law also is deferred to the time of recognition. The
personal law of this later moment decides on the question of
retroactivity. Such a view might be suitable also to this
country, where in many jurisdictions acknowledgment must
be added to a subsequent marriage in order to complete
legitimation and is generally permitted after the marriage. 94
BB Smith v. Kelly (I85I) 23 Miss. I67 (subsequent marriage during domicil
in South Carolina does not legitimate an issue previously born; the later
domicil of the family in Mississippi was of no avail). For the general rule
see In re Presley's Estate ( I925) 113 Okla. I6o, I64, 240 Pac. 89, 93;
TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o) at 6I7, supra p. 597, n. I, and infra p. 630,
n. I69.
89 Code Napoleon art. 331, widely copied.
9o WErss, 4 Traite 90.
9 1 Spain: C. C. art. I2I; France: C. C. art. 33 I as amended by Laws of
Dec. 30, 19I5 and of April 25, I924.
92 Italy: C. C. (I942) art. 283, "or from the day of a recognition posterior
to the (subsequent) marriage."
93 Spain: C. C. art. I23. The preliminary draft of the Italian Civil Code
( I930) art. 320 followed this rule; cf. Relazione sui progetto ( I931) 167.
94 In the case of Smith v. Kelly, supra n. 88, af 170, the father would have
been able, according to the said view, to add to fhe ineffective South Carolinian marriage an acknowledgment in Mississippi.
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Such a supplement to a previous act of legitimation may
likewise be accomplished in the case when the parent has acquired a new personal law. The provisions of this new law
determine the decision without regard to any former personal law. Suppose the parents have married after the birth
of the child, when they were domiciliaries or nationals of a
country whose law does not know legitimation by marriage.
If they change their personal status afterward and their
new personal law allows legitimation and considers a belated recognition sufficient, such recognition can be effected
accordingly. 95
2.

Contacts: Usual Rules

(a) Law of Domicil. The law of the domicil of the
parents at the time of marriage governs legitimation by subsequent marriage in England and in the United States. It is
quite possible that a child, in view of its illegitimacy, has a
separate domicil at that time, but this does not count. 96
Analogous rules obtain in Argentina, 97 Switzerland (with
respect to foreign legitimations by foreigners) ,98 and the
other countries following the domiciliary principles. 99
95 See RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 405, 441. Similarly, a Swiss court has
held that a marriage which had no legitimizing effect under the law of the
originally Italian husband would gain that effect after the husband acquired
Swiss nationality, Appellationshof Bern (Sept. 3, 1951) 9 Schwz. Jahrb.
(1952) 247·
96 Restatement § 140, comment b adds, it is true, a caveat that the law of
the child's domicil might be sufficient to grant legitimation; but the basis for
this allegation is not apparent.
97 Argentina: C. C. arts. 313-315 (new 347-349), very difficult to understand. ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 330, calls these articles manifestly
contradictory; Vrco does not attempt any comment. Such an attempt was
risked by the Berlin KG. (Feb. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 96.
98 Switzerland, NAG. art. 28. In the case of a husband of Swiss nationality, the application of Swiss law is provided by the Federal Constitution,
art. 54· See BuRcKHARDT, Kommentar der Schweizerischen Bundesverfassung
513 ff.; BEcK, NAG. 246 no. 106.
99 Denmark: BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 53; BORUM 127.
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 126.
Uruguay: Ap. Montevideo (April 27, 1910) Clunet 1914, 674.
Brazil: Introductory Law ( 1942) art. 7, apparently covering the problem.

PARENTAL RELATIONS

(b) Law of Nationality. The national law of the father
at the time of marriage or recognition governs the problem
under most European conflicts laws/ 00
3· Personal Law of the Child
Under some of the more recent conflicts legislations, how·
ever, the personal law of the child is observed in determining
the question whether legitimation requires certain conditions
to be fulfilled in the person of the child, such as consent by
the child or its guardian. 101
Occasionally the national law of the child has been claimed
to govern legitimation as a whole. 102 This opinion has been
generally rejected, however. 103 The contrary view prevails
Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § I3 par. I.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I907, 462, PouLLET 465
no. 395·
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 29.
Finland: Law of I929, § 22.
France: prevailing opinion, see PILLET, I Traite 644 no. 313· SuRVILLE 459
no. 313; NIBOYET 770 no. 65I (2). BATIFFOL, Traite 532.
Germany: EG. art. n par. I.
Greece: C. C. ( I940) art. 22.
Guatemala: see MATOS no. 274 (except where the child is not under pa·
rental power) but, under the actual laws, it would be more consistent to apply
the domiciliary test.
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I.
Japan: Law of I898, art. I8.
Poland: Law of I926, art. 22.
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 3I.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 8; where the marriage is celebrated in Switzer·
land, see BG. (May 3I, 19I9) 45 BGE. I I 55, 163; BG. (Jan. 28 and May 20,
1914) 40 BGE. II 295, 302. BECK, NAG. 171 no. 64. If the father is a Ger·
man or an Italian, authorization by the court is needed, Just. Dept., Bundes·
blatt 1941, II03 no. 8, II04 no. 9·
101 GEBHARD, Draft I ( 1881) § 22, Gebhardsche Materialien 7·
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 3 x.
China: Law of 1918, art. 13.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18.
C6digo Bustamante art. 6o, but see infra n. 109. Cf. BAR § 102, n. 4· How·
ever, what conditions of such kind are provided for in actual legislations?
RAAPE 559 deals with the requisite of consent by a child of full age.
102 In France a few decisions about 1926-1927 were to this effect· also
BARTIN in 9 AuBRY et RAu § 546, 81, n. 8 ter,· see also for the Netheriands,
MULDER 121-124.
108 For France, see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 623 no. 14; J. DONNED!EU
DE YABRES 497•
100
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for the good reasons that legitimation is an effect of marriage, that one law should govern the family as a unit, and
that the child's entrance into this family should not be prescribed by another legislation. The English Act of 19.26
refers distinctly to the law of the father's domicil, because
otherwise a domiciled Englishman could be burdened with a
child legitimized abroad. 104 It is equally certain in the United
States that neither the law of the domicil of the child nor
that of the mother controls any acts of legitimation by the
father. 105 Moreover, if the child's own law is adverse to the
legitimizing effect of marriage, the child should not suffer
therefor .106
In a third opinion, the law of both parent and child must
concur for every requisite in allowing legitimation. 107 As
usual, such a doctrinary cumulation of laws is a very inconvenient solution.
4· Rules on Effects of Legitimation
Most of the rules mentioned determine both the act of
legitimation and the effect of this act. In some codifications,
however, special rules have been provided with respect to
the effects of legitimation. 108 The C6digo Bustamante, in
particular, states that:
104

See Note, 7 Cambr. L. J. (I94I) 405.
Blythe v. Ayres (I892) 96 Cal. 532, 572, 3I Pac. 9I5i In re Presley's
Estate ( I925) II3 Okla. I6o, 240 Pac. 89.
106
PILLET, I Traite 647 no. 3I5i POULLET (ed. 2) 5I4 no. 395; Nouvelles
Belges, 2 D. Civ. 620 no. 59I; RAAPE 55I (b), 558 (b); Trib. civ. Seine
(Dec. ZI, I916) Clunet I9I7, I4I9; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 23, 1857) D.I857.1.423,
s.1858.I.2 94.
10 7 France: Isolated decisions.
Italy: DrENA, 2 Prine. I8g.
The Netherlands: KOSTERS sso; VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. zoo. C6digo
Bustamante art. 6o in fine.
Brazil (under the former law): BEVILAQUA, I C6digo Civil (ed. 6, 1940)
Introd. art. 8 no. IS.
108
Japan: Law of I898, art. 18 par. 2.
China: Law of I9I8, art. I3 par. 2.
105
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"The effects of legitimation and the action for contesting a
legitimation are governed by the personal law of the
child." 109
It seems that this rule is destined in the first place to take
care of the case where the legitimated person has retained
his separate nationality and under his national law becomes
of full age earlier than under that of the parent, 110 but the
fact that by such an event parental power is terminated rests
upon the nationality law and upon the law of status and is
not an incident of the parent-child relation.

5· Renvoi
As is their wont, French and German courts apply
renvoi, 111 and English courts follow in applying any law that
is applied at the domicil of the parent. It was in fact a case
of legitimation that gave rise to the celebrated judgment
upon renvoi of Lord Maugham in In reA skew. 112
6. Soviet Russia and Other Socialist Countries
The problem offered by the Soviet Russian and other
socialist laws and those American statutes which make no
distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy has been
more discussed in connection with the subject of legitimation
109 Art. 62.
11o See BusTAMANTE, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 74·
111 France: Cour Paris (March 23, 1888) 8.1888.2.131, Clunet 1889, 638
(Irishman); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 21, 1916) Clunet 1917, 1419 (Englishman
from Mauritius); Trib. civ. Saint-Brieue (June 26, 1951) Revue Crit. 1951,
520.
Germany: K.G. (Nov. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 88; and in the same case,
KG. (Feb. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no 96 (marriage of an Argentinian domiciled in Florida, law of Florida applied); LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. 10, 1932)
]W. 1933, 193 (Englishman if domiciled in the Netherlands, Dutch law
applied).
Italy: a decision of App. Firen2e (Jan. 23, 1919) 12 Rivista (1918) 288,
against the current Italian doctrine.
112 In re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259, Clunet 1931, 175, followed in Collins v.
Att. Gen. [1931] 47 T. L. R. 484, 145 L. T. 551. Cf. 6 Z.ausi.PR. (1932) 62o.
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than with that of legitimate birth. A German court has held
that the child of a Russian who married the German mother
after the birth was illegitimate, because the Russian law d~es
not know legitimation. 113 However, as the Russian law does
not discriminate and as under German law the child who
was, before the marriage, an illegitimate relative of the
mother, would become by the marriage a fully recognized
child of both parents, legitimacy agrees with the spirit of
both legislations involved. 114 An analogous view is certainly
appropriate in this country where the parents of a previously
born child marry in Arizona. 115
B.

SCOPE

r. Validity of the Marriage

Conforming to principles mentioned before, the validity
of the marriage is to be determined under the ordinary rules
concerning the formalities, on one hand, and the intrinsic
validity of marriage, on the other.
Illustration: The parents, Frenchmen, having lived in
concubinage in France, went to New York and continued
there to live together. French courts made the recognition
of the marriage dependent upon the question whether their
relation had assumed at some time the character of a common law marriage under New York law, and this is pertinent
also to legitimation.116
There is, however, a tendency to regard the subsequent
marriage as valid if it is valid under the law governing the
legitimation.117
113

n. 6.

St.AZ. 1930, 44, cited with apparent approval by NussBAUM, IPR. 172

114 This solution was foreseen by RAAPE 568, 569; and RAAPE, so Recueil
1934 IV at sos.
11s See supra n. 3 8.
116 See the case of Trib. civ. Havre (Feb. 14, 1907) and App. Rauen (Feb.
z6, 1908) Clunet 1909, 1057; the question was left open only because the
recognition of maternity was missing in any case.
117 Germany: LG. Koln (Feb. zo, 1953) MDR. 1953, 488, Revue Crit. 1955,
no; LEWALD 130. Contra: RAAPE, IPR. 357·
Other cases, see supra n. 41 a.
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2.

Conditions and Effects of Legitimation

Where the marriage is valid under all laws concerned, the
conflicts rule is applicable to the questions :
(i) Whether legitimation follows from the marriage always, or never, or not for the issue from adulterous or incestuous cohabitations, 118 or only for certain privileged
classes of children.
Whether legitimation is invalid where it is proved that
the child has not actually been begotten by the husband or
borne by the wife of the marriage;
Whether consent of the child is required, 119 etcetera.
( ii) Regarding the acts sometimes required in addition to
the marriage ceremony, particularly the formal acknowledgment of paternity or maternity as required by the French
Civil Code, art. 33 I, and its many followers. 120 This provision has been applied by the French courts as an incident
of the personal law to Frenchmen at the forum and
abroad. 121 Likewise, where the man is of Bulgarian nationality, a court in Germany (where no such requisites exist)
requires recognition by both parents according to the Bulgarian provision. 122 Conversely, where foreigners marry in
the Netherlands, the Dutch requisite of recognition is released in favor of the national law not requiring recognition.123
Since in the new text of the French Civil Code, art. 23 I,
postnuptial recognition is allowed but must be effectuated by
118
119

France, England, Italy, the Netherlands, etc.
Chile: C. C. art. 210 (adult child); art. 211 (child with tutor or cura-

tor).
120 La. Rev. Civ. Code Ann. (1932) art. 198. Belgium: C. C. art. 331, cf.
342(b). The Netherlands: B. W. art. 327.
121 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 20, 1879) S.1879.I.417; Cass. (civ.) (April 20, 1885)
D.1886.1.23; Cass. (req.) (July 8, 1886) Clunet 1886, 585.
122 KG. (Nov. 29, 1929) HRR. 1930, no. 882, IPRspr. 1930, no. 85 (on the
ground that the Bulgarian provision requiring recognition is not meant for
evidence of the procreation only).
123 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. 201.
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court proceedings, this requirement, too, is to be considered
a part of the substantive personal law 124 rather than a
formality with territorial effect. 125
(iii) Respecting the effect attached to legitimation:
Whether legitimation is effective from the time of marriage or retroactively from the birth or from the date of
recognition (Anglo-Canadian laws, for instance, prefer the
effect from birth) ; 126
Whether already existing children born in wedlock retain
rights of "primogeniture"; 127
Whether rights normally included in legitimacy are denied; 128
Whether in particular the child receives the name of the
father. 129
3· Invalid Subsequent Marriage
A delicate question arises, if the subsequent marriage is
considered invalid at the forum; under what law should we
determine whether, nevertheless, the child is legitimized?
Express municipal provisions are made in the German and
Swiss Civil Codes/ 80 whereby the rules of putative marriage
should be applied by analogy. Such an analogy is convenient
also in the field of the law of conflicts. In the same way that
124
BATIFFOL; 8 Repert. 424 no. 124; a strange case of application: Trib. civ.
Rochelle (May 29, 1934) Clunet 1935, 370.
125 SURVILLE, Clunet 1916, 769, 780.
126 See Ontario Legitimation Act, 1921, II Geo. V, c. 53, as amended I927,
Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. r87 s. I, also in Rev. Stat. Ontario I950, c. 203 and r
JOHNSON 344 n. I. The time of the marriage is maintained as date of effectiveness of the legitimation in Quebec, C. C. art. 239·
127 Cf. Austrian Allg. BGB. § I6I.
128
Germany: cf. Bay. ObLG. (June 8, 192I) 42 ROLG. 105 (Czechoslovakian decree of legitimation withholding rights of inheritance).
129
See E. H. PERROUD, Clunet 19II, 503; 4 FRANKENSTEIN I6I n. 40.
130 BGB. § I72I; Switzerland: EGGER, 2 Kommentar zum Schweizerischen
Zivilgesetzbuch art. 258 (I) (b). In France, the same solution obtains,
PLANIOL-RIPERT-BOULANGER, I Traite e)ementaire de droit civil ( ed. 5, I950)
385 no. rosi.
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the personal law of the parent at the time of the marriage
determines whether legitimacy is dependent or not upon a
valid marriage, the law governing legitimation by subsequent
marriage should determine also the effect of an invalid subsequent marriage. 131
In the United States it has been contended, however, that
where the marriage was void no effect could be recognized
with respect to the children. 132 As a matter of fact, the statutes conferring legitimacy on children, irrespective of the
intrinsic validity of the marriage, have overlooked the case
of a subsequent marriage, but it may be asked whether courts
should not grant analogous application 133 by virtue of the
liberal construction generally given these beneficial statutes.
Were this done by the domiciliary law, no other jurisdiction
would have any reason to refuse recognition.
The inverse case that the marriage is considered invalid
under the personal law but valid under the internal rules,
has been discussed in Germany; the father's personal law
was said to determine the parent-child relationship in this
case also. 134
4· Acquisition of Nationality

Nationality of the parent is regularly transferred by legitimation to the child in the Continental European laws. This
raises peculiar problems, particularly in France. 135 English
law excluded until 1948 this acquisition of nationality.136
131 In this sense also 4 FRANKENSTEIN 153 (d), while RAAPE 570 follows
his theory referred to, supra p. 613, n. 68.
132 2 BEALE 708 n. 5· The decision in the Matter of Look Wong (1915) 4
U. D. Dist. Haw. 568, cited by BEALE, does not seem to support this view, but
it has been expressed in Adams v. Adams ( 1891) 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260
even with respect to the liberal California legislation.
133 Cf. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1049, 1051 n. 16.
134 RAAPE, JW. 1934, 2951; same in 50 Recueil 1934 IV 405, 487 no. 63
against other opinions.
135 Code de Ia nation a lite (I 945) art. 34·
136 The rule of Abraham v. Att. Gen. [1934] P. 17 was changed by the
British Nationality Act, 1948, s. 23.
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5· Prohibitive Public Policy of the Forum
Much thought has been given to those municipal provisions which prevent legitimation of the children conceived
or born in polygamous, incestuous, or bigamous relations.
There is no such provision in most American jurisdiction~ nor
in Germany, the Scandinavian countries, nor Switzerland.
The Venezuelan Civil Code expressly permits legitimation
by subsequent marriage even though the parents were incapable of marrying at the time of the conception. 131 The
former text was similar, but it prohibited the recognition of
children born to such marriages. 138 Yet British and French
influence has prompted a great number of provisions against
such a legitimation. Recent French reforms modifying the
famous article 335 of the Code N apoltfon brought only
partial relie£. 139
(a) United States. The courts of New York persist in
their general policy of outlawing the children of "prohibited" marriages. 140 In the other states, the weight of authority recognizes the domiciliary law without objection
stemming from an opposed local policy. 141
(b) England. According to the British Legitimacy Act
of 1926, the offspring of an adulterous union cannot be legitiVenezuela, C. C. ( 1942) art. 227 par. 2.
Venezuela, C. C. (1922) art. 248 par. 2, cf. art. 233.
139 Amended by Law of Dec. 30, 1915; cf. Ital. C. C. (1942) arts. 251, 281.
140 See Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, aff'd 216
U. S. 386 and In re Bruington's Estate (1936) 160 N. Y. Misc. 34, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 725, cited supra notes 59 and 6o respectively.
141 Mund v. Rehaume (1911) 51 Colo. 129, 117 Pac. 159 (near relationship); Moore v. Saxton (1916) 90 Conn. 164. 96 Atl. 96o (bigamy); Succession of Caballero (1872) 24 La. Ann. 572 (miscegenation); Green v. Kelley
(1917) 228 Mass. 6o2, 118 N. E. 235 (bigamy); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin,
Commissioner of Immigration (1927) 21 F. (2d) 801 (polygamy); see also
Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore ( 1926) 151 Md. 321, 134
Atl. 497 at 499· The case of Matter of Look Wong (1915) 4 U. S. Dist. Haw.
568, where recognition of children of a Chinese marriage was withheld, has
been called unfortunate and unsound, Note, 31 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1917) 892. See
also McNamara v. McNamara (1922) 303 Ill. 191, 135 N. E. 410 (legitimation by conduct).
137
138
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mated when the parents are domiciled in England, but no
such express clause has been added in section 8 ( 1) dealing
with marriages celebrated while the spouses are domiciled
abroad. By reasonable interpretation, it has been held that a
child born of a father with a foreign domicil is legitimated
according to the domiciliary law without interference by
English public policy. 142
(c) Continent. Similarly, legitimation is recognized in
France when foreign nationals marry abroad/ 48 except in
the case where the parents, both formerly French, have
abandoned their nationality for the purpose of evading the
French provision against legitimation of adulterines. 144
However, the problem has been much discussed, 145 and an
increasingly nationalistic attitude of the Court of Cassation
has made from what is left of article 335 of the Civil Code,
after repeated modifications, a rule of ((ordre public international." 146 This possibly means that adulterine children
142 In re CoJiins v. Att. Gen. [I93I] 47 T. L. R. 486, I45 L. T. 55 I.
CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 39I n. 2, raising a formalistic doubt, is too much impressed
by the opinion of a Chancery official.
143 Cour Paris (Aug. 2, I866) S.I866.2.342; Cour Paris (July 2, I926)
Clunet I927, 77· Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I907, II54·
144 Cour Paris (July I6, I902) Clunet I903, 392 (French parties had become Swiss citizens).
145 On the different opinions and the stages of development of the cases see
WEiss, 4 Traite 94; VALERY 1147 no. I. 8o8; NIBOYET 77I no. 652; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 373 no. 348; BARTIN, 2 Principes 359 § 324 (critical);
Notes to Cass. (civ.) (March 3I, I930) by SAVATIER, D.1930.1.II3 and BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 425 nos. I34 ff. and Revue Crit. I934, 6I5.
1 .W Cass. (civ.) (March 3I, I930) D.I930.I.II3 at u8, S.I93I.1.9 and ibid.
at I77, Case Note by GENY; Clunet I930, 650, Revue Crit. I934, 615 (a
Russian, Reweliotty, married and being father of children by this marriage,
had an illegitimate child in France by one Struve, whom he married after
having been divorced from his first wife. Both parents had acknowledged the
child. The Czarist law admitted legitimacy, and the Soviet Russian law ignores any qualifications of children. The Appeal Court refused recognition
for the double reason that the child, being of French nationality, was subject
to French law. LEREBOUR&-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 2) 4I2 no. I, and 4I5 n. I stresses
the point that the Supreme Court did not disapprove of the second ground,
although it did not examine it. Similar in Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles
(March 27, I930) Pasicrisie I930.3.I73 and Trib. civ. Liege (Nov. I3, 1930),
both in Revue I933, 358, even for the case where recognition was made
abroad, on the worn authority of 5 LAURENT 554 no. 266.
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cannot be legitimated where any one of the three persons involved is of French nationality or a part of the facts happened in France. The courts are apprehensive that the people
may become accustomed to polygamy I
Where all three persons are of foreign nationality, however, the objection of public policy is unlikely to be raised
in a European court. 147 But renvoi may have an influenGe on
these considerations. For instance, where an Englishman was
domiciled and married in the Netherlands, a German court,
by renvoi from the national English law, applied Dutch law
in determining that the premarital issue was not legitimized
because born in adultery. 148
Also on the grounds of public policy, the Appeal Court of
Hamburg 149 refused to recognize a legitimation valid under
Dutch law, where an unmarried woman of German nationality, mother of a German child, married a Dutchman and both
parties recognized the child as their own. The German
courts, like those of some American jurisdictions, 150 regard
as necessary for legitimation that the man marrying the
mother shall in fact be the father. The Court extended this
requirement to the foreign legitimation of a German child,
on the ground that, if the child is not actually an offspring of
the married couple, its interest ought to be protected as is
done through the other form of legitimation, viz., in the
course of legitimation by state authority. This reasoning results, however, in creating a double status of the child as
legitimate abroad and illegitimate at the forum/ 51 and should
not be followed in the jurisdictions mentioned above.
Cf. KOSTERS 538, 554LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. 10, 1932) JW. 1933, 193, IPRspr. 1933, no. 51.
149 OLG. Hamburg (Aug. 16, 1935) Hans. RGZ. 1935, B 495 no. 135.
tso Pike v. Standage (1919) 187 Iowa 1152, 175 N. W. 12; Helm v. Goin
(1929) 227 Ky. 773 at 778, 14 S. W. (2d) 183; Eichorn v. Zedaker (1924)
109 Ohio St. 609, 144 N. E. 258; Harper v. Harper (1932) 159 Va. 210, 165
S. E. 490; Mooney v. Mooney (1912) 244 Mo. 372, 148 S. W. 896.
151 Cf. EcKSTEIN and LORENZ, notes to the decision in 6 Giur. Comp. DIP.
no. 132.
147

148
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6. Permissive Public Policy of the Forum
Occasionally, the father's law prohibiting legitimation has
been disregarded for reasons of a benevolent local policy. 152
French courts affirmed the effect of legitimation under
French law where an Englishman married a French woman,
although legitimation was not yet recognized by English
law. 153 This may be the right decision, provided the couple is
domiciled in France. 154

7· Law of Situs
The famous English case of Birtwhistle v. V ardill 155 has
retained authority, inasmuch as a state where land is situated may require birth in lawful wedlock for the capacity of
inheriting land, although in other respects foreign legitimation by subsequent marriage is recognized, and certainly in
England it has been recognized in all respects by the law of
1926.156 Very few American cases have followed this doctrine/57 more suitable, indeed, to old feudal institutions.
15 2 LG. Frankfurt am Main (Dec. 6, I953) 20 Z.ausi.PR. (I955) 34I (critical note by NEUHAUS); LG. Karlsruhe (May I5 1 I952) IPRspr. I952-53 no.
I95a; RAAPE 562(a), 563, in the case of a Belgian domiciled in Germany
who in adultery had a child by a German woman, later married the mother
of the child in Germany.
153 Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 23, I857) S.I858.1.293 (sounding as though French
law were always applicable); Cour Bourges (May 26, I858) S.1858.2.532,
D.I858.2.178; App. Rouen (Jan. 5, I887) Clunet I887, I83; Cour Paris
(March 23, 1888) Clunet I889, 638, approved by VALERY II48 no. I I 8oz;
but disapproved by most writers, see WEISS, 4 Traite 96 ff.; DESPAGNET 838
no. 277; SURVILLE 46I no. 3I3.
154 NmoYET 734 no. 625 II, but contra 5 Traite 490.
155 (1826) 5 Barn. & C. 438; (1835) 2 Cl. & F. 571; (1840) 7 Cl. & F. 895·
156 See FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Characterization," 15 Can. Bar
Rev. (I937) 2I5 at 242 (giving information on the Canadian legislation).
15 7 Alabama: Lingen v. Lingen ( I871) 45 Ala. 4I0 (no recognition of any
status created by foreign legitimation); Florida: Statutes (I941) § 73I.23 (7);
Williams v. Kimball ( 1895) 35 Fla. 49, 16 So; 783; Pennsylvania: 48 Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) § I67 (Act of May I4 1 I857, P. L. 507, §I);
Smith v. Derr's Adm'rs (1859) 34 Pa. 126. Contra: see Note, 46 Yale L. ].
(I937) I049 and cf. on the cases TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 7I5,
supra n. I.
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IV.

LEGITIMATION BY OTHER AcTs

"Legitimatio per rescriptum principis," by which the emperor in the Roman imperial epoch elevated a child to the
status of legitimacy, has been preserved in numerous civil
law countries. The state's chief acted on the instance of the
father, or of both parents, or upon the father's wish expressed in a will. 158 In some countries, the legislature 159 or
the monarch or state president was replaced by courts. 160
This method has been followed in a few common law jurisdictions of the United States. 161
Moreover, kgitimation may be effected by parental acknowledgment or by conduct of public repute, so as to place
the child upon the footing of a legitimate child. Thus, in
eight states of the Union by oral or written, and in Michigan, by written acknowledgment, 162 legitimation is performed
for all intents and purposes. 163 We are not dealing now with
institutions conferring limited rights upon an illegitimate
child. The subject includes, however, those kinds of legitimation which give the child a full position of legitimacy minus
the right of inheritance, as in Delaware and formerly
Czechoslovakia. 164
E.g., Austria: Allg. BGB. § 162.
Germany: BGB. § 1723.
Italy: C. C. (1865) art. 198 ff., C. C. (1942) art. 284 ff.
The Netherlands: BW arts. 329, 330.
Spain: C. C. art. 120.
159 See, e.g., the Arkansas special statute of Oct. 27, 1835, referred to in
Scott v. Key ( 1856) I I La. Ann. 232.
160 Peru: C. C. (1936) arts. 314, 319; Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. 251,
C. C. (1942) art. 230. See also Switzerland: C. C. art. 260.
161 Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee; 4 VERNIER 181 § 245·
162 4 VERNIER § 244.
163 4 VERNIER 183 § 246.
164 4 VERNIER § 245· Allg. BGB. § 162 replaced by the Family Law of Dec.
7, 1949. In fact, faced with a Czechoslovakian decree of legitimation, the
Bay. ObLG. (June 8, 1921) 42 ROLG. 105 held that the status was concerned and the act should be recorded at the civil status register.
158
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I.

United States

The conflicts rule of the United States, in the evidently
prevailing opinion, 165 is the same as that concerning subsequent marriage; the law of the domicil at the time of the
act governs. It does not matter whether the foreign legitimation has been executed in a form not known at the forum,
as for instance by a special statute, nor whether the child
would have been barred from legitimation by the policy of
the forum. These principles have been very clearly expressed.166 Also, the child's domicil is not taken into consideration; a legitimation by acknowledgment has been upheld in California despite the English domicil of the child, 167
quite as, conversely, the Virginia statute of r 866, legitimating colored children, was refused application in Massachusetts in respect to a father who was domiciled there, although the child resided in Virginia. 168 A domicil of the
father or even of all parties at a time posterior to the legitimating act is without importance. 169
2.

England

No case had occurred in England before the Legitimacy
Act of 1926, where a foreign legitimation other than by
subsequent marriage was in question/ 70 and the Act likewise
limited itself to recognizing English and foreign legitima165Restatement § 140; STUMBERG 331. The author of the Note in 46 Yale
L. J. ( 1937) 1046, 1053 thinks that the doctrine is in a "chaotic condition,"
but this contention is not well supported by the few deviating cases and the
absence of authority as to certain details.
166 See, e.g., Adkins, J. in Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore (1926) 151 Md. 321, 134 At!. 497; Buchanan, J. in Scott v. Key (1856)
I I La. Ann. 232 (legitimation by special statute of Arkansas legislature)
quotes with STORY§ 51 from BOULLENOIS: "Habilis vel inhabilis in loco domicili est habilis vel inhabilis in omni loco."
167 Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915.
16 8 Irving v. Ford (1903) 183 Mass. 448, 67 N. E. 366.
169 Eddie v. Eddie (1899) 8 N.D. 376, 79 N. W. 856; In re Presley's Estate,
Anderson v. Presley (1925) 113 Okla. x6o, 240 Pac. 89, supra p. 616, n. 88.
17 0 Supra p. 613.
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tions by marriage. Soon afterwards, however, in the case of
In re Luck, it happened that an Englishman, when domiciled
in England, procreated an illegitimate son and, while domiciled in California, acknowledged him pursuant to the California Civil Code, section 230, by receiving the child into his
family with the consent of his wife and by obtaining a decree
of legitimation from the time of birth. It would have been
a reasonable expectation that the legitimation should simply
be recognized under the law of the father's domicil at the
time of the act, by analogy to the rule laid down in the law
of 1926. The father's domicil at the time of the birth should
be of no significance. However, the Chancery judge reached
this result by resorting to the child's law, 171 which was an
unwarranted breach with the principles in force. Two of the
three Lords of Appeal were apparently so strongly under
the spell of the dogma abolished by the Legitimacy Act,
that they refused recognition because of the father's English
law as of the time of the birth of the child. 112 The resulting
decision is obviously regrettable. 173
3· National Law of Parent
In the countries following the nationality principle, the
rules are the same as in the case of a subsequent marriage.
Hence, a foreign legitimation agreeing with the national law
of all parties is recognized, even though the specific procedure is unknown to the forum. For example, French courts
respect a foreign legitimation by state authority although
unknown to French municipallaw. 174
111fn re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. 323 at 329.
1 7 2/n re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. (C. A.) 864 at 890.
173 See TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 621-627, supra n. 1; MANN,
"Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev.
(1941) 112, u8-122; FALCONBRIDGE, Comment in 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941)
37, 42, also criticizes the dissenting vote of Scott, L. J.
174 See Cour Paris (April 13, 1893) Clunet 1893, 557; WEISS, 4 Traite 101;
VALERY 1150; POULLET 469 no. 395·
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Where the parties are of different nationality, usually the
father's law alone is applied. 175
But with respect to legitimation by acts other than marriage, it is convenient to require the consent of the child or
of some competent agent on its behalf, as municipal legislations frequently provide, 176 and there is a tendency to apply
such provisions of the child's law as an exception to the rule
referring to the father's law. The German statute (EG. art.
22, par. 2) directly provides that in the case of a German
child the consent of the child or of the persons and courts
charged with the care of it should be secured in accordance
with the German rules. 177 French courts and certain writers
require application of French law every time that any party
is of French nationality. 178
4· Argentine Doctrine
Another application of local public policy, enunciated in
Argentina, is that a legitimation by act of a foreign state
should not be recognized because "it presents a privilege." 119

V.

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN LEGITIMATION

Much discussion has been devoted to the relations existing
between the above-mentioned rules and the conflicts rules
concerning succession upon death.
175 See for instance App. Bern (May II, 1939) 36 SJZ. (194o-1941) 128
no. 23. Swiss C. C. arts. 260 ff. applied although the woman and the child
were Germans. For an opposite view requiring that the parties and the
authority rendering the decree belong to the same state, see WEiss, 4 Traite
104; contra: RoLIN, 2 Principes 158 no. 628.
176 Cf., for instance, German BGB. § 1726 in contrast to § 1719 (legitimation by subsequent marriage); Peru: C. C. (1936) art. 320; Venezuela: C. C.
(1942) art. 233·
177 It is controversial whether this rule is applicable to foreign children.
The prevailing answer is in the negative. See RG. (July II, 1929), 125 RGZ.
266; RAAPE 549; NUSSBAUM, IPR. 173, n. 3·
The Czechoslovakian statute on private international law of 1948, § 31,
generalizes by providing that the requirement of consent by the child or any
other persons is governed by the child's national law.
178 See the criticism by CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 57, 73·
179 2 VIco no. 171 at 127.
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1.

Validity of Legitimation as a Preliminary Question

There is a general problem respecting the law applicable
to legitimation or adoption, when either one is a condition
for an individual's sharing in a succession upon death. 180
Where a claim to participate in a distribution of assets, governed by the inheritance law of state X, is based on a legitimation created in state Y, should the validity of the legitimation be adjudicated under the law of X or Y? This
question occurs in its purest form in third states; should a
court in state Z apply its ordinary conflicts rule concerning
legitimation or does application by such court of the inheritance law of X by implication include the conflicts rule of X
regarding legitimation? (There is, of course, nothing to
recommend the lex fori of X, or the substantive legitimation
law of X as such.) The problem is significant only where the
conflict rules on inheritance and those on legitimation or
adoption result in contrasting solutions. No case in the English or American practice to illustrate this contrast has been
found by Robertson, 181 and only one German decision of the
kind has been found. In this case, an Alsatian in adultery
had a child by a woman whom he afterwards married. He
acquired French nationality by the Treaty of Versailles but
died in Germany. As well known, Frenchmen cannot legitimize adulterine children, but Germans are allowed to do so.
As the man's succession under the German conflicts rule was
governed by French law, the court decided to apply French
rules of conflicts. Under the French conflicts rule concerning
legitimation, as the court understood it, the legitimation
operated in favor of the child in spite of its adulterine position, because the parties were German at the time of their
subsequent marriage. Acknowledging the legitimacy of the
1so The logical necessity of applying the law of the state of inheritance to
the preliminary question has been expounded by MELCHIOR § 175; WENGLER,
8 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1934) 148 at 166; also RoBERTSON, Characterization 137 ff.
1s1 RoBERTsoN, ibid. 135, 151.
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child, the court therefore ordered that it share in the
succession. 182
The case is instructive in two respects and helps us to distinguish two problems.
One of these problems, neglected in Europe, holds an
interest in this country, in view of the persistent effort to
separate statutes of legitimacy (or status) from statutes of
distribution. In the French law, the statute of distribution
furnishes only the words: ((enfants et descendants" (C. C.
art. 7 3 I). Legitimacy, of course, is presupposed, but an
adulterine child is only indirectly excluded by reason of its
incapacity to be legitimized. And only the conflicts rule on
legitimation prescribes that the ban on adulterine children
ceases where all facts happened abroad and at the time did
not concern a French national. This seems, in fact, to be the
averred doctrine; 188 at least the German court was entitled
to assume its correctness.
We may conclude that, if recognized at all, the foreign
act is valid in our jurisdiction as measured by its own law.
It cannot be recognized for the purpose of family law and
eliminated for the purpose of distribution.
What the European literature discusses, however, concerns the other problem, namely, whether the German court
should have decided the validity of the legitimation according to its own German conflicts rule on legitimation, 184 instead of following the provisions of French law because it
governs the succession/ 85 The individual case gives no solid
basis for arguing this question, since the legitimation could
not be denied validity in any event; it had been effectuated in
Germany by parties then of German nationality. Arguments
182

OLG. Karlsruhe (March 20, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 96, Revue 1932,

702.
183

SAVATIER, D.1930.1.IJ6j LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 2) 318 no. 279·
RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 494·
185 LEWALD, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 454·
1 84
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of practical convenience may be considered. If such preliminary questions are subjected to the statutes regulating
inheritance, consistent application of these statutes may be
facilitated. On the other hand, by applying constantly the
law indicated by the forum's special conflicts rules on legitimation or adoption, consistency in deciding the effects of the
same marriage or adoption is promoted. The latter consideration appears preferable.
2.

Effect of Foreign Legitimation on Inheritance Rights

Where a child has been legitimized under the law of state
X and an inheritance is governed by the laws of state Y,
should the effect of the legitimation on the inheritance be
determined under the inheritance law of X or Y? This much
discussed question has no serious significance, if we understand legitimation to mean an act elevating the illegitimate
child to full legitimacy. The analogous question concerning
foreign adoption is less simple, because an adoption may produce various degrees of rights. It is obvious that full recognition of a foreign legitimation assimilates the child to legitimates in the sense of any statute of distribution which does
not except legitimized children, an exception practically occurring only in anachronistic applications of the Statute of
Merton. 186

VI. RELATIONS BETWEEN LEGITIMATE PARENTS AND CHILD
A. RULES

A comparative survey of this topic has to face a situation
similar to that encountered with respect to the effects of marriage. The Continental systems start from a comprehensive
notion of parental power, historically derived partly from
the Roman patria potestas, partly from the Germanic munt,
186

See cases cited supra p. 628, n. 157.
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and result in the recognition of a status governed by the personal law of the parent. In common law, much is left to the
rules concerning contract, tort, and support; the remaining
small domain of domiciliary law is difficult to define.
Even so, we may be astonished at the scarcity of conflicts
rules that are discussed in this country with respect to parental rights and duties. The Restatement ( §§ 144-148) devotes to parental power as a status only one conflicts rule,
subjecting "custodianship" of a legitimate child to the law
of the father's domicil at the time of birth, and treats jurisdiction for modifying custody in a few sections. Support and
domicil are dealt with separately, but neither personal property of a child nor the authority of a parent to act for the
child are expressly mentioned in the chapters on property and
contracts, respectively. Such subjects as personal services and
earnings of children do not seem to fit under any rule of the
Restatement. This neglect, of course, is not accidental.
Whereas Wharton and Story dedicated some space to the
differences of civil and common law conceptions about this
matter, subsequent writers seem to reduce the "status" of
legitimacy to custodianship, which word, used in this connection, probably means no more than personal care and
education, excluding maintenance (which otherwise may be
included in the term). Exactly as with respect to matrimonial
rules, the methods of civil law and common law are divergent; concentration of the effects of legitimacy under the
aspect of family law in the Continental conception contrasts
with dispersal into several topics in the American system. To
account for all implications of the personal law, we have to
base our survey upon the broader scope of the civil law
doctrines.
1.

Personal Law of Father

Wherever the unity of the family law is in the foreground
of thought, the personal law of the father is deemed to de-
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termine the relation between both parents and the child,
even when, as today, wife and child may have separate personal laws. This has remained the rule especially in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Japan, 187 and in the French dominant
opinion, 188 where the national law of the father governs the
entire complex of relations, as well as in other countries,
including Switzerland/ 89 where the law of the father's domicil governs.
Correspondingly, in this country, "custody" is governed by
the domiciliary law of the father, 190 although sometimes the
opinion is expressed that parental power should always be
subject to the local policy of the parties' momentary residence.191 The only exception to the rule of the foreign domicil
should be urgent public policy, and this not so often as is
generally claimed.
Nationality:
Austria: Decree of Oct. I5, I94I, § IO.
Germany: EG. art. I9 sentence I.
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I.
Belgium: ROLIN, 2 Principes IOO no. 587, 646; POULLET 436 no. 374;
Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 759·
Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. I.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 20.
China: Law of I9I8, art. I5.
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 30 par. I.
Iran: C. C. art. 964.
188 France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. I3, I873) S.I873.I.I3, Clunet I874, 245; Cass.
(civ.) (March I4, I877) S.I878.1.25, Clunet I878, I67 (in this case the
parents were Frenchmen and the child a foreigner). See NIBOYET 784 no. 674,
and for cases ibid. 784. no. 675; in 5 Traite 372 ff., the author pleads for the
application of French law if only one of the parties is a French national!
SURVILLE 472 n. I; PILLET, I Traite 659 no. 328. BATIFFOL, Traite 54I ff.
189 Domicil: Switzerland: (for Swiss citizens abroad) NAG. art. 9· Treaty
of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1940, art. I8, correcting the
existing art. I4. Uruguay: C. C. (as amended I94I) art. 2396.
1 90 Restatement § I44 combines this rule with § 30 declaring that the child
normally shares the father's domicil, thus no change of award of custody
would occur regularly against the law of the father's domicil under § I45· The
same rule applies to support, Berkley v. Berkley (I952) 246 S. W, (2d) 804.
191
See especially I WHARTON §§ 253, 254· For England, WESTLAKE § 4
infers from the old case of Johnstone v. Beattie (I843) 10 Cl. & F. 42, II3,
II4 that the authority of a foreign parent over his child living in England is
recognized to the extent to which an English parent would have similar
authority, whatever that means.
1 87
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2.

Cases of Different Nationalities

The now frequent cases where the parties have different
personal laws are treated variously.
(a) Certain writers of the civil law countries, now followed by some legislations and courts, suggest that a personal law of the child different from that of his father should
prevaiJ.l 92 The favorite argument for this view is that paternal power in modern law serves only the welfare of the
child; this is true, but it is no argument for the national or
domiciliary law of the child.
The problems of the common law lie on another plane.
British law, followed in this instance in Scotland/ 98 recognizes the jurisdiction of the child's domicil as competent,
although not exclusive. Likewise in this country, "the state
of domicil of the child can change the custody of the child
from one parent to the other, or to, or from both." 194 The
courts apply their own substantive laws, but the doctrine of
the child's domicil by operation of law corrects this apparent
rupture of the system. 195 So long as the family lives together,
there is no question at all; even if the community is disrupted
by one parent abandoning the child or by separation or divorce of the parents, the child is considered domiciled with
one of the parents.
(b) The Polish and Czechoslovakian laws have adopted
1 92

Finland: Law of 1929, § 19.
C6digo Bustamante art. 69 (with broad exceptions on which later).
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 17 par. 2, reserving, however, Hungarian law if this is more favorable for the child and the child lives in
Hungary.
France: SURVILLE 468 no. 319, ibid. 472 no. 320 n. 2; DESPAGNET 821 no.
269 II; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 716, 718; WEISS, 4 Traite 27, 146,
164; Cour Paris (Aug. 5, 1908) Clunet 1909, 173.
Brazil: 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA IIO.
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (May 18, 1934) W. 12791 (authority of
the father, a foreigner, over a Dutch child, determined by Dutch law).
193 Ponder v. Ponder [1932] Session Cases 233, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 123.
194 Restatement § 145·
195 Restatement § 3 3·
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the last national law common to both parties, as in conjugal
matters. 196
(c) The recent Greek Code, elaborating the subject matter, makes the relation between legitimate parents and their
child dependent: (i) upon the national law that was last
common to the father and the child, (ii) in absence of such,
upon the law of the father at the birth of the child; (iii) if
the father is dead, :Upon the last law common to the mother
and the child; and ( iv) in absence of such, upon the law of
the mother at the death of the father. This symmetrical
solution solves all possible cases but is arbitrarily chosen.
Moreover, in both this and the Polish regulations, paternal
rights and duties are determined by a law that may be alien
to both parties for the time being. 197
(d) In another opinion, both laws are to be cumulatively
applied. 198
(e) Also the law more favorable to the person sued on
account of an obligation of parent-child relationship has been
advocated. 199
(f) The law of the forum has been applied, where one
party was a national of the forum, sometimes as an expedient
because of the unsettled conflict laws, but in France as a
declared policy where either the father or the mother is of
French nationality, even though the child be a foreigner. 200
196 Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I9; criticized by
ScHNITZER ( ed. I) 209 n. I; Czechoslovakia: Law on private international
law of I948, §§ 2I, 22.
1 9 7 Greece C. C. I940, art. I8. See also infra p. 652.
198 2 ZITELMANN 889; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 70, n. I6I; CAVAGLIERI 242; FEDOZZI
502; Trib. Venezia (Jan. 30, I932) 24 Rivista ( I932) I06; see contra:
RAAPE 464.
199 E.g., Cass. Ita!. (July 3I, I93o) Monitore I93I I32.
1
20 Cass. (civ.)
(Jan. I3, I873) S.I873.I.I3, D.I873.I.297. Cf. ROLIN, 2
Principes I87 no. 649. Cass. (civ.) (March I4. I877) S.1878.I.25, D.I877.1.385;
cf. Clunet I878, I67. App. Bordeaux (July 23, 1897) Clunet I897, 1028;
NmoYET, 5 Traite 472 ff.
Germany: German law applied where the mother is of German nationality
and the child stayed with the mother in Germany, see RG. (Feb. 20, 1913) 81
RGZ. 373; OLG. Miinchen (Aug. 24, I938) HRR. I938, no. I463.

°

PARENTAL RELATIONS

640

3· Renvoi
Where the rule refers to foreign law, renvoi may be applied.2ol
B. SCOPE OF THE RULES
1.

Maternal Rights

The rules outlined above determine what rights the
mother has during the father's lifetime and after his death.

Illustration: After the death of his German father, a son
was entrusted to an uncle in Italy and later was released
from his German nationality. It was held that, under German
conflicts law, the mother, being of German nationality, retained her maternal powers, so that no guardian was to be
appointed. 202
2.

Personal Care

The content of paternal or maternal rights embraces
"care, advice and affection," 203 in other words, personal care
and education. Religious education is included, insofar as it
is considered of private concern 204 and the foreign law does
not offend public policy by compromising religious freedom.205 The law governing parental relations extends to the
action by which a parent entitled to custody sues the other
parent for restitution of the child; 206 in the prevailing opin201 Germany: (although EG. art. 27 does not expressly order renvoi in this
case), RG. (Dec. 29, 1910) JW. 1911, 208, 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 336 (Australian
party); Bay. ObLG. (March 13, 1912) 13 Bay. ObLG. 136, 26 ROLG. 257;
Bay. ObLG. (April 22, 1922) 42 ROLG. 126 (New York parties); KG. (April
17, 1914) 32 ROLG. 31 (Russian from Baltic province); Bay. ObLG. (Oct.
16, 1925) 24 Bay. ObLGZ. 270.
2o2 OLG. Dresden (Jan. 16, 1900) 21 Ann. Siichs. OLG. 309 no. 15. Similar:
A Dutch widow has no maternal power and therefore cannot be authorized
by the court like a German mother to alienate her child's immovables, KG.
(Oct. 10, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 15.
20s Simonds, J., In re Frame [1939] Ch. D. 700, 704.
20 4 KG. (July 26, 1904) 15 Z.int.R. (1905) 325.
205 DIENA, 2 Prine. 191; RAAPE 476.
206 RG.
(Nov. 14, 1912) 68 Seuff. Arch. 163, 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 316
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ion, also after a divorce, this law excludes the law under
which the divorce has been granted. 207
The French decisions are divided; the majority apply
French law under the color of public policy, 208 and an English
court is likely to follow the same method in the case of a
ward of the court. 209 In the United States, it seems difficult
to tell in what cases a court may be inclined to apply a foreign law. Correction and chastisement have always been
indicated as an example of parental power limited by the
territorial habits of the place where they are exercised. 210
Probably a parent's renunciation of his right to visit would
be held contrary to public order, as has been held in Germany.211
The requirement of parental consent to the child's marriage, as discussed earlier, is included in parental rights
under civil law, while it is categorized with formalities according to the traditional British view and is, without qualification, subject to the law of the place of celebration under
the American conflicts rules.
3· Duty of Providing a Dowry
Whether a parent has a duty to settle property as a dowry
for his daughter, as he had under the German law but not
under Dutch law, is a question determinable under the rules
outlined above. 212
{Austrian law); RG. (May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 (Bulgarian
law; the form of procedure, however, is subject to the law of the forum); LG.
Stuttgart (Nov. 12, 1953) 19 Z.ausi.PR. (1954) 152 with note Kaser.
207 Supra p. 573; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. &, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 84.
208
See Trib. civ. Seine (June 18, 1934) D. H. 1934. 471, Clunet 1935, 619
and the practice reviewed by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427 ff. who wishes
that a foreign personal law be observed with vigilant criticism rather than to
be neglected; Cour Paris (July 13, 1951) Clunet 1952, 612.
209 See In re B-'s Settlement, B- v. B- [1940] Ch. 54·
210 1 WHARTON § 254; Codigo Bustamante art. 72.
211 KG. {Nov. 14, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 8.
2
12 RG. (April 12, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449·
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4· Protecting Interference by Courts
Many cases have dealt with the power of courts to protect
children who are resident at the forum, against parents who
are foreigners. German courts are ready to recognize that
it is primarily a matter of the personal law of the parent,
whether and under what conditions parental rights can be
abridged or terminated. Such remedies as are provided in the
Italian or the Dutch civil codes have been found sufficient. 213
Where the national law did not offer an adequate basis for
intervention of the German court, temporary measures were
always permitted. 214 Incidentally, where the welfare of a
child resident within the country appeared to be menaced,
public policy was often invoked in favor of the local remedies, but this view has been challenged recently. 215
A similar practice in favor of the personal law exists, for
instance, in the Netherlands. 216 In Switzerland parents domiciled within the country are subject to Swiss law under the
domiciliary principle itself. 217
213 KG. (June 5, 1921) 53 Jahrb. FG. A 56 (Italian law); KG. (Nov. 28,
1913) 45 Jahrb. FG. A 18 (Dutch law). See also KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) JW.
1935, 3483 (applying Austrian law); Bay. ObLG. (Dec. 6, 1933) JW. 1934.
699 and Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 1934, 1369, IPRspr. 1934, nos. 63,
64 (Lebanese law).
214 RG. (May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 and cited writers. In a
constant practice sec. 63 par. I (2) of the Law on Youth Welfare of July 9,
1922, providing for emergency education of depraved children, is applied to
foreigners. See RG. (June 30, 1927) 117 RGZ. 376; RG. (May 22, 1933) JW.
1933, 45, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 137 no. 51.
215 KG. (Jan. 12, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 62 denies jurisdiction as to
foreigners if any one of the parties interested in an order regulating custody
or right of visitation is not to be found within the territory of the state. OLG.
Miinchen (May 18, 1938) HRR. 1938, no. 1281, (although the child was at
the forum, depriving the Bulgarian father of his powers was held excluded
because the Bulgarian law did not recognize such a measure).
216 The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (Jan. 13, 1939) W. 1939, no. 286
(although the wife was Dutch and the parties lived in the Netherlands, Austrian and German Jaws were applied as the child's national law, the mother
was entrusted with the personal care, and the father excluded from visiting
the child).
217 BG. (Sept. 29, 1927) Praxis 1927, 456. The powers of a Dutch father
(domiciled in the Netherlands) are characterized under Dutch law: BG.
(Feb. 3, 1939) 65 BGE. I 13.
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The lex fori at the domicil of the child simply is applied in
the United States 218 for controlling and transferring custody.
The Bustamante Code expressly reserves the law of the
forum, depriving the parents of their power "by reason of
incapacity or absence, or by judgment of a court." 219 To
justify the similar practice of the French 220 and the Belgian en courts, an author who is otherwise not favorable to
extending public policy has adduced that mistreatment of a
child arouses public indignation and harms morals. 222
Also in the countries prepared to observe foreign law,
temporary residence is sufficient not only to bring provisional
legal aid to the child so long as the national country does
not assume its care, 223 but also to assist a father or mother in
coercitive actions against a child, according to the local
law."24

5. Parental Interest in Child's Property
The Roman paternal "dominium" in all family property
had given way in the imperial period to a right of "administration and enjoyment" upon property acquired by the children and not excepted from this right. Property either of
infants or of children less than eighteen years old is still
subject to such paternal encroachment in many civil law
218

Restatement § 148.
Art. 72.
22 France: Law of July 24, 1889 as amended Nov. 15, 1921; on the application to foreigners see PILLET, Clunet 1892, 5, and 1 Traite 66o no. 328; WEISS,
4 Traite 157; App. Colmar (March 28, 1935) Clunet 1936, 642.
221 Belgium: Law of May 15, 1912 on Protection of Minors; for application
of provisions on the forfeiture of parental power to foreigners see App. Liege
(July xo, 1917) Pasicrisie 1917.2.254; Trib. Liege (Nov. 23, 1917) Pasicrisie
1918.3.82.
222
BATIFFOL> Revue Crit. 1937, 418, 429 and Traite 543, 544·
223 For this situation see Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 64;
Swiss BG. (Feb. 3, 1939) 65 BGE. I 13 (where it is stated that art. 7 of the
Hague Convention on custody does not cover the case).
224 Italy: Cass. Torino (April 13, 1909) Clunet 1910, 673 (Spanish parties).
Germany: KG. (Dec. 16, 1938) JW. 1939, 350 (Danish mother and daughter).
219

°

PARENTAL RELATIONS
countries, 225 including Louisiana. 226 By some American statutes, 227 a parent has control of the property given by him to
the child, although only as an administrator. Such control in
the predominant interest of the child, with or without 228 duty
to account for the revenue, is frequent in modern legislations.229 Common law and the legislations of Sweden and
Czarist and Soviet Russia do not contain any such legal
powers of parents, but at common law parents have a right
to the earnings of the child, which right affects the property
as well as produces obligations. In other countries, on the
contrary, earnings are a favorite exception to the management or usufruct of the parents.
In the law of conflicts, immovables must be treated separately, because of their particular position at common law.
(a) That immovables are governed by the lex situs also
in regard to the paternal rights, 230 was a doctrine shared by
many statutists and older French authors. 231 In more recent
times, no civil law text has followed this doctrine, 232 except
225 E.g.,

France: C. C. art. 384.
Germany: BGB. §§ 1649, 1652.
Switzerland: C. C. art. 292.
Italy: C. C. {1865) art. 228, C. C. (1942) art. 324.
Argentina: C. C. art. 287 {new 32I).
Brazil: C. C. art. 389.
Mexico: C. C. art. 430.
Peru: C. C. (1936) art. 398, 8.
Japan: C. C. arts. 890, 891.
China: C. C. art. 1088 par. 2.
226 La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart. 1932) art. 223.
227 Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri; see 4 VERNIER 23 § 232.
228 E.g., Austrian Allg. BGB. § I 50.
229 See VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 782.
230 STORY § 463; WESTLAKE § 166.
231 See CoLMET-DAAGE, Revue de droit fran<;ais et etranger 1844, 401, 406;
TROPLONG, 2 Droit civil explique, privileges et hypotheques, no. 429 {the legal
hypothec upon French immovables of a guardianship has been established
abroad, since the "statute" is a "real one").
232 Legal provisions in Germany: EG. art. I9; Poland: Law of I926 on
international private law, art. I9; Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. 20 par.
I; Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of I948, s. 23; C6digo
Bustamante art. 70.
Doctrine and practice in Belgium and France: see 6 LAURENT 36 §IS;
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the Montevideo Treaty of I 889; 233 its new draft of 1940
joins the general doctrine of the civil law, that the entire
assets of the child are governed uniformly by the personal
law. 234 This is the domiciliary or national law, ordinarily of
the parent, while in the C6digo Bustamante it is again the
law of the child. 235 For instance, the usufructuary interest
allowed to a parent by the French Civil Code (art. 3 84) is
said to depend upon the personal law of the parties. 236
But lrow is this mutual recognition among the countries
adhering to the personal law to be effectuated? For illustration, the French and German paternal rights in the real
property of a legitimate child are of different nature. The
French right is an ordinary usufruct; the German one has a
special character and is not recorded in the land register;
they differ also as to the periods of duration. If the father is
of French nationality, should his right be transformed with
respect to German immovables into a German uNutzniessung"? 237 This suggestion would amount to applying the law
of the situs as at common law. The system of personal law
requires rather that the French type of right be recognized
in its true nature in Germany; 238 consequently it should be
recorded in the German public register to satisfy the requirement of the law of situs for creating an ordinary usufruct. 289
2 Principes I83 no. 646; WEISS, 4 Traite ISO, ISI; Cass (civ.) (Jan.
13, I873) D.I873.I,297; Cass. (civ.) (March I4, I877) S.I878.I.25, D.1877.1.
385, Clunet I878, I67.
For the provisions of German EG. art. 28, Polish Law of I926, art. I9
par. 3, and Czechoslovakian law of I948, s. 23 respecting the Anglo-American treatment of immovables, see supra p. 367.
233
Treaty on international civil law (I889) art. IS.
284
Treaty on international civil law (1940) art. I9.
235 Art. 70.
236
8URVILLE 469 no. 3I9.
287
This was suggested by RAAPE 463, 476, 487.
238
RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. ( I93 I) 24I, 278.
239
4 FRANKENSTEIN 49·
ROLIN,
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(b) Personal property of the child is submitted everywhere to the personal law, i.e., the domiciliary law 240 or the
national law 241 of the parent.
The C6digo Bustamante limits the domain of the personal
law, by the proviso that no prejudice shall arise in foreign
countries "to the rights of third parties which may be granted
by local law and the local provisions in respect to publicity
and specialty of mortgage securities." 242 In the other countries this limitation is included in the rules on property
themselves.
6. Authority of Parent
A parent generally is entitled to represent his child in private transactions or court proceedings dealing with its personality as well as its property. The system of personal law
embraces all connected problems, such as the question
whether the parent is able to act on behalf of the child by
force of law, or must be appointed guardian, or needs authorization by a court or a family council for the special purpose.
Illustration: A German prince had a minor son who was a
British subject. The question for what transactions on behalf
of the son's property the father needed the consent of the
court controlling guardianship was decided by a German
court in accordance with the father's German law. (EG. art.
19; BGB. § 1643). 243 To the same effect, an English
father, 244 a Dutch mother, 245 and an American father 246
240 1 WHARTON §255 (adhering to German writers).
241 See, e.g., German EG. art. 19; NrBOYET 78 5 no. 67 5·
242 Art. 71.
243 KG. (March 14, 1910) 39 Jahrb. FG. A 198 (expressly rejecting the
application of the child's law).
244 LG. Darmstadt (Sept. 9, 1907) 9 Hessische Rechtsprechung (1909) 13
no. 6.
245 KG. (Dec. 19, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 15, 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 239, 242.
246 AG. Tauberbischofsheim (June 14, 1910) 20 Z.int.R. (1910) 545· Other
German cases: RG. (Feb. 9, 1925) 110 RGZ. 173 (a Polish father needed
authorization by the Polish court for disposing of a German immovable under
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were deemed, according to their respective laws, to be without authority to represent their children, so that temporary
trustees had to be locally appointed.
The practical difficulties and great costs involved in procuring sufficient authority in some states of this country have
thus come to be noticed in German courts. In one case, for
this reason, the American father preferred to let the child's
property remain in Europe. 247
It is doubtful, however, whether such observance of foreign law is usual in many countries. Common law conceptions
are opposed to subjecting dealings with immovables to the
personal law, and this view is shared in certain civil law countries.248 As to movables, the law governing contracts enters
into competition. Finally, peculiar considerations of convenience have a strong influence upon all rules respecting administration of estates. For these reasons, the subject ought
not to be discussed further at this place.
7. Duties of Support
Support due to children by parents and to parents by children is in most countries the subject of specific obligations dependent on legitimacy. 249 There is the same contrast as in
matrimonial matters, 250 between the rule asserted by the Restatement ( § 4 58) 251 of applying the law of the forum and
the Polish law). RG. (March 28, 1931) JW. 1932, 588 (an Italian mother,
living with the child in Germany, needed authorization by an Italian court).
KG. (April 8, 1914) Recht 1914, no. 2691 (an Austrian father must have the
consent of court for repudiating the child's share in a succession on death,
etc.).
247
OLG. Dresden (March 4, 1913) 35 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 63, 13 Z.int.R.
(1903) 467.
248

.

In the Netherlands the personal law of the parent governs also in
respect to immovables; see for cases VAN HASSELT 91 § 9·
249
In the United States, most statutes provide maintenance for natural children while in twenty jurisdictions only legitimate or legitimized children
have the right to support, see 4 VERNIER § 234·
250 Supra pp. 349-350·
251
For important complements, see Restatement, New York Annotations
306 § 457·
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the systems established upon the assumption of familiar
duties to support. 252 In such countries as France, the law of
the forum is applied only as a check upon the foreign national law under the theory of public policy, but it operates
on a large scale. 253 Also in England, it has been considered a
common law rule that "liability of a father to maintain his
son must be determined by the law of the place of the father's domicil." 254 It has been inferred from this rule that
generally any alimentary liability is governed by the law of
the domicil of the person against whom a claim is made. 255
This seems a doubtful conclusion. Should not the law of the
head of the family govern?
8. Determination of Domicil of the Child
The old rule of private law confers upon the child the
domicil of his father by operation of the law, irrespective of
the factual circumstances. 256 This is still so much a normal
conception that in interpreting the Treaty of Versailles a
minor has been considered resident at the place where his
father or guardian was residing. 257 Modern conceptions, how2 52 Germany: According to the dominant opinion, EG. art. 19 is applied
(law of the parent); see LG. Frankfurt (Oct. 29, 1931) J\V. 1932, 2307,
IPRspr. 1932, no. 91. Italy: Cass. (July 31, 1930) Monitore I93I.I.I32 no. 10
(prefers the personal law more favorable to the debtor!).
253 NAST, I Repert. 400 no. 38. In Belgium: the same trend of the courts is
noticed by PoULLET 435 no. 373, who advocates the standard of the forum
only as minimum award; cf. supra p. 349·
254 Salter, J., in Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [1918] 2 K. B. 90, 96.
Berkley v. Berkley (1952) 246 S. W. (zd) 804 (recovery by mother of
money expended for support of child).
255 DICEY (ed. 5) 55I Rule I43 (i) (2), 550 n. i, dropped in ed. 6. Siam:
Law on private international law of I939, § 36 par. I.
256 Thus, the German BGB. § I I said simply: A legitimate child shares the
father's domicil. Restatement§ 30. Swiss BG. (June 6, I907) 33 BGE. I 371,
378. The English cases have not properly decided whether a child really re·
tains its father's domicil as of the birth invariably throughout minor age; see
FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84 at 87.
257 Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. I9/Dec. I4, I927, Feb. 1,
1928) 7 Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes 502, commenting
on art. 296 of the Treaty of Versailles.
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ever, have established exceptions to the rule in more and
more countries. 258 Moreover, the cases in which the child
shares in the domicil of the mother are not identical in the
various jurisdictions.
Of general interest is the case where the husband of the
mother contests the child's legitimacy by a suit at the court of
his own domicil on the ground that this is the legal domicil
of the child. It has been objected that the law there in force
is operative only when the child is born in lawful wedlock,
which the plaintiff denies. However, the German Reichsgericht encounters this argument of a vicious circle (unduly
popular in the law of conflicts) by the consideration that a
child is to be regarded as legitimate so long as its position is
not destroyed by judgment. 259
Characterization. But the main question is, which law, the
personal law or the law of the forum, should operate in determining domicil by force of "law"? The general idea prevailing in this and other countries has been that, for the
purposes of jurisdiction and venue, "domicil" has to be characterized according to the local law of the forum. 260 The
Reichsgericht, however, declares that the foreign family law,
as the personal law of the father, is applicable even though
the problem is of a procedural character. 261 Jurisdiction in
particular for disputing legitimacy, thus, becomes a privilege
of the court at a domicil recognized by the country of the parent, a limitation of jurisdiction highly desirable in matters of
status regarding the entire family.
Other difficulties have been realized in practice, where a
parent having custody deserts the child. To impose upon a
child the domicil of an emigrated father, as a German court
258
Cf. Restatement §§ 31 ff. Also §II of the German BGB. (supra n. zs6)
has been altered by the Law of June 18, 1957.
259
RG. (Jan. IZ, 1939) HRR. 1939, no. 376.
26° France: App. Toulouse (May zz, 188o) Clunet, I88x, 61.
261 RG. decision, n. Z59 supra, and former decisions.
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believed to be the law, 262 is indefensible. The Restators have
found a better answer, but they maintain a fictitious domicil
of the child at the place of the parent who last abandoned
it. 263 A wholly satisfactory solution would probably be found,
if the habitual residence of the child were substituted for
the legal domicil, whenever the family life is definitely disrupted.
9· Tort
It may be briefly noted in recalling the analogy of marital
relations that in this country actions for tort between parents
and child as well as responsibility of a parent for wrongful
acts of a child are purely tort matters, while in civil law they
are primarily incidents of the family law.
C. CHANGE OF STATUS
I.

Mutability of Incidents of the Child's Status

As we have seen, legitimacy once created under the personal law of the parent, either by the birth of the child or by
legitimation, is a permanent status. However, the content of
the rights and duties flowing as incidents from this status is,
in the dominant opinion, modified by a change of the personal
law deemed to be decisive for the child's status. 264 The same
is true where custody has been awarded or transferred by
court order; the meaning of this custody is altered, if parent
and child (at common law) move to another jurisdiction or
(in most civil law countries) change their nationality, even
though the decree regularly will be recognized until reexamination of the situation of the child at the new forum of
the parties.
This phenomenon is the same as the better known change
26 2

Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 1934, 1369, IPRspr. 1934, no. 64.
Restatement§ 33, to be read with Restatement §§ 21, 54 and 109.
264 The subject is treated principally by RAAPE 464.
263
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of incidents of personal property rights where a movable is
transferred to another state. We have encountered a third
instance in the transformation of non-pecuniary matrimonial
relations. 265 Such mutability is a general feature of rights of
an absolute character.

Illustrations: (i) An American citizen and his fourteenyear-old daughter, a rich heiress from her mother, move to
France. Hereby the father acquires (by change of domicil
and renvoi) a usufruct upon the movables and French immovables belonging to the daughter and not subject to a
trust. The usufruct is recognized in all other countries.
( ii) An Italian married couple went to Hungary and acquired Hungarian nationality in order to obtain divorce.
Afterwards both were restored to Italian citizenship. By this
fact, Hungarian law lost any influence upon further decisions
concerning the custody over the children. 266
2.

Different Personal Laws

In the case where only one of the two parties, either the
parent or the child, changes his status, the decision depends
on the person whose law governs under the conflicts rule.

Illustration: A minor German Girl, by her marriage to a
Greek national, lost German and acquired Greek nationality.
But under her new Greek status, she neither became of age
nor subject to a guardianship of her husband. A German
court held that as article 19 of the Introductory Law to the
Civil Code considered only the national law of the parent,
the change of nationality did not affect the father's authority
to act on her behal£. 261
This rule, however, has been replaced in the Polish, Greek,
and Czechoslovakian Codes by rules referring to the last
national law common to both parties. 268
265

Supra p. 326.
Trib. Napoli (July 13, 1932) 25 Rivista (1933) 281.
OLG. Dresden {June 28, 1926) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 78,
§ r63o par. r and § 1633.
268
Supra p. 638.
66
2
267

cf.

BGB.
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Illustration: In the example just given, the result in a
Greek court would be the same. But if the father alone
changed to American nationality and not his daughter, their
relations would under the Greek rule remain governed by
German law, both before and after her marriage to the
Greek national.
This imitation of a rule good for protecting a wife against
her husband's arbitrary change of status is questionable. The
father is free to take minor children into a new citizenship
without their consent. Why then, should he be bound by their
unchanged nationality? Nevertheless, German law has a
similar rule, which forms an exception in favor of the lex
fori; if a German parent changes nationality while the child
retains German nationality, German law governs/69
3· Non-retroactivity
By reasonable interpretation of the conflicts rule, a change
of status does not operate with retroactive effect upon the incidents of parental relations. The name of the child, an
emancipation performed under the former law, income from
the child's property once devolved to the parent, 270 remain
unaffected. For instance, under the German Civil Code
( § 1620), a daughter had a right to a trousseau in the case of
marriage. The Italian Supreme Court granted a suit of a
girl, formerly of German nationality but Italian by marriage,
against her German mother, on the ground that the marriage
only perfected the mother's pre-existent obligation. 271 The
German Reichsgericht decided to the same effect in a case
where a German father had acquired Swiss nationality. 272
Such interpretations, restricting the impact of the change of
269 EG. art. 19 sentence 2. No analogous application to foreign children is
permitted in the prevailing opinion, see LEWALD 132 no. 183; RAAPE 469.
21o STAUFFER, NAG. 62 no. 2.
2 71 Cass. Ita!. (July 31, 1930) 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 844.
272 RG. (April 12, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449·
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status, are certainly more valuable than any theory of vested
rights of parents and children.
No American doctrine on this subject seems to exist. Results similar to those described could be reached by an analogy to the doctrine obtaining in the case of matrimonial
property. Thus each single incident would be governed by
the law of the parent's domicil at the time of the incident.

CHAPTER
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Illegitimate Children
I.

1

MoTHER AND CHILD

WOMAN and her child born out of wedlock are
considered to be in blood relationship; in the legislations of the French type, however, no claim can be
based upon it before the mother recognizes the child. The
relationship is characterized either as "illegitimate" and of
a special nature or assimilated to the regular mother-child
relation constituted by wedlock. Differences exist also in
almost every particular. They are mirrored by the multiformity of the conflicts rules.

A
1.

Contacts

The law of the forum is applied in the United States 2 and
under the present Montevideo Treaty. 3
Comparative substantive law:
ROBBINS and DEAK, "The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children:
A Comparative Study," 30 Col. L. Rev. ( 1930) 308-329 (a historical summary).
FREUND, Illegitimacy Laws of the United States and Certain Foreign Countries, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 42 (1919).
Illegitimacy, Standards of Legal Protection for Children Born out of Wedlock, Report of Regional Conferences, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 77 (1921).
LUNDBERG, Children of Illegitimate Birth and Measures for their Protection,
U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 166 (1926).
TOMFORDE, DIEFENBACH, WEBLER, Das Recht des unehe)ichen Kindes und
seiner Mutter im In-und Ausland (ed. 5, 1953).
REXROTH, Uneheliche Kinder, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (1938) 633-676.
2
U. S. Restatement § 454·
3 Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law (1889), art. 18: The
rights and duties resulting from illegitimacy are governed by the law of the
state in which they are claimed to be exercised.
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Pre I. art. VI ( 10).
Codigo Bustamante art. 63 as to the declarations of maternity.
1
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Most countries refer to the personal law of the mother,
tested by her domicil 4 or nationality. 5
Minority solutions refer to the child's personal law 6 or
resort to the so-called distributive application of both parties'
laws, so as to determine the duties of either party by his or
her law. 7
The English law is sui generis. Only English law is applied, and then only if the child is born in England or, if born
abroad, of English parents. 8
2.

Scope
The applicable law covers the questions:
Whether the mother enjoys a power analogous to that of
a legitimate father;
What other rights she may have over the child's person
and property; 9

4 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 220 no. 53; BoRUM 126. Also BAR,
§ 204 was of this opinion.
5 Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, §II.
Germany: EG. art. 20 with regard to Germans but generally extended to
foreigners. RG. (May 13, 19II) 76 RGZ. 283; KG. (July 9, 1924) 50 Z.
Ziv. Proz. (1926) 337; OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. 26, 1926) 37 Z.int.R. (1927)
388.
Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 19: last common national law; in absence of such
the national law of the mother at birth.
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. I.
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 20: Where the laws of mother and child differ,
the last common national law; conforming Czechoslovakian law on private
international law of 1948, §§ 25, 26.
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law § 30 par. 2.
Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. 2, 3 (but child's law if more favorable).
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 17, 1936) W. 1936, no. 721
(speaking of a case where both parties were of the same foreign nationality
at the time of birth of the child).
6 Finland: Law of December 5, 1929, § 20.
Codigo Bustamante: art. 64 as to the name of the child.
7
Japan: Law of June 15, 1898, art. r8; China: Law of Aug. 5, 1918, arts.
16, 17. For details see infra p. 659.
8
2 HALSBURY ( 1938) 583 no. 804.
9
Rb. Haag (Nov. 29, 1934) W. 1936, no. 652 (authority of the mother
acknowledged under German law, while under Dutch law a guardian ought
to have been appointed).
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Whether the child bears the name of the mother/ 0 and
whether the mother's husband may give his name to the
child; 11
Whether it shares her domicil by force of law; 12 and
The question of alimentary duties of each party.
As the above-mentioned conflicts rules differ greatly from
those on legitimacy, a court may have to consider a person
an illegitimate child of his mother under one law and a legitimate child of his father under another law, as, for instance,
by German conflicts rules, where the father is of Finnish nationality and the mother a German. 13 This split result approaches American principles. 14 Equally surprising is the outcome in a French case where a Polish man and an Italian
woman both recognize their child. By the father's recognition the child acquired Polish nationality, and consequently
Polish law was applied; under Polish municipal law the
mother had authority to act in the name of the child, while
under her own Italian law this authority would have belonged to the father. 15
The inclination of French courts to apply French law
against all their own principles has inspired one of the most
objectionable decisions of the Court of Cassation. A French
mother recognized her illegitimate daughter, after the latter's marriage to an Englishman had made her a British subject, and sued for support. Although a reciprocal action of
the daughter would have been determined (and denied) by
C6digo Bustamante art. 64 (law of child).
German courts and prevailing doctrine, see RG. (Nov. 23, 1927) 119
RGZ. 44; NUSSBAUM, IPR. 175; RAAPE 497 ff.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 25, 1923) W. 11072.
Contra: the Czechoslovakian Law of 1948 on private international law,
§ 28, referring to the national law of the child.
12 HABICHT 158.
13 RAAPE 500.
14 Suf>ra pp. 601-603.
15 Triv. civ. Nice (Feb. 2, 1903) Clunet 1903, 859. Cf. Italian C. C. (1865)
art. 184 par. 2.
1o
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English law, the mother's claim for aliments was granted
under French law, which, in the court's conception, conferred
upon the mother "an imprescriptible right of recognizing the
child." 16 The fact that the affection of this mother for her
daughter was evidently discovered only after about twenty
years when wealth had come to the latter should exclude any
equitable considerations that might otherwise move a court.
Change of status. As a rule, a change of the personal law
on which the choice of law depends is determinative, the relationship between mother and child, of course, being determined originally according to the law applicable at the
time of the birth. Yet, the German Code (EG. article 20)
reserves application of German law in the case where the
mother becomes a foreigner and the child remains a German.
This contrasts unfavorably with the Dutch conceptions under
which a foreign child retains what rights it acquired by birth,
although the mother may acquire Dutch nationality and not
recognize her child according to Dutch law. 11

II.

FATHER AND CHILD

17

a

r. Classification

Today in the domestic laws, some right of a child to support by his illegitimate father is universally known. The
nature of the claim varies greatly, however; it may be based
on a natural obligation, a liability to exonerate the public
relief organizations from avoidable charges, tortious acts
accompanying the cohabitation (rape, seduction, etcetera),
the simple fact of cohabitation itself, or the fact of impreg16 Cass. (civ.) (March 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1938, 653, Nouv. Revue 1938,
120, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 124, criticized by BAT!FFOL, Revue Crit. 1938, 655.
17 VAN HASSELT, Supplement 32.
17 a An excellent survey of the German conflicts rules on the subject by
NEUHAUS, Die Verpllichtungen des unehelichen Vaters im deutschen internationalen Privatrecht ( 1953). On Swiss law, AUBERT, L'action en recherche
de paternite, 12 Schwz. Jb. (1955) 103 ff.
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nation. InN orway and Finland, an obligation to pay alimony
is imposed on any man who has cohabited with the mother
during the critical period (so-called pay-father), the liability
being entirely severed from any presumption of paternity.
In addition to the support for the child, if a man is assumed to be the true father, other incidents may be included
in the relationship between the parties, such as those concerning the name of the child, care and education, marriage impediments, inheritance rights of the child, alimentary rights
of the father, et cetera. The municipal laws acknowledge
more or fewer of such incidents, and some of them establish
a gradation according to different situations. For instance,
the Swiss Civil Code includes, besides the ordinary protection
of children born out of wedlock, the award of "status" to a
child either by recognition or, in certain cases such as seduction, by judgment (art. 3 23). A special kind of "illegitimate
relationship" is created with effects on name, care and education, and nationality; courts may even confer parental power
on the father. Also, the ordinary lawsuit for support may
vary in correspondence with the varying structure of the
rights allotted. The child may be provided with a simple action for payment of money, or with an action seeking a formal declaration of paternity, or, combining these two types
of remedy, with a petition for incidental declaration of paternity constituting res judicata and for adjudication of payments.
Many other differences of the municipal regulations have
made the corresponding conflicts rules a field of utter confusion, often deplored; public policy, playing a dominant
role, adds complication.
In most countries, the conflicts rule is unsettled. Where
statutory provisions exist, they are imperfect or need construction. As a typical example, article 21 of the German Introductory Law refers to the mother's national law only for
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the purpose of determining the support duty of the father.
Extension of this rule to the entire relation between father
and child was assumed for a time and embodied in the Polish
Law of I 926 (article 2 I, paragraph I) .17b Opinion prevailing now prefers for substantial reasons, to take the limitation of the rule literally and to reserve all problems other
than those related to support to the father's personallaw. 18
An action for support, however, although combined with a
demand for a preliminary declaratory statement of paternity, is considered to fall under the enacted rule. 19
Recent legislators are aware of the broader sphere of the
problem. The Finnish Law of I929 establishes different
rules, the mother's personal law governing generally, while
the illegitimate father's law determines inheritance rights. 20
The C6digo Bustamante assigns to the personal law of the
child the rules concerning its right to a name, determining
the proofs of filiation, and regulating the child's inheritance
(article 57), but applies the lex fori to the right of maintenance (article 59) .21 Also, a draft of the Greek Civil Code
made similar distinctions; the Code rejecting them is clearly
intended to cover the entire ground, like the Polish law. 22 A
similar distinction follows from the Swiss statute, which subjects status questions, especially of domiciled foreigners, to
the national law (NAG. article 8), but purely alimentary
17b Greece: C.
18 See LEWALD

C. art. 20.
145 no. 203; RAAPE 529 ff. and IPR. 345; M. WoLFF, IPR.
218; LG. Konigsberg (May 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 66; OLG. Frankfurt
am Main (August 15, 1953) StAZ. 1953, 253; OLG. Dusseldorf (March r,
1957) Ehe und Familie 1957, 182. Contra: NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 176 n. 4,
against whom 4 FRANKENSTEIN 108 n. 2.
1 9 LG. Frankfurt a. M. (Aug. 17, 1932) JW. 1933, 191, IPRspr. 1933, no. 48.
20 HERNBERG, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 107.
21 In the French and English translations, 86 League of Nations Treaty
Series ( 1929) No. 1950, pp. 137, 270, article 59 is incorrectly restricted to
legitimate children. The French translation of article 57 is mistaken in rendering "legitimidad" by "paternite," 86 ibid. p. 137.
22 Draft, art. 25 par. 2 (Revue Crit. 1938, 348); see MARIDAKIS, II
Z.ausl.PR. (1938) 124; C. C. (1940) art. 20.
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suits, according to general principles, to the law of the defendant's domiciU 3 The courts classify the above mentioned
action for declaration of "status" as a status in the sense of
the first group, and they therefore treat it as belonging to
exclusive Swiss jurisdiction. 24 The Dutch H of den Haag
recognized in 1937 an ordinary Swiss judgment condemning
a Dutchman as illegitimate father to pay alimony, although
he would have been able to prove the defense of plurium
concumbentium (several cohabitants), exonerating him under Dutch, though not under Swiss law; the problem was
thought to concern the status of the child, determinative in
the opinion of the Court. 25 The Dutch Supreme Court, however, subsequently held that support is not relative to status,
because a preliminary declaration of paternity is no more
than a mere fact; hence, the law of the defendant Dutchman
was applied. 26
Without doubt, a conflicts rule limited to the duty of support is insufficient to cover the field, and it may well be that
the contacts should be chosen differently for support and the
other incidents of illegitimate parenthood.
2.

Contacts

The rule applying the law of the place of conception was
originated by the tort idea in European common law prac23 BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503; BG. (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE.
I ros; BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92.
24 The action is available only against Swiss nationals before Swiss courts;
see BG. (July 6, 1916) 42 BGE. II 332; BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503;
BG. (Nov. 22, 1934) 6o BGE. II 338. Where the defendant is an Italian,
Italian law governs, and an action for declaration of status, if any, must be
instituted in Italian courts, Cour de Justice, Geneve (June 21, 1928) 36 SJZ.
( 1939-1940) 203 no. 141.
25 Hof den Haag (April 26, 1937) W. 1937, no. 538.
26 H. R. (April r, 1938) W. 1938, no. 989. For criticism see VAN DER FLIER,
Grotius 1939, 190 and citations. An analogous decision: Hof Arnhem (Nov.
15, 1938) W. 1939 no. 299 (illegitimate child born in Czechoslovakia, and of
Czech nationality, defendant of Dutch nationality; the alimentary duty belongs to the patrimonial law; the personal law includes, at the most, the
declaration of paternity); recently, H. R. (Dec. 2, 1955) N. J. 1956 no. 33·
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tice and was until recently applied in Sweden. Sometimes,
the birthplace replaces the less practical place of conception. 29
Numerous rules subject the entire matter to the law of the
forum, 3 ') eithe~ because the matter is regarded as of imperative policy or because it lacks a convincing classification.
Personal law is applied in very different conceptions, as
determined by:
The domicil of the mother at the time of the conception
or birth; :n the domicil of the man 32 at the time of concep27 Former German common law: LG. Frankfurt a. M. (Jan. 25, I893) 3
Z.int.R. (I893) su.
28 Swedish Sup. Ct. (Hogsta Domstol) (Aug. I8, I9I5) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928)
87I (Swedish defendant, cohabitation in Hamburg; exceptio plurium concumbentium admitted according to German law), overruled by H. D. (April
I3, I946) IS Z.ausl.PR. (I949/so) 502 (lex fori).
29 The Netherlands: H. R. (Feb. 7, I9I9) W. I0393, N.J. I9I9, 322. Italy,
interprovincial law: Cass. (April 30, I926) Giur. Ita!. I926, I, r, 1055·
Italy: Cass. (March 6, I953) Rivista I954, 99, Revue Crit. 1954, 37I (in the
case of a nonrecognizable child).
30 SAVIGNY § 374 at p. 279 j tr. by GUTHRIE p. 254·
United States: Restatement §454: "No action can be maintained on a foreign bastardy statute." C6digo Bustamante art. 59 (for aliments).
Austria: OGH. (Feb. I9, I924) 6 SZ. no. 66; OGH. (March 4, I937) I9
SZ. no. 70; WALKER 8I5 and in I KLANG's Kommentar 328. But see infra n.
35. 38.
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hojesteret) (June 22, I915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) 865;
Criminal and Police Court Copenhague (May 4, I897) IO Z.int.R. (I900) 293.
Finland: Law of I929, § 2I sentence I (for aliments) ; § 2I sentence 2 (for
all claims against Finns).
Norway: Sup. Ct. (Sept. 24, I953) 25 Nordisk Tidsskrift (I955) 49, Clunet
I955. 456.
Sweden: Sup. Ct. (April I3, 1946) IS Z.ausl.PR. (I949/so) 502j MICHAEL!,
Internationales Privatrecht (I948) 225 ff.; HuLT, Foraldrar och barn enligt
svensk internationell privatriitt ( I943) II2 ff.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (June 29, I925) W. II424i but contra
Hof den Haag (May 20, 1927) W. u8I4i Rb. Maastricht (April 28, I932)
W. 12684 and almost all other decisions; see infra n. 3 8.
The Treaty of Montevideo (I889) art. I8, Treaty of Montevideo (I940)
art. 22 provide that the rights and duties concerning illegitimate filiation are
governed by the law of the state in which they ought to be "effective."
Similar, Nicaragua C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. VI ( IO). It is highly obscure as to
what this means.
st Domicil of the mother:
(a) At the time of birth: older Prussian practice, see Gebhardsche Materialien 2I6.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 5, I956) 82 BGE. II 570, 575, overruling the reference to the law of the man's domicil at the time of conception, infra n. 33·
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tion; 33 the domicil of the man as defendant at the time of
the commencement of the action; 34 the national law of the
mother; 35 of the child; 36 of both cumulatively; 37 the national
law of the man; 38 of the man and of the child, cumulatively. 39
(b) At the time of conception: last Prussian practice before 1900 following
the thoroughly considered Plenary decision of the Obertribunal (Feb. 1, 1851)
37 Entsch. no. 1; FoERSTER-Eccws 1 Theorie und Praxis des Preussischen
Privatrechts (ed. 5, 1887) 64; alleged Norwegian practice, but controversial,
see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 128 and now supra n. 30.
32 Domicil of the man:
England: Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [1918] 2 K. B. 90, per Salter,
]. ; WESTLAKE 105 § 58a concludes convincingly that "the liability of a father
to maintain his son is determined solely by the law of the father's domicile."
But BEALE 1433 § 457.2 infers the primary importance of the place "where
support is needed," meaning probably the domicil of the child.
Norway: Sup. Ct. (1918) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 873 no. 52.
33 Switzerland: BG., Civ. Div. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92, following BG., Constitutional Division (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE. I 105; Bern 47
ZBJV. 663, no. 43; BG. (April 3, 1952) 78 BGE. II zoo. See ScHNITZER I 429.
Overruled by the decision supra n. 31.
34 France: NIBOYET, Notions Sommaires ( 1937) 192 no. 320. Former obiter
dictum of the Swiss BG. (Oct. 2, 1913) 39 BGE. II 495, 499; BG. (Oct. 22,
1919) 45 BGE. II 503.
35 National law of mother:
Germany: EG. art. 21.
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 12.
Czechoslovakia: Draft of Code on International Private Law, § 36 (1),
adopted by Sup. Ct. Briinn (Dec. 9, 1927) ]W. 1928, 1476; contra the law of
I 948, see infra n. 36.
36 National law of the child:
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (Aug. 29, 1900) 84 0 Direito 547 (inheritance by
will).
Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 27 (except
where both father and mother are domiciled in Czechoslovakia, sentence 2).
Finland: Law of 1929, § 21 in fine (claims other than for aliments against
foreigners).
France: some decisions before the first world war following 5 LAURENT 515,
523 ff. and other writers; again in increasing consistency: Cass. (req.) (June
8, 1921) Mihaesco, Revue 1924, 73; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 20, 1925) Tomatis,
8.1925.1.49, D.I925.1.177, Clunet 1925, 709, Revue 1925, 532; Cass. (civ.)
(April 1, 1930) D.1930.1.89, Clunet 1930, 973, Revue 1930, Cass. (req.)
(March 5, 1935) Fernandez, D.1935·1.57, Revue Crit. 1935, 775, Nouv. Revue
1935, 58; Cass. (civ.) (July zo, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 694; Cass. (civ.)
(Dec. 8, 1953) Revue Crit. 1955, 133·
Similar for foreign children: Cass. (civ.) (June 21, 1935) Gaz. Pal. 1935·
2.348; App. Colmar (June 15, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1934, 809.
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 2, 1913) W. 9557, Clunet 1920,
765 (child born in the Portuguese colony of Loanda, Dutch father, Portuguese law); Rb. Rotterdam (June 25, 1934) N. ]. 1935, 960 ("constant prac-
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3. Public Policy
(a) After having produced every possible opinion on the
subject, the French doctrine now struggles to keep a balance
between the personal (national) law of the child, which is
applicable in theory, and the French law which is applied on
many grounds. In the first place, French law prevails where
French nationality depends on filiation, since it ought never
to be based on a foreign law. 40 "The question of filiation is
tice"); Rb. Haarlem (Nov. 2, I926) W. n697 {termination of alimentary
right). Cf. also I VAN HASSELT 78 j VAN DER FLIER, Grotius I937, I66 j VAN DER
FLIER, Grotius I939, I90. This practice was overruled by H. R. (April I,
I938) N. ]. I938 no. 989, cf. infra n. 38.
Belgium: Cass. (March 20, I94I) Pasicrisie I94I I 86, 10 Giur. Comp. DIP.
( I944) I72; Cour Gand (March II, I954) Pasicrisie 1955 II 50.
Codigo Bustamante art. 57 ( cf. art. 59).
37 National law of mother and child cumulatively:
Poland: Law of I926, art. 21 (except where both father and mother are
domiciled in Poland, art. 2I par. 2).
Writers, especially in Italy, see MoRELLI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1934)
III 142 no. 476.
38 National law of defendant:
Austria OGH. {Feb. 8, 1938) 20 SZ. 64, no. 34· Cf. ibid. 265, no. 128; but
see for public policy, infra n. 44, and for the statute of I94I, supra n. 35·
France: Courts in former periods, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 381 n. 2,
and still App. Poitiers (Jan. 29, I929) Clunet 1929, 1046; SURVILLE 448 no.
306; NIBOYET 757 no. 645, 763 no. 649, and NIBOYET, Note S.1925.1.305.
Netherlands: Present prevailing practice, Hof Arnhem (Feb. 26, 1952) N.J.
1953 no. 507; Rb. Amsterdam (April 8, I954) N. J. I954 no. 639.
Germany: for problems other than alimentary, see supra n. 18.
Greece: C. C. {1940) art. 20.
Italy: Cass. (Oct. 21, 1925) 17 Rivista (1926) 515; App. Milano {May I2,
193I) Monitore I93I, 6I2, sanctioned now by C. C. art. 20 par. I, as interpreted by the prevailing opinion, MaN ACO, L'efficacia I74; MoRELLI, Elementi 125.
Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. 2 {but child's law if more favorable, par. 3).
Hungary: Decree-Law no. 23/1952, § 17 {but Hungarian law if child has
Hungarian domicil or nationality).
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § 36 {only support).
39 National law of father and child:
France: a few decisions after the war, see J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 494
n. 5·
Italy: Cass. {April 7, I932) Foro Ita!. Rep. I932, Filiazione 686 nos. 38,
39; Cass. (July IO, 1936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. I45 no. 75·
4 Cass. (civ.)
(Nov. 30, 1920) D.I92I.I.I77, S.I921.1.24I, Clunet 1923,
89; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 25, and March 3I, 1930) D.I930.1.II3, S.1930.I.321.
Cf. GAUDEMET, Rev. Trim. D. Civ. I92I, 2I8; see supra p. 149· This practice
is now codified by the Code of Nationality of 1945, art. 27.
Luxemburg: Cour d'appel (June 2I, I955) 16 Pasicrisie Lux. 362.
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absorbed by the higher one of nationality." 41 Only once, in a
decision of the Court of Paris, does the private law question
seem to have been duly isolated. 42 Where a child is born in
France, it is thought invested with a provisional French nationality and, for this reason, subject to French law; moreover, it cannot lose this provisional nationality except by
French law or a foreign law similar to the French. 43
(b) In an analogous way the law of the forum prevails
in some other countries, when one party 44 or the defendant 45
is a subject of the forum, or both parties 46 dwell within the
forum. The Polish law declares Polish law applicable (instead of the common nationality of mother and child at the
time of birth), if both father and mother are domiciled in
Poland at the time of birth and Polish law is more favorable
to the child. 47 German law refuses to impose upon a German
defendant a duty of support beyond what the internal law
grants. 48 These exceptions to the personal law do not leave
41

Trib. Nancy (Feb. 13, 1904) D.1904.2.249·
Cour Paris (Nov. 4, 1932); cf. Cass. (civ.) (July 21, 1933) Revue Crit.
1934, 405 ff., criticized by LEREBOURs--PIGEONNIERE 414 n. I.
43 Cour Paris (July 2, I926) D. H. 1926. 44I, Clunet 1927, 77·
44 Austria: OGH. (1938) 20 SZ. 265, no. 128 (dictum).
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hiijesteret) (June 22, 1915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 865
and Western Court (Vestre Landsret) (Oct. 4, 1928) 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933)
924 (mere residence of the father at the commencement of the action suffices
for application of Danish law).
The Netherlands: often, although not consistently, see I VAN HASSELT 79
and Supplement 3I ff.
45 Switzerland: OG. Ziirich (Oct. 13, 1936) Bl.f.Ziirch. Rspr. I938, 39, no.
21.
46 Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG.
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 7; LG. Dusseldorf (April 23,
1951) IPRspr. 195o-51 no. 106 (Norwegian mother and child); RAAPE, IPR
344 f. (controversial).
47 Poland: Law of I926, art. 21 par. 2. Similarly Czechoslovakia: Law of
1948 on private international law, § 27 sentence 2.
48 Germany: EG. art. 21 last clause: "No greater claims, however, can be
enforced than what have been constituted by German law." Understood as
merely protecting Germans, RGR. Kom., n. 2 before § 1705; LG. Hartenstein
(Nov. I8, 1929) IPSspr. 1930, no. 79· What is the equivalent of an award
under the German law? See for illustration cases in IPRspr. 1930, nos. 8o-83.
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 194I, § 12 sentence 2.
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § 36 par. 2.
42

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

665

much space to the pretended principle. There are yet others.
(c) Where, as between foreign parties, their national law
excludes suits involving the question of paternity, the action
is dismissed as a rule by courts following the nationality principle. Thus, the Italian provision before 1939, that no actions lay on the ground of paternity except in the cases of abduction or rape, was observed in Germany, 49 France, et
cetera. On the other hand, the action is also rejected where
the national law allows but the municipal law of the forum
refuses the claim. So long as the famous maxim of the Code
N apo!Con (article 340) was in full sway that uza recherche
de la paternite est interdite," foreign children were unable to
sue their foreign parents in France, 50 and the same prohibitive policy operated in Italy, 51 the Netherlands, 52 Guatemala,53 etcetera.
The French courts have transferred this doctrine to their
mitigated provision, as it has stood since 1912.53a No action
is admitted, unless the precautions and conditions precedent
provided in the present article 340 are fulfilled, i.e., unless
paternity appears manifest by written evidence or recognition. In this opinion, foreign laws more liberal than the
French offend the public order aiming at "the honor and
peace of families." 54 Laws which render paternity actions
still more difficult than the French have free play. 55
49 LG. Stuttgart (Dec. 3I, I931) JW. I932, I4I5 1 IPRspr. I932, no. 93,
against RAAPE 52I. Dutch parties: no action according to BW. arts. 338, 342
par. I, 343 par. I, 344, LG. Leipzig (Sept. 23, I933) IPRspr. I933, no. 49·
But see below n. 63. The new Italian C. C. (I938) art. 267, C. C. (I942) art.
269, recognizes four grounds for action.
5 0 Contra, 2 FIORE 272 no. 733, 279 no. 739, 283 no. 741.
51 FEDOZZI 496.
52 BW. art. 342 par. I. In accordance, Benelux-Draft, art. 9 par. 4·
53 MATOS 324 ff. nos. 27I 1 272.
53 nThe law of July IS, I955 has further amended the Code civil, especially by granting a claim for support to adulterous and incestuous children.
54 Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 20, I925) S.I925.1.49; and in most definite manner
Cass. (civ.) Rohmann c. Kellerhals es-qual (March 26, I935) S.I936.I.89,
D.I935·I.6I, Nouv. Revue 1935, 58, Revue Crit. I935, 768; Cass. (civ.) (Nov.
30, I938) Gaz. Pal. I939.I.203, Nouv. Revue I938, 838.
5 5 See the criticism of BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1934, 618; ibid. I935, 617.
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To illustrate special points, domestic provisions respecting the time limit within which the child's conception is presumed are often held to be imperative. The old Prussian
practice did not follow this view; whether the European common law, determining the time as running from the 3ooth to
the I82nd day, or the Prussian Landrecht, fixing it from the
2 85th to the 2 I Oth day should be applied, was determined
according to the domicil of the mother. 56 But the courts of
Austria 57 and France 58 refused to deviate from their own
rules. Also, whether a defendant whose cohabitation is
proved may raise the defense of several cohabitants is decided by contradictory rules, according to the personal law or
the lex fori,S 9 etcetera.
Reasonably, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has stated that
the exception allowed the defendant cohabitant under article
3 I 5 of the Swiss Code, that the child's mother led a frivolous life, does not imperatively operate against a foreign national law, since such dissimilarities are to be borne under the
principle of territorialism (meaning domicil) dominating the
Swiss international private law. 60
Finally, the award of alimony often is either simply conPrussian Obertribunal, 54 Striethorst 47, no. 12.
OGH. (March 4, 1937) 19 SZ. no. 70, applying Allg. BGB. § 163.
58 France: after the time determined in C. C. art. 340, a suit is not taken in
hand, even though the child acquired French nationality only after the end of
it; Cass. {req.) (July 15, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 151; Cass. (civ.) (May 27,
1937) Revue Crit. 1938, 82. Cf. NmOYET, Revue Crit. 1934, 135; BATIFFOL,
Revue Crit. 1935, 622; ibid. 1938, 83; see also the criticism by COSTE-FLORET,
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 129 no. 64. Contra: Cour Paris (March 14, 1952) Revue
Crit. 1952, 325.
59 Personal Law: Also on this point the Prussian courts comtantly applied
the domiciliary law of the mother; see I REHBEIN 84, no. 23. Germany: personal law of the mother against foreign defendants, see LEWALD 144, 146 If.;
RAAPE 513. Lex fori: Austria: OGH. (Feb. 19, 1924) 6 SZ. 152 no. 66, and
WALKER 818 n. 59, declaring the rejection of exceptio plurium concumbentium
(Allg. BGB. § 163) as imperative, contra: OGH. (Sept. 21, 1946) OJZ. 1947,
uo, 15 Z.ausi.PR. (1949/so) 466; OGH. (March 3, 1948) 21 SZ. (1946-48)
no. 77, 15 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1949/so) 467.
On the Dutch controversy, supra pp. 659-660.
60 BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 94·
56
57
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trolled by the law of the forum, 61 or, even if the personal law
is primarily applied, the usual amounts of support are considered as the maximum 62 or, conversely, the minimum. 63
By the latter consideration, a foreign law granting little or
no support is eliminated as inhuman or scandalous.
What persons may be liable to support the child, 64 or in
what circumstances the right to institute the action is forfeited or lost by limitation, 65 has been held subject to the personal law.
4· Time Element

If the law of the place of birth or the mother's personal
law at this date obtains, it is implied that a pregnant girl
who, before confinement, changes her nationality by marriage
or otherwise, or changes her domicil, respectively, will
thereby affect the fate of the child she gives birth to afterwards, unless the child acquires a nationality of its own by
jus soli. On the other hand, a change in the local connections
6 1 The lower Dutch courts applied the personal law of a natural father or
of the minor child to the question who had to sue for the child; but the
Supreme Court, H. R. (June 13, 19Z4) W. IIZ95 declared the appointment of
a special curator under art. 344h of the Dutch BW. indispensable.
6 2 France: Most decisions take it for granted that French law is applicable;
Trib. Seine (June 18, 1934) Clunet 1935, 619. BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937,
431 praises the prudence of Cass. (civ.) (July 20, 1936) Gaz.Pal.1936.2.696,
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 135 no. 65, Revue Crit. 1937, 694 because the court specifies the characteristics of § 1708 of the German BGB. which make the section
inapplicable in France.
Germany: RAAPE 5z1 contends that an award under foreign law which
would ruin the defendant should not be given. Contra: Italy: FEDOZZI 496.
63
Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG.
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) JW. 1934, 2644, IPRspr. 1934, no. 7 (English
mother and child); AG. Kehl (Sept. 22, 1935) 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no.
242 (Luxemburg); LG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Old
Rumania).
Contra: Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 11, 1933) Clunet 1933, 1041
(Belgian public order not interested). Germany: LG. Stuttgart (Dec. 31,
193 I) ]W. 1932, 3831.
64
German LG. Hartenstein (Nov. 18, 1929) IPRspr. 1930, no. 79 (paternal
grandfather liable under Swiss law).
65
Swiss BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503, 505.
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of the person whose personal law at birth is decisive does not
affect alimentary duties as once established or denied. 66 The
Polish law generalizes this rule so as to include all relations
between father and child. 67
French courts followed this rule until the first World
War 68 and occasionally later up to 1920.69 As, however, the
cases became more frequent where a child changed its nationality between its birth and a judgment for alimentation, the
highest Court developed a peculiar doctrine amounting to the
following rules: A foreign child acquiring French nationality
is subjected to French law. 70 A child of French nationality
changing to foreign citizenship is also subject to French law
on the ground of the theory of vested rights. 71 This theory
"turns so as only to protect the lex fori," 72 a purpose which
seems disproportional to the fact that the French law is backward on this point and puts the child at a disadvantage.
No such questions arise in this country, as each court applies its own state statute.

5· Renvoi
In this particular field, the German statute has omitted to
provide for renvoi. It has been applied nevertheless/ 3 against
some opposition. 74
Swiss BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89.
Germany: RAAPE 514; same, so Recueil 1934 IV 405, 454ff.
Italy: Cass. (Dec. 2, 1933) Foro Ita!. I934.I.683.
67 Poland: Law of 1926, art. 21.
68 VALERY I I45 no. 807; BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 4IO no. 35; 3 ARMIN JON 55
no. 47• Cf. J, DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 38I.
69 Cour Paris (Dec. 22, I92o) S.1921.2.97·
7 Cass. (req.) (June 8, 1921) Mihaesco, Revue I924. 73; Cour Paris
(March 27, 1933) Contardo, Revue Crit. 1934, 135; Cass. (req.) (July IS,
1936) Contardo c. Chaffy, Revue Crit. 1937, I 52; Cass. (civ.) (May 27, 1937)
Roure c. Maumy, Revue Crit. 1938, 82; Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, 1949) Revue
Crit. 1950, 65, Clunet I950, 180.
71 Cass. (civ.) (June 28, I932) Revue 1932, 685 at 688, Clunet I933• 368;
Cass. (civ.) (May 27, I937) Revue Crit. 1938, 82.
72 J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 499·
73 AG. Stuttgart (Oct. 22, 1930) JW. I93I, IS7, IPRspr. I93I, no. 87 (Amer66
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RECOGNITION OF A CHILD

In the French system, adopted in many countries, acknowledgment of a child by father or mother must precede any
claim of rights on the ground of illegitimate relationship and
moreover is a condition of legitimation. In another phase,
recognition may improve the situation of an illegitimate child
without reaching full legitimation (Greece, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and others) or only exclude the exceptio plurium concumbentium (Germany) . We are dealing therefore
not with one but several distinguishable institutions of private law.
I.

Formalities

Formalities, which greatly differ, 75 would be expected to
suffice if complying with the place where the act of recognition occurs. 76 But the rule ((locus regit actum" is challenged
by the personal law. Dominant opinion in France, in particular, requires a formal "authentic" declaration such as is
usual in France when a Frenchman recognizes a child abroad
and lets the local regulation determine only what solemnity
"authentic" documents ought to have. 77
In the Restatement, § 140, the law of the parent's domicil
ican mother: the American courts, applying the law of the forum, are
deemed to approve of the domiciliary court doing the same, following an
opinion of the writer); LG. Flensburg (Dec. 17, 1952) MDR. 1953, 298, Revue
Crit. 1953, 792. Also the French App. Rennes (July 24, 1923) Clunet 1924,
410 seems to apply New York law because the father still was domiciled in
New York.
74 See RAAPE, IPR. 340; ECKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no. 242.
7 5 For the United States see 4 VERNIER § 244.
7 6 Swiss BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis 1941, no. 9 at 23 If.
77 Trib. civ. Pau (May 13, 1888) Clunet 1893, 858. Less clear Cass. (req.)
(Aug. 2, 1897) D.1898.1.377, S.1900.1.283, Clunet 1898, 127 (Frenchman
recognizing his child in Singapore by a "testamentary letter," a kind of will
unknown to and invalid under English local Ia w).
Contra: LEREBOUR8-PIGEONNIERE 376 no. 347·
Germany: RAAPE 520 advocates the local form, but at 522 the personal law
respecting the question whether recognition can be made in a private wiii.

PARENTAL RELATIONS

seems to extend to all questions including formalities. Probably, this is the actual law. 78
2.

Substantive Requirements

The personal law seems to be universally applied. It does
not have to be the same law, however, that governs the alimentary obligation. Prevailingly, the domicil 79 or the nationality 80 of the recognizing parent is determinative, smce
78 Cf. Richmond v. Taylor ( 1913) 151 Wis. 633, 139 N. W. 435, and 2
BEALE 7II, § 140.1.
79 U. S. Restatement§ 140; Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (zd) 464; In
re Forney (1919) 43 Nev. 227, 184 Pac. 206, 186 Pac. 678; Eddie v. Eddie
(1899) 8 N.D. 376,79 N. W. 856; 2 BEALE 7II § 140-1. (the laws of mother
and child are not to be consulted, because the act is beneficial for the status of
the child).
Former Pruss ian law: Prussian Obertribunal (April II, 1856) 32 Entsch.
kgl. Ob. Trib. 401 no. 51 (recognition by a minor domiciled at a place under
Prussian law executed in a territory of French-Rhenish law was invalid
according to Prussian law. The court notes, at 406, as singular that the recognition would have been valid according to Rhenish law, and would have
bound the minor as a confession of impregnation under Prussian law, if
executed in a territory of the latter law; it regrets a hardship caused "by the
conflict of heterogeneous legal systems." This adds an argument to the adoption of the lex loci actus. But, today a court would establish an extraterritorial confession, although the declaration was made abroad).
80 Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. (Feb. 8, 1896) Clunet 1896, 1080,
70 0 Direito 13, Ap. Civ. no. 141.
France: dominant practice from 1892 on, see J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 495;
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 17, 1899) S.I899.I.I77, D.I899.1.329; Cour Paris (April
30, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1935, 70; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 623 no. 14;
and now confirmed by Cass. ( civ.) (March 8, 1938) Fontaine c. Pulteney,
Nouv. Revue 1938, 120, Revue Crit. 1938, 653. The Swiss Federal Trib. (BG).
(] une 20, 1929) 55 BGE. I 147, 149 remarks that this theory is necessitated
by the effect of the recognition on procuring the child French nationality.
Contra (law of child): Trib. civ. Seine (April 8, 1949) Revue Crit. 1950,
zoo; Cour Nancy (Jan. 13, 1955) Clunet 1955, 404, Revue Crit. 1955, 525.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 2, 1951) Pasicrisie 1952 III 7; DEVos,
Probleme 197.
Germany: RAAPE 523, III 3 (a).
Greece: App. Athens no. 445 ( 1896) Clunet 1897, 621.
Italy: Cass. (April 7, 1932) Foro Ital. Rep. 1932, 686 nos. 36 and 39; Cass.
(July 10, 1936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 145, no. 75·
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 22, 1909) 35 BGE. I 668, 67 5; Just. Dep., BBl.
1939, II 283 no. II (a former Swiss national, naturalized in Canada, cannot
adopt children in Switzerland complying with Swiss law only). Correspondingly, the BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis 1941, no. 9 at 23 has applied NAG. art.
28 to the recognition by a Swiss father domiciled in France, thus determining the effects by renvoi under Swiss law.
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the conditions of an act burdening its author and particularly
his capacity should depend upon his law. Hence, even courts
which subject the alimentary action to the law of the child or
consider this law cumulatively proclaim the rule. Nevertheless, sometimes the law of the child, 81 or the cumulated laws
of the parent and child, 82 or the child's law limited to the
capacity and consent of the child, 83 have been adopted or advocated. In the only American case that is known to be in
point, 84 Italian law, being that of the child's domicil, was applied, and on this basis the court held it sufficient that the
father, newly immigrated, had executed a power of attorney
in Philadelphia and sent it to Italy, whereupon his agent recognized the child formally in Italy. The fact that the man
had been domiciled in Italy, at least until a short time before,
and for the time being perhaps was merely resident in this
country, may have influenced the decision. But it would be
reasonable to recognize the validity of a recognition sufficient
by the child's law where, as in this case, the parent practically
makes an appearance in the child's country. Still more can be
said in favor of giving the child those remedies for opposing
a recognition, or for contesting its validity, which the child's
own law provides. 85
st C6digo Bustamante art. 57·
Among French writers, recently, NmOYET 769 no. 650 and Traite 478 (but
French law if only one party is French!); LEREBOUR&-PIGEONNIERE 380 no.
349; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I93S, 655 and Traite 53 I (insists on this opinion
even after the decision of the court of cassation of March S, I938). See
supra n. So.
82 United States: TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition in
the Conflict of Laws," I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) 5S9 at 6I2.
France: Some decisions and writers, see WErss, 4 Traite 46, 3 ARMIN JON 53
no. 44 ff., AuoiNET, Note S.I920.2.65.
Belgium: PoULLET 466 no. 392; Nove lies Belges, 2 D. Civ. 6I9, no. 587.
Italy: ANZILOTTI, 2 Rivista (I907) II5; DIENA, 2 Prine. ISI; CAVAGLIERI
244 ff.
83 Japan: Law of June IS, IS98, art. IS.
China: Law of Aug. 5, I9IS, art. I3 (speaking of "recognition").
84 /n re Moretti's Estate (I932) I6 D. & C. (Pa.) 7I5, commented on by
TAINTOR, IS Can. Bar Rev. (I94o), supra n. S2, at 6I2.
85 Italy: Cass. (April 7, I932) Foro Ita!. Rep. (I932) 6S6 nos. 3S and 39·
The Netherlands: VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 634 no. 195.
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3· Scope
The personal law determines:
Who may recognize, e.g. after the parent's death;
Under what conditions; 86
Whether before the child's birth, and whether after its
birth;
Whether the child must have reached a certain age;
Whether the child's consent is required;
Whether adulterine children can be recognized and under
what conditions; 87
Under what conditions and by whom a recognition may be
contested; 88
And, as submitted earlier, all effects of recognition. 89
86The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (Jan. 27, I9I3) W. 9438 and (May 2,
I913) W. 9557 (paternal recognition under foreign law during the lifetime
of the mother without her consent recognized, although prohibited by BW.
art. 339).
87 Bruxelles (July I5, I904) I7 Pand. Per. (Belg.) I904, no. 859, Novelles
Belges, 2 D. Civ. 6I9 no. 586 (recognition abroad under foreign laws valid);
in accordance: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 2, 195I) Pasicrisie I952 III 7;
Cour Nancy (Jan. I3, I955) Clunet I955, 404; public order is advanced by
AUDINET, Revue 19I7, 5I6 at 527; POULLET 509 no. 390.
88 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 24, I926) Clunet I928, 710 (Russian recognizing Italian child, Soviet Russian law); App. Colmar (Nov. 28, I93o) Clunet
I932, 470 (German law; on the person entitled to contest); Cass. (civ.)
(Jan. I7, I899) S.I899.1.I77, 8 D. H. I899.1.329, Clunet 1899, 546, and Cass.
(req.) (Jan. 9, I9o6) Revue I907, I54 (case of Bourbon de Bari, Italian
law); much criticized by the critics, ANZILOTTI, 3 Rivista (I9o8) I7I, Note,
and WEISS 4 Traite 73, 75; PILLET, Note, S.I899.1.177 and BARTIN, Note,
D. H. I899.1·334, among others, were of different opinions).
Germany: LG. Frankfurt a. M. (Aug. 17, 1932) JW. 1933, I9I, IPRspr.
I933, no. 48 (in application of EG. art. 2I, sentences I and 2 held that the
recognition cannot be annulled but recovered as undue enrichment).
Switzerland: BG. (July 7, I949) 75 BGE. II 177, I83; BG. (March 16,
1950) 9 Schwz. Jahrb. (I952) 242.
89 Switzerland: NAG., art. 8 par. I.
The Netherlands: Arbitration Court for maritime accident insurance (Feb.
26, 1938) 42 Bull. Inst. Int. (1940) 69 no. I0992 (recognition under German
BGB. § 17I8 does not constitute a relationship of the character required for
a right for damages by law on maritime accidents).
France: in the case of Cass. (civ.) (March u, I936) Revue Crit. 1936, 714
with Note by NIBOYET ( ?) , 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I3I no. 66 with Note by
CosTE-FLORET, recognition made in Saigon, Indo-China, by an English father
was considered invalid on the ground of English law, but treated as a confir-
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The eHect of acknowledgment or recognition on the problems of succession upon death, in any consistent rule, should
be determined by the same rule as that governing the formation of the act, 90 unless the inheritance statute either rejects dl!,,.!ren born out of wedlock 90a or admits illegitimate
children irrespective of recognition 91 or irrespective of a
recognition other than as specified by the statute itself. 92

IV.

MoTHER AND FATHER

Modern statutes determine expressly the law under which
an illegitimate mother may sue the procreator or cohabitant
for the costs of pregnancy, delivery, and support. Again, they
may variously refer to the laws of the mother, 93 the mother
and child,"' or the defendant. 95 Courts without express statutory provisions will incline to the law of the forum. 96
A problem of classification ought to be reported in this
connection. French practice gives the mother an action
mation of the natural obligation imposed on the illegitimate father in French
conception. The court applied French law without considering the conflicts
problems involved which are new and doubtful.
90 See supra p. 635 and infra pp. 7oo-705.
noa In re Vincent's Estate (1947) 71 N. Y. S. (2d) 165 (Irrelevance of
recognition under Haitian law because illegitimate children are excluded
from any inheritance under New York law).
91 United States: Moen v. Moen (1902) 16 S. D. 210, 92 N. W. 13 (since
under the South Dakota law every illegitimate child inherits, it is entirely immaterial what right Norwegian law attached to the recognition).
92 Van Horn v. Van Horn (1899) 107 Iowa 247, 77 N. W. 846 (a notorious
recognition suffices under the Iowa inheritance law, irrespective of the significance given the recognition in New Jersey).
93 Germany: EG. art. 21.
Greece: C. C. ( 1940) art. 21; MARIDAKIS, Revue Crit. 1938, 347 indicates
as motive of the draft, that the mother needed protection.
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, § 27 par. I
sentence 1.
94 Poland: Law of 1926, art. 21.
95Japan: Law of June 15,1898, art. 21.
China: Law of Aug. s, 1918, art. r6.
96 E.g., the Netherlands: Law of the mother: Amsterdam (Dec. 13, 1929)
W. 12193; Rb. Groningen (May 21, 1932) W. 1932, 12479 (law of the place of
cohabitation-in the Netherlands). Rb. den Haag (Nov. 29, 1934) W. 1936,
no. 652. For former views see KosTERS 542.
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against the father, ostensibly on the ground of a tort consisting in the illegitimate intercourse, but actually as a substitute for the remedies of support missing in the written law.
The courts award the woman, together with her own damages, alimony on behalf of the child. Under which conflicts
rule should such a claim be subordinated in a non-French
jurisdiction whose municipal law establishes for the analogous purposes specific family obligations? A reasonable answer should eliminate all technical legal constructions and
envisage the social purpose of the claim. The adequate conflicts rule to deal with these institutions is evidently bound to
be independent from tort considerations as well as from a
narrow meaning of "family" law, going directly to the question of what an illegitimate mother is entitled to demand
from her cohabitant. 97 It follows that, if the cohabitation
took place in France, French and German courts should apply to a French mother the French remedy, and if the facts
occurred in Germany, the German family law. 98
The French courts, however, oppose to the German law
their u ordre public." 99

V. CoNcLusiONs
The state of chaos reported in this part could easily be reduced by a simpler, if not uniform, approach. The legitimate family ought not to be denied a unified legal regulation;
it was an entirely sound idea that the law of its head should
govern all relations of the family. The two main objections
to this axiom raised in the last decades are unconvincing. One
of these objections is associated with the nationality principle
in Continental Europe. In view of the modern trend toward
97 To this extent the theory of the writer, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 265 has been
approximately allowed by NEUNER, Der Sinn 110 and RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934
IV 52& to 533·
98 NEUNER and RAAPE (precedent note) seem to draw more radical conclusions.
99 App. Douai (March 1, 1939) Bull. In st. Int. 1940, 81 no. 11032.
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granting separate nationalities to married women and children, the conclusion is popular that the national law of the
father must yield its dominant role; that it must either concur with the children's laws or even give way to them completely. This may be logical, but it amounts to a new inroad upon the nationality principle itself. This principle,
then, is no longer, if it ever was, suitable as the main vehicle
of conflicts law. It will be abolished some day. So long as it is
maintained, however, the objection should be disregarded.
The only practical method consists in determining the events
affecting the life of the family according to the national law
of the father and, after his death, that of the mother. The
other reason for opposing the rule of the parent's law has
been derived from the need of the child to be protected. We
have tried to show that the benefit of the child ought to be
protected by all legislatures and all courts rather than exclusively by the law and the jurisdiction to which the child belongs, often only accidentally. Conflicts law must presuppose
equality among the particular national laws, statutes, and
tribunals.
Consequently, it is natural that in the countries devoted
to the principle of domicil the law of the domicil of the family head at the birth of the child determines the latter's legitimacy; furthermore, his law at the time of a legitimation or
adoption governs the conditions and effects of such acts, as
at later dates it indicates the rights and duties following from
legitimate father-child relations. The inheritance law of a
domicil acquired after legitimate birth, legitimation, or adoption ought not to change any of their effects, unless there
is a distinct, exceptional public policy, either prohibitive or
permissive, at the forum of inheritance.
The only question less definitely answerable by theoretical
and practical considerations is concerned with the American
peculiarity of ascribing different positions to a child with re-
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spect to his father and his mother. The ideas and consequences of this peculiarity have not been fully explained, to
the knowledge of the writer.
Entirely different is the nature of the problems arising
from illegitimate filiation; French and other conflicts laws
should not have formed a category of "filiation" comprehending all children. Of course, any act of acknowledgment
or recognition by a parent is governed simply by the law of
this parent. Moreover, something can be said for the personal law of the mother with respect to her relationship to
the child. But the relations to the procreator which are derived from conception, birth, or cohabitation cannot be referred, without artifices, to the place where any one of the
three persons involved was domiciled, or was a national, and
still less to the contacts at the time of the action. As it is very
important for the purpose of a serviceable conflicts rule not
to base it on any special domestic construction of the liabilities or the rights of the parties, the simplest contact, viz.,
with the place of the birth, is the most commendable. The
danger that, before giving birth, the mother may move to a
locality where the law is unfavorable to her or the child, is
negligible; an improvement for the child is welcome.
These suggestions are not meant, however, to supersede
the system under which bastardy proceedings are now authorized in this country. Support is awarded under similar
considerations throughout the country, and interstate relations are the only ones to be considered. Hence, the chief concern is with jurisdiction, which naturally is found at the father's domicil as well as where personal jurisdiction over him
is obtained at the mother's domicil. Every court applies its
own law.
Lex fori, as a matter of fact, can be defended in this doctrine with comparatively better justification than anywhere
else. In international matters, however, it should be avoided.

CHAPTER

17

Adoption
I.
I.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Definition of Adoption

N some archaic civilizations, including the Greek, Roman, and Japanese, adoption has been the means of
continuing a house and ancestor cult threatened with extinction. Hence, the original type of this institution implies
that the adoptive son be considered exactly in the position of
a veritable legitimate male issue (Greek: v16s vfr6s, made
son). In much later periods, adoption was used with the primary object of securing the welfare of a child. In this application, the class of persons capable of participating in the
transaction was considerably enlarged (e.g., to include female adopters), and new varieties of adoption were introduced, with restricted effects, particularly in that the rights
to be acquired by the adopter would be limited to care and
education.
As a result, the national legislations present a much varied
picture. In a number of countries, such as Portugal and
Paraguay, adoption has never been introduced. The recent Civil Code of Guatemala abolished the formerly existing institution of adoption, because it had led to misuse
by despoiling the assets and exploiting the labor of minors.1 In most of the world, however, adoption in one
form or another has been recognized by statute. The common law countries, including England, finally have followed
this trend. However, many legislators have thought that they

I
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394 no. 277.
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had to surround the institution with formidable obstacles,
while a strong modern current favors adoption as the best
means of caring for destitute children. New adoption laws
in France 2 and many other countries, 3 which facilitate adoption through careful investigations by advisory offices, evidence this tendency.
The variety of policy considerations behind the national
legislations is amazing. The Roman requirements implied by
the saying, uadoptio imitatur naturam," have suggested
many rules regarding age and family conditions of the parties, but these rules often also have been rejected as for instance in the Code Napoleon which prohibited any adoption
of minors in order to protect infants against exploitation.
This rule, recently repealed in France and Belgium, still exists in other countries. On the other hand, only infants may
be adopted in England, Sweden, and some of the United
States. Southwest Africa requires that the sixteenth year be
not completed. Other fundamental differences characterize
the effects of "adoption." In this country, some statutes declare that the adopted person is to be considered a legitimate
child to all legal intents and purposes, but others follow the
French method of enumerating the specific rights and duties
affected. Although the latter method is generally accompanied by broad construction of the statutory texts, 4 the results are not necessarily in favor of a standard of full legitimacy. Contrary to general custom, by some laws the natural
father retains parental power, and by American and some
foreign statutes adoption does not preclude marriage with
2

France: Law of June 19, 1923, July 29, 1939, and August 8, 1941.
Argentina: Law no. 13,252 of September 23, 1948.
Belgium: Law of March 22, 1940.
Chile: Laws No. 5,343 of 1934, and No. 7,613 of 1943.
Ireland: Law of April 29, 1952.
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) arts. 291 fl.; etc.
The Netherlands: Arts. 344i-3440 B. W., as added by Law of Jan. 26, 1956.
4 4 VERNIER 406, §§ 261 fl.
8
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the adopter. The child's name is subject to many variations.
The statutes also exhibit the greatest diversity with respect
to the rights of intestate inheritance from and by the
adopted parent, the child, and the natural family.
An important difference consists in the fact that in many
laws the private contract effecting an adoption is construed
as the very core of the transaction, the state acting only to
authorize the agreement, while in othe~ statutes the official
decree ordering adoption on a party's application constitutes
the essence of the act. In the latter case, the decree may be
granted either as an act of discretionary power or as corresponding to a right of the parties who have complied with
the legal conditions of adoption. Validity and revocability of
the transaction depend largely upon these premises.
Finally, the state agencies intervening differ, and official
action either precedes or follows the private agreement.
Thus, adoption forms an exemplar of the difficulties that
may present themselves in formulating a uniform definition.
As a matter of fact, the description of adoption given in the
Restatement as a "relation of the parent and child created by
law between persons who are not in fact parent and child," 5
is certainly too narrow, since in a number of legislations
parents may adopt their natural children. If taken literally,
this definition seems also to exclude all those institutions
bearing the name of adoption that do not grant as respects
both parties the full status of parent and child. Is this the
real meaning, and, if so, is it right?
A clear answer to these questions would facilitate the discussion of certain problems concerning succession upon death
by and from foreign adopted children. In the midst of this
confused discussion, a well-elaborated American decision
ventured to proclaim that "A person is either adopted or
5 Restatement

§ 142 comment a.
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not; a woman is either married or not. . . . there is no such
thing as a limited status of adoption." 6 This is manifest
error and a very prejudicial one. A woman is indeed either
married or unmarried, and, likewise, a child is legitimate or
illegitimate, but there are adopted children of totally different kinds. It is of primary importance that each type
should be understood and recognized according to its merits.
No wonder that it is hard to know what is meant by adoption in every one of the national conflicts rules. At any rate,
the concept of adoption held in the municipal law of the
forum is of no direct avail. Instead, a sound construction of
the existing rules depends to some extent upon their own
character. When a conflicts rule emerges from the patriarchal
thinking still characteristic of most family laws and therefore simply refers to the law of the adopter, especially the
father, it is logical to assume that this rule is to be applied
only to transactions creating a rather complete parent-child
relation and not to an act exclusively conferring a right of
inheritance upon the child. Again, if a conflicts rule calls for
the law of the child only, this rule may embrace those kinds
of adoption that contemplate only quasi-familial care and
education. Quite reasonably, a German draft of 1929 provided for the application of the national law of the child to
govern foster parenthood, 7 though the primary German rule
determines adoption according to the national law of the
parent. Thus, the scope of conflicts rules dealing with "adoption" may vary. One limit, however, exists; no institution can
be designated as adoption, unless it makes the child legitimate in relation to the adopting parent. An "adoption by the
Nation" of French war orphans is, of course, not recorded
in a Swiss register of civil status. 8
6 In re Riemann's Estate ( 1927) 124 Kan. 539 at 542, 545, 262 Pac. 16-18,
confirming the view held in Bilderback v. Clark ( 1920) 106 Kan. 737 at 742,
189 Pac. 977, 980.
7 See RAAPE 601 VIII no. 4·
s Swiss BBl. 1924 II, 29 no. 15.
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Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

American writers and the Restatement speak of the "law
governing adoption as a status"; 9 they probably mean the
law of the forum at the domicil of a party. However, in his
treatise, Beale exclusively discusses jurisdiction for adoption.
American and English co~rts, in fact, appear to be concerned
not with choice of law problems but only with the question
what courts have the power to create adoptions with extraterritorial effect. If so, common law is again in opposition to
civil law, which sharply distinguishes between jurisdictional
and conflicts rules and in principle applies foreign statutes.
In the civil law countries, jurisdiction for adoption does
not offer much of a problem, since for this purpose foreigners
usually enjoy the "hospitality" of the courts. It is true that
access of foreigners to the courts for the purpose of adoption
was questioned in France/ 0 but it now seems assured everywhere. A number of countries, however, refrain from taking
jurisdiction, if the homeland does not approve of it.
The main question in these countries is concerned with
choice of law, that is, primarily with selecting the law applicable to adoption of or by foreigners in the forum, but
regularly the same conflicts rule suffices to determine recognition of foreign adoptions.
The difference of method between reference to a foreign
personal law and simple application of the law of the forum
seems fundamental. It is tempting to think that the personal
law is more obviously to be complied with when the whole act
is thought to be chiefly founded upon the contract of the
parties. On the other hand, if the act of a governmental
agency or court is the essentially constitutive part within the
9

Restatement § 142 (within "status," not "jurisdiction"). Similar MINOR
222 § 101; STUMBERG 336; Note, "Descent of Foreign Lands to Child
Legitimated by Adoption," 36 Harv. L. Rev. (1922) 85.
1o The controversy on which see WEISS, 2 Traite 234 was ended by the
Law of June 19, 1923, amending C. C. art. 345 par. r.
221,
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structure of adoption, the personal law of the parties may be
neglected. However, distinctions are not so neat in actual
practice. In this country, the personal law is never considered, although the civil law view emphasizing the significance
of the private contract of adoption has left deep traces in
many statutes.

II.
1.

ADOPTION OF OR BY FOREIGNERS WITHIN THE FoRUM

Law of the Forum

(a) United States. Although the cases are known to be
rather scarce and confused and certainly are contradictory, a
prevailing opinion seems to be forming to the effect that two
different grounds for assuming jurisdiction are open to election.
In the first place, it is agreed that a child can be adopted in
the state of its domicil, irrespective of the domicil and residence of the adopting parents. 11 In the second place, there is
increasing authority for concurrent jurisdiction of the state
where the adopting parents are domiciled. The Restatement
does not approve of this view, except when this state has
jurisdiction over the person having legal custody of the
child or when the child is a waif and subject to the jurisdiction of the state.12 But the consent of the natural parents or
the guardian, wherever they may live, should suffice. 18 The
few cases which may be looked to as authority seem to justify
the unconditional jurisdiction of the adopter's domicil. 14
The domicil of the child as a basis of jurisdiction 15 has,
however, been questioned. Sometimes, a mere domicil by
operation of law, locating the child with its natural father or
guardian, has been held insufficient without actual residence
11 GoODRICH

448 § 146 n. 51, 52; Restatement§ 142 (a).
Restatement § 142 (b); cf. 2 BEALE 713 § 142.2.
13 LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349 no. 341.
14 GOODRICH 448 § 146 n. 54·
15 Strictly required by 2 BEALE 713 § 142.2 and Restatement § 142.
12
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at the same place. 16 Moreover, actual residence, particularly
if habitual, has been preferred to a merely formal domicil,
since the state where the child is dwelling is believed to have
more ability to control th~ person of the child and to be more
interested in its welfare. 17 In reality, neither domicil nor
residence, especially in large cities, guarantees that a court
will be able to exercise effective supervision. On the other
hand, every court, not excluding that of the adopter, will
ordinarily be eager to safeguard the well-being of the child.18
The modern means of communication and the social relief
agencies facilitate obtaining information. The interest of the
child's consanguineous family will be better cared for by the
court of the formal domicil of the child. 19
These principles determine equally the granting of an
adoption and the recognition of a foreign adoption.
(b) British Law. Under the British Adoption Act, 1950, 20
an adoption order is not granted, unless the applicant is domiciled and resident in England and the infant is resident in
England. No provision is made regarding adoptions by British subjects domiciled abroad. Children of foreign nationality who, under the Act of 1926, had been excluded from
adoption proceedings in England can be adopted since 1949.
It is difficult to believe that no foreign adoption would be
recognized with respect to British subjects, as has been suggested.21 The implication seems rather to be "that the domicil of the adopter at the time of the adoption is alone rna16

Blanchard v. State ex rel. Wallace (1925) 30 N.Mex. 459,238 Pac. 1004.
See esp. STUMBERG 337 ff., who invokes Stearns v. Allen (1903) 183 Mass.
404, 407, 67 N. E. 349 (child in Massachusetts with technical domicil in Scotland); Rizo v. Burruel (1921) 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234; Taylor v. Collins
(1927) 172 Ark. 541, 289 S. W. 466.
18 See GOODRICH 448 § 142 n. 55·
19 Cf. the propositions as to choice of law in England by MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev. ( 1941) u2,
123 n. 44·
zo 14 Geo. 6, c. 26.
2l DICEY (ed. 5) 535 n. u; 2 BEALE § 143.1. Contra DICEY (-WELSH) 468.
17
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terial." 22 But certainly hardships are caused by the tenacious
reluctance of English courts to acknowledge that the adopter
has transferred his domicil from England to a foreign country.2a
In Canada similar restrictions obtain. Indeed, a Canadian
court has held that the adoption of a child domiciled with
its natural parents in Alberta and adopted by order of an
Alberta court, while the adoptive parents were domiciled in
Saskatchewan, was invalid in the latter province. 24 Must all
parties be domiciled in the same province? Falconbridge sees
a solution of this strange conflict only in uniform and reciprocal legislation by the provinces grounded on the principle
of the child's domiciP 5 But we may infer that the system of
exclusive application of the law of the forum tends to absurd
results, notably in the case where the different jurisdictions of
the parties do not recognize each other's decrees. In Quebec,
jurisdiction is granted, if one party is domiciled there. 26
(c) Scandinavian Countries. The domicil of the adopter
determines the state where adoption must be sought under
the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. II),
which also decides expressly that the law of the forum is applicable (art. 12). With respect to adoptions in other foreign countries, the law of the forum governs under the Danish adoption law of 1923, with certain exceptions for Danes
adopting abroad and foreign children adopted in Denmark. 27
22 FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws-Legitimation by Adoption or Recognition," 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 37, at 39·
23 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflicts of Laws," x6 Bell Yard (1935)
4, 6 (a Scotchman resident but not considered "domiciled" in England cannot
adopt the daughter of his deceased brother, even though the brother was
domiciled in England and the daughter is resident there).
24 Culver v. Culver and Gammie [1933] 2 D. L. R. 535, with reference to
Haultain, C. J. S., in Burnfiel v. Burnfiel (Sask.) [1926] 2 D. L. R. 129.
25 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171.
26 Quebec: Adoption Act, R. S. Q. 1941, c. 324, s. 5; cf. x JoHNSON 349·
2 7 BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 54; BORUM 128.
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More consideration is given to foreign law by the conflicts
rules of Norway 28 and Sweden. 29
(d) Law of the forum governing formalities everywhere.
It is in the nature of a state act, n_ecessary in all countries to
some extent to effect adoption, that all formalities required
by the municipal law of the court (or other acting agency)
must be observed. Also, recognition in another country depends on compliance with the formalities prescribed by the
law under which the act is alleged to have been performed. 30

Illustration: An oral adoption agreement, completely performed by the adopted person and concluded within the
state, 31 will be given effect as creating a status by a :Missouri
court of equity, but is regarded as ineffective by a Missouri
court, if concluded in Rhode Island and invalid according to
the laws of such state. 32
Courts are naturally inclined to apply this principle with
enhanced rigor when it comes to determining their own judicial procedure. Under the duty of applying foreign personal
law, conflicts arise. Thus, German courts, in the case of a
Soviet Russian adopter, refuse to confirm the contract because under the Soviet law adoption is created by mere state
act. 33 In applying a foreign law requiring that the court examine the social advantages enuring to the child by the adoption, German courts even took it for granted that they were
unable to intervene, because under the German Civil Code
the courts (other than the court of custody) had only to in28 Law of April 2, 1917 as amended by laws of September 23, 1921, and
May 24, 1935, §§ 29, 30.
29 International Family Law 1904, c. 6, as amended 1949.
3o It is sometimes asserted that the parties may constitute an adoption in
any country according to their personal law, since the maxim locus regit
actum is only of optional application. But there is no proof of actual force
of this assumption which overlooks the significance of the administrative act.
31 Buck v. Meyer (1916) 195 Mo. App. 287, 190 S. W. 997·
32 Mutual Life of New York v. Benson (1940) 34 F. Supp. 859.
33 KG. (April 7, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 67; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 31, 1934)
]W. 1935, 1190.
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quire into the fulfillment of certain legal conditions. They
refused, therefore, to authorize adoptions by French, Rumanian, and all other adopters whose personal law requires
a substantive investigation of the child's benefit by the
court. 34 If, however, a foreign personal law is to be applied
at all, as prescribed by the German conflicts law, and jurisdiction is not doubtful, the procedure should be adjusted so
as not to frustrate the purpose of the institution. 35 This cooperative attitude has been recommended in France. 36 Remarkably, the Finnish statute directly provides that formalities essential under the national law of both parties should
be observed so far as possible. 37
2.

Systems of Personal Law

(a) Law of the adopter. Still starting from the postulate
that one sole law should govern a family, many conflicts rules
determine the substantive requisites of adoption exclusively
according to the personal law of the adopter. 38 As, according
to the municipal laws, a married person generally needs some
34 KG. (June 30, 1922) 42 ROLG. x88; KG. (Jan. 15, 1932) 6 Z.ausl.PR.
(1932) 3II, IPRspr. 1932, no. 98; KG. (March xo, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no.
53, and still after a fundamental change of the adoption law by a law of
November 23, 1933, see decision KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) 13 Jahrb. FG. I75· This
practice was abandoned however by KG. (Nov. 8, 1935) JW. 1936, 53·
35 See RAAPE 597; RABEL, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 310.
36 NIBOYET 776 no. 662.
37 Finnish Law of Dec. 5, 1929, § 25.
38 Germany: EG. art. 22 par. 1 (the father).
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 23 (the adopter) ; cf. SULKOWSKI, "Conception
du droit international prive d'apres Ia doctrine et Ia pratique en Pologne," 41
Recueil 1932 III 696 ff.
Austria: Decree of Oct. 15, 1941, § 13 par. x.
Italy: C. C. (1938) Disp. Pre!. art. 10 par. 2 and C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!.
art. 20 par. 2, adding to the text of the final draft-"national law of the
adopter"-the words: "at the time of the adoption."
France: App. d'Aix (March 16, 1909) Revue 1909, 642; SuRVILLE 464 no.
316; 3 ARMIN JON 55 nos, 53, 54·
Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. (Jan. x6, 1940) 56 Arch. Jud. 421
(adoption made in Brazil; Italian law applied to capacity and consent of
adoptive parent and natural mother of Italian nationality).
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joint action or consent of the other spouse for adopting a
child, the situation where. the spouses have different personal
laws raises difficulties. The principle of personal law is best
applied to this case, each spouse being distinctively subjected
to his or her own law. 89
In this system, the child's interests are protected just as
well or badly as the personal law of the adopter provides. In
the prevailing construction of the German statutory rules,
for instance, the personal law of the adopted person is not
considered, unless he be a German, 40 but it follows only that
the provisions of the internal law of the forum, requiring the
consent of the child or otherwise protecting it, are applicable.

Illustrations: (i) Where a German adopts a Danish child,
the contract of adoption can be made, according to § I 7 50,
par. I of the German Civil Code, by the child's guardian with
authorization of the court. As the Danish principle of domicil refers to the local German law, the German court has
jurisdiction. (KG. (June 7, I929) IPRspr. I929, no. 88.)
( ii) Adoption of a Swedish illegitimate child by a German depends on the consent of the illegitimate mother, according to § I 74 7 of the German Civil Code, but not subject
to authorization of the Swedish king as required by Swedish
law. (RG. (July II, 1929) I25 RGZ. 265, IPRspr. 1929,
no. 89.)
(b) Consideration of the child's law. In opposition to exclusive control of the law of the adopter, it has been postulated that the law of the child should govern those requirements which may be established for the protection of the
child's status against hasty or dangerous alterations. 41 This
39

See RAAPE 580, but also 589 (par. 4).
See the decision following in the text; and KG. (June 30, 1922) 42
ROLG. x88, 189; KG. (Oct. 29, 1926) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 8x; LG.
Dresden (Dec. 20, 1929) and OLG. Dresden (Feb. x8, 1930) IPRspr. 1931,
nos. 90, 91. Contra: most writers, see RAAPE 550, 4 FRANKENSTEIN 174·
41 This theory was prominently developed by BAR 547 § 199 and NIBOYET
775, 776 no. 659. In different manner: BATIFFOL, x Repert. 252 nos. 3, 5;
4 FRANKENSTEIN 171.
40
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category was understood to include those provisions that require a certain age 42 or full age 43 of the adopted person, or
his consent or that of the persons and authorities charged
with his personal care.44 To the law of the adoptive parent
are left the requirements concerning the adopter's age, any
requisite difference in age between the parties, the absence
of legitimate issue, or other interests of the family into
which the adopted person is to enter. For instance, adoption
of natural children by their parents was forbidden by the
Italian Civil Code of 1865 (art. 205) but permitted by
French practice. 45 As this matter concerns the adopter's
family, under this principle, an Italian could not adopt his
own illegitimate child in France. A Frenchman would be permitted adoption of his natural child in Italy, if it were not
considered contrary to public policy. 46
(c) Exclusive application of the child's personal law. In
some recent opinions, the law of the child governs exclusively
all conditions of adoption. 47 This thesis is based on the unWEiss, 4 Traite 113.
When minors could not be adopted in France, before the Law of June 19,
1923, adoption abroad was considered void; see Trib. Valenciennes (infra
n. 47).
~ 4 ROLIN, 2 Principes 167, 168 nos. 634, 635; PILLET, I Traite Pratique
651, 652 no. 319; Germany: EG. art. 22 par. 2 (as to German children).
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, §§ 30, 31.
Treaties: On Judicial Assistance between Czechoslovakia and Poland of
Jan. :u, 1949 (3 I U.N. Treaty Series 205) art. 27 par. 2; between Hungary
and Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1951, § 26 par. 2; between Hungary and
Bulgaria of August 8, 1953, § 27 par. 3, see DROBNIG, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. (1956)
487, 493·
45 Cass. (May 13, 1868) D.1868.1.249·
,!;6 2 FIORE 310 ff. no. 761; SURVILLE 464 ff. no. 316.
47 France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June 18, 1914) Clunet 1919, 242 (a
minor girl of French nationality adopted by German parents; the decision
may have rested also upon French public policy); Cour Paris (Jan. 14, 1926)
Clunet 1927, 641; Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 10, 1948) Revue Crit. 1848, 108;
Trib. Civ. Lyon (April 24, 1951) Clunet 1952, 198. Writers limit themselves
generally to the application of French law to French children.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 22, Nov. 21, 1952) Clunet 1955, 908
(Dutch adopters, the Dutch law then ignoring adoption); cf. infra n. 48.
Italy: App. Milano (May 9, 1910) Clunet 1913, 243·
42
43
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warranted identification of the child's law with the law best
securing its welfare.
(d) Both laws cumulatively applied. Finally, in one of
those well-known attempts to cumulate the laws where a
choice between them seems hard, adoption is said to depend
on all the requirements stipulated in each law of both the
parties. 48 Such a mechanical addition results in not applying
any one of the statutes and in impeding a transaction that all
students of juvenile welfare wish greatly to foster.
Consideration of the law of a foreign party is accomplished in a much sounder way in those statutes that prohibit authorization of adoptions, unless these are recognized
as valid by the laws of both parties. 49 That is, this rule has
a proper place, provided that recognition is granted in the
foreign country in a broad-minded spirit without insisting on
the fulfillment of peculiar domestic requirements.
Egypt: Trib. Alexandria (I926 no. I84) Clunet I928, III2 (American
woman adopting a Greek child; Novella I7 of Emperor Leo applied).
Soviet Russia: Law of January 4, I928, art. 6 (see MAKAROV 42I): where
adopting and adopted parties belong to different Soviet Republics, the consul
shall apply the law of the child, if known, otherwise the law of the adopter,
or, last, what law the adopter demands.
48 Austria: OGH. (April I5, I930) Zentralblatt I931, I30 no. 33, Clunet
I932, I98.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Charleroi (April 30, I954) Clunet I955, 904.
Italy: Prevailing opinion, restricting C. C. ( I942) art. 20 par. 2 to the
effects of adoption, App. Bologna (Jan. 5, I95I) Monitore I95I, 26o;
MORELLI, Elementi I27; MONACO, L'efficacia I77·
Greece: C. C'. ( I940) art. 23 par. I.
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § 35 par. 2.
Probably of this type Japan, Law of I898, art. I9; China, Law of Aug. 5,
I9I8, art. I4j Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I940,
art. 23 (difficult to understand).
Advocated by BROCHER 333, DESPAGNET 848, 849 no. 284; BARTIN in 9
Aubry et Rau § 555 at I76, and n. 2; BARTIN, 2 Principes § 276 at I66; DrENA,
2 Prine. I86; CAVAGLIERI 247; 2 ZITELMANN 883; 4 FRANKENSTEIN I7I n. 4;
LEWALD I 53; contra: RAAPE 549·
49 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, § 24 par. 2.
Norway: Law of April 2, I9I7 with amendments of September 23, I92I,
and May 24, I935, § 29 par. I.
Sweden: International Family Law of I904, c. 6, as amended I949, § I
par. I.
Switzerland: Just. Dept. June 30, I928, 25 SJZ. So.
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In the Finnish enactment, it is added that the adoptive relationship, if the adopter is a foreigner, cannot be rescinded
in Finland, except if the adopter is there domiciled and the
rescission is recognized in his national country. 50
(e) Special rules on the effect of adoption. In those jurisdictions where the personal law of the adoptive father governs the act creating adoption, the same law of the adoptive
parent may govern the effect of adoption 51 at any later moment, in the same way as a parent's law governs creation and
effect of a legitimate parent-child relation. This means that,
in the case of a change of personal law, later events are governed by the personal law of the time being. Where, however, the law of the child is influential in the constitution of
the family relationship, this law is not appropriate to regulate the ensuing relationship within the adoptive family. 52
Therefore, the statutes involved have mostly restricted the
child's law to the creation of adoption and applied the parent's law to its effects. 53 In another, not more attractive,
opinion advocated by Italian and French writers, the law of
the child governs the child's position in its natural family, including reciprocal inheritance rights, while the adoptive relationship is determined by the parent's law. 54 Pillet has, in
5 0 Finland: Law of 1929, § 24 par. 2. Similarly, Norway, Law of I9I7, as
amended, § 30 par. I; Sweden: Law of I904, as amended c. 6, § 2 par. I.
51 See for example, Germany: EG. arts. 22 and I9j Italy: C. C. (I942)
Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. 2, but see supra n. 48.
52 This however has been proposed by WEISS, 4 Traite 126; BATIFFOL, I
Repert. 255 no. 23, and has been adopted in Siam: Law of I939 on private
international law, § 35 par. 2 sentence 2.
63 Japan: Law of I898, art. I9 par. 2; China: Law of I9I8, art. I4 par. 2;
Finland: Law of I929, § 26; Italy: C. C. ( I942) art. 20 par. 2; France: 6
LAURENT 77 no. 39; SURVILLil 464ff no. 3I6j PILLET, I Traite Pratique 652
no. 320. Poland: Law of I926, art. I9 par. 2, and Greece: C. C. (I940)
art. 23 par. 2, extend their reference to the last common nationality to the
effects of adoption.
54 2 FIORE 296, 297, 298 no. 752; DESPAGNET 850 no. 286; VALERY 1153
no. 8I4; NIBOYET 778 no. 665. This solution has been reproduced in C6digo
Bustamante art. 74 with the modification that the adopter's law governs "in so
far as his estate is concerned," and that of the adopted person "in respect to
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despair, suggested that the judge be allowed free choice of
law. 55

Ill.
1.

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ADOPTION

55

a

Conditions of Recognition

The above described English and American jurisdictional
rules seem to imply that a foreign adoption will be recognized, if the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign state is based
either on the adopter's domicil 55 b or, in the American view,
on the domicil of the child. It is true that not even among
the sister states does this principle appear clearly settled.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had occasion
to proclaim that the Federal Constitution did not oblige a
state to recognize legitimations and adoptions made in another state. 56 The underlying doubts are connected, however,
with the specific effect of adoption upon inheritance rather
than with the principles of recognition. It seems that there
is no serious question respecting recognition in general.
Whether in addition to the two grounds for jurisdiction
mentioned above, adoptions occurring in the national state of
the adopter are to be recognized, may be questioned. There
is no compelling reason for recognition, for instance, where
an American child resident in the United States is adopted
in a German court 57 pursuant to German law by a German
domiciled and resident in the United States; 58 still less, if all
the name, the rights and duties which he retains regarding his natural family,
as well as to his own estate in regard to the adopting person," while the
right to maintenance is left to public policy (art. 76).
Contra: see RAAPE 594·
55 PILLET, Principes 324 no. 154, renouncing any rule.
55a On Anglo-American Jaw, DoPFFEL, Anerkennung ausHindischer Adoptionen im englischen Rechtskreis, 22 Z.ausi.PR. (1957) 22o-261.
55 b Dictum in In re Wilson [1954] Ch. 733, esp. 741, 744, Revue Crit. 1954,
544 per Vaisey, J.
56 Hood v. McGehee (1915) 237 U. S. 6u.
57§ 66 par. 2 of the German Law on Voluntary Jurisdiction.
58 KrPP, in KrPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht § 99 n. 12.
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parties concerned, though German nationals, are domiciled
and resident in Australia. ssa
Exclusive jurisdiction over nationals as claimed by the
frequently cited Austrian and Hungarian tradition 59 still
subsists in the Scandinavian states. Swedes and Norwegians
cannot adopt or be adopted abroad without permission of
the king. 6 ° Finns need the permission of their Minister of
Justice. 61 Other states generally reserve judicial activity in
status matters of nationals to their own tribunals. France,
Belgium, and Hungary require that nationals should seek
supplementary authorization at their home court. 62 Italy
subjects recognition even to the procedure of exequatur. 63
Recently the National Socialist innovations in German adoption law have inspired the view that a foreign adoption of a
German always needs confirmation by a German court in
order to have effect in that country. 64
Opposition of public policy to foreign adoptions has
formed a natural problem in countries in which no form of
~adoption has been instituted. In England, which until recently belonged in this category, no case has occurred, but
Dicey pronounced his decided opposition to the recognition
of any foreign adoption and impressed Beale and the American Restatement with this theory. This influence, together
with the common law tradition, repugnant to adoption, was
ssa R.v.A. [I955] V. L. R. 24I, 22 Z.ausi.PR. (I957) 357·
59 Austria: supra p. 427; Hungary: ScHWARTZ, 4I Z.int.R. (I929) I07 at
I82.
60 Sweden: International Family Law of I904, c. 6, as amended I949•
§I par. 2.
61 Finland: Law of I929, § 24 par. I sentence 2.
62 ROLIN, 2 Principes I7I no. 637; Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 659 no. I49·
Hungary: Decree no. 23/I952, §IS.
63 Cass. civ. (June 24, I932) Monitore I932, 929, Clunet I933, 454; cf. App.
Genova {Dec. I6, I932) Monitore I933, 225.
Contra for France, WEISS, 4 Traite I30·
64
RAAPE's view, IPR. {ed. 3) 250, has, however, been gradually rejected,
RAAPE IPR. {ed. 4) 374·
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strong enough to prevent recognition of an American adoption in Canada even after the Canadian reform laws, on the
ground that this legislation had no retroactive effect. 65 The
court, using this argument, overlooked that not the reform
law but the strength of the present public policy was in question. In the Netherlands, before enactment of the present
law, foreign adoptions were recognized when the national
laws of both parties permitted it, but naturally not when one
party was of Dutch nationality. 66
Remarkably, the opposite liberal view has been taken in
Portugal, 67 Argentina, 68 and Guatemala. 69
In countries with adoption, the domestic law is frequently
applied to a foreign adoption to which a subject of the forum
is a party, at least insofar as it is thought that this individual
must be protected. In France and in Latin countries, 70 public
policy is invoked in such cases for almost all internal conditions of adoption as being of "international public order."
Adoption between foreigners in their own national states
should be and is regularly recognized without any such limitations.71 But a French decision was concerned with the
following case: A Russian married couple, the husband
forty-nine, the wife forty-five years old, adopted in I 9 I 2 in
Ru~sia a child of twelve years. The transaction was perfectly
65 Burnfiel v. Burnfiel [1926] 2 D. L. R. 129; Haultain, C. J. S., in this
strange decision acknowledged that the case was absolutely similar to that
contrarily decided in In re Throssel [1910] 12 W. L. R. 683. In both cases
the adoption had been made by decree in Iowa.
66 H. R. (Dec. 20, 1950) N. ]. 1952 no. 40; VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635
no. 203.
67 See Sup. Trib. Lis bonne (May 15, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1935, 424; supra
pp. 191-194·
68 See 2 VICO 128, no. 172.
69
MATOS 394 no. 277.
7°France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June 18, 1914) Clunet 1919, 242. Italy:
App. Palermo (June 12, 1931) 24 Rivista (1932) 563, Clunet 1933, 1091.
VALERY II51 no. 812.
7 1 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 56.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 7, 1920) W. 10632 (child of
foreign nationality born in the Netherlands).
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valid under Russian law; it would not have been allowed
under article 343 of the French code, as it stood at that time,
requiring a fifty-year age of the adopter and full age of the
adopted person. Instead of simply recognizing the foreign
act, the court of Paris declared it effective only because in
the meantime the French provision had been changed so as
to require forty years of the adopter and fifteen years of age
difference. 72 The implied claim to control an entirely foreign
act by the municipal law of the forum is absurd.
2.

Effects of Recognition

Where no obstacle arises from jurisdictional considerations or public policy of the forum, it may yet be dubious to
what extent the foreign created adoption is effective at the
forum. The only consistent solution of this question is given
in such statutes as that of Quebec:
"A person resident outside of the Province who has been
adopted according to the laws of the United Kingdom or any
part of the British possessions other than the Province of
Quebec or of any foreign country, shall possess in this Province the same rights of succession that he would have had in
the said United Kingdom or part of the British possessions
or in the said foreign country in which he was adopted." 73
The French-Belgian doctrine has always supported the
clear principle that the effect of adoption is governed by the
applicable foreign law. 74
72 Cour Paris (Jan. 2, 1936) Gaz.Pai.I936.1.55I, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 159
no. 83, criticized by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427, but apparently approved
by CosTE-FLORET, 7 Giur. Camp. DIP. 160. Ten years later, the same court
recognized this same adoption without recourse to the S).lbsequent change of
French adoption requirements, Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) Nouv. Revue 1948,
217, 227.
73
Quebec: 14 Geo. V, c. 75 s. 14 (1924) as amended by 25-26 Geo. V,
c. 67 s. 2 ( 1935)' R. s. 1941, c. 324 s. 22.
Similar, Alberta, Infants Act, 1913 (2), c. 13, s. 33, and Domestic Relations
Act. R. S. A. 1942, c. 300, s. 49; unification proposed by I jOHNSON 353·
74 WEISS, 4 Traite uS; 6 LAURENT 75 no. 37; ROLIN, 2 Principes 172 no.
638.
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The Swiss Federal Tribunal in a quite recent case has left
no doubt on the application of the Swiss intestate portion for
legitimate children (including adopted children), to a girl
adopted in Moscow in -1912. It expressly states that her
adoption had taken place according to the then Russian law
"not only as a so-called contractual adoption without inheritance right, but as a fully operating one conferring rights
equal to those of a legitimate child." 75
Indeed, foreign adoptions should be recognized, if at all,
to exactly the extent to which they have been created as
measured by the entire legislation of the state of adoption;
they should not be given either more or less effect. One would
think that in the United States the same solution must
smoothly flow from the recognition of adoption orders rendered hy the domiciliary court either of the parent or the
child, but things have taken another course. The question has
been much discussed in this country and recently also a little
in German literature.
Before entering into the main subject of the controversy
regarding inheritance rights, it may be permissible to indicate
the points where disturbances seem to have set in.
(a) General attention has been devoted to the problems
of recognition arising in the succession upon death to the
adopted parents or sometimes to the adopted child, or to
property of the natural parents. It should be noticed, however, that statutes on adoption differ widely also on other
points such as alimentary support quoad the child's consanguineous family, the paternal power of the natural father,
the name of the child, etcetera. In the United States, many
statutes terminate the effects of the natural parent-child relation in the case of adoption, while others make it "exceedingly difficult to find in the legislative pronouncements any
1s BG. (Oct.

21,

1943) 69 BGE 357, 363.
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intent to work a complete severance of parental relationship
and substitution of parent." 76
Again, the effect of adoption between the adoptive parties
seems reduced in South Carolina to property rights, 77 and
courts in Mississippi may limit the right of the adopted child
to certain benefits. 78
If we face this broad field, recognition of the foreign act
with its proper effects appears to be the only suitable maxim.
Certain countries, of course, headed by France, will indulge
in large exceptions, also in this respect, on the ground of
public policy/ 9
(b) The reluctance of the Dutch and English jurists in
earlier periods to conceive an extraterritorial effect of judicial acts and to acknowledge a "status unknown to the
forum," as we have seen, finally resulted in the similarity
doctrine, expressed by the Restatement in § 143:
"The status of adoption, created by the law of a state having
jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of
adoption when created by its own law." 80
The foregoing section probably was exclusively influenced by
consideration of inheritance problems. Another section,
§ 305, expresses a second time the same idea in application to
distribution; the adopted person shall be treated "as if he
were a natural-born legitimate child of his adoptive parent
if the law that regulates distribution gives such effect to
adoption."
76
77

4 VERNIER § 261 at 406; cf. Sup pl. 127 ff.
South Carolina: Code of Laws 1942, C. C. § 8679.
78 Miss.: Code Ann. ( 1942) § 1269, cf. 4 VERNIER § 261 at 406.
79 Cf., for instance, on aliments: WEISS, 4 Traite 120; BATIFFOL, 1 Repert.
256 no. 25; prohibition to marry {C. C. art. 354): 2 FIORE 39 no. 539; BATIFFOL, 1 Repert. 256 no. 26; on C. C. arts. 343-346 {before reform): VALERY
1151 no. 812; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427.
80 2 BEALE § 143.1 classifies, correspondingly, the cases along the distinction
whether or not the adopted foreign child is treated like a child adopted at the
forum.
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Even in limitation to the problems of distribution, It IS
amazing, not only that.no foreign adoption should be recognized in a country not knowing adoption, but also that every
foreign adoption of whatever extent should be treated like
a full adoption, if the law governing inheritance does so
with respect to adoptions performed within the state. 81 This
unexpected dogma has certainly not found favor with American courts, 81a but it does contribute to obscure the picture. It
has caused, at least, more readiness to recognize an adoption
similar to the domestic type than a dissimilar one, which is
an unfortunate starting point.
Certain Canadian statutes avoid enlarging the rights
created by foreign adoption, but they share the main rule of
the Restatement. For instance, the Ontario statute provides
that:
"A person . . . adopted in accordance with the laws of the
province where he is domiciled, shall be entitled to the same
rights of succession as to property in Ontario as he would
have had in the province in which he was adopted but not
exceeding the right he would have had if adopted under this
Act." 82
(c) Faced with their usual topic, viz., the share to which
foreign adopted children are entitled in a succession, American courts have decided from case to case, as results seemed
warranted by the circumstances, although in some instances
they have been influenced by the formalistic arguments fre81 See the critical analysis by YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (I936) 2I2.
8la See, however, cases and statutes collected by TA!NTOR, "Adoption in
the Conflict of Laws," I5 University of Pittsburgh Law Review (I953/54)
222-267.
82 Ontario (1927) I7 Geo. V, c. 53 s. I3, re-enacted R. S. 0. 1950, c. 7 s. IS.
Similar, British Columbia, Adoption Act. R.S.B.C. I94S c. 7 s. II; Prince
Edward Island, Adoption Act, I93o, c. I2 s. I5 and €hildren's Act (I940)
c. I2 s. 124, R.S. P.E.I. I951, c. 3 s. I5; Alberta, R.S. I942, c. 300 s. 49;
Manitoba, R.S. I954, c. 35 s. 9S; New Brunswick, R.S. I952, c. 3 s. 32; Quebec,
R.S. I94I, c. 324 s. 22; Saskatchewan, R.S. I953, c. 239 s. Sr.
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quent in English and Canadian courts. Unfortunately, a
theoretical point has been introduced. The courts and their
annotators usually distinguish whether a right to inherit by
or from an adopted person has been established by the state
where the adoption has been performed and, if so, whether
the statute giving the right is an adoption statute or an inheritance statute. To illustrate, it has been said in a remarkably explicit note that, if the right of inheritance has been
limited in the state of adoption, the restriction may be imposed either upon the status or upon the right to succession.
The first is to be presumed, if the child, by the statute of
the state of adoption, has been granted the full position of
a natural child in relation to the adopter, but not to his
collateral relatives; this limitation, then, has to be recognized in the state of inheritance. Where, however, adopted
children are placed in second rank, to favor the legitimate
issue primarily entitled, the limitation concerns the hereditary right. 83
It is submitted that the courts are facing an impossible
task with this method. It suffices to observe what distinctions,
verbal interpretations, and inferences a modern author has
felt obligated to propose, "in order to decide whether a
right asserted by a claimant should be treated as one which
flows from status, if at all, or as one which is given irrespective of the existence or non-existence of status." 84 More
appropriately, it has been repeatedly asserted that statutes
of adoption and statutes of inheritance of the same state
must be read together. In fact, the entire effect of adoption
is either defined at one place in the laws, namely, in the
chapter on adoption, or has to be deduced from both cateL. R. A. 1916 A 668; similar for legitimation 73 A. L. R. 958.
TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition in the Conflict of
Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 589, 691, at 703. RAAPE 592 attempts similar
distinctions.
83

84
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gories of statutory provisions taken together. Usually, there
is neither any legislative intention nor any sound reason for
presuming by interpretation, that one group of provisions
should govern only domestic adoptions and the other foreign
adoptions, or that one group should prevail in the domestic
courts only and the other have extraterritorial effect. Nor is
it the task of these internal provisions to make such distinctions. It is up to the law of conflicts to find the solution. As
has been contended above, the entire legislation of the state
of adoption defines the effects to be recognized.
(d) Two practical considerations may guide us. On the
one hand, it is inadmissible that an adopter could change the
effect of an adoption by changing his domicil. He would be
able to do just that, if the statute of distribution at his last
domicil were given predominance in construing the previously made adoption. On the other hand, an adopter who has
not by the adoption created inheritance rights is free to
maintain the effects of the transaction or to supplement them
by gift or by will, so far as the statute of distributions allows
him. It is no natural task of conflicts law to demolish these
results of private law.
3· Effect on Inheritance Rights in Particular
In order to distinguish the scope of the conflicts rule on
adoption from those concerning succession upon death, it is
justly said that the law governing succession determines
whether adopted children as a class are competent to succeed,
and the law governing the creation of adoption determines
whether a certain person is an adopted child. 85 This, however, does not answer all questions.
85 See for instance GoODRICH, "Legitimation and Adoption in the Conflict
of Laws," 22 Mich. L. Rev. (1924) 637 and Handbook 449 ff.; LoRENZEN, 6
Repert. 349 no. 342; Notes, L. R. A. 1916 A 666 and 65 L. R. A 186.
Germany: RAAPE 591 ff. and RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents
et enfants," so Recueil 1934 IV 401, 508 no. 81.
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(a) Construction of language. Where a testator has devised or bequeathed property to his or other people's "children" or "issue," it was argued, especially in Canadian cases,
that children or issue born in wedlock are meant. This was
contended even after the introduction of adoption into the
legislation, at least in construing older wills. 86 The traditional opposition of the common law to adoption was still
effective, though in British Columbia the contrary opinion
was followed even where a will used the term "heirs." 87 It
may now be assumed that the intention underlying a will or
deed is to be construed according to the mere factual circumstances, and statutes are not to be deemed any longer to
demand legitimate birth or blood relationship. 87 a
(b) Major rights acquired by foreign act. 88 A group of
cases is characterized by larger rights granted in the state of
adoption than in the state of distribution. In particular, the
statute applicable to the succession may be wholly ignorant
of the kind of adoption accomplished abroad. We have to
distinguish as follows:
(i) Law of situs of immovables. A social and ethical
background such as lay behind the famous Statute of Merton
8 6 Supreme Court of Canada: Donald, Baldwin & Mooney [1929] 2
D. L. R. 244 (Washington adoption).
Ontario Supreme Court: Re Skinner ( 1929) 64 0. L. R. 245, [1929] 4 D. L.
R. 427 (Ohio adoption). See FALCONBRIDGE, Cases on the Conflict of Laws
(ed. 4, 1938) 170.
8 7 In re McGillivray, Purcell v. Hendricks [1925] 3 D. L. R. 854.
87a Statutes in Canada now usually contain a rebuttable presumption that
the expression "child" in any will or instrument includes adopted children,
see Alberta, R. S. 1942, c. 300 s. 48; British Columbia, R. S. 1948, c. 7 s. 12;
New Brunswick, R. S. 1952, c. 3 s. 31; Ontario, R. S. 1950, c. 7 s. 12 par. 3;
Prince Edward Island, R. S. 1951, c. 3 s. 17; Quebec, R. S. 1941, c. 324 s. 21;
Saskatchewan, R. S. 1953, c. 239 s. So. In an international case and in the
absence of l!n ascertainable intention, the question of course remains: Are
these statutes applicable to govern the status of adoption or the succession?
Recent decisions tend to the first solution, Re Pearson [1946] V. L. R. 356;
In re Brophy [1949] N.Z.L.R. 1006, I I Giur. Comp. DIP. (1954) 409. Contra:
DICEY 514.
88 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 358 sub (C).
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(A.D. I236) 89 and still continued at the time of the English
case of Birtwhistle v. P ardill (A.D. I 840) 90 may well have
required birth in lawful wedlock as the sole title to succession
to land. This conception, however, seems finally to have lost
its hold in the English land law. But it survives strangely in
the Alabama courts, 91 while in Florida foreign adopted children are excluded unless-they become citizens of the state; 92
in both states, recent statutes remedy the law. 92a The Supreme Court of Mississippi overruled its former acceptance
of this conception in I 917 with the express denial of a public
policy preventing the adopted child from inheriting. 93 Surprisingly in one decision, the French Court of Cassation also
applied the law of the situs rather than that governing
adoption, as a pretext for sticking to French law. 94
(ii) Local policy. Apart from such peculiar prohibitive
policy claimed for the laws of succession and leaving aside
the bulk of the cases, which offer no problem because both
states involved grant similar positions to adopted children, 95
there is authority denying that local policy should normally
intervene. 96
This view was applied to the problem of inheritance from
20 Henry III, c. 9 (1236).
7 CI. and F. 895.
Brown v. Finley ( 1908) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577; cf. on legitimation the
Lingen case (1871) 45 Ala. 410, supra p. 628, n. 157.
9 2Tankersley v. Davis (1937) 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501.
92 aAJabama Code (1940) 27 §9; Florida Stat. Ann. (1941) §731.30 (as
amended 1945 and 1952) ·
9 3 Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358, 76 So. 267, overruling
Fisher v. Browning ( 1914) 107 Miss. 729, 66 So. 132.
94 Cass. (req.) (April 21, 1931) D.1931.1.52, S.I931.1.377, Clunet 1932, 142,
Revue 1932, 526; Contra: BARTIN, "Adoption et transmission hereditaire,"
Clunet 1932, 5; NrBOYET, Decision note, Revue 1932, 541. Distinguished in
Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) Nouv. Revue 1946, 217, 227. Favorable to the
decision, however, WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 167 n. 1; LEWALD, Regles
generales des conflits de lois (1941) 137.
95 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 357 sub (A).
96 For this opinion also FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171.
In re Finkenzeller's Estate (1929) 105 N.J. Eq. 44, 146 Atl. 656; Keegan v.
Geraghty ( 1881) 101 Ill. 26.
89

90
91
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natural parents. In Slattery v. The Hart ford Connecticut
Trust Company,0 7 an individual adopted in Michigan claimed
his share in his natural father's estate and was successful in
Connecticut. The statute of Michigan maintains, that of
Connecticut terminates, the right of inheritance of an adoptee from his native parents. The Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut held that, as the right of inheritance of the
child was not lost by the statute of Michigan, he could claim
it; the legislature of Connecticut debarring a child from such
a right "has not attempted to lay down any rule applicable in
the case of children coming here from another state where
they have been adopted under laws which do not take away
that right." 98 This argument is equivalent to saying, as we
did, that the extension of the inheritance rule to foreign cases
with foreign elements is up to the conflicts rule, and that,
under this rule, adoptions made in the domiciliary state must
be recognized with their own effects. The restriction imposed
on the statute by this conception is not only equitable and
justified by the anomalous structure of the Connecticut type
of adoption, 99 but consistent with the advisable general
postulates. The case demonstrates with particular clarity the
necessity of protecting by adequate conflicts rules those legal
effects which the parties to a transaction were entitled to
foresee.
Yet the contrary view was recently taken by the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania 100 refusing intestate succession to
grandchildren from their natural grandmother through their
97 Slattery v. The Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. (1932) II5 Conn. 163,
161 Atl. 79, commented by YNTEMA and DE NovA in 2 Giur. Comp. DIP.
352 ff. no. 169.
98 There follow excellent explanations why public policy is not contrary to
recognizing such a provision "dissimilar" to the domestic regulation.
99 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 359, against criticism of the decision
in 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1932) 213.
100 In re Crossley's Estate (1939) 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 524, 7 Atl. (2d) 539;
noted 24 Minn. L. Rev. (1940) 268.
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mother adopted by unrelated persons in Ohio. The Court
construed section r 6 (b) of the intestate statute of Pennsylvania, excluding adopted children from taking from or
through their natural parents, to the effect of including all
foreign adopted children and their issue. This thesis is not
justified by the argument that "to hold otherwise would
create a power in another state to limit and nullify the authority of this state to determine for itself how property
shall descend on intestacy." The intention of the Pennsylvania statute cannot be changed by another state, but why
should a statute intend implicitly to exclude foreign adopted
children whose adoption did not abolish their status in their
natural families where it was done? The only sound method
is to leave the application of the intestate statute to the conflicts rule which should not be dubious.
The climax, so to speak, of incomity seems reached by
Frey v. Nielson/ 01 where an inheritance statute of New
Jersey admitting adopted children was construed to be restricted to children adopted in New Jersey; similarly, In re
Wilson restricted the inheritance rights in England on children adopted abroad. 101a Also, in the Nether lands, where a
foreign party has acquired Dutch nationality, a former adoption of or by this party formerly was not recognized. 102 This
refusal, however, was not ascribed to the Dutch statute of
distribution; it denied the entire family law relationship by
adoption and was based on public policy regarding Dutch
nationals.
Another outstanding case, Brown v. Finley, 103 has been
101 Frey v. Nielson ( 1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 135, 132 Atl. 765; the Note, "Conflict of Laws-Inheritance by Adopted Child," 25 Mich. L. Rev. (1926) 189 is
uncritical.
lOla [1954] Ch. 733, 740, Revue Crit. 1954, 544; In re Wilby (1955) [1956]
1 All E. R. 27, Rev. Crit. 1956, 87; In re Marshall [1957] 3 All E. R. 172
(C. A.).
102 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 636 no. 203.
lOS Brown v. Finley ( 1908) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577, reproduced in 22
Z.int.R. ( 1912) 164.
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sharply criticized by European writers. 104 The Alabama
court refused a right of distribution to a person adopted in
Georgia, because the adoption had not been registered at
the probate court as required in Alabama, though not in
Georgia. The refusal has been called a denial of international
private law.
(c) M ajar rights granted by the statute of distribution.
Where inheritance rights are conferred by the law of succession and denied by the law presiding over adoption, in a
logical solution the original effect of the act cannot be enlarged by the law of another state. This some American
cases state. 105
Opposition, in part, is based again on the formal argument
that a foreign statute depriving an adopted child of inheritance is a statute of distribution and as such not susceptible of extraterritorial application. 106 There is no proof for
that assumption, and the result comes as a startling surprise
to the parties. Where an English woman has adopted an
English child in England, all parties, at least their solicitors,
have understood that no right upon death was implied; why
should the legal situation be reversed by the woman's moving to New Hampshire and dying there? 107
Some decisions, however, are based on quite different considerations that flow from a sound policy. The statute of
104 LEWALD, "Question de droit international des successions," 9 Recueil 192s
IV 7S n. 3; RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," so Recueil 1934 IV S09 n. I.
105 Estate of Sunderland ( 1882) 6o Iowa 732, 12 N. W. 66s; Meader v.
Archer (1889) 6s N.H. 214; Shaver v. Nash (1930) 181 Ark. III2, 29 S. W.
(2d) 298; Shick v. Howe (1908) 137 Iowa 249, II4 N. W. 916; Ross v. Ross
(1878) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; Boaz v. Swinney (1909) 79 Kan.
332, 99 Pac. 621, overruled in In re Riemann's Estate (1927) 124 Kan. S39,
262 Pac. x6, infra n. IIO.
See Note, 73 A. L. R. 961, 973; YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 3S7 i
WENGLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 163 n. 2.
106 This argument is invoked by STUMBERG, 339 f.; also RAAPE, so Recueil
1934, IV S09 no. 82.
107 Thus far of the same opinion RAAPE, so Recueil 1934, IV SII no. 8s.
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distribution may allow a share to all children, inclusive of
illegitimates, so as to eliminate any discrimination among
children. 108 Furthermore, courts have resorted to a permissive public policy in cases in which adoptive children were a
class of persons entitled in the forum; explanation of the
child's unfavorable treatment by the statute creating adoption is found in an antiquated prejudice against bastards. 109
Thus, in In re Riemann's Estate, the Illinois statutory provision, denying the child's relationship with the relatives of
the adopter, was considered a "peculiar discrimination,"
repugnant to the "generous spirit" underlying the law of
Kansas. 110 In Pfeifer v. Wright, 111 the progressive view was
expressly directed against the tradition extending from the
Statute of Merton to such cases as Keegan v. Geraghty and
Frey v. Nielson.
But public policy should not be overdone. The Mississippi
court says poignantly:
"It would be unjust to both parent and child, to hold that
the mere fact of moving to another state would upset and
unsettle this relationship. It is of the utmost importance that
the status of this character should be maintained so far as it
i& possible. . . . " 112
108 In re Crowell's Estate ( 1924) 124 Me. 71, 126 Atl. 178 (an "adoption
into the family" in Nova Scotia had no legal significance in this province, but
fulfilled the conditions for inheritance in Maine).
109 Anderson v. French (1915) 77 N. H. 509, 93 At!. 1042 (estate of adopter); Calhoun v. Bryant (1911) 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266 (estate of
adoptive child).
llO[n re Riemann's Estate (1927) 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16.
111 Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (2d) 464.
112 Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358 at 369, 76 So. 267, overruling
Fisher v. Browning, supra n. 93·
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effect on divorce, 483-493, 544·
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in parental relations, 602, 614-618,
63o-631, 63 8,
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of illegitimate children, 655, 66x,
670·
of origin, II7, 141-x43·
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Dumoulin, 14, 92, 369.
Dutch School, 7, n. 12.
Ecclesiastical Courts, 266-267, 524.
Ehevertrag, 318.
Emancipation, 188.
Emigration, Influence on Nationality
Principle, 165-166.
Engagement to Marry, 215-221.
England
literature, II.
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foreign, 453·
capacity, 206-207.
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consent of parents, 225, 288-289.
consular marriages, 237-241.
divorce
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grounds, 468.
jurisdiction, 429-432, 482, 493·
domicil, concept, ll7-II9, 150, 153·
marital property, 365, 372, 381.
marital relations, 322.
marital settlement, 394-396.
marriage, substantive requirements, 28o-282.
personal law, uo-113, 117-119.
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Espinola, 17.

795

Evasion
of divorce laws, 487, 491-493, 544-

sso.
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polygamous, 223, 272, 584, 612, 625.
prohibitions, 263, 286-307.
absolute, 298.
adultery, 292-293.
bilateral, 291.
dispensation, 298.

799

impotence, 291.
nonage, 274-294, 286, 313.
penal, 304-305.
political, 304.
religious, 293-294, 301-304.
remarriage, 272, 290, 304-306.
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Marriage Settlements
capacity to make, 394-395.
change of status, 386-388.
formalities, 394·
immovables, 397-398.
mutability, 395-397.
obligatory, 398.
permissibility, 392-394.
Married Women
capacity, 195-197, 209, n. 63, 335348, 363-410.
classification, 33 5-338.
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bona fide domicil, 544·
capacity of married women, 565.
change of domicil, 486-493.
choice of law, 453-456.
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